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ABSTRACT 
This thesis identifies a key to achieving success in large-scale cross-sector collaborations. 
Surveys of such collaborations, involving multiple and opposing stakeholders in achieving 
shared objectives, indicate that they invariable fail. I examine a successful case, and 
demonstrate that the gap between failure and success is created by underestimating both 
incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity; and the gap is filled by a few diverse, 
dedicated activists – Enablers – and the mandates which help to empower them.  
 
The literature review engages with four fields of study. ‘Community participation’ 
theory promotes the exercise of popular agency in development, arguing for less state 
control and the right of civil society groups to get involved in what affects them. 
‘Collaborative governance’ argues for government to actively involve other stakeholders in 
matters of common interest. The ‘participative sphere’ endeavours to demystify behaviour 
and power within different degrees of collaboration. The ultimate challenge is ‘cross-sector 
collaboration’, in which shared power between multiple parties in separate sectors is 
attempted, but seldom yields success. A false assumption that collaborations curb 
turbulence and can be managed by their stakeholders is, however, apparent.  
 
In this thesis I examine an ambitious housing project, the ‘iSLP’, during South 
Africa’s tortuous transition. It began as an attempt to develop land from which sixty 
thousand people had been violently displaced to thirty locations. Stakeholders comprised 
those communities, warlords, apartheid government agencies, recently unbanned political 
parties and civic movements, municipalities and local industrialists. From conception the 
collaboration was undermined by private developers luring a succession of stakeholders 
into potentially profitable alliances. However the collaboration survived four years of 
transitional governmental paralysis and was rewarded with an enhanced mandate and 
guaranteed finance – only to come under attack again from different quarters. Ultimately 
the iSLP met its objective of housing over 32 000 families in fully-equipped suburbs. 
  
 Through an intensive analysis of project archival materials, particularly of actual 
participation in collaborative processes, the critical role of a few people emerged. 
Extensive interviews with them and reflection on my own participation in the project 
confirmed their unique and un-theorised role, contributing critically to improving planning 
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How I got here 
 
This thesis is set against the background of a very dismal history of influx control, urban 
segregation and discrimination in the provision of housing opportunities in South Africa, 
and in Cape Town in particular. As an introduction to this chapter the reader is referred to a 
brief history of housing provision for black people that I have compiled (see Annexure F). 
Furthermore, to facilitate a grasp the of location of all that follows, here is a map of the 
project as it eventually appeared in 2000. A larger representation be found in Annexure A. 
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In the spirit of Arthur Ransome’s “We Didn’t Mean to Go to Sea”, this thesis was not part 
of the plan for how I would bring to a close my lengthy involvement in ‘housing for the 
poor’ in South Africa. But an opportunity had arisen for me to return to university for an 
inter-disciplinary masters degree, and one thing led to another. I contemplated reading what 
had been written about experiences similar to mine to see what interesting things I would 
learn. It took quite a long time to discover the field of theory in which my experience lay – 
for thirty years I had been unaware that I had actually been practicing ‘cross-sector 
collaboration’. That literature rang all sorts of familiar bells and I found it quite comforting 
to find a theoretical home – even if, as it warned, it was regarded as the most unpopular, 
difficult and unsuccessful method of synergistic development. 
 
 However I had been involved in a very large and conflict-ridden project that had 
actually been successful, and I was challenged to find out where the disjuncture lay 
between the insoluble terrors expressed in what I was reading and the achievements that I 
had witnessed. That sent me back into a world which I thought had been left behind for 
good: my project files, a library of 250 lever-arch files which I had sorted into thirty large 
packing cases and delivered to the government archives. Incorporated in the arrangement 
was a provision that I could access them at any time, in case an old issue should ever be 
queried. I had never anticipated borrowing nearly half of them back for a period of years so 
that I could discover what it was that the scholars had missed, and support it with hard 
evidence. 
 
The project was occasionally re-named but is remembered as the ‘iSLP’ - the 
Integrated Serviced Land Project. It was an attempt to develop land on which waves of 
violence had displaced sixty thousand people to thirty locations. Other stakeholders were 
the resident warlords, agencies of the apartheid government, recently legitimised political 
parties and civic movements, municipalities and local industrialists. From conception the 
collaboration was undermined by private developers luring a succession of stakeholders 
into potentially profitable alliances. However the collaboration held through the four years 
of transitional governmental paralysis and was rewarded by the approval of a much-
expanded project and all the necessary funds – only to come under attack from a series of 
new forces. Ultimately the iSLP met its objective of housing over 32 000 families in fully-
equipped suburbs. 
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This thesis studies the effectiveness of large scale cross-sector collaborative 
development project in the social sphere from an institutional perspective using invited 
spaces: opportunities and venues provided by a sponsor. My main empirical resource is a 
unique and extensive documentary archive of the entire fifteen-year project, the 
compilation of which had been substantially my responsibility. The description of the 
project is drawn exclusively from this archive and from interviews of persons whom I 
selected, the implications of which for the thesis methodology are presented in Chapter 3. 
My research question was “What factors enabled this project to succeed despite substantial 
evidence that such projects offer very little chance of success?” The lacuna that I explored 
in the literature was exposed by the case study and was created by two false assumptions in 
the literature: that the environmental turbulence that typically accompanies the need for 
such a project will diminish on the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration, and that 
the parties represented in the collaboration will have the capacity to manage and sustain the 
collaboration in addition to their own institutions and careers. 
As a consequence this thesis excludes from its purview a detailed examination of 
the forces that attempted to create ‘invented spaces’ as alternatives to the invited space 
created as the cross-sector collaboration for this project. Writing about the collaboration 
from an institutional perspective I have written of such attempts as challenges and threats 
and provided detailed accounts of how they were manifested from the perspective of the 
invited spaces, but I have not attempted to gain a deep understanding of their organisations 
and motivations. That was difficult enough to assay at the time, twenty years ago, let alone 
now, long after those parties disbanded. Such perspectives would be extremely interesting, 
and worthy of further research, but they are peripheral to this study. 
This thesis is also by its nature far more of an in-depth case study than a 
comparative study. The literature that particularly frames the research question reflects very 
broad surveys of cross-sector collaborations in which the success of each project had been 
gauged not by some independent standard but by the assessment of the promoters of each 
project as to whether the collaboration had met its objectives. Similarly, therefore, the 
premise on which this thesis was launched was that the objectives of the collaboration had 
been fulfilled by the project process and affirmed by the project’s sponsors and is 
demonstrated by documentary evidence in the thesis, both as goals and results. I have also 
explained, where appropriate, the meaning of some of the critical terms. 
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 The most significant aspect of this research, however, has been the revelation of an 
entire cadre of under-theorised people – the Enablers, people who behind the scenes make 
cross-sector collaboration work in the project studied here. It was almost like discovering a 
long-lost tribe, except that they are so few, and so different from each other. They did not 
have a word to describe themselves, so I have called them ‘Enablers’. But I also had to 
discover what had kept them hidden – and by going back and forth between the literature 
and the files I am persuaded that researchers must have underestimated the incessant strife, 
contestation and violence – ‘turmoil’, in a nutshell – that accompanies every phase of a 
cross-sector collaboration; and that they also overestimated the ability of the stakeholders 
to manage the process themselves. Consequently scholars were not looking for Enablers 
because they did not realise that they were necessary. Furthermore, most stakeholders who 
might be interviewed would assume through their ignorance of the bigger picture that the 
collaborating institutions were more involved and effective than this thesis demonstrates.  
 
The Enablers in the iSLP came from an assortment of backgrounds and occupied a 
variety of voluntary or institutional positions but their Enabling functions, either formal or 
informal, added another layer of diversity to their lives. Through the functions that they 
performed – such as patron, chair, host, facilitator, coordinator, bridge-builder, innovator, 
planner, project manager or steadfast encourager - they quietly pulled, pushed, corralled 
and guided the stakeholders and hundreds of other role-players into adopting and applying 
principles, formulating and approving projects and then collaboratively planning and 
delivering. They served for different durations and were never in the public spotlight. The 
iSLP was undertaken for the benefit of tens of thousands of households who had suffered 
intolerably and a prime objective of the participative process was that they would proudly 
regard the project as their own achievement. 
 
I should also explain that this story is not about me, although I was there and 
witnessed much of it. This thesis is to promote the value of large scale cross-sector 
collaboration as a vehicle for development in extremely difficult circumstances and to 
explain how it can be quietly reinforced, defended and sustained for as long as necessary 
by just a few dedicated people. I am privileged to have the opportunity to tell the story of a 
remarkable project during a unique period in South Africa’s history, in unprecedented 
detail. If by drawing attention to the critical roles that Enablers play behind the scenes in 
large complex projects this thesis might improve the possibilities of success for future 
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This thesis is located within the field of ‘cross-sector collaboration’, defined as “the 
linking or sharing of information, resources, activities and capabilities by organisations in 
two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by 
organisations in one sector separately” (Bryson et al. 2006. p 44). They proceed to explain 
that such a process is only embarked upon when all else has failed - and “the normal 
expectation should be that success will be very difficult to achieve” (ibid. p. 44). 
 
However, in this thesis we shall venture into even more daunting territory: large-
scale cross-sector collaborative development in South Africa, in which a chronic and 
possibly violent social crisis has to be addressed through the delivery of a range of goods 
and services in a manner that is acceptable to a large and diverse number of participating 
stakeholders, many of whom are mutually antagonistic, for an extended period. 
Furthermore, the nature of such a crisis is such that its successful resolution is absolutely 
imperative for society. 
 
 The focus of the thesis is a paradox that is apparent within the literature of cross-
sector collaboration: it is an ultimately unavoidable process in which success is imperative 
yet extremely difficult to achieve. Is there any basis upon which the prospects for a 
successful cross-sector collaboration could be significantly improved?  
 
The key is to discover who or what makes cross-sector collaborations actually 
work. The literature is not clear on this point. There is mention of facilitators of various 
sorts being required from time to time, leaving an implied assumption that the stakeholders 
are capable and available to manage the collaboration themselves. The literature also 
comments about the environmental turbulence that must be managed as a ‘starting 
condition’ and in doing so implies that the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration 
will substantially settle the turbulence, enabling a constructive process to proceed. In 
reality, as this thesis will demonstrate, ‘turbulence’ in the form of constant change in the 
political and social environment and assaults upon the collaborative process are likely to be 
incessant – and one of the consequences will be the incapacity and even disinclination of 
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stakeholders, as organisations and individuals, to devote the time and talent required to 
manage the collaboration themselves.  This thesis argues that the key to success for a cross-
sector collaboration is a few diversely positioned people of differing backgrounds and 
perspectives who share a common belief in and devotion to the collaboration, which they 
express in an assortment of ways. Their reasons for doing what they do are primarily 
individual and personal, and their ability to achieve success rests on their acquisition of a 
few influential mandates. I argue here that we can conceptualise these individuals as 
Enablers, and understand their critical roles as binders, levers and defenders, the key to 
holding together and making effective collaboration in this type of complex, conflict-
plagued context.  
 
In the field of collaborative endeavour John Gaventa has proposed some ‘key 
challenges for the 21st century’, four of which provide useful signposts for this analysis. 
The first is “the construction of new relationships between ordinary people and the 
institutions – especially those of government – which affect their lives”. (Gaventa. 2004. p 
25-34). These relate to the intersection of civil society and state-based approaches, how 
such spaces work and the way in which power is manifested within and through them – 
which is the subject matter of this thesis. His second challenge is to engage in approaches 
by both civil society and institutions of the state to focus on their intersection. The thesis 
draws on useful analytical assessments by drilling into the literature from those two 
standpoints (‘community participation’ and ‘collaborative governance’), exploring their 
junction in the ‘participative sphere’ and then moving into the daunting places of cross-
sector collaboration. 
 
There it engages with Gaventa’s further challenges to explore how collaborative 
spaces actually work, for whom and with what social justice outcomes – and to analyse the 
powers involved in the creation of spaces, the places and levels of engagement, and the 
degree of visibility of power within them. These issues are the essence of this thesis, and 
raise questions about what exactly is happening in a large-scale cross-sector collaborative 
development, how visible is it all, and who is interested in what. The simple answer is that 
such a complex process, within such a volatile context, is likely to be legible only in part 
from almost any perspective. For example, as will be described in the iSLP case study, it 
was years before the affected communities realised that they were being falsely 
represented, and the surrounding residents of greater Cape Town never registered that the 
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most radical housing project ever attempted in the country was taking place under their 
noses. Even the Enablers, when interviewed for this thesis, occasionally said, “I didn’t 
know that was happening.” 
 
 My journey towards understanding collaborative development began at the 
conventional starting point of ‘community participation’ – the exercise of popular agency 
in relation to development (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). But on whose initiative and for 
whose purposes is development undertaken? Turner and Fichter (1972) were among the 
first to extol the benefits of individual control over the housing process. The battle for 
community control of development, for the expression of individual and local initiative and 
for a reduction in government interference was joined by many, from  Ward (in Turner, 
1976) to Hamdi (2004) and beyond.  However it is relatively easy for the state to respond 
symbolically to these pressures, inviting participation but actually applying co-option, as 
reflected in criticisms by such as Miraftab (2004) and books of that era that decried the 
‘tyranny of participation’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
 
But there is also a need to understand the chasm of scale between the needs of the 
individual or neighbourhood and those perceived by government to be its responsibility.  
Cornwall (2004), Cleaver (2004), Bénit-Gbaffou (2008), and Bebbington (2004) reflect on 
the intricacies and nuances of negotiating within that space, pointing out pitfalls, teasing 
the helpful from the unhelpful, and recognising that systems are not simply good or bad but 
usually create some opportunities for relationship building, formally or otherwise. Within 
the South African context in particular, Robbins (2008) helpfully demonstrates that it is not 
only the state which can seem duplicitous in its negotiations – citizens constantly exercise 
rights and obligations in multiple directions.  These insights into the hard realities of 
participative development helped to motivate a deeper dig into the nature of participation in 
the empirical research from which this thesis is constructed. 
 
The target is then approached from the other side, by giving consideration to 
theories of ‘collaborative governance’, which centre upon government initiatives to involve 
other parties and, by implication, other sectors in the planning and implementation of 
initiatives in which there is a shared interest. Arguably the most significant expression of 
this approach at scale has been the ‘Local Agenda 21’ participative programme for 
sustainable development inaugurated by the United Nations Earth summit in 1992 and 
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implemented from 1996. The collaborative processes that its promoters recommended 
(ICLEI, 1996) are remarkable for the naivety with which they ignored the likelihood of 
possible complications and contestation. Experience proved otherwise and ten years later 
Ansell and Gash (2008) researched 137 cases of collaborative governance and reported on 
being overwhelmed by their complexity. They constructed a model for a collaborative 
governance process and described ten conditions for success, which contribute to the 
analysis within this thesis.  
 
Meanwhile considerable discourse was being generated within the ‘new South 
Africa’ regarding the implementation of a ‘developmental state’ and, in particular, the 
enabling of ‘developmental local government’ which is required by the country’s 
Constitution, “to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations 
in the matters of local government” (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec 152). There was 
an obvious opportunity for promoting a new model and practice of governance and a raft of 
literature ensued, including volumes by Parnell et al (2002), van Donk et al 2006 and 
Pieterse (2008). The revision of national housing policy (Department of Housing, 2004) 
was widely trumpeted, but there was also much criticism of the neglect of informal 
settlements, particularly by Abbott (2002) and Huchzermeyer (2004, 2006 and 2011). On 
the ground change in many places was slow and the challenges still faced by Capetonians 
ten years after democracy are documented by Besteman (2008) and Oldfield (2000 and 
2005), the cynicism of its ‘World City’ institutions are captured by McDonald (2008) and 
the prospects for improvement presented by Swilling (2010). Although most of these were 
published too late to have any direct influence on the iSLP they seldom attempt to 
document or grapple creatively and experientially with the practical realities of negotiating 
and implementing change collaboratively, across sectors and at scale. This is the lacuna 
that this thesis will address. 
The focus of the literature review then moves from community- or state-based 
approaches into the ‘the participative sphere’ which accommodates their interface. This is 
more useful territory and is where Gaventa directs his primary challenge. These are spaces 
of contestation and collaboration, “into which heterogeneous participants bring diverse 
interpretations of participation and democracy and divergent agendas” (Cornwall and 
Coelho, 2007). There is great comfort in finding some literature that resonates with one’s 
practical experience! Cornwall’s earlier comment that “Spaces created with one purpose in 
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mind may be used by those who engage in them for something quite different” (Cornwall, 
2004) foreshadows much of the narrative recorded here from Chapters 5 in which some of 
the stakeholders appropriate the space created by and for the iSLP to promote an alternative 
or opposing agenda.  
 
One of the vibrant schools within the participative sphere is that of participatory 
research and planning, which has an abundance of literature, offering techniques with 
names such as Action Planning, Participatory Rapid Appraisal, Planning for Real and 
‘toolkits’ of methods to enable researchers and planners to address all sorts of 
circumstances, particularly at the grassroots.  Inspiring case studies abound, but their 
relevance to the iSLP was at the micro level in the implementation phase, when each 
individual housing project had to be separately planned in a participative manner – the 
detail of which is not recorded in this thesis. Nevertheless, homage must be paid here to the 
influence in my life of pioneers like Turner and Fichter (1972), Schumacher (1973), Keyes 
(1983), Payne (1984), Anzorena (1985), Hamdi (1991) and Gibson (1994) - and of the 
organisations and newsletters that spread the word, such as the Asian Coalition for Housing 
Rights, The Urban Edge, Habitat International Coalition, Neighbourhood Initiatives 
Foundation and Slum Dwellers International, all of which provided perspective to the 
minds of those who eventually enabled the iSLP. But, as Flyvbjerg (2004) emphasises, 
planning must engage with all of the complexities of the context for it to be relevant and 
implementable, and for that reason this thesis is primarily placed at the macro 
organisational level, which had to be settled before individual projects could proceed. 
 
My consideration of the participative sphere concludes with a tabulation of nine 
degrees of participation, from manipulative state control to (possibly over-ambitious) 
community or civil society control, informed by analyses by Anzorena and Poussard 
(1985), Arnstein (1969) and Hamdi and Majale (2004), as an aid to understanding the 
powers at play within any collaborative space. It serves to call into question the precise 
nature of any arrangement between parties to give clarity to roles and expectations. In the 
middle of this spectrum of approaches, is a relatively thinly populated platform where 
power is equalised across the inclusive range of stakeholders. This is the little bridge that 
leads from the rationalities of the participative sphere, in which the controlling party is 
usually visible, into the scary world of cross-sector collaboration, in which control is 
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somehow shared between parties that have probably never worked together.  
 
Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have extensively researched the literature on 
cross-sector collaboration and their analysis and conclusions are particularly pertinent to 
this thesis. They offer plenty of advice but are not very encouraging, emphasising firstly 
that stakeholders only choose this mode when attempts to apply the alternatives have failed 
– it is the antithesis of a preferred option; and secondly that having embarked upon a cross-
sector collaboration the reasonable expectation should be that success will be extremely 
difficult to achieve. Yet in their analysis they fail to grapple with the contradiction between 
success as the imperative that ultimately provokes cross-sector collaboration and the 
unlikelihood of achieving success as a consequence. Their assessment is that parties ‘fail’ 
into cross-sector collaboration when all other options have been eliminated and that 
ultimate failure is to be expected. There is a significant conceptual gap, which they 
acknowledge with concern. By comparing their commentary with the experience of success 
in the iSLP this thesis will identify at least part of that gap and contribute to making cross-
sector collaboration a more viable last resort.  
 
In this thesis I engage this area of the literature, arguing for the conceptualisation of 
Enablers, as the key to what made the possible the success of a particularly large and 
complex project. I document and analyse this argument through detailed research into 
fluctuating dynamics within and around the project and the extent and consistency with 
which the expansive invitations to participate in decision-making forums were actually 
taken up. Perhaps it takes a practitioner to know where to look and to understand the 
complex layers of events and processes, as well as their implications. In doing so this thesis 
demonstrates that turbulence and disruption are likely to be far more persistent than as they 
have been theorised – conceivably never-ending – and that the capacity (ability, availability 
and will) of stakeholders to themselves manage and direct a cross-sector collaboration has 
been almost silently, but completely incorrectly, assumed. Had researchers identified these 
two contextual realities they would have naturally asked about whom it was that the 
stakeholders depended upon for results, and they would probably have had to audit the 
minutes and attendance registers from all the meetings to find the answer. The ‘gap’ 
comprises an assortment of diverse people from contrasting backgrounds and occupying 
very different positions who quietly, unpretentiously and often informally ensure that the 
collaboration is sustained and succeeds. Through this thesis analysis I conceptualise these 
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people as Enablers. 
 
The empirical research 
 
The empirical research upon which this thesis is constructed is located within South 
Africa’s low cost housing sector and involves an examination of the intimate workings of 
the largest integrated urban development project to span the country’s complex transition 
from apartheid to democracy. This project, originally named the Serviced Land Project 
(‘iSLP’), not only survived unceasing conflict and change but succeeded in delivering upon 
its wide-ranging objectives, all in cross-sector collaboration mode. Over a period of fifteen 
years it transformed a violence-ridden array of informal settlements into fully-serviced 
suburbs with subsidised dwellings for over 32 000 households, supported by a full range of 
schools, clinics, libraries, recreation areas and capacity-building programmes.  
 
 The project was conceived as the last resort to address an incessant and violent 
crisis in and around a place called Crossroads, within Cape Town. For years the informal 
settlement of Crossroads had oscillated between being an exclusive place of privilege and a 
bloody, burning battleground, both with the complicity of the state (Cole, 1987). The 
consequences amounted to sixty thousand displaced people in thirty temporary settlements, 
warlords in supreme control of Crossroads and a confused and ill-equipped state apparatus. 
Then came the unbanning of the liberation movements and a huge escalation of hopes and 
fears, followed by a long interregnum of negotiation in which it was impossible to obtain 
approval for the kind of multi-year programme that would be required.  
 
 In 1990, with Crossroads still in flames and no idea of how long the national 
resolution would take, collaboration was the only possibility for the considerable number of 
stakeholders: government at provincial, local, city and regional levels; recently unbanned 
political parties; autocratic squatter groups, old and emerging democratic civic groups; and 
business interests. For each of them the resolution of the Crossroads crisis was politically 
or socially imperative. However its ambitious development programme also fuelled the 
profiteering ambitions of private sector developers, who engaged in a lengthy and tortuous 
battle for control through a succession of alliances. Eventually a new government decided 
to support the project and magnify its scope, endowing it with ‘presidential project’ status 
and making available sufficient finance. But no sooner had implementation begun than new 
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waves of opponents appeared, this time from within government. Ultimately, however, 
with grassroots communities collaborating with government and consultants in individual 
project committees, the project was completed and all the objectives were met. 
 
 The entry point for the empirical research was undoubtedly my intimate knowledge 
of the project’s proceedings over fifteen years and of the contents of the iSLP Project 
Coordinator’s records. In 1992, shortly after the collaboration had been convened I began 
assisting the facilitator, mainly by drafting proposals and documenting the process, but 
when implementation began I supervised the participative housing process and ultimately 
coordinated the entire project. However, it was only in revisiting the project records, and in 
particular by investigating exactly how the collaboration’s inclusiveness was actually 
manifested in multiple forums, that it became evident that although many people 
participated very few actively held it together. ‘Enablers’ is an apt word for them, and 
because they were so different in almost every respect seven Enablers were interviewed to 
establish not so much what they did, which was already documented, but why they went 
out of their way to make the impossible possible. 
 
 As a result the case study that has been compiled here is far more about people, 
their personalities and how they responded to the threats and opportunities of their time and 
place, than it is about the technical and financial aspects of a huge and complex project. 
The era within which they enabled the iSLP was an ever-twisting rollercoaster of political 
and economic contestation in a country whose mechanics and structures were being 
reviewed and replaced – accompanied by violent demonstrations. The place on which the 
Enablers focused – Crossroads - was an iconic symbol of oppression, which still exploded 
into violence periodically. The turmoil persisted through the project process – something 
unrecorded by researchers. Also generally unrealised was that the people who would be 
expected to lead the collaboration – the managers, directors and chairpersons of stakeholder 
organisations – were preoccupied with keeping their own ships afloat and securing their 
own careers: ‘Struggle’ veterans were angling for jobs and apartheid beneficiaries were 
anxious to preserve theirs. Without Enablers there was actually no chance of success. They 
also needed to be vested with particular authority from time to time through mandates to 
inaugurate or terminate processes; approvals of principles, plans and budgets; and the 
availability of all the necessary land and money to complete the project. 
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The argument of this thesis is that a cross-sector collaboration should expect to 
suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, and that the 
stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration 
themselves. Success therefore depends on the existence and activities of Enablers – people 
who are not only the designated patrons or champions or just ad hoc facilitators, conflict-
resolvers or blockade-breakers.  They are likely to have a wide assortment of backgrounds, 
positions and motivations but they share a dedication to the achievement of the 
collaboration’s goals and ensure that the mandates and resources to make that possible are 
specified, acquired and applied. The task of an Enabler transcends that of a ‘job’ or even a 
role to fulfil – they are unselfishly providing support to a critical social cause, knowing that 
if the collaboration fails there will not be another chance. Furthermore, they do this during 
a period of social and political upheaval when most people are either opportunity hunting 
or staying out of harm’s way. Their contribution is also without any public recognition. My 
argument is that they are the special ingredient without whom a large-scale cross-sector 




In this thesis I first locate cross-sector collaboration as a field of theory (Chapter 2) and 
then, after explaining my methodology (Chapter 3), introduce the iSLP as a cross-sector 
collaboration (Chapters 4 – 11). I then contrast the theorised conditions for success with the 
evidence of success provided by the iSLP (Chapter 12) and ultimately present an argument 
which addresses the gap between the two (Chapter 13). 
 
In Chapter 2 I explore the literary terrain of community involvement in 
development, searching for something that reflects my experience at a large scale in a 
constantly changing and often hostile environment to see what I can learn. I begin on 
emotionally comfortable ground, in the principled pages of ‘community participation’ – but 
it is not always very practical. I then discover ‘collaborative governance’, which looks a lot 
like local housing policy, but which is not really very participative. So I wander into the 
‘participative sphere’ which seems to be populated by much more pragmatic people, who 
explain in various ways that things are seldom what they seem. But I am looking for 
serious and inclusive and large scale development praxis within a cauldron of change and 
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am pointed to the last platform on the station, which is labelled ‘cross-sector collaboration’. 
There I find familiarity and reassurance that my experience in the field was not unique, 
however I learn that very few trains that leave this platform ever arrive at the projected 
destination... Yet the train that I travelled on some years ago did arrive – a little overdue, 
but at the right place, and with all its carriages attached and ticket-holders on board. 
 
 In Chapter 3 I explain what steps I took to revisit my experience, unearth the 
records of that long, convoluted development project, confirm that it actually was a cross-
sector collaboration and then begin digging for evidence of what actually happened that 
contributed to its success. Changing the metaphor, rather like looking for the ‘black box’ 
after an aircraft has disappeared from the radar screens. It was a long process – I wrote and 
re-wrote the history, wondering how much I needed to include. Then one day I decided to 
plot the attendance record of each person attending a series of 36 policy committee 
meetings. The result was illuminating. I analysed other meetings and found the same kind 
of result – and the proceedings of these committees became the substance of the record that 
I compiled. 
 
 Chapter 4 paints the background to the Crossroads crisis, which had roots that far 
pre-dated apartheid policy. It explains how this tiny triangle of land became a unique area 
of privilege, then exploitation, then warfare and utter chaos. It also explains about all the 
people who were hurt and dispossessed by what transpired, about a confused and desperate 
government that ultimately abdicated responsibility to a completely unprepared provincial 
department. This chapter is also important because it situates each of the Enablers in its 
history and introduces them into the story as real people with real reasons for making a real 
difference for good. In the narrative they have each been given a symbolic name to make 
them more easily recognisable through the case study and to not distract from a story that is 
already complicated. Similarly, some of the characters who worked hard to disable the 
iSLP have been similarly re-named, and although their backgrounds remain largely 
mysterious the roles that they played in the iSLP are instructive. In the very few places in 
which the Author appears within the following chapters it is as the Scribe. The chapter ends 
at a pivotal point where people in power decide to share their biggest problems with their 
opponents. 
 
 Chapter 5 introduces the radical collaborative proposal, crafted and approved by 
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Enablers, based upon inclusivity, equality, consensus-building and transparency. It also 
reveals that almost immediately a counter-proposal was conceived by members of the 
apartheid era old guard that were located within government, the private sector, ex-
politicians a group of co-opted autocratic informal settlement leaders. These were the 
disablers, who for the next four years tried through ever-changing alliances and structures 
to wrest control of the project for their own ends. But the collaboration is inaugurated and a 
policy committee is established, in duplicate because some parties refuse to sit with others. 
The Enablers manage them in parallel, with the aid of a devoted volunteer, and a technical 
committee begins to research the demand for housing and the availability of resources. 
 
Chapter 6 describes how for the next two years the project ingredients - objectives, 
operating principles, sub-projects and land – are gradually and deliberately assembled. 
Whilst this is underway in collaborative mode, Crossroads demands to be dealt with 
separately, the association of informal settlement leaders walks out and stays away for a 
year – as does the African National Congress (ANC), which also creates a national civic 
association which attempts to subsume all the local groupings. Enabling all of this under 
the umbrella of a weak transitional government is a challenge indeed. 
 
 In Chapter 7 the opposition makes its first move, disguised as a non-profit company 
created to run the entire project, and calls for the immediate replacement of the iSLP’s 
facilitator, and not for the last time. The policy committee learns that the company is 
actually a cartel of consultants and contractors, who will use their informal settlement 
associates as facilitators, and responds by drafting rules for private sector involvement in 
the project. Violence is rampant across the country and is never absent from the iSLP 
project area, which also witnesses some land invasions. The iSLP is the only cross-sector 
collaboration in the development field, and its Enablers start establishing local community 
development committees, to the fury of stakeholder groups that are not as representative of 
communities as they purport. A new alliance springs up, backed by the same interests, and 
its demand for the right to develop the first large project is rebuffed. The Enablers 
doggedly maintain progress, now holding public workshops which unanimously approved 
to the iSLP Principles. The first national democratic election was held in April 1994, but 
instead of bringing immediate relief to the iSLP it prompted a furious final takeover bid by 
the cartel in conjunction with all the ‘community organisations’ in the policy committee 
who by now were widely discredited. The process was brought to a halt. 
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 In Chapter 8 the new national government steps in and not only endorses the iSLP 
and all its principles as good practice but greatly multiplies its size and, after the Enablers 
compile an enlarged business plan, makes it the flagship of its national Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) and guarantees the provision of all the required funds. 
Collaboration is now to be primarily effected at the level of individual projects, with 
communities represented by development committees. It was the end of a four year policy-
making phase, filled with meetings at which the Enablers were by far the most consistent 
attendees. Implementation commences in earnest in Chapter 9, but is immediately 
interrupted by the new RDP department which insists that the development committees be 
replaced by its own invention – RDP Forums. In the event it is the same committed 
community members who attend meetings... and the national RDP ministry was disbanded 
after two years. The iSLP continues, but local government is undergoing complete re-
structuring which renders it unable to fulfil its role of upgrading informal settlements in the 
iSLP, whilst provincial government is very keen to divest itself of housing functions, 
including the iSLP, but may not do so. Instead the iSLP is increasingly driven by 
consultants and community leaders, facilitated by Enablers in various ways. 
 
 Chapter 10 describes the nature of the 250 different projects or programmes that the 
iSLP comprised and the way in which the collaboration was sustained until the project’s 
completion in 2005. In Chapter 11 the circumstances within which the entire project was 
conducted is summarised in terms of interminable complexity and the the incapacity of the 
stakeholders to manage such a process. It is the argued that these two factors are not 
evidenced by the collaboration literature, and that together they frame the gap in the 
literature which is filled by this thesis. 
 
 The story contained within Chapters 5 – 11 demonstrates that the kinds of social 
crises that necessitate a cross-sector collaboration are associated with vectors of turmoil 
that both transcend and infiltrate the project – probably for its whole lifetime. This presents 
a daunting project for any kind of process management: the client is indistinct, constantly 
morphing and unstable; the environment is unpredictable and insecure; and the required 
decisions and resources cannot be scheduled because the authority is not yet in place. But 
the objective is clear and success is imperative. There is only one way of holding such a 
structure in tension and in motion: people are needed to hold the centre, to keep some 
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components together, to monitor and maintain every connection, and to keep it moving and 
in the right direction. Furthermore, those people should operate quietly and unobtrusively, 
because there are others in and around the project who do want to be seen and heard. Those 
who make the difference are the Enablers – they do not actually bear that name, that is just 
who they are, but with a capital ‘E’. 
 
Chapter 12 describes the indispensible functions performed by the Enablers in the 
iSLP and the mandates which authorised them. These are then compared with the 
references that are made in the literature to such functions and significant differences in the 
nature of these functions are highlighted. The success of the iSLP is ascribed substantially 
to the Enablers, and this is contrasted with the failure of the literature to offer anything but 
the slightest hope of success. It is therefore argued that the nature and functions of the 
Enablers, and the characteristics of the mandates that they obtain, is a key to success in 
cross-sector collaboration, and that this constitutes a gap in the literature. 
 
Chapter 13 begins by presenting the argument of this thesis and then proposes ways 
in which its findings can be integrated into the models of cross-sector collaboration and 
collaborative governance that were referenced in Chapter 2. Furthermore a structure is 
offered for the creation of an Enablement Plan to address circumstances that may warrant 
cross-sector collaboration. The thesis concludes with a re-summary of the argument: that 
the likelihood of success in a cross-sector collaboration can be enhanced by anticipating 
incessant turbulence, acknowledging the incapacity of the stakeholders, recognising the 
value of a diversity of Enablers and ensuring that they are provided with the necessary 
mandates and resources. 
 
References to all literature cited are in the Bibliography, but references to 
documents within the iSLP archive and to the interviews that were conducted are by 
endnotes, which are listed in the Notes and References section. 
 
The Annexures 
The body of the thesis is supplemented by six diverse annexures. Annexure A contains 
reprints of maps of the iSLP project, dated 1995 and 2000. Annexure B contains all the 
tables, most of which provide the detail which substantiates the arguments that have been 
presented. Of particular significance are the tabulations that quantify and analyse the 
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attendance by participants at meetings of the collaboration, and highlight two opposing 
achievements: the breadth of inclusivity and the narrowness of consistency achieved. This 
research was pivotal in identifying the Enabler function – which could then be explored in 
much more personal depth through interviews. Thus Annexure B is very much part of the 
thesis and has been dislocated from the body only for convenience. 
 
Annexures C and D are a by-product of the thesis and contribute to everyday 
practice and policy-making. Annexure C is a collection of the main lessons learned by 
Enablers in the iSLP and is an abridged version of a longer list. These main lessons have 
been annotated to indicate whether I consider that they are generally applicable to the 
enabling of collaborations or that they are primarily appropriate in a cross-sector 
collaborative endeavour. Annexure D is an Enabler’s Manual, which I have written as a 
very detailed handbook for practitioners, presented in a more expanded form than the 
Enablement Plan within Chapter13. Annexure E is an abridged list of the iSLP’s capacity-
building programmes, offered to provide some flavour to that spectrum of the project’s 
deliverables. Finally Annexure F, as has been mentioned, comprises the pre-history of 
Chapter 4, which offers the reader a greater sense of the housing deprivation suffered by 
black people since Cape Town was founded, and a valuable introduction to the context of 
this thesis. It has only been appended in order to restrict the focus of the thesis to empirical 
material that has actually been researched. 
 
Some Issues of Terminology 
 
South Africa’s social history is dominated by issues of ‘race’, the classification of which 
was, particularly under apartheid legislation, based upon four primary descriptors: Indian, 
white, coloured and black, with enormous implications for every person within a very 
segregated and discriminatory society. In the historical sections of this thesis (Chapters 4 
to11) the use of some of this terminology is unavoidable, with ‘black’ denoting indigenous 
Bantu-speaking peoples; and ‘coloured’ referring to people of ‘mixed race’, predominantly 
consequent upon the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by Europeans from 1652. 
Coloured people comprised the largest segment of Cape Town’s population until the end of 
the 20th century, when the black population overtook them. 
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An explanation of my use of the term ‘community’ is also required. I realise that the 
term is used in all sorts of ways that imply or infer qualities that are not demonstrated or 
explicit. In this thesis I require a term to denote the entire population of a specific location, 
and the most common and recognizable term used in the South African context is 
‘community’ – for example, ‘the Crossroads community’ or ‘community of Crossroads’. 
My usage of the term is not to suggest that any particular community is internally cohesive 
or similar to any other. I also use the terms ‘community organisation’ or ‘community 
representatives’ simply as concepts, at face value, unless I indicate otherwise. 
‘Communities’ within the ambit of this thesis are to be regarded generally as intended 
beneficiaries of the project, although sometimes I use the term ‘beneficiary communities’ 
to refer to those communities which have been allocated a quota of beneficiaries for a 
particular project within the iSLP. I only use the single word ‘beneficiary’ to denote a 




As I write these words more than eight years has passed since the completion of the 
iSLP. Eight years is a long time within a constantly changing system, which is what South 
Africans have experienced since the mid-1980s. Virtually none of the politicians, 
councillors, community leaders and ‘community organisations’ who played a significant 
role in the iSLP is still active in such positions. Very few of the officials are still in place 
although most of the consultant project managers are still in practice, now in senior 
positions within their firms. The iSLP is very seldom referred to in public, because already 
a new generation is overwhelmed by the urgency of new policies and programmes, new 
challenges and new ideas – without realising that there was a time of greater chaos, greater 
difficulty, that became addressed and reversed by using unnatural, unpopular, inconvenient 
techniques. In a rapidly transmogrifying society the iSLP is already ancient history, the 
protagonists and antagonists are of another age – but history has a habit of repeating itself, 
and whilst I would not wish another Crossroads on Cape Town or anywhere else I need 
only read my newspaper to notice the tell-tale signs at hot spots all over the world: 
persistent turbulence, government and other stakeholders who are inadequate to the task, a 
reluctance to collaborate across sectors, and approaching the place of last resort.  
 
Finally I feel very privileged to have had the opportunity to research within the field 
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of collaborative development in all its aspects. My greatest satisfaction, however, comes 
from having been in practice, deep in the engine room and right at the cutting edge, where 
bullets sometimes ricochet and where I was once held hostage, and then to find that I have 
learned things that could inform and better prepare the next generation of practitioners. It 
has also been a pleasure to write up the case study, and to realise how few practitioners get 
to do that – perhaps because they are too busy or their objectivity is questioned – and 
instead the job gets done, if at all, by people who might not recognise the limits to their 
comprehension. The really first prize, however, would be if something in my work inspired 
a few more people of all sorts to become Enablers. It is not a profession or even a trade, but 
combines an attitude that is not rocked by any amount of turbulence, a function that is not 
fazed by the failure of the more obvious functionary, and a commitment that lasts for as 
long as it is needed. Perhaps the reason for the existence of the gap that I found is that it is 
defined far more by personal practice than project process – and will not be noticed by a 
systems approach to development. On the other hand the reason for the existence of 
Enablers is very clear: in an unpredictable, volatile world institutions and their personnel 
are preoccupied with their own survival. If there is cross-sector work to be done it will be 
accomplished mainly by those who are neither bound by sectors nor bend under pressure 
but are committed to building and empowering strategic relationships for good. 
 








Expecting failure: Arguments about the practicalities of collaborative 
development 
 
“A first key challenge for the 21st century is the construction of new relationships between ordinary 
people and the institutions – especially those of government - which affect their lives.” John 
Gaventa, 2004. p.25. 
 
 
This chapter explores the realm of participation and collaboration theory in the context of 
development, especially in response to social crisis. It establishes a viewing platform for considering 
the iSLP in the chapters beyond. In the process it endeavours to drill into the detail of who is able to 
do what when normal processes come to a standstill; to examine how complexity should be viewed, 
grappled with and even embraced; and to raise questions about whether any environmental 
turbulence must be eliminated as a pre-condition or accommodated and driven through. 
 
 The argument presented in this chapter is that neither bottom-up community participation nor 
top-down collaborative governance are adequate theoretical frameworks for practically enabling 
multiple parties to deal with complex realities; that a more helpful paradigm is a ‘participative 
sphere’ containing multiple models of collaborative spaces in which intersections, motivations, 
perspectives and strategies are seldom simple or clear; and that a particularly challenging model, 
only embarked upon when alternatives have been exhausted, is cross-sector collaboration, in which 
success is extremely unlikely, even with the best of intentions and the aid of independent facilitators 
from time to time. The argument exposes a gap between this very pessimistic theory of cross-sector 
collaboration and the evidence of a successful large-scale cross-sector collaborative development 
that was located within a very complex and volatile environment. This thesis will demonstrate that 
the gap is shaped by two false assumptions – that turbulence is temporary and stakeholders have the 
capacity to collaborate – and that the gap is filled by a small cadre of diverse activists: the Enablers. 
 
Participative development – a literature review 
 
This thesis is about the practicalities of dissimilar and even opposing parties working together to 
successfully address critical social crises, such a severe lack of housing, in an unstable and uncertain 
environment. This chapter explores arguments related to the practicalities of working together by 
engaging with various bodies of literature through a process illustrated in Fig 1 overleaf. 
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This survey begins at ‘A’ by disaggregating the challenge posed by Gaventa in his own terms. From 
there the survey engages with two well established schools of theory which approach the subject 
from opposite perspectives. The first is ‘community participation’ (‘B’), generally representing 
community initiative, although some (e.g. Miraftab, 2004; Rahnema, 2010) regard it as an originally 
virtuous grassroots-based concept that has been hi-jacked by the state and thereafter sustained by 
A 
The Challenge 
To establish what happens at the interfaces 
between parties in a complex collaboration 
that ensures success. 
B 
Community Participation 
The question of how the 
community can deliver at 
scale and get involved with 




The question of how the state 
can invite community 
participation without catering 
for conflict and complexity. 
D  
Participative Sphere 
The question of how 
collaboration actually works 
with multiple models, 




The question of why this is the last resort and what 
makes it so difficult and success so improbable. 
F 
The Key Roleplayers 
The question of who does what 
within cross-sector collaboration, 
and what is it that nobody does that 
renders the achievement of success 
so difficult. 
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prostitute intermediaries. Those who adopt a more pragmatic stance (e.g. Cleaver, 2004; Robbins, 
2008) emphasise the value of even the subtle improvements in power and position that can be 
achieved by individuals or structures. The second school (e.g. Ansell and Gash, 2008; Thomson and 
Perry, 2006) is ‘collaborative governance’ (‘C’), which takes a state-based perspective of the same 
arena but questions whether it can successfully hi-jack or co-opt communities and squeeze them into 
a collaborative mould – or whether the building of collaborations is much more difficult.  
A further school (‘D’) has emerged around the ‘participative sphere’ (e.g. Cornwall and Coelho, 
2007; Bebbington, 2004) in which the parties engage, and from there the survey moves to the field of 
‘cross-sector collaboration’ (‘E’) (e.g. Bryson et al, 2006), which studies the implications and 
dynamics of collaborations that are not necessarily an initiative of either government or communities 
but within society in general, represented by various sectors. The survey concludes (‘F’) with a 




A. The Challenge : Recognising ‘working together’ as an imperative 
but asking Who? Where? and How? 
 
Gaventa’s primary challenge for the 21st century, quoted at the head of the chapter, is pronounced to 
a world of increasingly formidable social problems that are progressively beyond the means of 
individual agencies to successfully address – but for which collaboration often proves perplexing. 
Within this rather anguished landscape he has identified “six challenges which point to the 
importance and potential for assessing the transformative possibilities of citizen engagement with 
local governance ...” (Gaventa, 2004. p.25) 
 
The 1st challenge is a general one: to replace popular distrust and disillusionment in 
increasingly unresponsive, corrupt and oligarchically-managed governments in both North and South 
by creating “new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions”. (ibid. p.25)  
 
This leads to the 2nd challenge, which requires ”working both sides of the equation – that is, 
going beyond ‘civil society’ or ‘state-based’ approaches, to focus on their intersection, through new 
forms of participation, responsiveness and accountability” (ibid. p.27). This requires a strengthening 
of both the process of citizen participation and of the accountability and responsiveness of the 
institutions. He quotes Heller (2001) in calling for a balanced view which recognises the tensions 
between the need for representative working institutions and the need for mobilised demand-making 
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civil society, and proposes that the solution is not found in the separation of the civil society and 
good governance agendas but in their interface. The identification and management of such 
interfaces and of all the intersections that they contain foreshadows ‘D’ and ‘E’ below and raises 
questions about who is capable of such management. 
 
Gaventa’s 3rd and 4th challenges are for a re-conceptualisation of participation as a right of 
citizenship and for the extension of such rights to ensure a much richer participative democracy. 
Whilst the validity of these arguments is appreciated this thesis does not address the issue of the right 
to participate but focuses on the practicalities of participation. 
 
Skipping to his 5th challenge, it is that, “While the creation of new spaces for participatory 
governance holds out the possibility for transformative change, far more needs to be learned about 
how such spaces work, for whom, and with what social justice outcomes. In general, however, while 
there is some evidence of both the pro-poor development outcomes and the positive ‘democracy’-
building outcomes of participatory governance, these exist only under certain conditions ... For 
example, there is evidence that democratic decentralization simply opens up space for the 
empowerment of local elites, not for consideration of the voices and interests of the more 
marginalised” (Gaventa, 2004. p.31). Questions of representation and accountability are, as 
demonstrated in Chapters 5-10, a recurring theme in collaborative development. 
 
Gaventa’s 6th and final challenge is that “Power analysis is [thus] critical to understanding 
the extent to which new spaces for participatory governance can be used for transformative 
engagement, or whether they are more likely to be instruments for reinforcing domination and 
control” (ibid. p.34). He proposes that “we need to look more closely at three differing continuums 
of power, if we are to assess the transformative possibility of political space. These involve (i) how 
spaces for participation are created; (ii) the places and levels of engagement; and (iii) the degree of 
visibility of power within them”  (ibid. p.34). He goes on to suggest a continuum of spaces which 
include closed spaces, invited spaces and claimed/created spaces; an understanding of the 
contestation for locating/placing participation; and an examination of how the dynamics of power 
shape the inclusiveness of participation within each – whether the participation is visible (presumed 
open); hidden (reserved for a privileged few); or rendered invisible through the internalisation of 
dominating values, ideologies and forms of behaviour. 
 
He   claims that “in any given issue or conflict, there is no single strategy or entry point for 
participation. Much depends on navigating the intersection of the relationships, which in turn create 
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new boundaries of possibility for action and engagement... The politics of intersection is also about 
identity, and understanding which identities actors use in which spaces to construct their own 
legitimacy to represent others, or how they perceive the identities and legitimacy of others who speak 
on their behalf. We need to continually unpack this question of representation, legitimacy and 
identity at the intersections of spaces and places, in order to understand more fully the possibilities of 
deeper forms of participatory governance” (ibid. p.38). 
 
South Africa’s history of spatial segregation, the reservation of places on a racial basis and 
inadequate representation of groups created a complex tapestry of powerful memories, influences 
and dynamics that a political transformation could not simply replace. In such circumstances, 
Gaventa comments, “it is no wonder, then, that the dynamics of participation in newly emerging 
democratic spaces are subject to all sorts of imperfections, manipulations and abuse” (ibid. p.38). 
 
For example, the iSLP case study presented in Chapters 5-10 was a participative housing project 
riddled with intrigues, masquerades, power plays, subterfuges and ambushes. Yet it survived 
repeated hijacking attempts and prevailed for a sustained and intense period of fourteen years 
through South Africa’s tumultuous shift to democracy, ultimately achieving its objectives. My 
analysis responds to Gaventa’s 5th challenge to investigate how participatory spaces actually work, 
and draws some conclusions in Chapters 11 and 12. But there are underlying factors at work – 
collaborating institutions and individuals carry complex and conflicting assumptions, expectations, 
motivations and allegiances – and to engage with them we shall now explore other fields of 
literature. 
 
B. Community Participation : widely acknowledged as good practice but much easier said 
than done. 
 
Participation theory is essentially about the exercise of popular agency in relation to development 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2004(i)). However the identity and motivation of the initiator of the process is 
likely to determine the nature of participation. Is it the populace who organises itself to engage in 
development for its own benefit? Is it institutions of government who motivate the populace to 
collaborate in development for their mutual benefit? Or are third parties involved who might 
motivate, organise or even seek to represent the populace; or who might act as agents of government 
to engage and equip the populace – and perhaps for a more complex set of benefits? 
 
As we shall see, the iSLP was created primarily a response to housing delivery failure. There 
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are two opposed perspectives on who is responsible for housing the poor. In the one corner is John 
Turner, who declared that, “When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their 
own contribution to the design, construction or management of their housing, both the process and 
the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being. When people have no control 
over, nor responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, on the other hand, dwelling 
environments may instead become a barrier to personal fulfilment and a burden on the economy” 
(Turner and Fichter, 1972, quoted in Turner, 1988. p. 15). In the other corner is UN-HABITAT 
urging government to be the main housing resource provider, empowered by strong political will, 
although involving communities and other supporting actors in the process, viz: “Partnerships cannot 
replace government. Partnerships should be subsumed under representative democratic systems” 
(UN-HABITAT, 2003. p. 184). Such a view renders structure and control pre-eminent over process. 
 
Nabeel Hamdi questions “How much structure will be needed before the structure itself 
inhibits permanent freedom, gets in the way of progress, destroys the very system which it designed 
to serve, and becomes self-serving? At what point does it disable the natural process of emergence, 
with all its novelty and creativity?” (Hamdi, 2004. p.xviii). As recorded in Annexure A, government 
in South Africa had long ago problematised the urban black population and reserved the provision of 
any solutions to itself. To such an approach Colin Ward comments, “The moment that housing, a 
universal human activity, becomes defined as a problem, a housing industry is born, with an army of 
experts, bureaucrats and researchers whose existence is a guarantee that the problem won’t go away” 
(Turner, 1976. Introduction). Turner, Hamdi and Ward argue that housing is best created by the 
people who need it – and that if government has to be involved it should be in a participative or even 
partnering mode as a supporter and enabler but not as controller. A memorable image was once 
provided to the author when visiting Tony Gibson of the Neighbourhood Initiatives Foundation: 
when the Foundation invites residents and municipal officials to an introductory planning workshop 
for a particular neighbourhood the officials are presented with a cup of tea on arrival, shown a chair 
against the wall, and requested to only engage in the discussion when asked a specific question by 
the facilitator (see also in Gibson, 1994). Such measures are needed to tip the balance of power – in 
the iSLP community leaders were invited to interview and select technical consultants. 
 
Although lauded and promoted, community participation has become rather a battleground. 
Faranak Miraftab reflects that the international development literature and practice of recent years 
reflect the popularity of the closely related discourses of community participation, empowerment and 
social capital, and wryly comments that these were “once the subversive, emancipatory tools of 
activists, but have now become tools of the trade for governments as well as for international 
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financial establishments such as the World Bank” (Miraftab, 2004. p. 239). This argument is that the 
original object of empowering the people has been replaced by the enablement of government 
through the exploitation of people, using the same techniques and terminology that was intended for 
their emancipation. Hence book titles such as Participation: the new tyranny?  (Cooke and Kothary, 
2001) and Participation: from tyranny to transformation? (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 
 
Andrea Cornwall adds to this debate, explaining that: “At a very basic level, discourses of 
participation make available particular subject positions for participants to take up, bounding the 
possibilities for agency as well as for inclusion. Being constructed, for example, as ‘beneficiaries’, 
‘clients’ or ‘citizens’ influences what people are perceived to be able to contribute or entitled to 
know or decide, as well as the perceived obligations of those who seek to involve them” (Cornwall, 
2004. p. 83). So, for example, people categorised as beneficiaries of a housing project might only be 
consulted about the product – and excluded from deliberations about the process, even though they 
might have been hoping from some employment in it. Similarly, it may be erroneously assumed that 
‘community members’ are unable to understand and discuss technical aspects of a development 
process simply because they might lack some formal education. Cornwall also points out that the 
way people speak is also used to define them and to trigger attitudes that obstruct dialogue and 
relationship-building.  
 
So although, as we shall see, the iSLP Policy Committee was established on the basis of 
equal status for all parties preconceived attitudes and perceptions could no more be wished away 
than the huge disparities in understanding and perspective. Frances Cleaver claims that duality is 
inherent in these social processes: “In normative attempts to find transformatory prospects in the 
politics of participation and representation, we tend to look at social processes and highlight the 
potential of the bits that we like: the transformation rather than the tyranny, the solidarity rather than 
the conflict, articulation rather than mutedness, the enablement of agency rather than the constraint 
of structure. In thinking through participation, we do ourselves no favours in wishing away the 
potentially negative aspects of representation. Our challenge is to use an understanding of the 
dynamic nature of such duality to identify opportunities for change. However, we have to reconcile 
ourselves to these only ever being partial, intermittent, involving winners and losers, not entirely 
controllable or predictable. Recognizing the limits of the makeability of social life is as important to 
achieving something in development as over-optimistic faith in the possibilities of participatory 
politics” (Cleaver, 2004. p.276). This is a good characterisation of ‘Enablers’, as I shall reveal in 
Chapter 12. 
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By way of example in the South African context, Claire Bénit-Gbaffou introduced a special 
edition of Transformation devoted to “deepening understanding, at the local level, between social 
movements and the political system” through “institutional participatory mechanisms (i.e. those 
organised by the state – ward committees, ad hoc participatory or development forums, integrated 
development planning processes, etc.)” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008. p. i). Most papers concluded that the 
mechanisms do not work properly in practice and lead residents to resort to other modes of 
expression. Some went further and averred that in the process these dysfunctional institutions 
disempowered other non-institutional forms of residents’ participation. But there were others which 
pointed out how even dysfunctional participatory platforms were used beneficially by community 
groups – e.g. to raise their profile, to mobilise members and to obtain strategic information about the 
structure and operation of local government. It would seem that if ‘participation’ is viewed 
creatively, opportunistically and unboundedly by residents it can be life-giving, however stultifying 
the institutional framework may be. 
 
Invitees can choose whether to participate and whether or how to negotiate the terms of their 
participation. The motivations are diverse. Anthony Bebbington writes, “The tense interface between 
theory and practice, thought and action, has never been far from the surface in discussions of 
participatory development. Participation helps unite people who share commitments to more 
equitable and humane forms of social and political economic organisation but who differ greatly on 
strategy; some are more reformist; others are deeply sceptical that reform can make much difference; 
some are more forgiving of people who work, live and seek reform within dominant institutions that 
otherwise tend to impose agendas and so foster exclusion, while others see Machiavellian intent 
everywhere they look; some see the need to theorize strategy carefully, others view abstraction as a 
tyranny that obstructs change-orientated action and once again privileges elite forms of knowledge” 
(Bebbington, 2004. p. 278). As we shall see, even the Enablers in the iSLP became involved for 
diverse reasons and applied diverse attitudes and perspectives to their tasks. 
 
However it is not only the spaces, places and dynamics of participation that have to be 
understood – there are the cultures and norms of the different groups of roleplayers, many of which 
might not be appreciated within the relationship. Cleaver (2004) identifies three key factors which 
both enable and constrain the exercise of agency and therefore shape citizenship: moral 
understandings of action (e.g. respect to elders, or to the powerful) and the unconscious motivation 
of many acts; the complexity of both individual and collective identities (the moral norms of 
decision-making are deeply psychologically and socially embedded and often elude conscious 
scrutiny and discourse); and the (often unequal) interdependence involved in the exercise of rights 
2 EXPECTING FAILURE    29 
and livelihood interests (rights do not exist in a vacuum but are embedded in social relations).  
 
Probably the most bewildering factor for a housing policy-maker or practitioner in South 
Africa is the unpredictability of how intended beneficiaries and their representatives will engage with 
the process. In relation to experiences within the iSLP I found Steven Robbins’ analysis particularly 
iluminating: “Individuals have multiple rights and obligations – re: traditional leaders, clan members, 
patron-client relations, religious affiliation, etc.” (Robbins, 2008. p. 6). “What appears to be an 
autonomous, rights-bearing citizen in one setting may, in another context, morph into an ‘ethnic’ 
subject invoking indigenous values” (ibid. p. 12). “... As a consequence the urban and rural poor in 
South Africa, as well as elsewhere in the developing world, commit enormous resources and energy 
to ensuring the social reproduction of kinship, clientship, clan and neighbourhood ties and networks. 
Given prevailing conditions of jobless growth and structural unemployment it is not surprising that 
these social bonds are seldom sacrificed for the elusive dream of ‘suburban bliss’ with its normative 
model of the nuclear family, private property and individual, bourgeois subjectivity” (ibid. p. 22). 
 
Robbins avers that “the ‘popular classes’ are not only ‘target populations’ and ‘docile bodies’ 
shaped by, and susceptible to, modern state discourses of development and governmentality; instead 
they often straddle multiple political discourses and logics in their strategic and situated encounters 
with the modern state, donor agencies, NGOs and other sites of power” (ibid. p. 15.) “The poor need 
multiple strategies – often deployed opportunistically” (ibid p.6). Thus “in postcolonial settings such 
as South Africa, NGOs and social movement activists increasingly recognise the strategic value of 
engaging with both liberal ‘rights talk’ and communal forms of mobilisation” (ibid. p. 12). “For most 
South Africans, claiming rights is not necessarily incompatible with claiming communitarian 
identities and cultural and group rights. Both of these purportedly antagonistic and oppositional 
political logics can be asserted by the same actors simultaneously, or deployed separately depending 
on the specific contexts and audiences” (ibid. p. 16). Such an environment makes the work of 
managing projects or processes extremely difficult. Non-compliance may become the norm, leaving 
Enablers with no option but to drive the process pragmatically in generally the agreed direction. 
 
The context in which South African NGOs found themselves in the early 1990’s is well 
illustrated in the iSLP case study, especially Chapters 5-7. Robbins comments:  “The South African 
liberation struggle, for example, produced thousands of working class activists who, through their 
involvement in anti-apartheid activism, were inducted into civil society, and later became significant 
players in big business and the post-apartheid state” (ibid. p. 16). However, there were many who 
were not as fortunate, for “with the arrival of democracy in 1994, many highly effective grassroots 
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activists were unable to convert their political skills and credentials into the forms of cultural capital 
required by the new bureaucratic state” (ibid. p. 16). Such hopes and fears were powerful threads 
within the tapestry of ‘community representatives’ involved in the early years of the iSLP – see 
Chapters 5-7. 
 
‘Community participation’ is invariably recommended as essential practice for creating synergy 
and achieving satisfactory results in social projects such as sub-economic housing. In practice, 
however, it is complicated by a myriad of factors, not the least of which is the variation in 
participants, their backgrounds, the frameworks and mandates from which they operate, the 
resources that they are willing to invest and their expectations, both as individuals and as 
representatives of a constituency. A real problem is that participation or ‘working together’ cannot be 
built from only one side. We need to look at the other side of the engagement – collaborative 
governance. 
 
C. Collaborative Governance : an institutional approach to working together 
The community participation literature, with its focus on community interests in engagement with 
the state, is mirrored by a public affairs literature on collaborative governance which has a focus on 
what government needs to do in order to effectively engage with other parties. The imperative to 
collaborate, not least in countries of the north, has been described as resulting from devolution, rapid 
technological change, scarce resources and rising organisational interdependencies (Thomson and 
Perry, 2006).  
 
The Local Agenda 21 model 
One significant early influence in this movement, particularly aimed at local government, was the 
‘sustainable development’ challenge articulated in the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit as a quest 
for a “global action plan for sustainable development”. Code-named Agenda 21, it called upon local 
authorities in every country to establish their own Local Agenda 21 and promoted a partnership 
approach to service provision that would balance economic, community and ecological development. 
“Balancing the diverse interests of business, the environment and community development requires 
partnerships. This is especially true in today’s environment of rapid urbanisation and globalisation. 
The pressures facing local communities today make it increasingly difficult for any one institution to 
single-handedly develop, supply and maintain an essential service. Traditional service roles (of 
government, the private sector, community organisations, trade unions, neighbours and families) are 
rapidly changing due to fiscal constraints, constitutional and legal reforms, resource scarcity and 
ecological concerns, globalisation of economies and market liberalisation, changing values and 
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social norms, and demographic pressures” (ICLEI, 1996. p. 13)). 
 
The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide from which the above quotation is drawn went on to 
describe 6 basic steps that a municipality would need to take in order to construct and support an 
effective partnership: 
Step 1 Determine the scope of the planning exercise and define goals and objectives – in 
consultation with stakeholders after a preliminary educational campaign to generate 
 public interest and support. 
Step 2 Create or designate a Stakeholder Group to coordinate and guide the overall planning effort, 
and to integrate the results of discussions, research and planning into an Action Plan(s). 
Step 3 Establish distinct Working Group structures under the supervision of the Stakeholder Group, 
each with responsibility for a distinct issue or planning task. 
Step 4 Identify appropriate partners to participate in the Stakeholder Group and its Working Groups. 
Step 5 Establish the terms of reference for the activities of each group, which includes defining the 
relationship between stakeholder planning and statutory processes, such as official 
development plans. 
Step 6 Develop a common Community Vision to guide the entire planning process. 
(ibid. p. 15) 
The logic was represented schematically as shown in Fig 2 below:  
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In this model the Municipality establishes the Stakeholder Group, which may comprise, in addition 
to the Municipality, service agencies, NGOs, CBOs, trade unions, universities, private businesses, 
professional associations and under-represented groups – and provides it with a formal planning 
mandate. To enable the process the municipality creates an internal Interdepartmental Committee 
and helps the Stakeholder Group to establish a Planning Team, and to create however many working 
groups may be required. 
 
Through this structure the Stakeholder Group is mandated to provide and oversee policy and 
management for the planning process, to establish and oversee working groups, develop the 
Community Vision, engage in public consultation and establish planning priorities, negotiate 
consensus positions and recommend actions, review action plans and integrate the plans of different 
actors, and liaise with and provide reports to the municipality. By these means the Stakeholder 
Group provides a public profile, offers public accessibility and generates legitimacy for the 
municipal planning process. 
 
The Interdepartmental Committee liaises between the Municipality and the Stakeholder 
Group, provides ideas and information, reviews action strategies and proposals and integrates 
stakeholder planning decisions with formal planning processes. The Planning Team provides staff 
support to the Stakeholder Group, administers the planning effort, provides technical and research 
support, engages in problem solving and trouble-shooting and monitors and evaluates outcomes. 
  
The Working Groups may be composed of service providers, service users, service funders 
and affected parties - and could comprise, as illustrated in Fig 2: 
A Planning Team, which analyses problems and opportunities; proposes action options, targets and 
triggers; and prepares draft action plans;  
An Implementation Group, which negotiates implementation partnerships, mobilises resources, 
institutes projects and programmes, and documents activities; and  
A Monitoring and Evaluation Group, which develops indicators, monitors impacts and changing 
conditions, analyses outcomes and reports on findings. 
 
It is noteworthy that 5 of the 6 steps promoted in the Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide and listed 
earlier address only the institutional arrangement. There was no hint of the complications that may 
arise, let alone advice on how to address them. As will become evident, collaborations are invariably 
complex.  
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Collaborative governance in the new South Africa 
South Africa’s new Constitution states that the object of local government is to provide democratic 
and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the provision of services to them in a 
sustainable manner; to promote social and economic development and a safe and healthy 
environment; and to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec. 152). The manner in which this 
last directive has been implemented is of relevance to this thesis. The basic structural instruments for 
enabling community involvement in municipal affairs are Ward Committees and then Sub-Councils 
for groups of municipal wards. Provisions for these are made in the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 
1998, which declares that a Ward Committee shall be chaired by the Ward Councillor, comprise not 
more than ten persons and have no authority or decision-making capacity (Schmidt, 2008. p. 114). 
Such a committee would offer very limited scope and capacity as an instrument for real public 
involvement in a development project – information sharing and consultation would be the limit of 
its ability. It begs the question of how government would collaborate with communities in housing 
development projects.  
 
 In terms of the South African Constitution, everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing and the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec. 
26). Funds for the subsidising of public housing programmes are allocated at national level and 
policies for their administration are established by the national Department of Housing. 
Responsibility for implementation was devolved initially to provincial Departments of Housing 
(under which the iSLP was initiated in 1991) but after the first local government elections (in 1996) 
the Housing Act of 1997 (Republic of South Africa, 1997) set in train an increasing devolution of 
housing responsibilities to local government, requiring that every municipality shall ensure that the 
inhabitants under its jurisdiction have access to housing on a progressive basis (ibid. Sec 9.1.(a)(i)) 
and that any municipality may participate in an approved housing programme by, inter alia, 
“facilitating and supporting the participation of other role players in the housing development 
process” (ibid. Sec 9.2(a)(vi)) There is provision for municipalities to approve housing programmes 
themselves, but accreditation, which comes in three levels,  is reluctantly granted and by March 2011 
Cape Town, generally regarded as the most efficient municipality in the country, had only acquired 
Level 2 authority, with financial responsibility reserved by the provincial government (City of Cape 
Town, 2011). 
 
 Housing Policy introduced by the new democratic government in 1994 made community 
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involvement through a ‘social compact’ a prerequisite for the approval, and therefore subsidising, of 
any project. However, for the first decade of democracy the philosophy of governance was New 
Public Management, which promoted regulatory local government and the privatisation of public 
services (Pieterse, 2002. p. 8). No instructions were given as to how social compacts should be 
constructed or adjudicated, and in that immediate post-apartheid environment of privatisation and 
focus on delivery lip service was often paid to them in practice – compacts were, after all, voluntary 
in nature (Menguelé et al, 2008. p. 195). 1994 was when the iSLP began implementation, with a 
philosophy in which social compacts were far more than obligatory – they constituted the entire 
framework of the project. 
 
 In fact the application of New Public Management and its ‘regulatory state’ philosophy 
diminished the capacity of government to a concerning degree, particularly at the local level 
(Pieterse, 2008. p. 4), and so was replaced in 2004 by the philosophy of the Developmental State, 
and in particular Developmental Local Government, in which government is expected to drive 
development. It may do so in partnership with a community-based organisation, if such body is 
legally competent to enter into such an agreement. (Republic of South Africa, 2000. Section 76(b)). 
That implies a much more formal and exclusive arrangement than a social compact involving 
affected community members. Therefore the revision of the National Housing Policy – the much-
vaunted ‘Breaking New Ground’ document - made reference to community participation but 
described it in terms of a large scale ‘listening campaign’ by politicians and a communications 
campaign driven by a cadre of community development workers (Department of Housing, 2004. 
Section 8). That was to be the extent of community participation in development. In fact the state’s 
‘Flagship Project’, called the N2 Gateway, which is mentioned as a postscript in Chapter 11, was 
altogether devoid of community involvement in an extraordinary re-enactment of apartheid-era top-
down development. 
 
 For all practical purposes the upgrading of informal settlements by collaborative means has 
become optional in South Africa. In spite of much groundwork in promoting participative 
development here by experts such as Lalith Lankatilleke (1989 and 1995), John Abbott (1996), and 
the ongoing influence of the Slum Dwellers International movement (Bolnick and Patel, 1994) 
results have been few and small scale. Government policy is reflected in the Upgrading of Informal 
Settlements Programme published in 2007, which declares: “This Programme is premised upon 
extensive and active community participation. Funding is accordingly made available to support the 
social processes. Community participation should be undertaken through Ward Committees with 
ongoing effort in promoting and ensuring the inclusion of key stakeholders and vulnerable groups in 
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the process. The municipality must demonstrate effective interactive community participation”  
(Department of Housing 2007, Part 3. P.15). A national assessment of sixteen pilot projects within 
this programme (Department of Housing, 2009) reported very little compliance with the programme 
prescripts. Such a lack of enthusiasm and integrity in applying participative practices have been well 
documented by Huchzermeyer (2001-2011) and Kahn and Thring (2003), but it should be expected 
that collaboration under government control will not be rigorous unless there is no alternative way to 
achieve delivery, which was where government found itself in the Crossroads crisis back in 1990, as 
will become evident in Chapter 4.  
 
Collaboration is more complex and cyclical 
In looking more broadly at the practical application of collaborative governance, Chris Ansell and 
Alison Gash researched 137 cases across a range of policy sectors to identify critical variables that 
could determine success – i.e. “to transform adversarial relationships into cooperative ones” (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008. p. 547). They define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where 
one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making 
process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement 
public policy or manage public programmes or assets” (ibid. p. 533). 
 
Their model of collaborative governance is much more complex, cyclical and iterative, in 
which the institutional arrangement (which dominated the Agenda 21 model) is only one of the 
contributors to the outcomes. The primary influence is the composition of the starting conditions: 
power asymmetries, incentives and constraints, and the degree of existing trust between the parties 
(organisations and individuals). Another influence is the nature and extent of facilitative leadership 
that is brought to bear, perhaps from a number of quarters. Then comes the institutional design, 
which must respond to and complement the first two influences – and be flexible. All of these 
contribute to the collaborative process, which is not linear but cyclical, deepening and strengthening 
in engagement, activities, trust and delivery with every revolution. This is not the usual modus 
operandi of either government or the private sector. The model that Ansell and Gash constructed is 
presented diagrammatically in Fig 3 overleaf, in which the figures in parentheses refer to the 
“conditions for success” which are outlined thereafter. 
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On the basis of this framework Ansell and Gash synthesised a ‘Contingency Theory of Collaborative 
Governance’ which can be of real practical advantage in establishing collaborations, trouble-shooting 
those that already exist and for learning from those that have ended. They concluded with the 
following 10 key conditions for success, which lie within the starting conditions, facilitative 
leadership and collaborative process elements of the above diagram. They are numerically referenced 
in parentheses in the diagram. 
 
Starting Conditions 
1. If there are significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders, such that important 
stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance 
requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or 
disadvantaged stakeholders. 
Starting Conditions 
Power-Resource-Knowledge Asymmetries (1) 
 
Incentives for and Constraints on Participation (2,3) 
 
Prehistory of Cooperation or Conflict (initial trust level)(4) 
 
                    Collaborative Process 
 Trust-Building             Commitment to Process 
          (7)                                      (8,9) 
                              Mutual recognition of interdependence 
                              Shared ownership of the process 
                              Openness to exploring mutual gains 
 
Face-to-Face Dialogue 
Good faith negotiation 
 
Intermediate Outcomes           Shared Understanding 
“Small wins”                              Clear mission 
Strategic plans                       Common problem definition 
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2. If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, then 
collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly 
interdependent. 
3. If interdependence is conditional upon the collaborative forum being an exclusive venue, then 
sponsors must be willing to do the advance work of getting alternative forums (courts, legislators 
and executives) to respect and honour the outcomes of the collaborative process. 
4. If there is a prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders then collaborative governance is 
unlikely to succeed unless a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders or 




5. Where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders 
have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by 
relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust. 
6. Where power distribution is more asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or 
asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong ‘organic’ 
leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the 
process. ‘Organic’ leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. 
The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances. 
 
The Collaborative Process 
7. If the prehistory is highly antagonistic, then policy makers or stakeholders should budget time for 
effective remedial trust building. If they cannot justify the necessary time and cost, then they 
should not embark on a collaborative strategy. 
8. Even when collaborative governance is mandated, achieving ‘buy in’ is still an essential aspect of 
the collaborative process. 
9. Collaborative governance strategies are particularly suited for situations that require ongoing 
cooperation.  
10. If prior antagonism is high and a long-term commitment to trust building is necessary, then 
intermediate outcomes that produce small wins are particularly crucial. If, under these 
circumstances, stakeholders or policy makers cannot anticipate these small wins, then they 
should probably not embark on a collaborative path.  
(ibid. p. 551-561). 
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Their deconstruction of collaborative governance responds to questions raised by Gaventa, Cornwall 
and others about interfaces, intersections, spaces, places and visibility. The concepts of community 
participation and collaborative governance are both premised on the ability to build trusting 
relationships between stakeholders in order to achieve shared goals. The threats to such a process, 
suggest Ansell and Gash, are antagonisms, mistrust, power imbalances and unequal access to 
resources. Among their remedies are deliberate investments in empowerment, over-representation, 
trust building, shared ownership and small wins and the involvement of three possible 
intermediaries: sponsors, an honest broker or a strong organic leader. A sponsor is a patron who 
creates the opportunity, an honest broker is able to build inter-relationships and strong organic 
leaders draw participants to themselves and to their espoused goal. This thesis will raise the 
possibility of there being other facilitators whose profile is far less prominent than their influence. 
The discourse leads naturally to this place of engagement – the ‘participative sphere’. 
 
D. The Participative Sphere : the meeting ground between government, communities and 
other stakeholders which itself becomes an institution. 
 
Andrea Cornwall and Vera Coelho suggest that rather than locating institutions of participation 
within either the state or the public sphere “they constitute a distinct arena at the interface of state 
and society, what we term here the ‘participatory sphere’. The institutions of this sphere have a semi-
autonomous existence, outside and apart from the institutions of formal politics, bureaucracy and 
everyday associational life, although they are often threaded through with preoccupations and 
positions formed in them. As arenas in which the boundaries of the technical and the political come 
to be negotiated, they serve as an entirely different kind of interface with policy processes than other 
avenues through which citizens can articulate their demands – such as protest, petitioning, lobbying 
and direct action – or indeed organise to satisfy their own needs. These are spaces of contestation as 
well as collaboration, into which heterogeneous participants bring diverse interpretations of 
participation and democracy and divergent agendas. As such, they are crucibles for a new politics of 
public policy” (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007. p. 1). 
 
These ‘institutions’ in the ‘participatory sphere’ referred to above may be established either by 
statute or regulation, such as for participatory budgeting or advisory boards for health or education 
purposes, or they may be created voluntarily as a pragmatic or tactical response to a problem that has 
defeated unilateral approaches. The case studied in the following chapters is located in the latter 
paradigm, and is about voluntary partnerships created out of necessity by government and others. 
Many of the principles are common to both models, however, because the existence of a law does 
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not ensure the fulfilment of its spirit and neither does a voluntary relationship exclude the possibility 
of powerful mutual commitment. 
 
The case study in Chapters 5-11 demonstrates how the intentionally virtuous creation of 
participatory space can also be the unconscious and naive creation of a window of opportunity for 
exploitation; how the need for such space reflects a lack of relationship and familiarity, which will 
also makes it difficult for parties to test each other’s legitimacy and mandates without betraying 
distrust; how precious any meeting space is within a divided society and the difficulties involved in 
sustaining it; and the possibility of participants playing by their own rules and towards undisclosed 
goals. 
 
Collaborations of different and changing perspectives 
Cornwall highlights the fluid nature of participation: “Discourses of participation might be 
viewed, following Foucault, less as a singular, coherent, set of ideas or prescriptions, but as a 
configuration of strategies and practices on constantly shifting ground. They may be at one time 
oppositional and at another conducive to the interventions of particular kinds of agents, whether 
states or supra-national institutions. Spaces produced by hegemonic authorities can be filled with 
those with alternative visions, whose involvement transforms their possibilities. Spaces created with 
one purpose in mind may be used by those who engage in them for something quite different. Efforts 
to control outcomes can only be partial, and the impotence of initiating agencies to direct or close 
down emergent processes is part of their inherent dynamism. Factoring in the agency of those who 
are invited to take up, or come to inhabit, spaces suggests that nothing can be prejudged” (Cornwall, 
2004. p. 81). Thus in the iSLP, as will become evident, the fact that diverse parties agreed to 
collaborate did not imply that they would act in any particular way. Each had its own motives and 
agenda – and some viewed the project as a means to various ends. She quotes Scott (1986) in 
explaining how what people appear to be doing masks the subtle tactics with which they subvert the 
strategies of the powerful – and in the iSLP this was evident not only within community groups but 
within government and through their liaisons with external agents. 
 
The significance of context is emphasised by Bent Flyvbjerg in his reflections on phronetic 
planning research: “What Bourdieu (1990, p. 9) calls the ‘feel for the game’ is central to all human 
action of any complexity, including planning, and it enables an infinite number of ‘moves’ to be 
made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations, which no rule-maker, however complex 
the rule, can foresee. Therefore, the judgement, which is central to phronesis and praxis, is always 
context dependent. The minutiae, practices and concrete cases that lie at the heart of phronetic 
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planning research must be seen in their proper contexts; both the small, local context, which gives 
phenomena their immediate meaning, and the larger, international and global context in which 
phenomena can be appreciated for their general and conceptual significance”  (Flyvbjerg, 2004. p. 
298). This imperative to thoroughly understand the context foreshadows the assertion that I shall 
make in Chapter 11 that the ‘gap’ which this thesis addresses has been framed by an inadequate 
appreciation of contextual complexities and incapacities. 
 
Another determining factor in evaluating participative initiatives is the analyst’s perspective. 
By way of example, Majid Rahnema, after tracing the history of ‘participation’ in development from 
the late 1950s and how participation came to be embraced by governments and development 
institutions to meet their own political and economic agendas, then questions the bona fides of the 
‘community empowerment’ (e.g. Participatory Action Research) counter-movement. In this 
Rahnema focuses on the role of the “non-professional grassroots-oriented intermediary” hired by the 
development project “to do away with subject-object relationships and to replace the alien authority 
of the outsider with a ‘co-actor’ whose role was to intervene, primarily, as a catalyst in an 
endogenous process of self-regeneration.” (Rahnema, 2010. p. 136). This aroused my interest, 
because there was a team of facilitators in the iSLP with precisely such a function. 
 
Rahnema’s assessment is that “In reality, however, the change agent often ended up 
exceeding his role as a catalyst beyond all recognition. Acting, in most cases, as a promoter or 
professional of participation, rather than a sensitive party to a process of mutual learning, he became 
sometimes a militant ideologue, sometimes a self-appointed authority on people’s needs and 
strategies to meet them, and often a ‘barefoot developer’ lacking the professional competence of the 
expert. Few were actors generally seeking to learn from the people how they defined and perceived 
change, and how they thought to bring it about. The change, of which they considered themselves to 
be the agents, was only the projection of a predefined ideal of change, often highly affected by their 
own perception of the world and their own ideological inclinations” (ibid. p. 136). Rahnema could 
have been writing about the iSLP – we actually called our team members “development facilitators” 
because they were required to involve communities in driving development – not just to facilitate 
discussions. 
 
Rahnema continues: “With a few exceptions, due to the personal qualities of the mediators, 
the new instrumentalities of participation served to promote a kind of ‘fast food’ or do-it-yourself 
development, made out of the same old ingredients. On the other hand, the very patients who were 
encouraged to go back to their self-care traditions became dependent on the new breed of barefoot 
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specialists, either parachuted in from abroad or trained on the spot. In short, more refined and 
deceitful means of action and persuasion came to be added to the paraphernalia of development 
institutions” (ibid. p. 136). There may be some validity in such criticism – but does Rahnema have a 
constructive alternative? He then confesses to the dilemma of being unable to reconcile “two facts: 
that no form of social interaction or participation can ever be meaningful and liberating, unless the 
participating individuals act as free and unbiased human beings; and that all societies hitherto have 
developed commonly accepted creeds (religions, ideologies, traditions, etc.), which, in turn, 
condition and help produce inwardly unfree and biased persons” (ibid. p. 139). He therefore 
concludes his essay by moving ‘beyond participation’ to extol the virtues of ‘self discovery’ and 
‘inner freedom’ and to suggest that macro-changes (presumably what others term ‘development’) are 
less the product of macro-plans than of a myriad un-planned micro-changes.  
 
Degrees of participation 
The value of being able to follow Rahnema’s logic through to its rather metaphysical end is 
that it reveals the perspective from which his views are made – a benefit that is not extended by all 
scholars. His perspective illustrates what a value-laden concept ‘community participation’ is, and 
signals that underlying every evaluation of its theory or practice is a particular combination of 
values, motives and objectives that may be undisclosed. Similarly, it should be expected that actors 
in a participative process also have their own values, motives and objectives that may be undeclared, 
disguised or denied. Therefore an appraisal of participation requires a declaration not only of context 
and perspective but a recognition of the type or degree of participative process that is sought or 
practiced. For this reason a range of participation modes is presented in Table 1 (see Annexure A p. 
A1) which has been extrapolated by the author from the works of Anzorena and Poussard (1985), 
Arnstein (1969) and Hamdi and Majale (2004). 
 
The array of nine degrees of participation in Table 1 has government control at the top (1) 
and community control at the bottom (9), with a band of particularly collaborative practices in the 
middle (4 – 7). The models can also be distinguished by whether they use community participation 
as a means to achieve some other goal or whether participation is an end in itself – i.e. that a 
participative or collaborative society is the desired end state and that whatever products are delivered 
along the way are simply outputs. The means/end division lies between types 5 and 6: types 1 – 5 are 
typically used for projects, for which participation is a means; and in 6 – 9 the focus is less upon the 
project and more upon the recognition of community structures as a responsible and accountable 
element of society. 
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The implications of engaging within the middle band (4 – 7) of collaborative practices, where 
diverse stakeholders are involved but none is dominant, must be examined, because the whole 
objective here is for the parties to find value in their differences, pool their resources and work 
together. Such a deliberative act moves our debate deeper into the participative sphere to a 
particularly challenging mode of operation in which the stakes are high and danger abounds. It is the 
realm of cross-sector collaboration.  
 
E. Cross-Sector Collaboration 
 
A body of scholarship which has a focus on the mechanics and nuances of collaboration without 
presuming that the initiative is being taken by any particular party is represented by the literature on 
cross-sector collaborations. John Bryson, Barbara Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone (2006) have 
reported that “people who want to tackle tough social problems and achieve beneficial community 
outcomes are beginning to understand that multiple sectors of a democratic society – business, 
nonprofits and philanthropies, the media, the community and government – must collaborate to deal 
effectively and humanely with the challenge” (p. 44).  They define “cross-sector collaboration as the 
linking or sharing of information, resources, activities and capabilities by organisations in two or 
more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organisations in one sector 
separately” (ibid. p. 44). One of their conclusions from “an extensive review of the literature on 
collaboration” is that “organisational participants in effective cross-sector collaborations typically 
have to fail (sic) into their role in the collaboration. In other words, organisations will only 
collaborate when they cannot get what they want without collaborating” (ibid. p. 45). They also refer 
to ‘environmental turbulence’ – “increased environmental complexity, such that the ‘ground is in 
motion’”, quoting Emery and Trist (1965) - as a likely characteristic of the presenting problems – 
along with failure of a particular sector (e.g. government) to solve a public problem. This exactly 
reflects experiences in the creation of the iSLP – voluntary collaboration motivated by societal 
imperatives and the failure of the public sector, not by regulation or philosophy. 
 
In their paper, Bryson and his colleagues have developed a slightly more complicated 
framework for understanding cross-sector collaborations, in which the initial conditions are 
paramount in directly determining the structure and governance, process and outcomes – but that the 
process and structure are also constantly impacted by constraints emanating from the type of 
collaboration that is attempted, power imbalances and any competing structural logics. They also 
recognise that the structure and governance arrangements are both formal and informal (the latter 
was specifically excluded by Ansell and Gash). The result is shown in Fig. 4 overleaf, which 
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suggests a churning process, constantly monitored and adjusted with various inputs and influences – 
and yielding a variety of outputs from time to time.  
 




















From this analytical framework Bryson and his colleagues have deducted “22 propositions related to 
collaboration outcomes and success” – with the caveat that “the variables referenced in these 
propositions may lead directly to success, but they are more likely to be inter-related with, moderated 
by, or mediated by other variables; embedded in fairly complicated feedback loops; and change over 
time” (ibid. p. 52). The usefulness of these propositions is that they are presented not as conclusions 
but as indicators in a very complex and shifting terrain and provide very helpful tools for analysis. 
“To say that cross-sector collaborations are complex entities that defy easy generalisation is an 
understatement” (ibid. p. 52), they remark, and their final Proposition 22 sums it up neatly: “The 
normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector 
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22 Propositions related to collaboration outcomes and success 
As with Ansell and Gash’s conclusions these propositions are grouped – in this case under initial 
conditions, process components, structure and governance, the contingencies and constraints that 
affect these, and outcomes and accountability. Here they are: 
 
Initial Conditions 
1. Like all inter-organisational relationships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to form in 
turbulent environments. In particular, the formation and sustainability of cross-sector 
collaborations are affected by driving and constraining forces in the competitive and institutional 
environments. 
2. Public policy makers are most likely to try cross-sector collaboration when they believe the 
separate efforts of different sectors to address a public problem have failed or are likely to fail, 
and the actual or potential failures cannot be fixed by the sectors acting alone. 
3. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when one or more linking mechanisms, 
such as powerful sponsors, general agreement on the problem, or existing networks, are in place 
at the time of their initial formation. 
 
Process Components 
4. The form and content of a collaboration’s initial agreements, as well as the processes used to 
formulate them, affect the outcome of the collaboration’s work. 
5. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to succeed when they have committed sponsors and 
effective champions at many levels who provide formal and informal leadership. 
6. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they establish – with both internal 
and external stakeholders – the legitimacy of collaboration as a form of organising, as a separate 
entity, and as a source of trusted interaction among members. 
7. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when trust-building activities (such as 
nurturing cross-sectoral and cross-cultural understanding) are continuous. 
8. Because conflict is common in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to 
succeed when partners use resources and tactics to equalise power and manage conflict 
effectively. 
9. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they combine deliberate and 
emergent planning; deliberate planning is emphasised more in mandated collaborations and 
emergent planning is emphasised more in non-mandated collaborations. 
10. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when their planning makes use of 
stakeholder analyses, emphasises responsiveness to key stakeholders, uses the process to build 
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trust and the capacity to manage conflict, and builds on distinctive competencies of the 
collaborators. 
 
Structure and Governance 
11. Collaborative structure is influenced by environmental factors such as system stability and the 
collaboration’s strategic purpose. 
12. Collaborative structure is likely to change over time because of ambiguity of membership and 
complexity in local environments. 
13. Collaboration structure and the nature of the tasks performed at the client level are likely to 
influence a collaboration’s overall effectiveness. 
14. Formal and informal governing mechanisms are likely to influence collaboration effectiveness. 
 
Contingencies and Constraints Affecting Process, Structure and Governance 
15. Collaborations involving system-level planning activities are likely to involve the most 
negotiation, followed by collaborations focused on administrative-level partnerships and service 
delivery partnerships. 
16. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they build in resources and tactics 
for dealing with power imbalances and shocks. 
17. Competing institutional logics are likely within cross-sector collaborations and may significantly 
influence the extent to which collaborations can agree on essential elements of process, structure, 
governance and desired outcomes. 
 
Outcomes and Accountability 
18. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they build on individuals’ 
and organisations’ self-interests and each sector’s characteristic strengths while finding ways to 
minimise, overcome or compensate for each sector’s characteristic weaknesses. 
19. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they produce positive 
first, second and third order effects. 
20. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they are resilient and 
engage in regular reassessments. 
21. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to be successful when they have an accountability 
system that tracks inputs, processes and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering, 
interpreting and using data; and use a results management system that is built on strong 
relationships with key political and professional constituencies. 
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22. The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector 
collaborations.  
(Bryson et al, 2006. p. 46-52). 
 
This analysis by Bryson et al ventures into the territory of Gaventa’s 2nd challenge: “to go beyond 
civil society or state-based approaches to focus on their intersection – through new forms of 
participation, responsiveness and accountability” (Gaventa, 2004. p. 27) – and in Chapter 10 the 22 
Propositions will be combined with Ansell and Gash’s Contingency Theory to create a platform for 
comprehending the scope of what in this thesis are referred to as Enabler functions.  
 
F. Key Actors: Who or what keeps collaborations going?. 
 
Ansell and Gash identified ‘facilitative leadership’ as “a critical ingredient in bringing parties to the 
table and for steering them through the rough patches of the collaborative process... Although 
“unassisted” negotiations are sometimes possible, the literature overwhelmingly finds that facilitative 
leadership is important for bringing stakeholders together and getting them to engage each other in a 
collaborative spirit” (Ansell and Gash, 2008. p. 12). They then quote Susskind and Cruikshank 
(1987) in suggesting that three increasing degrees of intervention can be applied: facilitation, 
mediation and nonbinding arbitration (in which the arbitrator offers a solution). 
 
They emphasise that leadership is crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground rules, 
building trust, facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual gains; for embracing, empowering and 
involving stakeholders and then mobilising them to move forward (Vangen and Huxham, 2003); for 
acting as a steward of the process, focused on promoting and safeguarding the process rather than 
taking action as an individual leader (Chrislip and Larson, 1994); for providing adequate 
management of the collaborative process, maintaining ‘technical credibility’, and ensuring that the 
collaboration is empowered to make credible and convincing decisions that are acceptable to all 
(Ryan, 2001). Ansell and Gash suggest that collaborative leaders must have the skills to promote 
broad and active participation, ensure broad-based influence and control, facilitate productive group 
dynamics and extend the scope of the process. Furthermore, there may be more than one person 
exercising leadership of a collaboration, formally or informally (Lasker and Weiss, 2001). Huxham 
and Vangen (2000) emphasise that collaborative leadership is likely to be time, resource and skill 
intensive. 
 
From where are such leaders drawn? Ansell and Gash place their greatest emphasis on the 
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work that is required to empower weaker stakeholders and to ensure a balance of power within a 
collaboration. They recommend that where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is 
relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can 
successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders 
accept and trust, who might be a professional mediator. On the other hand, they suggest, where 
power distribution or incentives to participate are more unequal collaborative governance is more 
likely to succeed if there is a strong leader who emerges from the community of stakeholders. The 
view of Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) is that success depends on leadership of many different 
kinds, and they highlight leadership roles such as sponsors, champions, boundary spanners and 
facilitators. They also quote Huxham and Vangen (2005), who argue that leadership, in the sense of 
‘what makes things happen’, also occurs through structures and processes. It should be noted that all 
of these analyses focus on the performance of ‘functions’ by ‘leaders’. In my analysis of the iSLP I 
found that the key to success lay in people who were not necessarily leaders and whose roles 
exceeded their official functions. They are Enablers, whom I introduce in Chapter 4 and whose 
activities constitute an important focus of this thesis. 
 
Roles in preparing for a collaboration 
For the preparatory phase of a collaboration the literature suggests that: a brokering 
organisation or a legitimate convenor can facilitate collaboration formation (Gray, 1989; Waddock, 
1986); powerful sponsors or brokering organisations draw attention to an important public problem 
and accord it legitimacy within a stakeholder group (Crosby and Bryson, 2005); and convenors  (e.g. 
a mayor), who are often recognised as boundary-spanning leaders with credibility in multiple arenas 
touched by the problem  (Kastan 2000), can draw together an initial set of stakeholders (Gray, 1989). 
They also highlight the role that prior relationships between individuals in different parties play in 
judging the trustworthiness or legitimacy of key stakeholders. 
 
Roles in the collaborative process 
Then within the collaborative process itself, Bryson and his colleagues focus on six 
components: forging initial agreements, building leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, 
managing conflict and planning. On the first point they arrive at the simple proposition that “the 
form and content of a collaboration’s initial agreements, as well as the processes used to formulate 
them, affect the outcomes of the collaboration’s work” (Bryson et al, 2006. p. 47). Curiously, they 
make no mention of a need for any kind of facilitator here. With regard to the building of leadership, 
however, the authors state that collaborations provide multiple roles for formal and informal leaders 
of committees, projects, work groups, etc. whom, in order to be effective, require formal and 
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informal authority, vision, long-term commitment to the collaboration, integrity and relational and 
political skills (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Gray, 1989; Waddock, 1986). They identify two key 
leadership roles, provided by ‘sponsors’ and ‘champions’. They describe sponsors as individuals who 
have considerable prestige, authority and access to resources that they can use on behalf of the 
collaboration, even if they are not involved in the day-to-day collaborative work; and champions are 
people who focus intently on keeping the collaboration going and use process skills to help the 
collaboration accomplish its goals. 
 
Their focus on ‘building legitimacy’ is apt: “When a newly organised entity is a network of 
organisations, not a single organisation, how does the network gain legitimacy to begin with? A 
network of collaborators is not automatically regarded by others – insiders or outsiders – as a 
legitimate organisational entity because it is less understandable and recognisable than more 
traditional and conventional forms, such as bureaucratic structures” (Bryson et al, 2006. p. 47). 
Bryson and his colleagues make no mention of the need for particular roles here, whereas they could 
be essential. The same comment applies regarding the building of trust between the parties – it is 
possible that individually the participants see no reason to trust their counterparts, needing some kind 
of agent to ensure that it is nurtured to a constructive level, even if it is not declared publicly. 
 
To manage conflict Bryson et al recommend in their paper that because conflict is common 
in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when partners use resources 
and tactics to equalise power and manage conflict effectively. They do not elaborate on the 
techniques that might be used and whether any third parties might be required. Their final comment 
on the collaboration process is to identify two alternative planning approaches for a collaboration: 
deliberate, step-by-step planning on the basis of agreed goals – or an emergent planning process, in 
which a clear understanding of mission, goals, roles and action steps emerges over time. The notion 
that each of these would require an enabling function, the first to ensure good order and the second to 
keep the relationship going until something tangible appeared, is not addressed by the authors. 
 
Collaboration structures 
In considering the structure and governance of collaborations Bryson and his colleagues make the 
point that “structures are likely to be dynamic because of the ambiguity and complexity that is 
inherent in collaborations (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). Ambiguity rises from many features of 
membership, including perceptions of who belongs to a collaboration, what these members actually 
represent (themselves, their organisations, or a particular identity group), and turnover among 
members. Membership turnover may be especially important when powerful players such as top 
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elected officials leave, join, or alter their level of collaboration (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Kastan, 
2000). This ambiguity is further exacerbated by hierarchies of collaborations in which individuals or 
organisations are often members of multiple and overlapping partnerships. For self-governing 
partnerships (Provan and Kenis, 2005) in particular, structures may begin to blur among these 
interrelated, multiple partnerships” (Bryson et al, 2006. p. 49). This description gets right to the heart 
of the challenge: cross-sector collaborations are complex, ambiguous and only partly legible or 
comprehensible to most of the people who are within and around them – yet they are indispensible. It 
must be apparent that the possibility of the participants (who are each committed to their own 
organisations) being able to manage, secure and sustain such a process, especially at scale, for any 
length of time must be remote. Someone and/or something would have to do it for them. The authors 
stop short of mentioning this. 
 
The 18th proposition tabled by Bryson et al is that “Cross-sector collaborations are most 
likely to create public value when they build on individuals’ and organisations’ self-interests and 
each sector’s characteristic strengths while finding ways to minimise, overcome, or compensate for 
each sector’s characteristic weaknesses” (ibid. p. 51). This suggests a space that is filled with the 
strengths, weaknesses and resource contributions of its participants. That may, however, be 
unrealistic – a collaboration may be less of a ‘filled space’ populated by the parties and more like a 
‘managed framework’ to which the parties contribute positively or negatively, often temporarily or 
intermittently. The statistics of attendance at iSLP committee meetings attest to that (see Tables 5, 6, 
8, 9, 12, 13 and 14 in Annexure B). There may be a false assumption that a collaboration is the sum 
of its parts; it may be more of a no-man’s-land where the territories of its parts meet but where 
precious few care to venture. As we shall see, those precious ones are the Enablers. 
 
The extent to which cross-sector collaboration theory provides an adequate framework for 
explaining or interrogating the iSLP is open to question. The presenting problem in this case had 
multiple elements, each with long, tangled roots – and all infused with powerful emotions. There was 
a local issue to be addressed, but it was intimately interrelated with wider issues, and all within an 
ever-changing and volatile context. The definition of stakeholders was difficult and the verification 
of their credentials impossible. The requirement for patience, tolerance and compromise would never 
be articulated but progress and pragmatism would be prioritised, aided by the occasional tactical 
intervention. The notion of a model process, with blueprints such as those that have been illustrated 
in this chapter, could also be questioned: a model might be a synthetic illusion that leads 
collaborations onto the rocks. Perhaps all that should be prescribed is a range of stakeholders and a 
shared objective, which they must then find ways of achieving using their relationships and 
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resources, probably without much regard for rules. The creation of an alternative paradigm for 
development, especially if it involves inflexible institutions and hardened attitudes, will always be a 




This chapter has reviewed the literature concerning collaborative development from ‘community 
participation’ to ‘cross-sector collaboration’. The argument that has emerged is that of all 
collaborative modes cross-sector collaboration is the most difficult, only embarked upon in turbulent 
circumstances and only as a last resort, and is so complex that there is very little chance of success. 
By extension this must apply even more so to large-scale cross-sector collaborative development 
initiatives. It is likely that the hyper-complexity also makes individual cases extremely difficult to 
understand, let alone analyse – and therefore very difficult to accurately synthesise. However this 
review has been illuminated by scholars who have not only argued for community participation or 
collaborative government, or have highlighted the complications involved in the participative sphere, 
but have ventured into the jungle of cross-sector collaboration to document and try to comprehend 
what goes on there. Their analysis is acknowledged to be incomplete: Bryson and his colleagues end 
their paper with an agenda for further research and an expression of concern that the substantial 
challenges to researching this subject “must be met or else effectively addressing the major public 
problems that confront us will be unlikely, and some of the most important opportunities for creating 
public value will be missed” (Bryson et al. 2006. p. 52). 
 
 So there is an acknowledged deficiency in the theory – perhaps more of a hole than a gap, 
and the closing of it is very much in the public interest. This thesis will contribute to this process by 
not only analysing the context, structure and process of a case in considerable detail and with some 
‘insider’ perspective, but by finding that hidden in the heart of a successful project are a few radical 
but quiet activists – whom I call the Enablers. 
 
In Chapter 3 I describe my methodology, in terms of the paradigm that I chose, how it was 








Methodology: comparing theory with practice and finding the 
people who made the difference  
 
 
The previous chapter described my search for a literature which meshed with my 
experience over many years in the iSLP housing project. A bit like Goldilocks in her 
attempts to find the perfect porridge, I found that ‘community participation’ was a bit too 
one-sided, ‘collaborative governance’ rather too full of theory and policies, the 
‘participative sphere’ promisingly inclusive and then came the discovery of ‘cross-sector 
collaboration’ that was very close to perfect, but it left one unsatisfied. The fairytale 
metaphor disappoints because not only did the inevitable unexpected 4th stakeholder creep 
in, but there was no happy ending: ‘cross-sector collaborations are unlikely to succeed’, I 
read. Yet I had participated in a huge one that was every bit as dreadful as the others, but 
we had succeeded, and I wanted to know why. Perhaps we had done something differently, 
or perhaps the researchers had been looking in the wrong places. In this chapter I describe 
the methodology that I employed, first describing the paradigm and then the actual practise. 
 
The Methodological Paradigm 
 
I have explained the context my position, perspective and motivation with regard to this 
thesis in Chapter 1. This has perforce framed my methodology – with the result that I have 
employed the case study method (a single case study), a single archive, a very open style of 
interview and have predominantly used narrative in presenting evidence. I discuss these 
below, together with my appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses associated with 
them.  
 
The use of the Case Study method.  
One of my motivations for investigating and reporting on the iSLP in such depth is that 
there are so few detailed case studies available of large, socially complex development 
projects. I also had the advantage of unique personal in-depth knowledge both of the 
project in its fullest extent and of the contents of the only extensive archive. However, one 
of the constraints that such an exercise immediately introduces is that effective comparison 
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with other projects is only possible if the same depth of information is available and if it is 
both compatible and comparable. Exploring that was beyond the scope of my resources.  
An explanation of the value or merit of a single case study, particularly as a basis 
for abstracting general principles, is therefore warranted. I have drawn particularly on 
Flyvbjerg (2006), who expounds the value of case studies in providing “context-dependent 
knowledge and experience (which) are at the very heart of expert activity” (p 223). 
Furthermore, he challenges the ability of social science to produce general, context-
independent theory, and concludes that “Predictive theories and universals cannot be found 
in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more 
valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals.” (p 225).  
In my literature search I have drawn upon a predictive theory about cross-sector 
collaboration that was culled from multiple cases and concluded with a general principle 
that success is likely to be elusive. This thesis takes a single, very detailed case study of 
such a collaboration that was successful and is able to demonstrate both limiting and 
enabling factors neither of which were perceived in the literature.  In Flyvbjerg’s view, 
“One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to 
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. 
But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the 
‘force of example’ is underestimated.” (p 228).  Rather than enter this debate myself I 
would prefer to have my single case study stand on its own merits, in the belief that there is 
real value to be found in it. 
The use of a single archive.  
The use of a single archive can so obviously be criticised as a subjective, partisan source. It 
warrants a careful explanation, validation and justification.  A feature of the project is that 
it encompassed a wide variety and large number of stakeholders, many of them competing 
with each other for influence in obtaining access to resources: housing, associated services 
and facilities, and the contracts and jobs that delivery would require. The project was also 
of an extended duration (fifteen years in all), in which the involvement of very few 
individual stakeholders was maintained: key people relocated, lost their positions or their 
lives, and institutions of all kinds came and went – mainly as a product of South Africa’s 
huge, multi-facetted national transition in the 1990s. Consequently almost all archives and 
institutional memories of the project are fragmentary. As a prime example, the 
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responsibilities for the project within the two institutional sponsors/clients of the project – 
the provincial government and the municipality – were so disparately allocated, and to 
departments whose personnel, premises and (in the case of local government) 
organisational structures changed so much, that they eventually had no comprehensive 
record of their own. I have, incidentally, some concern about the welfare of the archives 
that I used after I have returned them to their government repository. 
 
The other collaborators in the project were ‘community organisations’ that no 
longer exist in the area and members of local communities which were with very few 
exceptions transmogrified through the project as individuals gained access to improved 
housing in a variety of projects. As a result the few organised sets of archives on the project 
that were created were by consultants, and only with respect to the specific components of 
the project for which they had been contracted – typically one phase of one of the twenty 
housing projects, or one of some sixty community facilities. The only exception was one 
team of consultants that was involved in the project from start to end, initially 
conceptualising and facilitating the collaboration and then co-ordinating the entire project. 
Theirs are the only archives that encompass the whole project. Their contents were selected 
primarily in order to closely monitor every aspect of the process required to define and then 
achieve a large set of objectives through collaborative means. Consequently as an archive 
of the project it is unique and unparalleled in extent. It has never before been researched or 
written up, and only portion of it has been drawn upon here: the records and associated 
reports and correspondence of all the meetings of all the committees, except those of 
individual projects, from when a collaboration was first considered in 1990 to its 
conclusion in 2005. The study, recording and analysis of this archive ineluctably constitute 
the fundamental empirical research in this thesis.  
The structure and style of interviews.  
The context and objective determined the nature of the interview process, which is 
explained as follows. It was the evidence contained within the archive which, upon 
analysis, revealed a very small number of individual participants amongst many whose 
consistent application and role made a significant contribution to success. I then made the 
decision to interview them, not so much to verify what they had done, for that was known 
from the record and from my personal witness, but to discover why they had done it, why 
they had committed so much to such a an unconventional and energy-sapping enterprise. In 
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other words the interviews were primarily to give colour, to bring life, to the personalities 
whom the record had highlighted as enablers. 
Therefore the interviews were open-ended, unstructured and conversational, held at 
each interviewee’s home or office as a pre-arranged appointment. In each case I obtained 
permission to digitally record the conversation. I introduced the topic by explaining my 
research and my findings of these few people who had invested more in crucial stages of 
the development process than anyone else. Some were surprised to discover that. I 
reminded them of a little of their role, just to jog their memory, and then invited them to 
tell me how and why they got involved in the iSLP. I encouraged them to reminisce about 
the tensions and pressures of the time, within the project, within the institutions that they 
represented and in the socio-political milieu in which it all took place. I asked them about 
their backgrounds – what shaped them to become the people they were, and particularly to 
develop the perspective, values or passion that was required for their role in the iSLP. 
These interviews each took about ninety minutes, although one person was 
interviewed twice in order to complete the story, and one interview was spread over about 
five hours in order to include a meal and some refreshments at my host’s insistence. I 
transcribed the entire conversations myself, thereby creating seven personal records to 
work from. To these I added some biographical detail of a late colleague whom I had 
known well, and of a senior politician drawn from a brief public record of his career. I shall 
return to these people, the Enablers, below, but must conclude here by reflecting that 
however fascinating and significant the story of the iSLP might be from a development, 
social or political viewpoint it is the candid glimpses of the circumstances of the enablers 
that brings it to life. That has been the benefit of seven very different conversations with 
seven very different people who for different periods of time had a shared conviction of the 
absolute necessity for the iSLP to succeed. No scientific validity is claimed for the 
interview record, or for the parts of it that I used in the final document – I simply used it as 
a palette from which to tint an important part of the narrative with a representation of its 
true colours. 
The predominant use of narrative in presenting evidence.  
The empirical subject matter of this thesis, although in some respects substantial is in other 
respects exclusive, narrow and restricted. The environment in which it is located is replete 
with complexities and contestation, and there is consequently a great deal about the 
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context, its nuances and influences, that is not reported on or even investigated here. The 
reason is that this thesis deliberately follows the perspective of an institutionally initiated, 
facilitated and driven collaborative project, in consequence of which other contemporary 
events and trajectories are relevant only to the extent that they affect the project’s progress. 
  
This approach can be illustrated with reference to the value of a ‘project’ for any 
person or group whose objective is delivery, which begins simply as a shared set of goals, 
develops into a business plan then becomes an approved and funded project and must then 
be implemented to its completion and conclusion. The creation, defence and completion of 
the project become the sole means of achieving the goals, and this is the perspective 
through which everything else is viewed. This is the perspective from which this thesis has 
been written: not as an objective view from the outside of whether anything about the 
project was right or wrong, but as an objective view as possible from the inside of what 
was it about this project that enabled it to succeed. This requires a holistic view of the 
project, and because of its length and circuitous journey a longitudinal view of its entire life 
is most useful, and that is best expressed as a narrative. 
 
The diagrammatic representation of power 
The thesis is visually illustrated with tables, maps and figures – which include diagrams 
depicting the relationships between the parties over time, which I have termed ‘relational 
maps’. These are quite simplistic and lack much by way of nuance, depth and analysis. I 
acknowledge this, in the same way that I acknowledge that the thesis as a whole is limited 
by not addressing holistically or in depth the nature and merits of external factors that had 
an influence on the project and its process. The relational maps attempt only to show 
visually which parties were involved and ‘on whose side’ at particular moments in time, 
without explaining why that was so. I did explore the possibility of creating more 
sophisticated representations by reading Clarke’s Situational Analysis: Grounded theory 
After the Postmodern Turn, but realised that the kind of data necessary for such an exercise 
was not available to me. I therefore used a simple, generic term (relational maps) and 
desisted from including Clarke in my bibliography so as not to give a false impression. 
The representation of ‘the Enablers’ 
The existence of a small number of consistent participants in the process was a finding of 
the analysis. I concluded that collectively, although they as individuals were mostly 
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unconnected to each other, they were an un-theorised group. In the light of their individual 
roles as consistent levers in the process I gave them a group appellation which well fits 
their effect and which has not to my knowledge been used for another purpose in this field. 
I then set about theorizing them in terms of their characteristics and the mandates with 
which they were empowered. Thus within the boundaries of this project and case study 
they as a group were retrospectively shown to have had a critical role in ensuring success – 
and on those grounds the concept of ‘Enablers’ was also applied to offer a model and 
templates that could be used to assemble a cadre of enablers during the establishment of a 
cross-sector collaborative project.  
 
The concluding argument of the thesis is that cross-sector collaborators should 
expect to encounter incessant turbulence and contestation and that they will be too 
preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration - and that therefore success 
will depend on the existence and activities of Enablers. That, I contend, has been 
demonstrated in the iSLP and its wider applicability in other projects remains to be tested. 
To aid such a process a number of ways of applying the argument are offered: an 
Enablement Plan, the modification of two existing theoretical frameworks, a catalogue of 
Lessons Learned, an Enablers Manual and some suggestions for further research.  
I chose not to reveal the names of the Enablers, but to give each a nom de guerre 
which would acknowledge my recognition of their role, and in some cases their history. I 
realise that this thesis begs questions about the Enablers of the iSLP and who they were, 
but the purpose of the thesis is primarily to reveal that there is an ‘enabling’ function to be 
performed in a successful cross-sector collaboration, not to stereotype the Enabler function 
with descriptions of those who made a difference in the iSLP. I want to give readers just 
enough stimulation to seek or recognise enablers in their own contexts without confusing 
them by presenting detailed ‘models’ for which they are unable to find a match.  
I have therefore summarising the assets that the enablers brought to the project, and 
listed the main lessons that they learned. However I have chosen not to reveal more of their 
personal lives because each one of them is and has always been quite a private person, no 
matter whether they have ever been employed in a public function, and I suspect that that is 
one of the qualities that made them so valuable to the project. I acknowledge that implied 
in my treatment of them is a respect for their integrity, and thus a desire not to invade their 
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privacy any more than I have, which is open to challenge. The point is that the story is not 
about them as persons, but about the application of some of their attributes to a particular 
endeavour. I have, on a point of ethics, obtained their permission to use the information 
that they shared with me, their appreciation of anonymity and a nom de guerre, and their 




The seeds of my interest in collaborative development were sown in 1970 when I read 
Constantine Doxiadis calling for ordinary people to wrestle with big urban problems 
(Doxiadis, 1969), and I became a devotee of ‘community participation’ when Jorge 
Anzorena sent me a signed copy of his book (Anzorena, 1985) and placed me on the 
mailing list for his voluminous quarterly newsletters from the Philippines (Anzorena, 
1996). Because I had not received any academic training in planning or development I was 
not provided with opportunities to put these ideas into practice myself, but my career led 
me into management and consulting positions where I could at least ask pointed questions 
of the professionals who reported to me and slip phrases into policy documents that would 
require collaboration to be practiced in research, planning or implementation – and, if 
possible, in all three. 
 
 My career had begun in the real estate investment arm of a large insurance company 
in Cape Town, after which I pioneered a movement to encourage people to exercise their 
faith at work in the city centre, before being appointed regional Director of the Urban 
Foundation in Durban – an influential, although in some circles controversial, NGO during 
the last days of apartheid – and there I became involved in the upgrading of informal 
settlements. One of my associates was a person who will be introduced in Chapter 4 as the 
Democrat, and a few years later, after we had both become consultants in a very sparse but 
needy field, he invited me to join him back in Cape Town to assist him in facilitating what 
would become the iSLP. 
 
I arrived in April 1992, about eighteen months into the collaboration, and until the 
end of 1994 I stayed very much in the background, was invited to attend very few of the 
thirty six meetings of the Policy Committee, and was able to establish friendships with only 
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junior officials and technical consultants. Therefore although I was at the hub of the 
activity I was personally and emotionally detached from the passionate drama and anguish 
that characterised much of the process in those years. But I made it my business to 
understand what has happening and what would be required next to keep the process going, 
and to articulate that by drafting policies, programmes, resolutions and correspondence for 
submission to and approval by others. In this respect I ultimately prepared the entire 
business plan that was approved by national government and wrote every progress report 
and submission. I was also determined from the start to compile a comprehensive and 
accessible record of the whole process, as a defensive measure in a very fraught 
environment as much as for posterity. I remember the moment when I asked the Democrat 
if I could amalgamate our two small, precious, personal sets of files. I had to promise that I 
would not rationalise the records by removing any of his indecipherable notes. When the 
project ended in 2005 our files had multiplied into a library of 250 lever arch files, which I 
indexed and deposited in the government archives. 
 
The iSLP Project Coordinator’s Records 
 
 Because these records have played such a critical role in this thesis I shall explain 
what they contain. They were begun in the days of paper records, and they contain the 
originals of every notice of meeting, agenda and minutes of every meeting that the 
facilitator – later project coordinator – attended from 1990 to 2005. These comprised the 
meetings in which the project was mooted, the meetings of both parallel policy committees 
(explained in Chapter 5), the technical committee, project management committee, 
coordination committee and team leaders meeting – all of which related to the project as a 
whole. There was also a note of every important discussion that took place, particularly 
between those whom I shall refer to as the Enablers. Faxes were used extensively, 
especially in the first years, and all of them, both in and out, are there – although the type 
within many of those created before the introduction of plain paper faxes has faded.  
 
The eventual approval of the iSLP in late 1994 (see Chapter 8) spawned about 250 
projects: first serviced sites; then housing, schools, clinics libraries, community halls, 
markets, sportsfields and ECD centres; and then capacity-building projects for the new 
residents. The records for the overall arrangements and approvals necessary for all of these 
are included, whereas the detailed information for the planning and implementing of each 
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project were kept by their separate project managers – officials and consultants. This 
library was the product of a deliberate attempt to record and safeguard as much detail as 
possible about the arrangements, approvals and obligations involved in the overall project, 
and it included monthly status reports with respect to project progress and expenditure. 
 
 It is also worth mentioning that records alone, however comprehensive, are unable 
to provide an outsider with an understanding of such a project. On two occasions during the 
life of the iSLP attempts were made to evaluate the project, the first by a multidisciplinary 
team from an international accounting firm and the second by a researcher from a state 
agency. Neither was remotely able to grasp the sense and dynamics of the project and were 
reduced to picking on some individual issues and reporting on them sagely. Their 
conclusions and recommendations were disconnected to the realities of the whole and they 
were actually of no value whatever to those managing the project or those to whom they 
were accountable. It was a lesson that evaluators parachuted in are no match for an ever-
present iterative process of monitoring, evaluating and adjusting – which can only work if 
it is a management function anyway. In a cross-sector collaboration the threat of a riot or a 
bullet is a much sharper modifier of management behaviour than the considered advice of 
an alien consultant. I make this comment to suggest that the perspective of practitioners 
who have pursued a lengthy, sensitive and risky cross-sector collaborative process is 
multidimensional and uniquely valuable – and although it has to be balanced against their 
subjectivity, the direct translation of their experience into the literature should be 
encouraged. I thus declare my position and perspective in crafting this thesis – but I have 
taken great care to tell the story in the chapters that follow in a manner that is fully 
authenticated in the files that I have referenced – and it has been endorsed by the Enablers. 
 
 In September 1993 I became responsible for organising the involvement of the 
thirty grassroots communities in planning the housing projects, and employed a team of 
facilitators who spoke the lingua franca, isiXhosa, and who proceeded to educate 
community representatives in housing development and to facilitate the creation of project 
committees. Over the next five years, as the capacity of government diminished as a 
product of New Public Management policies and restructuring, I assumed greater 
responsibility for coordinating the housing programmes. In 1998 the Democrat chose to 
retire and for the last six years of its life I was the iSLP Coordinator, with high level 
oversight for the 250 projects and programmes within it. Very sadly, the Democrat did not 
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live to see the project completed. The relevance of these details is that they demonstrate 
that from 1990 until about 1997, which is the main focus of the empirical research in this 
thesis, my knowledge of the project far exceeded my personal influence, responsibility or 
strategic relationships. This is not at all a story about me and my role, but the fact that I saw 
so much of it happen makes the telling of it possible. I have that unique privilege, and 
responsibility. 
 
 I was therefore able to regain access to a superb set of records with which I was 
thoroughly familiar and study the records of the early years quite dispassionately. I 
‘borrowed back’ fifteen of the twenty-seven packing cases of files and was very grateful to 
be provided with sufficient shelf space at the university. Every committee created within 
the iSLP has its own file, in one or more volumes, every housing and community facilities 
project has its own set of files, some containing six to eight huge volumes. There are also 
files for particular submissions, reports, budgets and approvals. They are all in 
chronological order but have not yet been indexed – perhaps they never will...  
 
I recognised my style and even my favourite font in the policy documents, but the 
minutes of the two Policy Committees and of the later Steering Committee had been 
written by the Democrat’s secretary – and they proved to be rich in information. On the one 
hand they told the convoluted story of the collaborative process, augmented by notes and 
correspondence; but they also contained details of attendance at meetings which I could 
tabulate and analyse. As much as the qualitative data revealed about tactics and 
manipulations, the quantitative data that I uncovered helped to define something that I had 
never consciously contemplated: the consistent and indispensable attendance of a very 
small number of roleplayers, whom I have therefore called ‘Enablers’. 
 
Interviewing the Enablers 
 
I was able to contact most of the main Enablers, all but one now very differently occupied. 
Most of them were surprised to know how influential they had been. Part of that was 
modesty, but I also had the advantage of having revisited and reflected upon the various 
records of past events and documented the history. My interviews with the Enablers were 
not structured, but were entirely recorded and transcribed. I did not want to know what they 
did in the iSLP – of that I was well informed from the documents in addition to my first 
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hand experience. My interest was in why they got involved and what lay in their 
backgrounds that enabled and motivated them to play such significant yet differing roles in 
a very unusual and often unpopular process. I was not on familiar terms with all of them, 
and I had no foreknowledge about what their answers would be. All agreed readily, and 
each opened their hearts and memories according to their own personality. 
 
 I was astonished by the differences in their backgrounds and in the opposing roads 
that they had travelled before intersecting at the Crossroads. Nobody could be but struck by 
the incidents that changed lives, polarised people, and shaped men and women for service 
usually at a later, appointed time. Afrikaner veterans, struggle veterans, socially-minded 
housewives, faithful people watching for a sign, professionals working for a new order, and 
people just minding their own business until history and reality gatecrash their lunch time 
constitutional. You will meet them in Chapter 4. These interviews, and the conversations 
and insights that they produced shaped this dissertation, highlighting the individuality, 
devotion and sacrifice of enablement and the stark silence within the collaboration 
literature about their pivotal contribution. I have, however, renamed each of the Enablers to 
respect their own peace and to maintain focus on the principles and the theory. They have 
also read and approved my text. 
 
 Therefore not only did the Enablers as a concept provide me with the opportunity of 
crafting a thesis, but their stories, even simply their presence at and around the Crossroads - 
which coincides symbolically with Gaventa’s focus on a collaboration’s intersections – 
breathed life into the writing and re-writing of it all, from beginning to end. For, on 
reflection, what kept me in the development field for so many years was its human drama – 
something that is not often captured in the literature. Those whom I interviewed represent a 
much wider community of Enablers – including the community leaders who caught the 
vision, the facilitators who helped them to apply it and the project managers who guarded 




I have described here how I used the extensive library of files on the iSLP to trace the 
narrative of the project, particularly for the first six years; then analysed attendance at every 
meeting of the overall collaboration to document the actual participation of each party and 
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person and thereby discovered how narrow was the consistency of attendance despite the 
apparent breadth of commitment. I therefore called these people the Enablers, and was 
intrigued by their diversity. So I set about interviewing those whom I could still find in 
order to learn why they made such a committed contribution – what were their 
backgrounds and motivations. The outcome was a large canvass full of drama and intrigue, 
held together, directed and mobilised by the personal interest of a few very diverse 
individuals. Had they not played their role the iSLP process would undoubtedly have 
collapsed long before the new government came to power. 
 
The Enablers are the missing ingredient in cross-sector collaboration literature. It is 
true that the literature references functions such as patron or champion or facilitator, but the 
literature fails to describe the motivation and commitment that is required of them for 
success to be achieved. It also understates the persistently unstable contexts within which 
such collaborations must operate, and by implication overstates the capacity of the 
stakeholders to manage the process themselves. Some Enablers may be functionaries 
within stakeholder groups, but what makes them Enablers lies within individual life stories. 
 
Chapter 4 will reveal how extremely distressing was the historical background to 
the iSLP and how a resolution by conventional means became increasingly difficult and 
ultimately impossible. The chapter will also introduce the Enablers in person, pointing out 
the nature of their backgrounds that empowered them to swim against the tide and in due 
course motivated them to believe that the iSLP was worth the sacrifice of commitment. 
 
 Thereafter Chapters 5 to 7 will explain and analyse what actually happened in the 
policy-making phase of the iSLP: an orderly progression of collaborative structures and 
processes, countered by a furious succession of ambushes, contrary alliances and hijacking 
attempts. Chapters 8 to 10 describe the terms upon which the project was eventually 
approved and how it was implemented through local collaborations, again not without 
some opposition. Chapter 11 highlights the features of the project which frame the gap in 
theory: incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity; and Chapter 12 fills the gap by 
theorising the Enablers and the mandates which help to empower them. Finally Chapter 13 
crystallises the argument of this thesis and suggests how it can be applied. 
  




Towards the Crossroads: A history of the crisis and an 
introduction to the Enablers 
 
 
This thesis is about the use of cross-sector collaboration to address major social issues. The 
issues that ultimately gave rise to the iSLP were three hundred years in the making. Racial 
segregation, discrimination and oppression in South Africa began well before the invention 
of apartheid, and the place where it began and where over time prejudice against ‘black’ 
people ran deepest and longest, is Cape Town, where this story is located. The dreadful 
background is important, for the narrative in this Chapter spans only some sixteen years 
from some of the worst scenes from apartheid in 1974 to just after the capitulation of the 
apartheid government. I have therefore also documented the prior history of housing 
provision for black residents of Cape Town until 1974 in order to paint a fuller picture of 
the context upon which my thesis has been built, and it is appended here as Annexure F. 
 
This Chapter describes how the compression of those multiple discriminatory 
attitudes, policies and actions eventually erupted as a violent social crisis at a place called 
Crossroads. There a minor relaxation of state control had triggered an overwhelming 
demand for space in a tiny triangle of land. Unscrupulous profiteers took control, who in 
turn were aided and abetted by an unscrupulous government in a violent scandal which 
forced sixty thousand people to flee their flimsy shanties and made Crossroads a globally 
recognised icon of apartheid callousness. However over the next fifteen years apartheid 
proved to be no match for either urbanisation or the forces for change and whilst the 
government tottered towards repentance the Crossroads crisis festered into a volatile 
stalemate. Fortunately there was a small number of quite diverse people who shared a 
belief that Crossroads and all that it symbolised could be redeemed. They are introduced in 
this chapter as the Enablers, because they will have an influence for good out of all 
proportion to their status or experience. 
 
Housing at the Crossroads 
 
In 1974 a few shacks were erected next to a crossroads in a triangle of unused land to the 
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east of Nyanga bounded by Lansdowne and Klipfontein Roads and Mahobe Drive (see 
Map 2 below). They were constructed by people who were told by unspecified ‘white men’ 
that they could no longer stay on Brown’s Farm in nearby Philippi. When asked where they 
should go, they were told “to the Crossroads”. Around the Easter weekend of the following 
year many more people arrived at Crossroads, swelling the number of dwellings to around 
1 100 by August 1975. At first the settlement was tolerated by the authorities as a 
temporary camp. By 1977 it had 18 000 inhabitants. (Terreblanche, 2002. p. 185).  
Map 2. Crossroads 1974

















In 1977 an amendment to the Illegal Squatting Act empowered Bantu Affairs officials to 
demolish shacks without a court order. They wasted no time and demolished the squatter 
areas of Unibel and Modderdam near the airport. KTC, located west of Nyanga, was 
tolerated, but Crossroads was the next target. However the women of Crossroads, 
supported by the Black Sash and other civil society organisations, mounted a ‘Save 
Crossroads’ campaign and in 1978 won a declaration by the Cape Supreme Court that 
Crossroads was an ‘emergency camp’ and that the state must supply water taps and remove 
refuse and night-soil for the payment by residents of a nominal fee (Bickford-Smith et al, 
1999. p. 182-185). News of this victory, combined with persistent urbanisation, prompted a 
proliferation of shack settlements in the vicinity of Crossroads and in open spaces within 
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the townships of Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu (see Map 1 in Annexure F p. F7).  
In 1979 Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana formed a group of Crossroads men into a 
Residents’ Committee and, as rep[orted by the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry, “turned 
Crossroads into his personal fiefdom, raising numerous taxes by means of which he could 
reward himself and his male enforcers with salaries and ‘community cars’”. (Bickford-
Smith et al, 1999. p. 215). In May of that year, as a result of negotiations that included the 
Urban Foundation, Dr. Piet Koornhof, national Minister of Co-operation and Development, 
made an exclusive concession to Crossroads – that its residents would be enumerated and 
that those who wished to stay and who qualified in terms of certain criteria would be 
granted temporary urban rights and be provided with formal housing in an area between 
Nyanga and Guguletu. 1 As a result of this unprecedented decision the demand for space in 
Crossroads, associated with an implied right to ‘stake a claim’ for a house, became 
immense. Ngxobongwana and his deputy controlled the ‘housing lists’, charging residents 
to have their names included. 2
 
  
Introducing the Veteran 
The Veteran made the acquaintance of Johnson Ngxobongwana soon after minister 
Koornhof’s concession to Crossroads. He had joined the underground movement of 
the ANC military wing Mkonto we Sizwe (MK) soon after the ANC’s banning in 
1960 and for many years was actively involved in clandestinely moving people, 
arms and food parcels in and out of Cape Town on instructions of the external ANC 
structures. He lived in a local township, and in spite of the general mutual 
antagonism between residents of townships and informal settlements he maintained 
good relationships with some of the warlords because dense informal settlements 
such as Lusaka and Nyanga Bush (see Map 3 below) were ideal places for hiding 
MK personnel.  
 
Over the next few years, in response to an ANC ‘Programme of Action’ that civic 
associations be created that were not overtly political, he and others canvassed in 
the townships for the creation of the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). By 
1982 there were about 32 such civic organisations in Cape Town, (Bickford-Smith 
et al, 199. p. 208) with the WCCA representing black communities as one of three 
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‘umbrella’ organisations. One of the instructions that the Veteran had received from 
his handlers in the ANC in Exile was to get close to Johnson Ngxobongwana, the 
Crossroads warlord, and draw him and his people into the Western Cape Civics. He 
responded by spending entire days with Ngxobongwana, having his meals with him, 
and eventually inducing him to become chairperson of the WCCA and to bring 
many of his followers with him.3
 
 
Koornhof’s promised housing project for Crossroads residents, ‘New Crossroads’ was 
located a kilometre away and its first phase of about 1 100 houses was completed in 1981. 
However in 1983 the government announced a new grand plan: all black people who had 
the right to stay in the Cape Peninsula would be housed in a huge new ‘city’ on the urban 
edge to be named Khayelitsha (‘New Place’) - and the estimated 100 000 ‘illegals’ in Cape 
Town would be returned to their homelands. Khayelitsha was to be built on a 3 220 hectare 
site in the south-west of the Cape Flats that had been personally selected from a helicopter 
by Prime Minister PW Botha. 4 By the end of that year the land intended for Phases 2 and 3 
of New Crossroads had been appropriated by the residents of the ‘KTC squatter camp’ that 
had existed in the vicinity since the early 1970s, and who needed room for expansion 
(Readers Digest, 1994. p. 428).5
 
   
Introducing the Urban Planner 
He had been born in Cape Town but spent his childhood in Johannesburg and then 
Nairobi, where his secondary school became increasingly multi-racial during his 
time there. After returning to South Africa he studies at Rhodes and Cape Town 
Universities and became a town planner for the Cape Divisional Council, under 
whose jurisdiction was Crossroads and much of the Philippi area to its south. He 
had become particularly well acquainted with the new Philippi industrial area and 
its old landmark – an almost derelict cement factory on Lansdowne road. It was 
there that he gathered with his wife and many others one day in 1980 to celebrate 
the opening of a clinic.  
 
A few months earlier he had been one of thousands of Christians from across the 
denominations to attend the South African Christian Leadership Assembly in 
Pretoria in order to seek God’s guidance regarding the parlous state of the nation. 
They had each been challenged to personally make a difference, and there Dr Ivan 
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Toms had felt called to establish a clinic to serve Crossroads – which was now 
being opened and dedicated. The Urban Planner had been challenged to pray more 
fervently for the country, and in particular to pray not just for peace but for justice.  
Through the months and years that followed he keenly followed the events at 
Crossroads, praying for a breakthrough.6
 
 
Tensions within a grossly overcrowded Crossroads escalated and at the end of 1983 it 
exploded in violence, when some of Ngxobongwana’s old supporters turned against him. 
The bloody clashes spilled over into nearby areas such as KTC. Ngxobongwana’s 
supporters identified themselves by wearing pieces of white cloth, and became known as 
the ‘witdoeke’. (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999. p. 215).     
 
The political sweetener offered to black people for the ‘separate development’ of 
Khayelitsha in 1984 was the offer of 99-year leasehold property rights to its residents and 
the abolition of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. Although the state announced that 
Khayelitsha would comprise 120 000 brick houses, only 14% of the 450 000 people who 
actually settled in Khayelitsha over the next six years were accommodated in small core 
houses (built with cement blocks), 54% in shanties on individually serviced sites, and 32% 
in informal settlements with shared services. A lack of job creation produced an 
unemployment rate of 80%. (ibid p. 212).  
 
The government intended that the first residents of Khayelitsha be drawn from 
Crossroads, but it faced considerable resistance and insistence from the residents that 
Koornhof’s promise to provide housing nearby be honoured. The population of the 
Crossroads triangle continued to grow, creating four distinct settlements: “Old Crossroads” 
in the eastern corner; whilst in the western sector were the satellite areas of “Nyanga 
Extension” in the north, “Nyanga Bush” in the centre, and “Portland Cement” in the south, 
as illustrated in Map 3 below. (ibid p. 212).  
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Map 3. Crossroads 1983: The 4 Settlements
Cape Town 21kms Cape Town International Airport
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Reinforcement and reaction 
 
On the national stage in 1983 the government was approving its highly controversial 
tricameral constitution, creating separate houses of parliament for the white, coloured and 
Indian racial groups and reinforcing the ‘homeland’ policy for black people - the affairs of 
black urban dwellers would be managed by white lawmakers. With most political parties 
still banned, leaders of civic organisations across the country launched the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) which rapidly grew into a powerful mass movement of some 600 
organisations (including trade unions) and 3 million people. (Readers Digest, 1994. p. 474-
477). One of these organisations was the Western Cape Civic Association, whose 




Introducing the Community Planner 
The Community Planner was one of the helpers at the launch of the UDF. As a 
white man he had not been able to find a political home in opposition to the 
government, and he was under the impression that the organisations affiliated to the 
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UDF were all either black consciousness groups or women’s movements. The UDF 
itself was a conglomeration of organisations, so unless one was in an organisation 
there was no way of being involved in ‘the struggle’. Therefore he and his white 
comrades had volunteered their services to the United Women’s Congress to help 
with the launch of the UDF. Through this exposure they made such an impression 
that they were allowed to form one of the only three UDF Branches – and he was 
elected chair of the Claremont Branch. 
 
His political baptism had occurred in 1972 when he had witnessed at close hand a 
brutal attack by riot police on peaceful demonstrators outside and within St 
George’s Cathedral. He began reading alternative literature, some of it on 
anarchism, and studied - working his way through a BA by correspondence. While 
employed by a town planning firm he won a bursary to the University of Cape 
Town to study town planning during 1979-80. There he was exposed to Marxism 
and was an active member of a reading group on Marx until 1983, when the UDF 
was formed and his politics began to take a practical turn.8
 
 It was not long before he 
found ways to employ his planning skills to advise and help civic organisations. 
The Urban Foundation (UF) had been established in 1977 by concerned South African 
business leaders to investigate and test viable alternatives to government policy and 
practice that would improve the quality of life of urban Africans. Its focus areas were 
urbanisation, housing, education and small business development. The UF’s financial 
sponsors straddled the conventional English/Afrikaans and white political party divisions 
and its chief executive was a Supreme Court judge – from an esteemed and socially 
responsible Afrikaner family. The UF had garnered very strong support amongst moderate 
leaders of all races, but was regarded with suspicion by the political left who reckoned that 
it was too close to both government and business and from those in the government 
establishment who still believed that planning and development was their unique 
prerogative. The UF’s Cape Town office took a particular interest in Crossroads, which had 
by then achieved international repute as a symbol of resistance to apartheid laws.9
 
  In 1985 
the UF, after wide-ranging consultations with the various squatter leaders and their 
committees, proposed reducing the housing density in Crossroads by a third and then 
upgrading the whole area in situ.  
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Urban war declared 
 
Johnson Ngxobongwana, who had not participated in most of the negotiations with the UF 
because of imprisonment, refused to contemplate a reduction of a third of his support base 
(and income) and accused the leaders of the satellite camps of having settled their 
supporters on his land. Furthermore groups affiliated to the UDF were established in 
Crossroads in 1985 and challenged Ngxobongwana’s regime. This initiated and ignited a 
succession of violent conflicts between Ngxobongwana’s witdoeke and the UDF’s 
‘comrades’. The police blamed the youth (i.e. the comrades) who were based in the satellite 
areas, and commended Ngxobongwana for keeping his area under control. The police also 
recommended against the UF’s upgrading proposals on the grounds that in situ 
development would take too long and would create a product that would not satisfy its 
‘security requirements’. On 17 May 1986 the state’s intentions became dreadfully clear - 
the security forces sealed off Crossroads, and until 12 June allowed the witdoeke to set fire 
to all the shanty settlements around Old Crossroads, displacing about 60 000 people. The 
detail of the Crossroads saga to this date was well captured by Josette Cole (Cole, 1986). 
 
The Veteran recalls that just before this ‘war’ broke out in Crossroads he was 
instructed by his handlers to drive 1 000 kms to Bloemfontein to collect a ‘parcel’. Almost 
half way there, at Beaufort-West, he came across a huge military convoy heading for Cape 
Town. He alerted his comrades, went on to run his errand and then returned without 
stopping and immediately went to Crossroads. There he found utter devastation and from 
Guguletu alone 18 of the locally trained MK cadres had lost their lives. “After the enemy 
had destroyed whatever they could at Crossroads they came to KTC, and they knew we had 
externally-trained people here – and it was a terrible fight. I remember one woman comrade 
who was trained outside of the country – she was short, big and vicious and was armed 
with an AK – who was eventually shot through the head from a helicopter.”10
 
 
The refugees included a group which settled in Miller’s Camp, south of Klipfontein 
Road; some which settled in ‘Black City’ on the west side of Mahobe Drive opposite the 
Crossroads municipal buildings; and a group which settled on Brown’s Farm. Under such 
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Introducing the Democrat 
He was a small, quiet, determined man – who described himself simply as ‘a 
democrat’. He confessed to being a very private person, and his language was often 
unusually old-fashioned – he never ‘made a date’ with anyone, but he would 
‘procure an appointment’. He was raised in a public-spirited family and principles 
and ethics in public life were extremely important to him. He was a professional 
quantity surveyor but in 1982 made a radical career change and joined the Urban 
Foundation, which he regarded as presenting a creative and pragmaticl opportunity 
to make a difference in a very unjust country. He joined the UF as its Regional 
Director in Cape Town, where he began turning himself into a specialist at 
combining technical expertise with community participation.  
 
In the midst of huge public and international outrage at the Crossroads violence one of the 
more constructive responses was by the Community Planner and some fellow town 
planners. They decided to petition the government to desist from using violence as a 
planning tool – as it had just done at Crossroads. More than 150 professionals in the built 
environment field signed the petition, to which the government gave no response. However 
the initiators of the petition decided to invite all of its signatories to some meetings in order 
to inform them about what was happening – consciousness-raising, to use the phrase that 
was popular at the time. Some of them were already advising civic groups on planning 
issues in a voluntary capacity, but as the requests for advice grew it became obvious that an 
NGO should be created for this purpose. They created the Development Action Group 
(DAG) which offered training and mentoring to planners who wished to serve communities 
and offered introductions to situations where their expertise could be applied.13
 
 
Mr Ngxobongwana, who had been in voluntary exile in Transkei for most of 1986, 
14 had achieved control of Crossroads. On his return he set about reorganising his 
leadership, and in the process instituted disciplinary proceedings against some of his 
followers. One of these responded by leaving Crossroads and forming, with leaders of other 
informal settlements, the Western Cape Squatters Association, with the exclusive purpose 
of undermining the leadership of Crossroads and Khayelitsha. Although the Association 
only lasted a year, it demonstrated a different organisational model and was immediately 
succeeded by the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), whose leadership 
now included a former lieutenant of Nxobongwana, Jeffrey Nongwe. The aim of WCUSA 
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was to promote development in the black communities and negotiations with local and 
provincial authorities. At the same time Ngxobongwana was being wooed by organs of the 
government to become the first mayor of Crossroads. 15
 
 
In 1986 the national government acknowledged the inevitability of urbanisation and 
repealed its influx control legislation, but by then the situation in and around Crossroads 
had become chaotic. There was no effective local authority in the area so the provincial 
government had to take charge – and because there was no democratic urban black 
representation the only people with whom government could parley were the squatter 
leaders. Businesses in the Philippi Industrial Area, just south of Crossroads, found 
themselves in a war zone - isolated, impotent, increasingly victims of crime, violence and 
land invasion, and lacking any effective recourse. 
 
Introducing the Defender 
She had been born and raised in Brazil, but married a Capetonian in 1961 and 
settled in one of Cape Town’s oldest and most sought-after ‘leafy suburbs’. She had 
no family history of social or political awareness or activism, but in 1962 she 
decided to do some voluntary work and drove a van, delivering meals to poor 
coloured families on the Cape Flats. A year later she was introduced to the work of 
the Black Sash by a friend and joined the movement. One of her reasons for joining 
was that in Brazil the government fought mass illiteracy by establishing night 
schools all over the country whereas the South African government was closing 
down night schools on the grounds that they were subversive. Another factor that 
stirred her into action was that she had encountered some of the tragic consequences 
of the Group Areas Act. 
 
The Defender recalls that in the 1960’s the Black Sash believed that if only people 
in power could be shown the evidence of the destructive nature of their policies 
they would change them. She would therefore join fact-finding missions to migrant 
labour hostels and then seek appointments with cabinet ministers to explain the 
implications of government policy and make recommendations for how it should be 
changed. She would join a team attending a Group Areas Hearing at which it was 
determined where people may live. Black Sash members, all perfectly attired with 
hats and gloves as well as their black sashes, would make formal protests at the 
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hearings, which were always ignored. By the end of that decade the Black Sash 
realised that reason would not prevail but continued employing demonstration as a 
strategy, in addition to running their advice offices to guide victims of apartheid. 
They mounted silent demonstrations at significant locations and events, such as the 
route used for the opening of parliament – and she reflects on how they learned to 
encapsulate the essence of their protest in just four words on a placard. She clearly 
remembers the demonstrations at St George’s cathedral in 1972 (in which the 
Community Planner had first encountered the state’s brutality).  
 
She was well aware of her lack of knowledge and understanding of the complexities 
of both housing problems and inter-community tensions and politics. They were 
also limitations to the capacity of the Black Sash – she recalls the organisation 
having to decline a rare invitation to monitor a local government election in 
Crossroads because they lacked the necessary resources or knowledge. “We felt 
very bad,” she recalls, “because obviously there was need for an impartial agency to 
be present.” There was also a period when she was obliged to chair weekly 
meetings of all the different squatter groups that were threatened with bulldozing 
and eviction, and who accused each other of corruption and taking sides. “Those 
meetings were terrible...there was huge mistrust and anxiety – they didn’t know 
whether to accept the bona fides of the lawyers who were trying to help them, 
whether the government was telling the truth, whom to believe – it was a terrible 
time.” In 1986, at the height of the Crossroads conflagration, the Defender was 
elected national president of the Black Sash for a four-year term.16
 
 
In the early 1980s the government had made a policy change to allow black people who 
possessed Section 10 rights to elect their own ‘community councils’ in urban black 
townships. Such ‘Black Local Authorities’ (BLAs) could eventually replace the BAABs 
and, so the convoluted thinking went, these new structures could eventually be tied to 
Bantustans. (Terreblanche, 2002. p. 332). However, when the tricameral parliament was 
established in 1984 it excluded urban black persons from the franchise, which accentuated 
the incongruity of the BLAs, which therefore acquired very little popular support and their 
councillors were widely regarded as ‘sell-outs’. Nevertheless in 1987 Crossroads was 
declared a BLA, and Ngxobongwana was appointed its first mayor.  
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Disintegration and decentralisation 
 
During 1988, in yet another change in national policy, a start was made to transfer the 
responsibility for the affairs of the urban black population from national government 
departments and their Development Boards to its Provincial Administrators. The challenge 
in Cape Town was daunting – the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) had never been 
responsible for the administration of the extensive and complex business of ‘Black Affairs’, 
and had no employees with the required experience. Included in this transfer was 
Crossroads, which had been the responsibility of the Board, the police and the army – but 
not the province. Black Local Authorities in general and Crossroads in particular were 
veritable ‘hot potatoes’ which very few provincial officials or politicians wished to handle. 
The CPA urgently created a Community Services Branch, and appointed as its Director 
responsible for Black affairs in the Western Cape a very experienced official from the 
disbanded Bantu Administration Board: the Wrestler.  
 
Introducing the Wrestler 
The Wrestler had very little idea of what he had let himself in for. He had been 
grateful for the offer of promotion and for a transfer out of an oppressively 
managed department in the Eastern Cape, but it had been twenty years since he had 
worked in Cape Town, and then it had been the coloureds that he had been 
administering. “Some of them very beautiful, too, but of course you weren’t 
allowed to look at a coloured girl in those days. A pity...”, muses the Wrestler, now 
in his retirement and the apartheid prohibition on crossing the colour bar long dead. 
He had been in Black Administration ever since, like his father before him – Native 
Affairs, Bantu Affairs, Bantu Administration then Bantu Development. Between 
them they had spent 75 years in the service. 
 
As Secretary of the Native Resettlement Board in the mid-1950s his father had 
helped to implement apartheid’s first large-scale forced removal of an urban black 
community from Sophiatown, on the instructions of Dr Verwoerd. The residents’ 
homes, to which they had legal title, were razed by the State and the people trucked 
to Meadowlands in Soweto. Sophiatown was redeveloped for sub-economic white 
families and the suburb cynically re-named Triomf. Twenty years later the Wrestler 
himself had been exposed to some tragic events – whilst working for the West Rand 
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Administration Board he had been in Soweto on June 16th 1976 when 
schoolchildren began their protest against the detested Bantu Education system. He 
witnessed much of what became the Soweto Revolt, in which hundreds lost their 
lives and which is regarded by many as the tipping point in the struggle against 
apartheid. He was seconded to help his Chief Director prepare evidence for the 
official Commission of Enquiry. With sadness he recalls the police and army chiefs 
telling him that although they were able to keep on shooting only he and his 
colleagues could bring about peace. “They were really terrible times”, he reflected, 
and would prefer not to talk about them. 
 
And now back in Cape Town in the year 1988 he found that his new employer, the 
Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), was completely and utterly ignorant of 
Black Affairs. Nor could he find anyone in the CPA who was remotely interested in 
or sympathetic to what was involved in administering an increasingly discredited 
and dysfunctional Black Local Authorities system. “They didn’t have a clue – not a 
clue!” 
 
But the Wrestler was no stranger to handicaps. At the age of two he had contracted 
polio and consequently suffered a shortened leg. “My whole life I had to get along 
on a piston-and-a half, not two pistons. I think that had a lot to do with shaping my 
willpower and for enabling me to understand what it is to be less fortunate than 
other people.” His early years had been spent in a rural area of the Eastern Cape, 
where he had learnt to speak fluent isiXhosa but at the age of six he began to attend 
the Hope Training Home for polio victims, located in Johannesburg. There he 
realised how greater were the disabilities of others, and learned how important was 
will power. Years later, on arrival at Stellenbosch University, he quickly realised 
that not being a rugby player was in danger of becoming another handicap so he 
resolved to take up wrestling ... and rose to become South African Middleweight 
Champion. “Sheer determination!” he reflects, “and in later life that was 
important.” 
 
The Wrestler’s regional office was established in a suburb of Cape Town and 
staffed with personnel from the disbanded Development Board. His team felt 
alienated by the management and administration in the CPA head office. Out in the 
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field it proved very difficult to maintain viable local authorities and for six years, 
1988-94, he had the added workload of having to personally govern four of them, 
over 400 kilometres apart. In that role the full authority, powers and functions of the 
local council were vested in him. “A fearsome responsibility,” he reflects. “You’ve 
got to have balls of steel to last.” And in addition there was Crossroads, in 
circumstances beyond anything he had ever encountered.17
 
 
In the late 1980’s some advocacy work by the Development Action Group brought the 
Community Planner into contact with the Wrestler – “It was funny”, the former recalls, 
“We were total adversaries, and I knew that he sat on security committees that probably 
had my name on all sorts of lists. But that was just the role-play that one went through 
while wearing those hats – what I did know about him was that he was somebody with 
whom you could engage in good faith.”18
 
 
In 1989 the Veteran was detained without trial in Cape Town’s Polsmoor prison for 
a year under the ‘State of Emergency’ laws. It was his third spell behind bars. Meanwhile a 
young planner in the CPA began turning his mind towards Crossroads...  
 
Introducing the Provincial Planner 
Educated at an English-speaking school and then at the University of Cape Town he 
had just qualified as a town planner and had recently joined the Provincial 
Administration, an institution that was staffed overwhelmingly with Afrikaans 
speakers and National Party supporters. Sadly, he was no more welcomed into the 
CPA than the Wrestler had been: “I was told that I spoke the wrong language, had 
my account at the wrong bank, had been to the wrong university and had the wrong 
surname! My profile did not match what was desired at any level – I was simply 
tolerated.” His job for the first two years was to consider plans submitted by 
developers of leisure resorts, but then in 1989 he was asked to focus on areas 
covered by Act No 4 of 1984 – urban land designated to be developed for 
occupation by black people. 
 
His first challenge was to create a Crossroads Structure Plan. It was soon apparent 
that the triangle of land known as Crossroads could not possibly accommodate all 
the people who claimed a right to live there – so the objective expanded to ‘a 
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Crossroads and Environs Structure Plan’ because much more land in the vicinity 
would be required. He remembers beginning with a map which was only A4 in size 
on which Crossroads was drawn in the middle with the N2 highway nearby, onto 
which he and his colleagues then drew the outer perimeter of all the available land 
that was broadly contiguous with Crossroads. It included areas of Philippi, Delft 
and Mfuleni – and took into account a possible future expansion of the airport, as 
shown diagrammatically in Map 3 below.19
 
 
As had been intended, the scorched earth destruction within Crossroads had created space 
for some formal development, and the first phase of 800 contractor-built houses on the 
western edge of the triangle had been completed. But so few Crossroads residents could 
afford to buy them that many were sold to outsiders and some sites remained unsold for 
many years. When construction began on Phase 2, to provide 874 houses to the north of 
Phase 1, 1401 households were relocated from that area to a ‘transit camp’ across 
Klipfontein Road called “Boystown” (see Map 4 below). Priority in the housing waiting 
list was promised to those who fulfilled three requirements: residents of Boystown, bona 
fide inhabitants of Crossroads, and up to date with their payment of service charges.20
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In February 1990 the first twenty of the Phase 2 houses became available21 and were 
offered at a monthly rental of 55 Rands. No applications were received from Boystown, 
and once again they were made available more widely. The people of Boystown were left 
feeling betrayed on the sidelines in their informal settlement, which more than doubled in 
size to 2 400 households over the next two years.22 In Crossroads the mayhem continued, 
in which Ngxobongwana was ousted as mayor of Crossroads by Jeffrey Nongwe. Violence 
erupted between the two factions and in September Ngxobongwana fled with his followers 
over the N2 highway into the southern edge of the Driftsands Nature Reserve. 23
 
  
A glimmer of hope 
 
The opening of parliament on 2nd February 1990 brought the Defender and her Black Sash 
colleagues out on to the streets again with their sashes and placards, never imagining that 
President de Klerk was about to announce the unbanning of the ANC and other political 
organisations and the imminent release from prison of Nelson Mandela. FW de Klerk’s 
momentous speech was the death knell for all the apartheid legislation, functions and 
apparatus, including the tricameral parliamentary system which had excluded the majority 
black population from representation. The House of Representatives (for Coloureds) and 
the House of Delegates (for Indians) each had extensive administrations, including housing 
functions, which would have to be dismantled and assimilated into whatever government 
structures were to follow. 
 
Introducing the Strategist 
As a young man he had decided that rather than follow his father’s interest in 
politics he would join the civil service as a town planner. He prided himself on 
“serving the government of the day” and had established a reputation for addressing 
issues with expertise and integrity. His career had taken him from the national 
Department of Community Development, where he was the Deputy Town Planner 
in 1974, involved with the development of Mitchell’s Plain as a new town for 
coloured people, to the top housing position in the administration of the coloured 
parliament - the House of Representatives. There he had introduced a holistic 
approach to housing in areas such as Delft and Blue Downs, incorporating assisted 
self-building schemes with technical resource centres, ensuring the provision of all 
the necessary community facilities, involving the private sector in joint ventures 
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and providing a professional social service to support vulnerable households. He 
believed that big problems deserved big solutions and was not afraid to innovate. 
 
Two months after Nelson Mandela’s release the Strategist transferred to the Cape 
Provincial Administration on promotion to lead the Community Services Branch, 
with four gigantic responsibilities: the administration and development urban black 
settlements; the welfare of the urban black population; all spatial planning functions 
in the Province; and the oversight of all local government institutions. The Wrestler 
was one of his three first line managers for Black affairs. The Provincial Planner 
was a junior planner, three tiers below. Not only had the Strategist inherited a large 
team of personnel from diverse backgrounds – he had also inherited the problem of 
Crossroads, its warlords and the incessant conflict there. He had never dealt with 
warlords before, or even with black communities. 
 
The Strategist realised that although his predecessor had negotiated the funds to 
build the ‘white houses’ in Crossroads nobody had considered how they would be 
allocated. “And it was war! I realised that we cannot go on like this, fighting about 
resources. Khayelitsha was running alright, but in these older areas nothing was 
happening – they had suddenly made this small injection of housing but there was 
no holistic plan. We needed to provide some hope and get a plan on the table, even 
if it was going to take time.” 
 
The Strategist still had to work out how to deal with Crossroads. He recounts that when 
employed by the House of Representatives he had been kept well informed and advised by 
the National Intelligence Service. “They told us that we had to adapt, without telling us 
what to do. They provided very good briefings, including reports on their research on the 
realities of urbanisation. Their message was that we had to adapt and in particular we had 
to consult and involve people – it wasn’t easy, but we had to do it.”  
 
Introducing the Sponsor 
In the years preceding South Africa’s first democratic government 1994 state rule 
was centralised, aided by provincial administrations, each with an executive council 
which was chaired by the Administrator of the Province. Provincial governments, 
led by Premiers, were introduced in 1994. The Sponsor was Administrator of the 
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Cape Province from 1989-1994. He was a lawyer by training but had established 
himself very successfully as an executive in wine and wheat co-operative 
movements. He entered politics in 1972, first as a town councillor in Paarl, then as a 
member of the Cape Provincial Council, and in 1981 made it his occupation with a 
seat in parliament. From 1986 to 1989 he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – 
a very delicate job in those last years of State President PW Botha’s reign – and in 
the subsequent reorganisation he was appointed Provincial Administrator. (The 
O’Malley Archives). The Strategist comments: “We were lucky to have the Sponsor 
– you could speak to him and convince him of things. He was a people person, a 
Christian with good values, and if you came to him with the right kind of message 
he was willing to adapt”.  
 
At this time it was not State policy to build houses in urban areas for black people. The 
tricameral administrations had housing policies for coloured and Indian persons that 
provided subsidised home loans plus advice and training for self-builders, but the State’s 
policy for urban Africans was to create only serviced sites, which were then leased at an 
income-related rent. The tenants could build whatever they could afford, but they did not 
own the land and were not given access to loans, so most dwellings were informal shacks. 
The few formal houses that had previously been built in New Crossroads, Khayelitsha and 
Crossroads had been political initiatives and were exceptions to the rule. 
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Crossroads had become the iconic contemporary example of the South African’s 
government’s absolute determination to apply its apartheid policies to the urban African 
population. Its control of Crossroads had been achieved only by joining forces with 
similarly autocratic and repressive leaders, and by doing so it had magnified opposition 
within the country and internationally. There was nothing constructive to show for all the 
energy expended except a few unaffordable houses, some cleared, scorched land and a tiny 
local authority run by white officials with a warlord as mayor and his henchmen as 
councillors. Meanwhile urbanisation had not abated – and in the 16 years since it was first 
occupied Crossroads had generated immensely more problems than it had solved. An 
estimated sixty thousand people were now struggling to survive in or around Crossroads 
with inadequate access to basic facilities. 
 
As regional director of the Urban Foundation in Cape Town through most of the 
1980s the Democrat had wanted to properly consolidate the settlement of Crossroads in a 
participative manner, starting with an infrastructure programme, but it had been thwarted 
by the politics of the time. He had since resigned from the Urban Foundation and become a 
consultant in the facilitation of community involvement in development – and in that 
capacity the Strategist had employed him to do some work with rural coloured 
communities in the Northern Cape for the House of Representatives. Now, in 1990, the 
Democrat was busy coordinating community participation in 100 housing projects across 
the country which were being financed by the Independent Development Trust. 
 
With adaptation as an imperative, but confronted by the multiple challenges of 
outdated attitudes and practices within government and of building real relationships with 
legitimate black leadership, the Strategist invited the Democrat to a discussion on 
Crossroads in October 1990. 
 
The Crossroads stakeholders 
 
This story has identified many parties and individuals who have featured in the Crossroads 
crisis at some stage. Thus far the main actors have been broadly ‘government’ and 
‘community’, and from time to time organisations in the ‘private sector’ and ‘civil society’ 
played a role. However, many of the organisational structures and leading actors in the 
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Crossroads saga changed over the period 1974-1990, and to prepare for what lies ahead it 
would be wise to pause in 1990 and record what forces were at work in Crossroads at that 
stage. Relational maps are an attempt to record who the main actors are at any time and the 
nature of their inter-relationships. The key to the symbols used in the relational maps 
within this thesis are shown in Fig 5 below: 






By this means the forces at work in Crossroads in the early part of 1990 can be represented 
as shown in Fig 6 overleaf: 
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UDF United Democratic Front WCUSA Western Cape United Squatters’ Assoc 
Ikapa Ikapa Town Council Khayelitsha Lingelethu West Town Council 
 
The right hand side of Fig 6 shows the State’s establishment: responsibility had been 
delegated to the provincial government, which also administered the Black Local 
Authorities – and shown here is the Crossroads Town Council and its neighbouring Ikapa 
Town Council (for the old ‘townships’ of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) and the Council 
for the massive new ‘city’ of Khayelitsha. The leadership of the Crossroads remnant had 
been co-opted into the Crossroads Town Council with first Ngxobongwana and then 
Nongwe as Mayor. And Nongwe was an office-bearer in WCUSA – the association of 
squatter leaders. 
 
Crossroads was not the only squatter settlement with autocratic leaders – a number 
of the groups who had entered Crossroads and later fled as refugees into previously 
uninhabited areas were led by autocrats, and these also joined WCUSA. 
 
However, those refugees who settled in open spaces within existing formal 
townships and within hostel complexes relied on support from the leaders of their 
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neighbourhood, most of whom were associated with civic movements and therefore with 
the United Democratic Front. They were implacably opposed to the State and all its 
repressive manifestations and to any allies of the State, whom they regarded as ‘sell-outs’. 
 
Between all of these refugee settlements was a cautious, competitive relationship. 
They each wanted to receive priority in any possible housing project and were willing to 
fight for it. It was reputedly also common practice for settlement leaders to extract tribute 
from their followers for protection, access to resources and for being placed on an 
unofficial waiting list for a site or house in a probably fictitious new project.  
 
In addition to these rather obvious and high profile actors in the Crossroads drama 
there were a number of other parties who had an interest in the restoration of peace and 
development in Crossroads and in how the 30 unserviced refugee settlements would be 
provided with something better. These included the other local authorities in Cape Town 
from whom any responsibility for African housing had been removed by the State decades 
before. The principal of these was the City of Cape Town, containing most of the city’s 
businesses, and which had a long history of opposition to apartheid. The metropolitan area 
of Cape Town contained over 50 local authorities, and should apartheid fall local 
government would have to be rationalised and the City would have a major role to play. 
The City Council was very concerned about the ongoing violence and disruption in 
Crossroads yet had neither a mandate nor the capacity to intervene. There was also the 
Western Cape Regional Services Council which was responsible for metropolitan planning 
and the provision of bulk services and on which the local authorities were represented, but 
had no authority to intervene in crossroads either. 
 
Business interests in Philippi, bordering Crossroads, had been badly disadvantaged 
by the violence and arson. Some had abandoned the area and those remaining were very 
concerned at the inability of government to bring stability. Organised business was unable 
to exert leverage in such a localised crisis and its main instrument for creating such change, 
the Urban Foundation, had been rebuffed in Crossroads. 
 
Some civil society organisations, including welfare and faith-based groups, had 
been very active in and around Crossroads, providing emergency goods and services, legal 
and other specialist advice and humanitarian aid for various lengths of time. In the course 
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of their work such people would have gained a deep insight into detailed aspects of the 
crisis, and be acutely aware of the damage that had been inflicted and its causes. The extent 
to which such organisations might be able to contribute to creating a development 
programme would require careful consideration, for some were more reactive than pro-
active in nature and had tightly prescribed areas of interest. 
 
Leaders of neighbouring black communities were very concerned at the spread of 
violence from Crossroads and the pressures being put on their own areas by the influxes of 
Crossroads refugees. These leaders needed development for their own people, many of 
whom were living in overcrowded houses and hostels, and their compassion towards the 
refugees was mixed with the fear that these ‘outsiders’ or ‘latecomers’ might somehow be 
given priority in development over those who had been suffering in Cape Town for a far 
longer time. 
 
Also waiting in the wings were other parties who were keen to benefit from any 
housing development – the service providers: consultants, contractors and materials 
suppliers. Over previous years the CPA had developed a reputation for awarding contracts 
to political supporters. These same beneficiaries were waiting for more. On the other hand 
those firms that had been excluded were waiting for political change and wanted to be first 
in the queue when the dispensation changed. But there was another huge group of people 
waiting for their turn – those who had been denied any opportunity for advancement and 
profit-making simply because of the colour of their skin – and they were determined not to 
be left out again. 
 
Trust is usually in short supply in such crises, but in spite of opposing parties and 
philosophies it is possible that some individuals from opposing camps have a friendly or 
working relationship. They may have worked with each other long ago, or found 
themselves sitting side by side on a journey sometime and struck up a conversation, or 
perhaps are aware that they think more broadly or creatively than their job allows them to 
act. These are potential Enablers: bridge-builders, facilitators, deal brokers and conflict de-
fusers whose contribution can be of great value. This case study has already revealed that 
there were potentially significant pre-existing relationships between the Strategist and the 
Democrat, and between the Community Planner and the Wrestler. The Veteran had a very 
broad span of connections. The Enablers include four town planners who shared an ethical 
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code – three of whom had attended the same town planning school. And as will be revealed 
in the next chapter, although the Defender publicly opposed the government she was held 
in high esteem by the Sponsor. 
 
Contrarily cross-party relationships might be used for personal advantage or an 
illicit or hidden purpose that is contrary to the public interest. The possibility of large-scale 
development can tempt opportunists to grasp control of resources, and a careful watch 
should be kept on the formation of any strategic alliances that are for such purposes. 
 
The accumulated indignities of racial discrimination, segregation and oppression 
had reached an awful, fiery conclusion in Crossroads. Development was necessary but no 
longer possible, a mighty government apparatus had stumbled to a useless, incompetent, 
halt. There were no alternative institutions or procedures. But there were some potential 
Enablers who could bring some alternative attitudes, values and approaches to the table, 
and an opportunity had been created by the Strategist for the Democrat to suggest some 




This chapter has explained how accumulated layers of racial segregation, discrimination 
and law-making in South Africa eventually erupted in a place called Crossroads, producing 
unmanageable waves of chaos and violence which rendered the place undevelopable. The 
argument presented by this chapter is that Crossroads became a candidate for cross-sector 
collaboration because of the extreme turbulence of its environment and the inability of any 
party to unilaterally, or even bilaterally, resolve the social crisis. The contribution of this 
chapter to the main argument of this thesis is to reveal the stage upon which the empirical 
drama of this thesis will be played, and to introduce the characters who will carry the plot 
through to its successful conclusion.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces the terms of the proposal to collaborate and the process 
whereby Enablers canvassed its acceptability among stakeholders and presently launched 
the cross-sector collaboration. But a counter-plot emerges which will eventually fuel the 
argument that collaborations are incessantly complex..  




Collaboration conceptualised and contested: Enablers and 
Disablers take the stage 
 
 
“Intersection is about people and ways of doing things coming down to a crossroads, not 
knowing what else is going to be there, and no one being able to completely dominate what 
takes place there, since there are many different ways to get there and get out. Whatever 
happens, people coming to the crossroads are changed” (Simone, 2010. P. 191) 
 
Chapter 4 verified the argument that only when an institution has exhausted all of its own 
resources might it venture towards the last resort of seeking advice from an implacable 
opponent. Such circumstances also provide opportunities for creative, thoughtful officials 
to explore radical alternatives. In this Chapter we learn that the Democrat’s proposal 
prioritises the victims, flattens the organisational pyramid almost to the horizontal and 
requires every stakeholder group to be included. The Strategist believes in it, the Sponsor 
endorses it and the canvassing begins. However not everyone is a believer, for 
‘development’ also signals possibilities for power, influence and profits – and in a 
combination of opportunism and protectionism an alternative proposal is secretly hatched 
by members of an exclusive ‘old guard’; politicians, officials, consultants, contractors and 
their surrogate and rather suspect ‘squatter leaders’. 
 
Nevertheless the Sponsor and the Strategist proceed deliberately, following the 
Democrat’s proposal. All the stakeholders profess interest and the parties begin meeting in 
two parallel policy committees, because some local authorities have legal standing but no 
popular credibility. The Technical Committee is established and determines that the needs 
are far in excess of resources. It is a challenging but promising start.  
 
A Proposal to Collaborate 
 
The meeting to which the Strategist invited the Democrat was held on 22 October 1990. 
Officials reported that the remains of shacks destroyed in the latest violence in Crossroads 
would be cleared away that day, which would make about 10 hectares available for 
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development provided that the 17–20 households still living in that area could be relocated. 
Although the government (and new Crossroads Mayor Jeffrey Nongwe) was keen to 
develop and formalise any available land in Crossroads it was obvious to the Strategist that 
the new political climate would require a more inclusively participative process. The 
Democrat was invited to propose a framework strategy for how the development of 
Crossroads might be attempted.24
 
  
He responded on 5 November with a radically different development proposal which 
was not driven by an imperative to develop the crossroads triangle but by an obligation to 
meet the needs of every community that could claim a right to benefit from and be involved 
in a Crossroads-based development initiative. Technically therefore, a comprehensive 
social and physical assessment of demand and supply was required; new principles would 
be required for prioritising communities and projects, ensuring that participative processes 
are applied, allocating sites and compensating people who may be disadvantaged; 
improved standards for infrastructure and services would have to be prescribed; and 
systems to ensuring effective communication between all stakeholders would be essential.  
 
To guide and manage the development process the Democrat proposed the creation of 
Policy and Technical Committees, each containing representatives of the affected political 
parties, community organisations, informal settlements and government structures – on an 
inclusive basis. He recommended that the Sponsor, as the most senior statesman in the 
region, should be the convenor or patron of the process, but that the Policy Committee 
should be chaired by an independent person of public stature. Furthermore, integrity in the 
participative planning process would have to be assured for the non-government parties to 
invest in sustained involvement, and therefore the CPA would have to be an equal player 
with all the other parties involved in the process and be without a casting vote. Decisions 
would be made by consensus. Lastly, the Democrat commented that although the Black 
Local Authorities had a statutory role to play in the process their (unrepresentative) 
councillors would not be recognised by the ‘non-statutory’ groups – so that there might 
have to be two policy committees.25
 
  
Such a project would require much more land than was available in Crossroads. 
Therefore a critical issue was whether the technical analysis should be incorporated in a 
proposed metropolitan land planning exercise or undertaken separately. Although he 
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considered that a metropolitan framework would be ideal the Democrat doubted very much 
if it could be mobilised quickly enough to respond to the needs of the greater Crossroads 
crisis. He therefore recommended that the technical team focus on the project’s needs but 
include among its members the planners who would ultimately drive any metropolitan 
planning initiative. 
 
The Strategist decided to test the responsiveness of the town planning fraternity and 
immediately sent out an invitation to participate in an exploratory discussion on the 
establishment of a group to consider the issues of urbanisation in greater Cape Town. It 
was addressed to twelve planning and development professionals in provincial and local 
government, academia and civil society, but in their private capacities.26  However the 
politics of planning made such a meeting impossible and it never took place.27
 
 It was 
apparent that there could be no short cut in metropolitan planning – there were too many 
structures involved (more than 50 local authorities in greater Cape Town at that stage) and 
too many issues to address. 
The Democrat’s proposal was discussed and amended in a series of meetings with 
officials in November,28 and then presented to the Sponsor early in December, who 
recognised that not only was it politically imperative to resolve the Crossroads crisis but 
that the circumstances demanded a completely unorthodox approach. After ensuring that he 
would have the cooperation of the Chairman of the Regional Services Council, Piet 
Loubser, he approved the proposal in principal. The Democrat began canvassing support 
for the process in February 1991.29
 
  
On 7 March 1991 the Democrat reported to the CPA that the response from parties 
(including WCUSA) had so far been positive. He was encouraged to “get the ball rolling… 
especially as winter is approaching”.30 CPA officials were hoping for implementation in 
Crossroads at a very early stage.31 So far the ANC, the Pan African Congress (PAC), the 
Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), the Western Cape Civic 
Association (WCCA), the City of Cape Town (CCT) and the Western Cape Regional 
Services Council (RSC) had been canvassed. He had learned that talks were underway in 
the ANC to create a national association of civic movements, but that for the time being the 
political party and the Civics would have separate representation.32
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During this process some of the parties made it clear that they would not be willing to 
negotiate with the Black Local Authorities, and particularly their unrepresentative 
councillors. It was therefore proposed, with the approval of the Sponsor, to organise the 
policy-making process into two separate but parallel committees. One, the ‘local authority 
group’, would contain representatives of the existing local authorities that had statutory 
jurisdiction in the project area, whereas the ‘extra-parliamentary group’ would contain 
representatives of community groups and the un-banned political parties. In addition the 
Provincial Administration, Regional Services Council and Cape Town City Council (which 
at that stage was not responsible for any of the project area) would be represented on both 
groups. The local authority group would be chaired by the Member of the Executive 
Committee (MEC) for Community Services in the Province, who would also represent the 
interests of that group at meetings of the extra-parliamentary group. The Sponsor would 
chair the latter group until an independent chairperson was appointed. The Policy 




The creation of extensive spatial plans over areas controlled by different authorities was 
a particular challenge. The RSC was a tier of government established nationally in 1985 
with responsibilities that included financing and developing regional infrastructure and 
metropolitan planning. The process of creating a Metropolitan Spatial Development Plan 
for Cape Town over a 10 year period proved to be very complicated and has been 
separately documented by Vanessa Watson (2002). One of the early approaches attempted 
by the RSC was to commission sub-regional structure plans for the city on the assumption 
that when combined they would yield a metropolitan plan. (ibid p. 28). One of these was a 
structure plan for the Metropolitan South-East, which included Khayelitsha, Mitchell’s 
Plain, Philippi and Crossroads, which would also require public participation. In April 1991 
questions were raised by a number of town planners within government, private practice 
and NGOs about how to integrate this macro-planning process with the proposed 
development initiative for Crossroads.34 35
 
 
The Strategist and the Democrat met on 15 April and agreed to propose that each party 
on the Policy Committee be represented by two councillors or political figures and 
supported by one (non-voting) official. It was also proposed that the appointment of any 
required consultants would be made by the CPA, but only on the recommendation of the 
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Policy Committee. It was agreed that the Democrat would draft the invitations, the agenda, 
an introductory speech for the Sponsor, brief notes on the agenda items for the Sponsor as 
chairman, and a press release for consideration at the first meeting. The Democrat would 
also provide secretarial services for both Policy Committees.36
 
 
Some implications of the proposal 
 
The Democrat’s proposed process was very simple: an appraisal of demand and of how to 
balance it with supply; the definition of principles and standards; and the assurance of real 
participation and effective communication. His recommended structure was also simple: a 
high-level political patron, a policy-making committee with an independent chairperson, 
and a technical committee in support. Involvement in the policy-making process would be 
for political parties (especially essential for those recently un-banned), organisations 
representing the stakeholder communities, and relevant government structures. A radical 
but essential recommendation was that all parties have equal value, and that the CPA would 
only make decisions regarding the project, including the choice of consultants, on the 
recommendation of the policy-making body. The separation of Black Local Authorities 
from the main Policy Committee must have been a bitter pill for their councillors and 
officials to swallow, but their illegitimacy was so widely recognised that a compromise was 
unthinkable. One of the greatest challenges to be faced in the project was to achieve ‘real 
participation and effective communication’. Some more of the implications of the proposal 
are explored below. 
 
The change in scope 
The early change in scope of the project is significant. Some CPA officials had defined the 
objective as the development of the physical area of Crossroads for its current residents. A 
critical ingredient for them was their close relationship with the witdoeke leadership of 
Crossroads, forged in a number of government-supported conflicts. This group believed 
that the issue was technical and that development could be re-started by procedurally 
terminating the violence and simply relocating some households. But a group of planners 
within the CPA had begun thinking about the Crossroads issue more generally and were 
formulating ideas about ‘Crossroads and its environs’. The introduction of a consultant who 
had been involved in the history of the area, but who was unable to ignore the immensely 
controversial history of Crossroads and the claims and interests of many parties, averred 
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that the technical approach was no longer feasible. He argued that the perpetuation of 
development driven by patronage and violence would be increasingly unacceptable in a 
democratising society and insisted that the focus must be changed to the many people who 
had invested in Crossroads, most of whom had lost dwellings, possessions and family 
members in the conflict and were now living in a variety of locations in the district. The 
fault line between these two approaches would become one of the defining characteristics 
of the road ahead. 
 
The claims of ‘communities’ to participate in the project was not difficult to 
validate because it had been the regularisation of Crossroads that had attracted squatters out 
of the ‘bush’ and into Crossroads. Subsequently it was the Crossroads violence that had 
dispersed them into vacant areas within adjacent townships. Virtually every informal 
settlement within Philippi, Nyanga and Guguletu had its origin in Crossroads. Furthermore, 
community leaders who were canvassed about the proposal appealed for the needs of 
homeless households in nearby townships to not be ignored so it was decided to also 
accommodate some residents of backyard shacks as well as the overflow from an 
anticipated upgrade of government-owned hostels. 
 
Parallel Policy Committees 
The proposal to establish two policy committees combined a commitment to inclusivity 
combined with a pragmatic recognition that apartheid’s puppet Black Local Authorities 
were of doubtful legitimacy. It was, however, necessary to recognise the de jure local 
authorities and ensure that their officials were informed and consulted by the provincial 
authority – the CPA. There was also the need and opportunity to engage the most powerful 
local authority in the region, the City of Cape Town, in the contemporary realities of 
development for black communities for the first time since the Bantu Administration 
Boards had taken control of ‘locations’ in 1973. (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999. p. 174). 
 
A related complication was that there were more than 50 local government 
institutions in metropolitan Cape Town. Their rationalisation was imperative. However the 
problem extended across the country, and was of such a huge scale that its resolution was 
postponed until after the national political transformation had been achieved. Whilst the 
restructuring of local government had little manifestation until 1994 it had a very drawn-
out disruptive effect on the project environment thereafter and its implications were 
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considerable for the officials involved. 
 
Political influences and personal interests 
Politics was a powerful factor in this case study. Political movements are framed with 
principles and objectives and are motivated by issues of power and control. Under 
oppressive political systems the opposition may have to be fragmented in order to survive, 
yet require unity in order to demonstrate some order and consistency. From 1983 until 1990 
the many political movements which identified with any of the banned political parties, and 
particularly within the Western Cape, associated themselves with the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), as mentioned in Chapter 4. When the Democrat began canvassing for support 
the main UDF-affiliated organisations active within the project area were the Western Cape 
Civic Association (WCCA), the Western Cape United Civic Association (WCUCA), the 
Western Cape United Independent Civic Congress (WCUICC) and the Western Cape 
Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA). Each had their own territory, leadership and 
agenda. In a separate stable was the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA 
or WECUSA), whose members were not the squatters, but the self-made leaders of their 
settlements, who justified their style with reference to traditional autocratic tribal 
chieftainship, not democracy.  
 
All of these leaders found themselves on the cusp of a new dispensation in 1990, in 
which the organisations that had been their passion would be redundant. Their personal 
ambitions and careers would have to be re-fashioned along an unprecedented choice of 
channels: political, business, administration, academic, etc. They would soon discover that 
there was no guarantee of loyalty or reward for past service. There would be intense 
competition, exacerbated by the return home of political exiles who had been living in 
completely different contexts. They would each have to look after their own interests. 
 
At this stage, however, the nature of politics and political alignments in South 
Africa was very uncertain and fluid – and would remain so for at least a decade. It was 
advisable, therefore, to structure the process along lines of local representation rather than 
national politics, and to expect and accommodate changes in political organisations and 
liaisons. This proved to be very challenging in a period of constant and rather unpredictable 
change. 
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The way South Africa would be governed in future would also have a significant 
impact on the public service. The CPA and the BLAs were packed with white supporters of 
the old regime. Transformation would certainly involve not only major structural re-
engineering, but a multiracial approach to employment that would involve widespread 
replacements of personnel. Therefore participation by this key segment in the Policy 
Committee included some anxiety about the application of ‘revolutionary’ participative 
development practices and fears that some of their careers might be prematurely 
terminated. 
 
Disempowerment for empowerment 
Although no legally incorporated institution in the public or private sector may delegate its 
statutory authority or responsibilities to a non-statutory experimental committee it can refer 
issues or proposals to the committee and allow the committee to make recommendations. 
The willingness of powerful participants to respect others and share decision-making 
processes with them is fundamental to a successful collaboration. 
 
The decision-making process to be followed in this project was crucial. 
‘Consensus” is a rather vague term implying general or widespread agreement, yet it does 
not mean unanimity. Its significance is in the attitude or intent that it portrays. No party 
was to be given a casting vote. Neither would decisions be put to the vote and given to the 
majority. ‘Consensus’ was part of the language used in South Africa for the negotiation of 
its reconstruction from apartheid to democracy. Consensus decision-making was a 
founding principle. As time went on, in the national negotiations and then in this project, as 
discussions became more focused and contested, it became necessary to progress to a 
requirement for ‘sufficient consensus’ – when there is sufficient agreement for a course of 
action to be actually followed. 
 
The CPA had agreed to make a number of very significant changes in its practice. It 
would no longer deal exclusively with Mr Nongwe on Crossroads affairs but would 
promote all-inclusive participation venture in an urban area. It was prepared to relegate the 
Black Local Authorities to a subsidiary role relative to community organisations, and it 
would plan on the basis of community needs rather than government edict. By being 
willing to equally partner all others in the Policy Committee it would submit to the Policy 
Committee regarding, for example, appointments of consultants. Nevertheless the Sponsor, 
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the Administrator of the Cape Province, would be Patron of the project and personally 
support and protect the initiative. 
 
That level of commitment was essential for the proposal to have a chance of success. It 
was no guarantee, however, for the stakes were high and opposition could come from 
anywhere. As Fig 7 below shows, however, a useful and unprecedented group of 
stakeholders had declared their interest by April 1991. 
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There was, however, some risk attached. The Democrat’s proposal was indeed radical, 
completely counter to the culture and experience of most of the existing government and its 
development agents, and vulnerable to criticism of being naive, idealistic, socialist, 
impracticable, foolhardy and downright dangerous. He had no personal track record of 
actually managing large-scale participative development – he was being driven by 
principle, by theory and perhaps by some emotion, having been angered by the earlier 
rejection of the Urban Foundation proposal. Unbeknown to him his initiative was already 
being undermined within the CPA and beyond. The stage was set for what would become a 
long and intense drama. 
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An immediate counter-proposal 
 
The Democrat’s development proposal was not the only one being considered within the 
CPA. A letter had been sent to the MEC on 14 December 1990 from the Khayelitsha 
Committee of WCUSA, signed by its Director: Development and Housing, who shall be 
referred to here as the Headman. The letter began, “As the formal and legal representatives 
of the Squatter Communities in the Western Cape, the joint committees of WCUSA, 
representing amongst others the following towns viz. Khayelitsha, Philippi, Crossroads, 
Miller’s Camp, KTC, Browns Farm and Nyanga Bush and the country areas within its 
jurisdiction, have now decided to approach you on the following issues...” These included 
the transfer of land to ‘the Squatters’, engagement with all actors in the housing process 
and access to finance for the supply of infrastructure. WCUSA claimed to have the “sole 
mandate on behalf of the total Squatter Community”, would insist on utilising technical 
experts selected and appointed by itself, and warned that “Squatters will not participate in 
any projects unless they are fully and totally involved as set out above”. WCUSA 
demanded of the CPA that all red tape be removed in interactions between government and 
WCUSA and that “all negotiations between the two parties be treated with the greatest 
degree of confidentiality to ensure efficiency and direction and to develop an environment 
of mutual trust.” 37
 
 
A letter in similar vein was sent by the Headman to the Strategist on 7 February 
1991, referring to “our previous discussions relating to this issue” and claiming to have 
“the final mandate to interact with yourselves on behalf of the Squatter Community” in 
order to gain access to land and infrastructure. He appended a list of the land that WCUSA 
had provisionally identified, amounting to “approximately 2 500 hectares and therefore 70 
000 erven”, and also the original letter that had been sent to the MEC. He referred to the 
proposed policy committee, and said that it must be formed speedily for the benefit “of 
other disadvantaged communities”. However, the WCUSA initiatives were in place and 
ready for implementation. Urgent action was called for, but on condition that WCUSA be 
involved at all levels of decision-making, that its consultants and advisors (which shall be 
referred to here as the Private Sector Consortium - PSC) be utilised and that all other 
“planning for Squatter towns be put on hold until WCUSA’s representatives can get 
involved”. It was not until 8 April that the Democrat had first sight of this 
correspondence.38 
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WCUSA had also engaged with the Crossroads authorities: on 11 February at the 
Crossroads Town Office a delegation from WCUSA had met with the Town Clerk. The 
Headman told him that WCUSA was “a sub-structure of the African National Congress and 
operates under the auspices of the United Democratic Front.” WCUSA required “to be 
included in all planning and development of black areas on a partnership basis … and that 
the community … have taken over the decision-making functions in this respect. The roles 
are reversed.” He referred to funds available from government, resources to which 
WCUSA itself had access, and that it was also in liaison with the Independent 
Development Trust,39 “... which brings us closer to the funding aspects of development”.40 
The Headman followed this up with a letter to the Town Clerk, in which he stated that 
“WCUSA is now in the process of mobilising the communities to occupy the existing 
unutilised infrastructure”, and after listing WCUSA’s development objectives reaffirmed 
that it had appointed specific consulting engineers and project coordinators to do all the 
planning, designing and project supervision.41
 
  
Contrarily, in mid-April the Headman told the Democrat that WCUSA was in 
conflict with both the ANC and the Civics movement, and that WCUSA would have 
difficulty in sitting around the same table as them in a discussion of the development of 
Crossroads. When they spoke again on 23 April 1991 the Headman did not raise the matter 
again, but reported that the WCUSA committee was very suspicious that CPA’s intention 
to install bulk services in Section 1 on the west side of Crossroads might be to allow 
Ngxobongwana and his followers back into that area from their refuge in Driftsands.42
 
 
Fig 8 overleaf depicts the relationships at this stage – even before the Policy 
Committee has been convened. 
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The background to the counter-proposal 
In Chapter 4 WCUSA was described as a structure created to defend the interests of the 
informal settlement warlords from the democratising influence of the UDF which had 
spread from the townships to parts of Crossroads. But now WCUSA was clearly on the 
attack, with a new spokesperson, the Headman, who was apparently based in Khayelitsha. 
What had changed the nature of WCUSA, why was its Khayelitsha branch interested in this 
Crossroads-centred project, how could they have appointed a team of professionals and 
who was the Headman?  
 
The roots of this proposal lay in an opportunistic relationship that had been created a 
year before in response to a new national housing initiative. The Independent Development 
Trust (IDT) had been formed in 1990 with a R2 billion grant from the government with the 
objective of breaking the deadlock in housing delivery. The IDT offered to finance projects 
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that could deliver serviced sites at speed but also with the beneficiary community fully 
involved in the process. Proposals came in from all over the country, and just over a 
hundred of them were chosen, one of which was for 4 000 sites in Khayalitsha. The 
promoter was a firm of civil engineering consultants, the community partner was WCUSA, 
and the facilitator was the Headman. Their project was not very successful and provided 
very little community participation, but it provided the Headman with more housing 
development experience than anyone within WCUSA or amongst community leadership in 
the region.  
 
Of added significance was the fact that the leader of the consortium (the PSC) had very 
strong links with the old guard in the National Party and that the Headman was an 
enigmatic, shady but highly articulate character with access to unusual resources, who was 
widely believed to be somehow a member of one the State’s many secret services. As a 
consequence he made outrageous claims about his organisation’s mandates and abilities 
and with the PSC’s financial and administrative backing he made audacious demands of the 
Provincial officials. The Headman and his associates apparently received a private supply 
of information on the Democrat’s proposals from within the CPA long before any 
organisation was canvassed for support and they had every intention of capturing the whole 
initiative for themselves. Large scale developments benefit not only the end-users – they 
can be very lucrative for people and organisations within the supply chain. 
 
Evaluating the counter-proposal 
A sober appraisal of WCUSA’s proposal was immediately complicated by the nature of its 
demands and assertions: that it was to be the only representatives of squatter communities 
generally, implying that no other organisations would have a valid claim; that it was a 
“substructure of the ANC and operating under the auspices of the UDF”; that it required an 
exclusive and confidential relationship with the CPA, implying that no other elements of 
government would have a say; and that “the roles are reversed” between WCUSA and the 
CPA and that WCUSA would make all the decisions, implying that WCUSA had a more 
valid mandate than government and demanded corresponding authority. Although these 
claims were spurious, to say the least, the circumstances in the country were such that 
nobody dare challenge them or alienate any segment of the ‘squatter’ community lest votes 
be lost or violence ensue. For the four year transition from apartheid to democracy most 
people with handles on power walked on eggs. 
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Whereas WCUSA claimed to be the legitimate heir of authority in black 
development in the Western Cape there were other parties, both within the CPA and in 
society generally who looked forward to an inclusive democratic order – not simply a 
switch from one autocracy to another. This was part of a huge and tortuous national debate, 
and here it was being mirrored at grassroots project level. Furthermore, the national and 
grassroots discourse were each so intense and consuming that they were practically 
unconnected. Democratic and autocratic movements were both fighting for control of the 
future. This project was beginning to reveal conflicts between ideologies of development, 
all mixed up with personal, party and corporate ambitions and fears regarding future 
livelihoods, in a somehow reconfigured South Africa.  
 
The validity of WCUSA’s claimed mandates was highly questionable. One of the 
difficulties with addressing large scale social crises and uncertainty is that trust is in very 
short supply, everywhere. Mandates are given and assumed and traded speculatively. 
Whoever might provide a benefit can be granted a mandate to see what can be made of it. If 
it is questioned or tested nobody knows how to verify the mandate or whether it will be 
altered tomorrow. This is a characteristic of a turbulent society. Under these circumstances 
it is probably advisable not to seek proof of a mandate, for some ‘evidence’ will surely be 
provided. It would probably be wiser to assume that none of the parties has a watertight 
mandate and to therefore ignore the issue altogether at first, accepting stakeholders at face 
value, trusting that the truth will eventually emerge. If stakeholders have been excluded 
they will find ways to make themselves known, and receive an invitation to replace any 
imposters. 
 
The other obvious aspect of this proposal was that WCUSA was not acting alone. It 
had already appointed the PSC to plan, design and supervise the implementation of 
projects, pre-empting any adjudication or accountability regarding procurement. They had 
their eyes on land in Khayelitsha which might be immediately available to government, but 
would be of no interest to communities that had fought to stay closer to town. Ultimately, 
however, WCUSA’s approach was consistent with how the apartheid government had 
operated, particularly in its dealings with the affairs of urban Black people: through 
exclusive relationships and secret, autocratic processes. This was ultimately revealed to be 
an initiative of South Africa’s old guard – politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats and puppet 
community leaders – with WCUSA possibly being little more than a ‘front’. 
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The launch: April – July 1991 
 
Towards the end of April 1991 the Sponsor sent out letters entitled ‘Squatter Communities 
of Crossroads and Environs: Proposed Planning Initiative’, containing invitations to one of 
two meetings to be held on 8 May.43 Each meeting was destined to become a ‘Policy 
Committee’, with one containing representatives of the ANC, PAC, WCUSA, the various 
Civics, Hostel Dwellers Association (HDA), City of Cape Town (CCT), Regional Services 
Council (RSC) and CPA; and the other the ‘local authorities group’ of CPA, RSC, CCT 
and the Black Local Authorities of Crossroads and Ikapa. A few months later a request 
from the Khayelitsha authority for observer status was accepted.44












 The resulting 
configuration is shown in Fig 9 below: 
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Procedurally the extra-parliamentary group drove the policy-making process, meeting 
virtually every month with the local authority group convening with the same agenda very 
soon afterwards, more for information and consultation than decision-making. For this 
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reason in the continuing narrative the extra-parliamentary group is referred to as the Policy 
Committee and the local authority group is only mentioned in the event of something 
significant occurring within it. Whereas the Policy Committee met 36 times until July 1994 
the local authority group was relatively short-lived, meeting only 13 times until November 
1992, after which officials of the BLAs attended the Policy Committee. 
 
Both committees met and agreed to embark on a process to:  
 quantify the demand for housing  
 identify suitable land  
 choose appropriate processes for consultation, participation and communication  
 consider more appropriate standards of products and services  
 establish interim controls as may be required 
 generate proposals to secure funding 
 
They also resolved to review all planning in and around the existing informal 
settlements – and to use this unique coalition to motivate for the establishment of a 
planning forum with legitimacy to develop a metropolitan structure plan (five of the fifteen 
attendees at the ‘extra parliamentary’ meeting were professional town planners). No 
representatives of the Civics movements arrived, however, and representatives of the ANC 
and PAC reported that their parties had not yet decided on their delegates. The Democrat 
was unanimously approved as the facilitator of the process, to be remunerated by the CPA, 
and it was agreed to seek an independent chairperson from an agreed short list.45 The third 
meeting of the Policy Committee on 17 June was well attended by community 
representatives: 8 from WCUSA, 3 from the Western Cape Civics Association (WCCA), 2 
from the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA) and 1 from the Western 
Cape United Interim Civic Committee (WCUICC) – but no delegates yet of the ANC or 
PAC. One of the decisions of the meeting was to appoint communications consultants.46
 
  
Reflecting upon the start 
The Policy Committee had been inaugurated with the agreement of all, and by the fourth 
meeting all the parties were attending, with a chairperson, facilitator, host, some consultant 
specialists and a patron watching in the background. Each organisation represented on the 
Policy Committee was entitled to send two delegates. The appearance of 8 WCUSA 
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representatives at the third meeting was an obvious show of force timed for the first 
appearance of the Civics’ representatives because the other 35 meetings of the Policy 
Committee were never attended by more than 3 delegates. The Civics made a late start but 
their attendance thereafter was sustained, which is more than could be said for WCUSA. 
 
Demand and supply 
The first meeting of the Technical Committee was held on 20 May 1991 and on 17 June 
it reported to the Policy Committee that CPA officials had estimated that for the 56 000 
households without formal housing in the project area 24 000 could be accommodated in 
vacant areas within the existing townships and that large tracts of land would have to be 
found to provide the other 32 000 sites.47
 
 The details are summarised in Table 2 (see 
Annexure B. p. B1). 
This was a very early and rough estimate, but it provided some indication of the kinds 
of numbers involved and the area of land to be acquired. In the years ahead there would be 
many changes: the hostels would be addressed in a completely separate project, the number 
of households living in informal settlements and backyard shacks would escalate, the 
development of areas within local authorities would be delayed by their slow re-
organisation, and substantially more land would have to be acquired in Weltevreden Valley 
and Southern Delft. But all that was yet to come... It is purely coincidental that the project 
eventually accommodated just over 32 000 households. 
 
The scale or scope of the project was determined principally by the amount of 
vacant land that could be acquired, and then developed collaboratively to avoid disruptive 
land invasions. Major tracts were needed. There were only two possibilities south of the N2 
highway: Philippi East, which was the most central, being immediately south of Crossroads 
and east of Browns Farm; and Weltevreden Valley (now called Samora Machel), which 
was relatively remote in the south-west corner of Philippi West, isolated by the railway 
system. Although access to 390 ha in Philippi East was very beneficial, the advantage was 
seriously eroded as a result of it being promised for Crossroads by agreement between the 
CPA and Nongwe, who regarded the whole of Philippi East as his own territory.  
 
The Technical Committee needed to begin the planning process. Fortuitously a 
regional planning conference was held that month in the nearby town of Caledon, where 
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representatives of the ANC and community structures demanded that the RSC abandon its 
sector planning approach, begin work on an overall plan for a post-apartheid Cape Town 
and instruct its consultants to search for developable land. (Watson, 2002. p. 38). As a 
result the large scale planning for this project was undertaken through the creation of 
individual structure plans for the developable areas of Crossroads, Philippi East, Philippi 
West (Browns Farm) and Weltevreden Valley. The first of these to be tackled was Philippi 
East, undertaken by the same consultants that had been appointed by the RSC for the south-
east structure plan. 
 
The role of consultants 
The SLP’s first consultants also had a critical role to play. The town planners had the 
privilege and opportunity of creating the first post-apartheid structure plans and of 
identifying all the parcels of land that might be used, including some that had been ‘buffer 
strips’ which racially segregated areas. The civil and electrical engineers were taking 
advantage of the opportunity to create and apply new standards for a new era of 
development. They and their counterparts within government were all young professionals, 
longing to break out of the old restrictive paradigms. The communication consultant was 
tri-lingual, well acquainted with the history and politics of the project area and an 
accomplished journalist. Her role proved to be catalytic, as the next chapter will reveal, 
because she wanted to communicate news of the SLP from the Policy Committee to the 
grassroots communities whereas there were some parties who wanted to control all 
communications to their (alleged) constituencies. 
 
Finding a suitable chair 
The selection of an independent chairperson for such a controversial project within such a 
polarised society was not easy. A number of nominees were investigated and discarded 
because of objections from one side or another. However, one day the Defender received a 
surprising request to visit the Sponsor, who asked her to consider taking the chair of the 
policy Committee.  They had never met before, the Defender had never been involved in a 
development project and was very nervous about helping a government that she opposed, 
but the country was in transition, brave people were needed, and she felt obligated to help 
communities whose suffering she had witnessed at first hand. They were both taking a risk 
in trusting each other, but the Sponsor appealed to her faith, which he shared as a Christian. 
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She recalls, “The whole thing was very daunting. Absolutely terrifying! I think that 
the CPA people were very nervous of me. They could have only have known of me as an 
opponent of everything that they did, and they must have wondered what ulterior motive I 
might have had. I think that were I a man with that background there would have been far 
more hostility, but given where a lot of those people come from they were very courteous. 
They were incredibly nice to me. They did their very best to make the job easy, they 
probably reigned themselves in quite a bit – which they probably had to do anyway, just 
because this was such an important forum for them to be able to do their work. And I guess 
the same thing applied to me – it was important for me to do my best to know what was 
going on in order for me to be able to do my job. I never had the sense that they were 
undermining me or keeping information from me – although I must say that I don’t know 
that I had full trust in them. I think that that had to come gradually – I began to trust 
them.”49
 
 The Sponsor, remaining as the project’s patron, attended the Defender’s first 
meeting and then left her to chair the proceedings.  
Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 has demonstrated that although evidently irreconcilable differences between 
parties had necessitated the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration there was an 
additional cross-cleavage between persons of various parties who favoured either a 
democratic or autocratic approach to development. The argument of this chapter is that not 
only are the ‘presenting problems’ of Crossroads complex but as soon as a real possibility 
of development is mooted a new set of contests relating to development practice 
commence. The contribution of this chapter to the thesis is to introduce a disturbing and 
persistent cross-current that demonstrates that an agreement by different sectors to 
collaborate is no guarantee of an end to conflict. Nevertheless the collaboration was 
inaugurated with the formation of policy committees, objectives were agreed upon, a 
technical committee began to tackle a research agenda and an independent chairperson was 
appointed. The structures were in place, the stakeholders were participating and the process 
was gaining momentum. 
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In Chapter 6 the foundations crack. The main stakeholder is distracted by the 
persistent problem of Crossroads itself, the most dangerous stakeholder walks out, for a 
year, and the ANC representation disappears. This generates an argument that stakeholders 
as individuals, organisations and sectors are too preoccupied with their own circumstances 
to also manage a cross-sector collaboration. 




Conflict and Incapacity: Framing a gap which 
only Enablers can fill 
 
It is not long after the collaboration has been launched before the Province is 
obliged to continue trying to develop the Crossroads triangle – but that explodes yet again. 
Then the squatter leaders walk out of the policy committee and the ANC introduces its own 
creation: a national civic organisation. Land within the project area is invaded and becomes 
irrecoverable. The whole country is an uneasy, sometimes violent transition. But - the 
project slowly moves ahead, assembling information, consolidating the collaboration and 
awaiting the culmination of national negotiations so that decisions can be made and 
resources become available. The arguments presented by this chapter are that in the kinds 
of conditions that necessitate a cross-sector collaboration incessant interference in the 
process is likely; and that stakeholders will be so preoccupied that they have insufficient 
capacity to manage the collaborative process. 
 
The Crossroads sideshow: July 1991 – February 1992 
 
At the same July Policy Committee meeting the CPA disclosed that it had acquired 390 
hectares of land in Philippi East, primarily to accommodate the overflow from Crossroads, 
for which it had made a commitment to the Crossroads community prior to the start of the 
new initiative. This was the first indication to the Policy Committee that although the CPA 
recognised that the greater project was needed for the dispersed communities it retained 
almost a separate responsibility and obligation to develop Crossroads and cater for its 
residents as soon as possible. It was as though the CPA hoped that the creation of the 
Policy Committee might relieve it of pressure for large-scale development and enable it to 
get on with addressing whatever Crossroads would require. The Policy Committee was still 
in a very formative stage and had little option but to accept the CPA’s report.50
 
  
The aggravations intensified: the Headman had somehow learned that the Central 
Energy Fund had money available for housing projects and on 7 August he requested the 
Strategist to apply for them in conjunction with WCUSA. Two days later the Headman, in 
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a long letter to the Sponsor, complained about the lack of progress and blamed officials.51 
Over the next week the Democrat was drawn into discussions with the CPA, the town 
clerks of Ikapa and Crossroads, various squatter leaders, the Headman and a gentleman 
who was investigating the circumstances in Crossroads on behalf of the ANC nationally. A 
complex picture emerged, in which it was clear that WCUSA did not represent all squatter 
leaders and, furthermore, that within Crossroads there were two ANC branches, violently 
opposed to each other: the Buntubakhe branch of ‘urban’ settlers based in the Unathi area 
of ‘white houses’, led by Depoutch (‘Whitey’) Elese, and Nongwe’s branch that operated 
under a more rural and traditional kind of regime in Old Crossroads. Jeffrey Nongwe was 
simultaneously mayor of Crossroads, chairman of the Crossroads branch of the ANC and 
chairman of WCUSA. 52 White officials of Black Local Authorities, having to negotiate 
such complexities as well as the demands of unrepresentative councillors and opposing 
civic movements, reported that they were under immense strain.53
 
  
On 26 August the Policy Committee was informed that WCUSA had arranged to 
meet the Sponsor the following day,54 and it was subsequently reported to the local 
authorities’ group that the CPA and WCUSA “had gained an improved understanding of 
each other”.55 In a strategic response the Policy Committee, on the recommendation of the 
communication consultant,56
 
 changed the name of the project from the ‘Crossroads and 
Environs Project’ to the ‘Serviced Land Project’ (SLP – and later iSLP). The name change 
removed attention from Crossroads and whatever the government and warlords were 
planning there, and subtly detached the project as a whole from the clasp of the Crossroads 
leaders. Instead it created a clear focus of providing multiple communities with serviced 
residential sites, which was the national housing policy for black urban dwellers at the 
time. 
In February 1992 the CPA, without consulting the Policy Committee, made a 
commitment to WCUSA that for any area in which the community was represented by 
WCUSA the Province would not advertise or award any tenders without WCUSA’s prior 
approval.57 It was a strange decision, but illustrated the conflicting nature of CPA’s 
relationships and something of the political pressures that were at play. The land that 
Ngxobongwana and his followers had vacated in Crossroads when they had fled to 
Driftsands was the eastern extremity (Phase 4) so it was decided by the CPA to develop 
that area of Crossroads next, commencing in June 1992.58  
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The Crossroads leaders and CPA officials decided that all remaining residents of 
Phase 4, plus those located on a water and sewerage servitude through the adjoining 
proposed Phase 3, would be relocated to a “transit camp” in Philippi East (see Map 6 
overleaf). The transit camp comprised 765 small temporary sites, each provided with a 
bucket latrine and shared access to water: 1 standpipe per 10 households. It was intended 
that these people would return to Crossroads Phase 4 as soon as it had been developed. The 
first households to relocate from Crossroads were under the impression that they would 
only be in the transit camp for 3 months. When that proved not to be so the movement of 




At the same time the CPA had decided to rapidly develop a portion of Philippi East 
to the south of the transit camp named ‘Farm 682’ by providing 698 permanent serviced 
sites to accommodate Ngxobongwana and his followers, who could then vacate their 
informal settlement in the Driftsands nature reserve. However, politics intervened in a 
novel way. In preparation for a democratic election the National Party in the Western Cape 
needed to find itself a black constituency. So in a remarkably swift series of events 
Ngxobongwana became a member of the National Party and was appointed to the 
provincial legislature, in exchange for which his community were permitted to stay in the 
Driftsands Nature Reserve (See Map 6 overleaf) where a 500-site fully serviced township 
would be provided for them. Farm 682, which Nongwe insisted be called ‘Lower 
Crossroads’, was then offered to the residents of the transit camp. However they were 
determined to return to Phase 4 of Crossroads, and declined the invitation. Instead, 
agreement was reached to use Lower Crossroads as a roll-over facility for the upgrading of 
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The complexities emerge 
It is noteworthy that nobody in the Policy Committee confronted the WCUSA leadership 
with the fact that it was not as representative as it claimed, and neither was the ANC was 
asked to explain two opposing committees in Crossroads. The object of the SLP was to 
build a coalition during a time in the country’s history where all constituencies and 
allegiances were being reformulated. Most organisations were trying to change in some 
way and in the process made claims and allegations that needed to be understood in 
context. Coalitions are not built by challenging and embarrassing each other, but through 
tolerance and the cultivation of empathy and understanding. Furthermore, at this tender 
stage in the process the risk of an alienated party undermining the whole initiative was very 
real – so every effort was made to keep everyone on board, on the basis that the longer 
people work together the more likely is it that trust and relationships will grow. 
 
Within the Policy Committee it had become apparent that the major un-banned 
political parties, the ANC and PAC, would not be major players in the project after all. The 
PAC communicated that although in support of the SLP it had made a general decision not 
to negotiate with government agencies and therefore withdrew from the Policy Committee. 
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It continued to be supplied with minutes of Policy Committee meetings.61 For its part the 
ANC was preoccupied with building its own constituency and resolving conflicts between 
civic and squatter groups in the region. Its representative on the Policy Committee, the 
Community Planner, found it very difficult to persuade the party’s regional executive to 
pay attention to development issues. Although he played a strategic role in the SLP he had 
many other responsibilities and attended less than 40% of the Policy Committee 
meetings.62
 
 The ANC took a very careful line in the SLP because it hoped to build for itself 
a national federation of civic organisations, but did not want to alienate any of them 
(including WCUSA) in the meantime. The National Party was in power, and so was 
represented in the SLP by the provincial administration, the chairman of the RSC and the 
officials of the BLAs. The white political opposition to the government was represented on 
the Policy Committee by two widely respected councillors within the City of Cape Town, 
which had a long liberal tradition. 
WCUSA’s primary constituency comprised the shack lords, who were opposed to 
the civic movements that had sought representation in their informal settlements on the 
ticket of ‘democracy’. The lines were drawn between old men and young men, between 
informal settlements and townships, between traditional and modern – and much blood had 
already flowed. One of the real problems was that allegiances were going to be re-drawn 
along party lines – so both sides wanted to be associated with the parties and the parties 
wanted to be associated with both sides. These contradictions were highlighted in 
Crossroads, in which the shack lord Nongwe and the former freedom fighter Elese each 
controlled an ANC branch but were sworn enemies. The supreme irony was in 
Ngxobongwana being co-opted by the National Party, given a seat in the provincial 
government and provided with a fully serviced township for himself and his exiles in, of all 
places, a proclaimed nature reserve. The plot thickens – recent research has indicated that 
the Driftsands nature reserve was proclaimed in 1983 (the year the UDF was inaugurated) 
not to preserve nature but to preserve strategically located land for use by the military or 
police in the event of Crossroads getting out of hand. Unsurprisingly, the Driftsands 
community resented having a National Party leader, and chased Ngxobongwana out of the 
area a few months later. 
 
There was another problem in Crossroads: it now contained vacant land and unless 
a development process was quickly initiated there it would be re-invaded and war would 
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break out again. The SLP Policy Committee had first to concentrate on establishing broad 
principles and not rush into project management, so the CPA was given the green light to 
proceed as best it might in Crossroads despite the distastefulness of Crossroads politics. 
From here onwards the CPA had to collaborate in broad coalition building within the SLP 
whilst simultaneously addressing the immediate Crossroads issues on its own. Furthermore 
in the months ahead the House of Representatives (the Coloured parliament) would be 
dismantled and its officials incorporated into the CPA – which would then have to 
internally integrate some quite diverse development philosophies.  
 
The second year of policy-making: June 1992 – June 1993 
 
The Policy Committee meeting on 1 June 1992 was dominated by a debate on the 
communication of information about the SLP to communities. The essence of the problem 
was that WCUSA wanted to control all communication to squatter communities and had 
refused to endorse the mass circulation of a pamphlet about the SLP because it did not want  
its name linked with the other parties in the project. However leaders of some communities, 
such as KTC, had requested that they be directly informed rather than through WCUSA. 
WCUSA’s representatives in the meeting included the Headman and Mr Nongwe. The 
Headman refused to discuss the matter in the committee and declared that he had arranged 
an alternative meeting with the CPA, but the Strategist insisted that it was necessary to 
discuss principles such as this within the Policy Committee. The Civics and the City of 
Cape Town argued in favour of the publication and distribution of the pamphlet. The 
Headman thereupon announced that WCUSA was withdrawing from the committee – and 




The Wrestler met with the Headman and wrote to him on the 16th July confirming that 
the Headman had stated that WCUSA had discontinued its involvement in the SLP and any 
engagement with the SLP’s consultants. Furthermore, the Headman had declared that direct 
liaison between WCUSA and CPA with respect to Khayelitsha and Crossroads would 
remain undisturbed, and a meeting between those two parties should be held to discuss 
whether their present agreement should be amended in any way.  
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Around this time the ANC announced that the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) had been formed and its regional manager began attending the 
Policy Committee meetings on 17 August. SANCO’s establishment had been controversial: 
the logic was unclear – civic movements were distinctly local and different, so how could 
they be nationally organised? There had also been criticism of manipulation in the election 
of office bearers, particularly in the Cape. The Veteran, now chairman of WCCA, was one 
of many who were less than enthusiastic about joining SANCO, and signed himself in to 
the Policy Committee cautiously as ‘WCCA and SANCO’. Six months later he reverted to 
‘WCCA’, and after another two months his affiliation was noted as ‘Guguletu Civic’. Figs 
10 and 11 overleaf show how the SLP was structured at that stage.64
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The Wrestler’s letter to the Headman of 16th July, mentioned above, was tabled at the 
Policy Committee on 17 August and prompted great concern at the potential for conflict in 
the event of WCUSA maintaining its stance. The Community Planner threatened that the 
ANC would have to review its participation in the Policy Committee if WCUSA was not 
involved, perhaps to encourage everyone to get WCUSA back to the table. It was decided 
to invite WCUSA to state the terms upon which it would be willing to participate in the 
SLP, and to continue to provide it with all SLP documents, including the proposed 
principles for land and site allocation and institutional arrangements which had just been 
tabled.65 A week later the Strategist reported to the Local Authority Policy Committee that 




During September and October 1992 policy proposals for land and site allocation, 
institutional arrangements, recommended densities, planning principles and levels of 
service were presented to all the organisations in the Policy Committee – and received 
substantial support, except from the absent WCUSA. A very successful full day workshop 
had been held to canvass the support of about 120 SANCO representatives, facilitated by 
the Democrat and the communication consultant. On 26 November the Defender reported 
that she and representatives of the CPA had met the members of the WCUSA executive 
who had decided that their interests would be better served through direct negotiations with 
the CPA. No comments on the SLP proposals had yet been received from WCUSA.67 As 
the Policy Committee moved into 1993 it focused on finalising the policy proposals in the 
form of ‘the SLP Principles’ and on considering draft structure plans for Philippi East and 
Driftsands.68
 
 Significantly, a change in the SLP’s structure occurred as 1993 dawned – 
there was no sense in perpetuating the Local Authority Group parallel policy committee. It 
never met again and thereafter the senior officials of Crossroads and Ikapa local authorities 
were invited to attend meetings of the remaining SLP Policy Committee. 
CPA officials continued a separate dialogue with WCUSA, the highlight of which 
was a two-day residential workshop at a Stellenbosch conference centre in March 1993. 
The workshop began with each party stating its position on the SLP, in which WCUSA 
insisted on controlling development on land that it claimed to ‘occupy’. With regard to the 
SLP policy proposals, WCUSA made some requests for relatively small amendments, but 
the workshop was concluded before consideration was given to most of the institutional 
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arrangements, the proposed implementation structure and the structure plan proposals. 
WCUSA ended the meeting in an ambiguous manner by confirming its willingness to 
engage with the CPA, recommending that a structure be established to improve 
communication and co-operation between parties in the SLP, reporting that the WCUSA 
executive had decided to reconsider their position regarding participation within the SLP 
structure – and then stating that “WCUSA’s involvement in the SLP and relationship with 
SANCO will be dealt with on a political level”. The workshop agenda was not completed, 
and it was agreed to meet again.69 The ANC, for its part, adopted the view that the issues 
now being discussed in the SLP were matters for the Civics, and did not require the ANC’s 
presence. Whether the ANC would return to the Policy Committee, it stated, depended 
upon its discussions with WCUSA, which were yet to take place.70 The Democrat, 
meanwhile, had learned that WCUSA had chosen to interpret the ANC’s absence from 
Policy Committee meetings since its own withdrawal as support for WCUSA’s position.71
 
  
In Crossroads Mr Nongwe was impatient to get Phase 3 going, but on 18 May 1993 
he was refused permission by the CPA to start resettling people from Phase 3 to Lower 
Crossroads. 72 Although some approved relocations did commence towards the month end, 
Nongwe decided to take matters into his own hands and on 31 May most of the informal 
settlement on phase 3 of Crossroads was torched and razed to the ground. The inhabitants 
fled and within 10 days the only dwellings left in Crossroads were those of Nongwe’s 
faction, in the areas planned as Section 4 of Phase 3. The rest looked like a wasteland. Most 
of the refugees fled to Lower Crossroads, where the first 200 households from the Phase 3 
development process had already taken occupation, and quickly filled all available spaces. 
Others took refuge on the sports field corner site of Philippi East, in the N2 road reserve 
and elsewhere. Once again the development of Crossroads had come to a blazing, 
devastating halt. Subsequently these events became the subject of a national enquiry by the 
Goldstone Commission into acts of public violence.73
 
  
The CPA reported continuous difficulty in persuading WCUSA to attend a second 
workshop. It was also apparent that there still were strong conservative political influences 
within the CPA that were against the open-ended approach of the SLP. The Strategist 
decided to bring the matter to a head by proposing to the Policy Committee in June 1993 
that the CPA manage the project, using the Wrestler as manager and their civil engineering 
consultants as technical coordinators. The response was predictable: the City of Cape Town 
6 CONFLICT AND INCAPACITY    117 
and SANCO objected on the grounds that the SLP was jointly owned by all parties and that 
it would be unacceptable for its implementation to be driven by the CPA. The Strategist 
countered that CPA had statutory responsibility for the project and was footing the bill. It 
was agreed to create a sub-committee to explore the matter – which proceeded to 
recommend that the Democrat’s firm be appointed to coordinate the project. He would 
report to a CPA Project Management Committee, and the Policy Committee’s function 
during the project’s implementation would be to monitor the application of the SLP 
Principles.  
 
The Policy Committee also heard news of the first land invasion within its area of 
interest – Mr Thabo Memane had led an illegal occupation of the privately-owned cement 
factory site, and 800 shacks had been very quickly erected. Memane, previously a 
lieutenant of a faction leader in neighbouring Brown’s Farm, was not affiliated to WCUSA. 
Nor was this the first land invasion that he had masterminded. Although the land owner, 
Anglo Alpha Cement, had obtained an eviction order the sheriff of the court was unable to 
execute it because of the danger of violence. Negotiations at a political level were 
attempted but were ineffective.74
 
 The fact that it had taken place on private land lessened 
its direct threat to the SLP, but the inability to counteract it sent a warning signal to 
everyone - all vacant land should be regarded as vulnerable. 
Meanwhile members of the Policy Committee were investigating possible sources 
of finance for the SLP. The size and scale of the project required a multi-year funding 
commitment whereas the financial allocations by central government to the CPA were 
being made simply on the basis of a bulk annual allocation, with no regard to the budgets 
and requirements of individual projects. Long-term dedicated funding was required for the 
SLP to provide assurance to all communities that the entire project had been approved and 
financed and that there was a programme that would eventually accommodate everyone. 
Enquiries were being made to the RSC (primarily for bulk infrastructure)75, the National 
Housing Commission which was busy considering the introduction of a national housing 
subsidy policy and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which could provide loans. 
However, the possibility of a bulk dedicated allocation of project finance would have to 
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Not everyone is single-minded 
Between 1992 and 1993 South Africa was in the midst of a tumultuous transition that 
touched every aspect of national life. It was the worst possible time to attempt a local cross-
sector collaboration, but there was a crisis to address, and many people considered that 
collaboration was the only way. However not all parties had collaborative development on 
their minds: WCUSA and its PSC allies wanted full control of the project, and had 
significant support from an ‘old guard’ within the National Party and CPA. The ANC was 
working towards gaining control of the whole country at the polls, and one of its strategies 
was to capture the entire countrywide civic constituency by creating its own national 
‘civics’ organisation, SANCO. At the same time it needed votes from informal settlements 
and did not want to alienate the shack lords and lose their allegiance to, say, the PAC. The 
PAC had taken quite an exclusive stance and by deciding not to sit around a table with 
government in any way placed its party in danger of being sidelined. Significantly, the 
Policy Committee through its facilitator kept them all fully informed with minutes and 
other documentation – they might try to wander away from the SLP but the SLP would not 
be letting them go. 
 
Representatives of government also had plenty of other things to do. It is interesting 
to analyse the attendance at meetings over the life of a committee, because such meetings 
are the heart of activity in a cross-sector collaboration. The Local Authority Group met on 
13 occasions over eighteen months before it was disbanded, and comprised politicians 
(including councillors), officials, members of the Philippi Industrialists Association and 
consultants/facilitators. The frequency of their attendance is revealed in Table 3 (See 
Annexure B. p. B2). Although 46 persons attended the meetings at some stage, only 5 of 
them attended more than 75% of the meetings. They were the Strategist and his political 
boss in the CPA who chaired the meetings, an official from Crossroads, the SLP’s town 
planning consultant and the Democrat, who was the only one to attend all meetings. 
However they could not have constituted a credible committee on their own. There was a 
supportive and well-informed ring of 11 others around them (who attended more than 50% 
of meetings), then 7 others in reserve and 23 completely nominal members.  
 
The number of people who attended each of the 13 meetings on behalf of each 
group is shown in Table 4 (See Annexure B. p. B2). This table demonstrates the degree of 
commitment of each group to these meetings. They were clearly of the greatest interest and 
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importance to the CPA and to the facilitators and consultants whom it had employed, 
followed closely by Crossroads and Ikapa local authorities, which were the most directly 
affected participants. In spite of Table 5 showing that there were only 5 consistent 
attendees, the right hand column of Table 6 shows that the meetings were numerically well 
attended, except for some towards the end, with an average attendance of 16. Although it 
was a substantially different group of people meeting each time they were almost all 
officials in responsible positions, and were committed by the decisions made.   Importantly, 
each of the parties was invited to every meeting and received all the documentation and 
minutes and was thereby bound into the process. Each party decided whether it would be 
represented at each meeting and by whom. 
 
This ‘Local Authority Group’ successfully met a short term political need in the 
SLP during the first stages of transition from apartheid. As the SLP story proceeds the 




This chapter has reviewed the two year period from July 1991 to June 2003 and explained 
how the collaboration was structured and commenced work. One argument presented by 
this chapter is that every stakeholder has a multiple agenda and is also busy with other 
activities – and that whilst the collaboration was undeniably important it was not the only 
topic of importance for the participants – as sectors, parties and individuals. Furthermore, 
within a national interregnum of indeterminate length, many of the participants were 
keeping an eye open for opportunities or threats that could affect their own fortunes. The 
other argument proposed here is that circumstances that require cross-sector collaboration 
are by nature turbulent and are likely to remain so. It is not insignificant that many of the 
difficulties encountered were generated by the stakeholders themselves. This chapter 
contributes to the main argument of the thesis by using these two un-theorised elements of 
stakeholder incapacity and interminable turbulence to frame the gap in the literature that 
the Enablers will fill.  
 
In Chapter 7 as the collaborative process gains pace the opposition will assume a 
more institutional profile, induce more iSLP stakeholders to join its campaign, change its 
composition and form and attack repetitively with increasing fury 




Enabling progress: Creating synergy within conflict 
 
 
In this chapter the arguments that frame the gap are strengthened as a determined 
opposition tries every possible manoeuvre to wrest control of the SLP, while the national 
transition drags on – requiring a National Peace Committee to try to limit violence and 
lawlessness. The SLP is relatively a model of order in a sea of chaos, but it remains without 
the resources necessary for implementation. 
 
Ultimately those opposed to collaborative development induce every ‘community 
organisation’ within the Policy Committee to join their ranks and the project is virtually 
brought to a halt. Meanwhile, however, the Democrat’s community facilitators have been 
helping grassroots community leaders to understand the process of development and this 
produces the first project committee. Furthermore, these leaders begin questioning who is 
representing them on the SLP Policy Committee. 
 
The temperature rises: June – December 1993 
 
On 25 June 1993 the Democrat and the Strategist received a faxed letter from the firm of 
consultants that led the PSC announcing that it was establishing, together with WCUSA, 
SANCO and the African Bank, a not-for-gain company to develop projects within the 
framework of the SLP. It was to be named the Western Cape Community Development 
Company (WCCDC), and the letter requested that the PSC be invited to future meetings of 
the SLP.77 On 9 July the Headman wrote to the Strategist, stating that in WCUSA’s view 
the Democrat was not a suitable project manager and that the present SLP consulting team 
had concluded their brief by identifying the project. He stated that implementation would 
now be done by the affected communities and referred to the formation of WCCDC.78
 
 At 
its meeting on 12 July the Policy Committee resolved to invite the PSC and WCUSA to a 
special meeting at which the WCCDC proposal would be presented.  
At the same meeting a director of the company owning the disused cement factory 
whose land had been invaded, this time speaking as a member of the Philippi Industrialists’ 
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Association, reported that businesses in Philippi had been under siege, some employees had 
been killed on business premises and there had been community protests against the 
establishment of a satellite police station on Stock Road. He reported hostile acts against 
his company, which appeared to be related to the fact that it had leased office space to 
WCUSA, and therefore the company had given WCUSA notice to vacate the premises. The 
Policy Committee noted that the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry into violence in 
Crossroads was then underway, to which both the Democrat and CPA’s project managers 
in Crossroads would give evidence.  
 
The Strategist expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of progress towards 
implementation of the SLP. He recommended that no more time be lost in waiting for 
consensus on outstanding issues and that implementation should go ahead on the basis of 
the agreements that had already been finalised. Any outstanding issues could be addressed 
at the level of individual project committees, where there would be full community 
participation and the facility to resolve disputes. He recommended that only major 
problems of a general nature should be referred to the Policy Committee, which would not 
get involved in issues affecting individual projects. This was approved.79
 
  
WCUSA attended the Policy Committee on 26 July after a 13 month absence in 
order to participate in the presentation of the WCCDC proposal. In the presentation it 
became apparent that contractors as well as consultants for the proposed projects had 
already been selected and that WCCDC did not intend putting any of the work out to 
tender.   Furthermore, the representatives of WCUSA and SANCO would be relied upon to 
manage all processes involving communities, regardless of the dangers of hegemony and 
patronage. The Strategist asked why a housing utility (not-for-gain) company was being 
formed. He also expressed surprise that SANCO and WCUSA had become bedfellows in 
WCCDC, and wondered if their officials were going to be paid in the process. The leader 
of the PSC acknowledged that they would be paid, asserting that their proposal would be 
far more effective and practicable than the project committee system proposed by the SLP. 
The Policy Committee responded by appointing a sub-committee to formulate guidelines 
and a code of conduct for the involvement of developers.80
 
  
The Community Planner reappeared at the Policy Committee meeting to hear the 
WCCDC proposal and announced that the ANC would begin to play a more active role in 
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the SLP. He accepted nomination to the sub-committee to consider a code of conduct, and 
was able to share the philosophy of the National Housing Forum, that was busy formulating 
a new national housing policy. The other members of the sub-committee were the grande 
dame of housing in the City, Alderman Eulalie Stott, the Strategist, SANCO’s regional 
manager and the Democrat. Their recommended Code of Conduct for Developers was 
crisply worded, and stated that no entity may be involved in both planning and 
implementation, there must be a separation of function between consultants and 
contractors, consultants must be appointed by public authorities on the basis of equitable 
distribution of work and affirmative action, and that construction work must be made 
available to all interested parties by being put out to tender. Furthermore, developers must 
not be perceived to “own” any particular (community) grouping or organisation, and 
accountability and transparency must be evident at all levels of the implementation process. 
On the other hand parties should not be required to accommodate risks that they are not 
used to managing (i.e. political risks of any sort). 
 
The sub-committee also recommended principles to which any housing utility 
company involved in the SLP must comply, which particularly concerned conflicts of 
interests of directors and the difference between such not-for-gain companies and private 
sector operations. Finally it was recommended that the involvement of any such developer 
in the SLP be governed by a contract with the public authority that bound the developer to 
these principles and to those of the SLP as a whole. Obviously, it would not be acceptable 
for any such developer to also sit on the SLP Policy Committee, whose future function 
would be to monitor progress.81
 
 The recommendations were sent to the Policy Committee 
members.  
At that stage the inter-relationships between the stakeholders was as shown in Fig 
12 overleaf. 
  
7 ENABLING PROGRESS    123 




















ANC African National Congress PSC Private Sector Consortium 
CCT City of Cape Town RSC Regional Services Council 
CPA Cape Provincial Administration SANCO SA National Civics Organisation 
HDA Hostel Dwellers’ Association WCCA Western Cape Civics’ Association 
PIA Philippi Industrialists Assoc WCUSA Western Cape United Squatters’ Assoc 
 
The Policy Committee met on 9 August 1993, with the Sponsor present, and formally 
adopted the SLP Principles which thereby brought the SLP’s policy phase to a close. The 
implementation phase, in which each project was organised by its own project committee, 
had already begun, under the oversight of a Project Management Committee comprising 
CPA officials and the Democrat. The country was still in turmoil, however, and project 
development was far from easy. Tensions in areas under the jurisdiction of Ikapa and 
Crossroads Town Councils had brought many local authority projects there to a standstill. 
The only exceptions were the electrification of Crossroads phase 1, the delivery of serviced 
sites in Browns Farm and a township development in Driftsands.  
 
The Democrat reported that the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry was considering 
recommending that all developments in the Crossroads area should be undertaken in terms 
of the SLP Principles; and that the Regional Peace Committee had already made a similar 
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recommendation, calling for a consultative forum to be established before any further 
projects were initiated. WCUSA announced that it had decided to rejoin the Policy 
Committee. On the recommendation of the Community Planner it was agreed that each 
party and their technical advisors would study the recommended Code of Conduct for 
Developers, and each obtain a mandate before bringing a response to the Policy 
Committee. In the meantime there had been no progress in resolving the land invasion of 
the cement factory.82
Although The Sponsor had announced the completion of the policy phase, which 
enabled the CPA to appoint the Democrat to coordinate the implementation phase and to 
facilitate the creation of grassroots Residents’ Development Committees, the Policy 
Committee was not actually terminated. The reason was to keep the parties meeting – 
communication is the simplest means of achieving some mutual accountability. 
Furthermore, the SLP had become a battle ground between participative principles and no-
nonsense action, but neither side had access to the necessary political support and/or 
financial resources because the national negotiations had not yet been resolved. The battle 
for the SLP would have to continue until a new political authority with the associated 
finance was established in the country.  Another factor was that the SLP Policy Committee 
had increasingly become viewed by some influential non-participants as the only vehicle in 
the region that was able to manage such tensions, and its termination would have 
unnecessarily jettisoned a unique resource. 
 
 
The Policy Committee meeting of 13 September 1993 was the first of the SLP’s 
implementation phase, but the Democrat, in his first “Project Co-ordinator’s Report” 
reported that most of the existing project activity in the area had been suspended pending 
consultation with the affected communities and the establishment of Residents’ 
Development Committees. Peace Committees were very involved across South Africa in 
endeavouring to stabilise communities and resolve local conflicts as the country took the 
difficult steps towards democracy, and the SLP area was one of the tensest areas in Cape 
Town. It was agreed, however, to at least commence the bulk earthworks (soil preparation) 
process for Philippi East and Weltevreden Valley, for which community consultation might 
not be necessary. A number of participants failed to report back on the Code of Conduct for 
Developers, and so it was agreed that all parties would provide their responses to the 
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Democrat before the next meeting.83
 
 
On 21 September WCUSA and the CPA met again in Stellenbosch to continue their 
interrupted workshop about the SLP Principles, which had already been formally adopted 
by the other members of the Policy Committee. The meeting started poorly, with the 
‘points of agreement’ summarised by the Strategist being challenged by WCUSA, and the 
Headman stating that WCUSA no longer understood or accepted CPA’s role in the 
development process. The proposed institutional arrangements were presented by the CPA 
and accepted by WCUSA, except that it had serious reservations about a proposal that 
implementation would include extensive community consultation in sector (area) forums 
and social compacts at project level. This was left unresolved and was postponed to yet 




WCUSA was not represented at a special meeting of the Policy Committee on 11 
October but a delegation of 30 SANCO representatives made a surprise appearance. They 
made it clear to the Policy Committee that they affirmed the SLP, stressed the importance 
of directly involving the various communities represented by SANCO and challenged the 
degree of community support claimed by some other role-players in the process. They 




During the course of the next month the housing crisis in Cape Town was 
compounded by the organised illegal occupation of newly-built houses in Tafelsig (Delft) 
and Mitchell’s Plain. Neither of these was in the SLP project area, and both were within 
Coloured group areas in terms of the existing legislation. However, the issue was placed on 
the SLP Policy Committee’s agenda for 15 November, partly because the SLP was the only 
multi-stakeholder housing forum in the region and partly out of anxiety because the SLP 
had still to test its effectiveness at project or ‘grassroots’ level. A debate ensued about 
whether community participation in the SLP should be structured only at project level or 
also at one or more higher levels where any practical policy issues that required broad 
agreement could be discussed. There was, after all, no functioning representative local 
government at that time. It was decided to avoid creating additional layers of responsibility, 
but that a way must be found to obtain broad community agreement on, for example, the 
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The contest for Weltevreden Valley 
Weltevreden Valley is located in the south-west corner of Philippi, bounded by major dual 
carriageway road routes to the south and west, the city-Khayelitsha railway line to the 
north, and to the east a former railway police hostel complex and a tiny suburb called “The 
Leagues”. It is some 145 hectares in extent and in 1994 was a wilderness of dunes and 
depressions, except for an old occupied farm house and small stand of eucalyptus trees near 
its centre. The land comprised a number of properties owned by the government, railways, 
a housing utility company and private interests. It was anticipated by the CPA that the 
entire area could be acquired and that an integrated township could be created by the SLP 
containing about 4 200 residential sites.87
 
 This area of Philippi had been completely 
isolated from the action around Crossroads, and was thus spared all the competing land 
claims that characterised the development of Philippi East and Browns Farm. The only 
inhabitants of Weltevreden Valley lived in a small and politically insignificant informal 
settlement named Samora Machel in the north-west edge of the site. This was the first 
greenfields project which the SLP was able to pursue and therefore the Province began 
appointing consultants to compile a Local Structure Plan which would also provide enough 
data for the bulk earthworks to be designed. Communities within the SLP were invited to 
indicate whether they were interested in participating in the project.  
However, at the November 15 Policy Committee meeting the Strategist reported 
that unbeknown to him a member of his Branch of the CPA had written a letter to the 
WCCDC stating that it was the CPA’s intention to make Weltevreden Valley (a key SLP 
greenfields project) available to a developer who could utilise finance for the establishment 
of a township, and that the residents would then be able to access the extensive sports 
facilities contained in the neighbouring hostel complex that the CPA was about to acquire. 
The writer had further expressed the hope that his letter would help WCCDC obtain the 
necessary finance from the National Energy Fund (which was selling off some of the 
State’s oil reserves that had been established under apartheid to counter possible 
sanctions).88 The Strategist retracted the letter. Once again, WCUSA was not present at the 
meeting, and approval of the Code of Conduct by both WCUSA and SANCO remained 
outstanding. Meanwhile, the Strategist in his new role as Project Coordinator had 
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appointed his first Black development facilitators, who had begun to engage with 
representatives of the 30 different communities within the SLP project area.89
 
 
The local government factor 
The special meeting of the Project Committee on 11 October was to receive a presentation 
by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) about the degree of 
progress locally in the transformation of local government. Nationally, said the spokesman, 
local government was characterised by political collapse, financial failure, service 
deterioration, general stagnation and inability to deal with problems of urbanisation and 
transition. He recommended that the many fragmented local government structures in Cape 
Town should be replaced with one metropolitan structure with one tax base, and went on to 
describe the terms of reference of the Metropolitan Negotiating Forum which had been 
launched in the city in September.  
 
The Policy Committee’s decision that implementation commence with communities 
participating in their own projects heralded the nominal start of the implementation phase, 
but there were still obstacles to overcome. The first was that most of the land parcels that 
had been identified for the benefit of specific single communities were owned by local 
authorities which lacked the capacity to develop them. The process of rationalising local 
government in Cape Town had lagged behind both the national transformation process as 
well as the transformation introduced at a more local scale by the Serviced Land Project. 
All of the existing residential settlements within the SLP project area were under the 
jurisdiction of local authorities which would not be able to play their role in 
implementation without a transformation of local government attitudes, priorities and 
capacity.  
 
Although the implementation of the SLP began in 1993 the first non-racial local 
government elections occurred only in late 1996 and the consolidation of local government 
into one metropolitan authority had to wait until 2000. This delay, coupled with inexorable 
urbanisation, meant that by 2010 metropolitan Cape Town had become overwhelmed by 
the proliferation of informal settlements and a huge housing backlog, despite the best 
intentions of the SLP. The disconnection between national, provincial and local 
government rates of transformation, particularly in Cape Town because of its unique 
political mix and dynamics, ultimately proved to be the greatest factor in diminishing the 
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effectiveness of the SLP. In the Policy Committee the CPA had probably done the best that 
it could by ensuring the involvement in the SLP of the RSC, (the original) Cape Town 
municipality and the Black Local Authorities, but the powers and machinery required to 
transform local government were not within its control. 
 
The implications of the WCCDC proposal 
The CPA had no option but to patiently drive the SLP initiative through the lingering 
vacuum of political authority and financial decision-making in the country. The private 
sector was not so constrained, and the PSC contrived to construct a quicker avenue to 
political support and access to finance.  It reckoned that if it could woo SANCO into the 
PSC’s alliance with WCUSA it would automatically receive ANC support, and if it also 
could attract some interest by a financier it could make an irresistible challenge for the 
whole SLP. In reality the proposal was infused with autocracy and patronage – it was a 
package deal of pre-selected private firms employing ‘community leaders’ to deliver 
beneficiaries to the construction process, with no community participation in the planning 
and implementation process at all. However, the ANC immediately returned to the Policy 
Committee with a commitment to be more involved in the project. Its change of heart about 
leaving the project to the community organisations was undoubtedly motivated by concerns 
that SANCO leaders were being led by pecuniary interests. Although the Policy Committee 
was unable to reject outright the approach from its two major community participants 
without destroying itself, it could get back into policy-making mode and debate the 
principles applicable to the involvement of private sector organisations. 
 
The lines were being re-drawn within the SLP – the ANC was now quietly 
becoming an ‘establishment’ actor, in opposition to the persistent attempts to hijack the 
project. On the strength of that support the SLP Principles had been declared ‘accepted’ by 
the provincial government without WCUSA’s support. Furthermore, not only had some 
civic organisations such as WCCA distanced themselves from SANCO, but grassroots 
communities began to demand direct representation because SANCO was incapable of 
authentically representing them. Therefore the Democrat was given the go ahead by the 
CPA to appoint his own isiXhosa-speaking team to facilitate community participation at 
the local level through the establishment of Residents Development Committees. These 
RDCs were invited to participate in the development process for Weltevreden Valley – the 
very project that WCCDC wished to implement. 
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The bid by WCCDC prompted the creation of a new policy document to provide an agreed 
set of terms by which the private sector could be involved as a developer in the SLP and 
uphold the SLP Principles. It should have been natural for the ‘community organisations’ 
to agree to this code of conduct for the ANC representative on the Policy Committee had 
played a major role in drafting it and it was designed principally to protect the rights of 
communities. However, the policy prohibited private sector developers from doing 
whatever they liked, but and the leadership of SANCO and WCUSA now had vested 
interests in a private sector initiative, so they never approved the policy. Ultimately the 
policy was adopted by the government for application in the SLP. In reality, however, there 
was little chance that any private developer would be willing to take the risks that such a 
participative project required.  
 
At issue was the management of risk. Cross-sector collaboration involves political 
risks and financial risks. The public sector is able to accommodate both kinds of risk 
because it is politically controlled, legally responsible for addressing social issues and 
financially adaptable. The private sector is unable to control political risks and is geared to 
manage financial risks only in a free market, not in circumstances where the market is 
politically and restrictively defined. Therefore in a participative and highly politicised 
housing development project such as the SLP the private sector could not possibly take on 
the overall development risk, and could only provide functions for which the risk could be 
prescribed and the liability limited. Thus private sector service providers could offer a 
defined process or product only on condition that government either provided specified 
political elements or financially underwrote their attempted compliance by the contractor. 
That is a complicated system to manage and likely to be expensive. 
 
Over the succeeding years many private sector project managers, consultants and 
contractors would be involved in the SLP, all on contract to provincial or local government. 
A few failed to take the political implications seriously, either by trying to cut corners in 
the required participative procedures or by assuming that other parties would willingly 
relieve them of their responsibilities or sort out their problems. But only one private sector 
developer was ever involved, who in the project’s latter years successfully constructed the 
ultimate 6 000-house phase of Delft – but as a ‘turn-key’ project on vacant land, in which it 
had complete control of every aspect of the process except the identification of 
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beneficiaries. 
 
Within the Policy Committee the Philippi Industrialists’ Association had 
contributed a politically and ideologically non-aligned private sector perspective, but its 
representatives were all from one small beleaguered area, which had now experienced not 
only invasion but violence and vandalism. As their assets in Philippi remorselessly 
devalued they gradually lost interest in the SLP – and large scale industry in the area has 
never recovered. 
 
The plot thickens: January – May 1994 
 
In January 1994 a new association emerged called the Western Cape Community 
Organisation (WECCO), with seven founding movements, only two of which were 
involved in the SLP: WCUSA and the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). SANCO 
was not included, demonstrating the antipathy of civic organisations at the time towards 
SANCO’s unrepresentative leadership. 
  
Within the SLP project area WECCO claimed to represent township dwellers, those 
informal settlements that were still controlled by warlords, and a Coloured constituency 
which sought benefits in the development of Delft South. SANCO represented hostel 
dwellers and those informal settlements whose leaders espoused a more democratic kind of 
leadership. 
 
The Veteran was prominent in WECCO and was appointed as its chairman. 
However he soon began to realise that he was in danger of being manipulated by unknown 
people who had financed WECCO’s lavish launch and provided offices and inducements at 
a time when all civic leaders were wondering how to create a livelihood in the forthcoming 
dispensation.90
  
 The SLP was now structured as shown in Fig 13 overleaf: 
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Later that month SANCO and WECCO each hosted a workshop at which delegates were 
invited by the Project Coordinator to prioritise projects for implementation and 
communities for receipt of housing, all within the SLP. Every SLP community was 
represented at one or both workshops and a consensus was achieved, which was reported to 
the Policy Committee on 24 January. Of the 32 listed projects it was agreed to give 
immediate priority to the following: Crossroads 3 & 4, Philippi East 2 & 3, Weltevreden 
Valley 1 & 2, Millers Camp 3 & 4, Black City, KTC 2 & 3, Browns Farm, New Rest / 
Kanana, the remainder of Tambo Square and Delft South. The result of the other 
prioritisation exercise was a ranking communities led by Old Crossroads, Millers 
Camp/Lusaka, Black City, KTC, Browns Farm and New Rest / Kanana. The agreed next 
steps were to obtain clarity on the terms of the new national subsidy policy, apply for the 
substantial funds that the SLP would require, and establish the individual project 
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committees.91
 
 Within a week the Project Coordinator was reporting that some project 
committees had made a good start but that there was a lingering standoff between factions 
within Browns Farm and in Millers Camp there was a leadership vacuum. The tenders for 
earthworks in Philippi East had been received and work beganon a structure plan for 
Weltevreden Valley.  
In an encouraging move the United Nations Housing organisation, UN-Habitat, 
expressed interest in the SLP and sent a delegation from Nairobi to undertake a week-long 
survey. The team considered that the SLP’s combination of complexity and size was 
unprecedented in their experience although the SLP’s principles and guidelines 
corresponded fully with their own Community Development Programme. They affirmed 
the development process that was now underway.92
 
  
SANCO was still keen to broaden its representation in the Policy Committee to 
enable its member communities to enjoy more direct representation, but the Policy 
Committee was unable to contemplate adding forty or more delegates to its membership – 
so it was agreed to grant SANCO two more seats. Neither SANCO nor WECCO had yet 
responded on the proposed Code of Conduct for Developers.93 In Crossroads Mr Nongwe 
expressed his anger at the Democrat’s insistence that the development of Phases 3 and 4 of 
Crossroads include the involvement of the Boystown Committee in order to avoid the 
outbreak of violence between the two communities.94
 
 
To the Policy Committee meeting on 14 March 1994 the Democrat explained the 
SLP community participation strategy: that each community was being encouraged to form 
a Residents Development Committee (RDC) that might even include community members 
who were not already part of the existing local leadership but had useful skills. The 
representatives of SANCO and WECCO objected that their civic structures were being 
sidelined and undermined and demanded that they be represented on every RDC. The 
Democrat reminded them that the SLP Principles had been accepted by their own 
representatives and that his facilitators did not prescribe to communities whom they should 
include in their RDCs. In the ensuing discussion the Headman pointed out that WCUSA 
had not agreed to the Principles. The Strategist therefore enquired whether the community 
organisations wanted a different approach to community participation or whether there 
should be a moratorium on development until after the April national election. SANCO 
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wanted to consider the matter and indicated that it would call the Democrat to a meeting 
within a fortnight.95
 
 Such a meeting did not eventuate. The Strategist’s invitation to the 
organisations to either propose an alternative process or request a moratorium on 
development was a brave move which called their bluff – they were unable to propose an 
alternative method of community participation and dared not stop any project because of 
the inevitably angry reaction from the intended beneficiary communities. 
In March 1994 there was a flurry of discussions resulting in reconciliation between 
the Civics and SANCO, leading to the Veteran writing as Chairman of WECCO to the 
CPA to report that SANCO had “reconfirmed their support” of WECCO’s proposal to 
develop Weltevreden Valley and to ask to whom “the letters of support and application 
should be addressed” and “at your soonest convenience, but not later than 25 March 1994, 
for a meeting to be arranged between yourselves, WECCO, SANCO and the developing 
team”.96 It now appeared that WECCO, ostensibly simply an association of community 
organisations, was proposing to develop Weltevreden Valley – the same area that the 
PSC’s proposed utility company, WCCDC, wished to develop. This was unlikely to be a 
coincidence. The Strategist instructed his deputy to inform WECCO that the matter would 
be discussed by the SLP Policy Committee on 11 April, and that no purpose would be 
served by having discussions outside of that forum. All documentation should be sent to the 
Democrat in his role as secretary of the Policy Committee.97
 
  
Relationships within the SLP now resembled Fig 14 overleaf: 
 
  
7 ENABLING PROGRESS    134 



















ANC African National Congress SANCO SA National Civics Organisation 
CCT City of Cape Town WCCA Western Cape Civics’ Association 
CPA Cape Provincial Administration WCCDC W Cape Community Development Co 
HDA Hostel Dwellers’ Association WECCO W Cape Community Organisation 
PSC Private Sector Consortium WCUSA Western Cape United Squatters’ Assoc 
RSC Regional Services Council   
 
In a wide-ranging report written on 23 March the Democrat recorded that it had not yet 
proved possible to create a Project Committee for Philippi East, where the bulk earthworks 
contract was ready to commence. There were two reasons for this: On the one hand 
Nongwe regarded the whole of Philippi East as his own to allocate; and on the other hand 
leaders of the factions in Browns Farm, whose people were to be among the beneficiaries 
of Philippi East, were not talking to each other because some of them had occupied more 
than their agreed number of sites in Village 4a of Browns Farm.98 On 25 March the 
Democrat commented in a report to the Defender that there was clearly a bid still being 
made by the PSC to develop Weltevreden Valley, for which WECCO was “collecting 
names” (i.e. selling places on a housing waiting list) and that the SLP was regarded by 
these parties as being ‘in the way’ of the development. He had agreed with the Strategist 
that Weltevreden Valley be placed on the Agenda of the next Policy Committee meeting.99 
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On 29 March 1994 the Western Cape Regional Peace Committee, established in 
1991 by a multi-stakeholder National Peace Accord, (Readers Digest, 1994. p. 511), called 
a Special Executive Committee Meeting just to discuss the potential for conflict over the 
development of Weltevreden Valley. In an accompanying memorandum it was explained 
that its Crossroads Crisis Sub-Committee had recognised that the SLP was the ‘primary 
development forum in the area’ and had therefore co-opted a representative of the SLP onto 
the committee. Furthermore, the Crossroads Crisis Sub-Committee had assumed a 
monitoring function of all development taking place in the SLP area. The memo expressed 
concern that a utility company consisting of a consortium of developers and consultants 
was seeking to develop the area privately, that sites in this undeveloped area had already 
been sold or allocated to 4 000 people and that pressure was now being brought to bear on 
the CPA to make the land available and on the Regional Housing Board to provide funding. 
It pointed out that WECCO, although a participant in the SLP, was in support of the private 
initiative and that accusations had been made that sites had been sold to WECCO members. 
Concern was expressed that if the issue was not addressed it could lead to conflict between 
civic bodies and the collapse of the SLP.100
 
 
Agreement was reached with the Peace Committee that the SLP Policy Committee 
would discuss the matter first.101 Its agenda for the meeting on 11 April included the 
proposed Code of Conduct for Developers and an Application for Development of 
Weltevreden Valley by the WCCDC. Distributed with the agenda was the development 
proposal, with an unexpected covering letter from the same CPA official who had earlier 
encouraged the PSC and been repudiated by the Strategist, which explained that the 
attached proposal had been presented to the (national) Department of Local Government 
and National Housing by a legal firm on behalf of WCCDC, and that the Director-General 
of that Department had referred it to the CPA for submission to the Regional Housing 
Board. The official asked the Democrat to have the iSLP Policy Committee evaluate the 
application in terms of the Code of Conduct on 11 April, and then to advise him of the 
Policy Committee’s view so that the proposal could be forwarded to the Regional Housing 
Board together with the SLP Policy Committee’s comments.102 Everyone in the Policy 
Committee recognised the name of the legal firm as being associated with a former senior 
National Party politician. (Readers Digest, 1994. P. 475, 491). This looked very much like 
a tactical manoeuvre by members and associates of the apartheid old guard. However 
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Regional Housing Boards were newly created institutions and were not yet operational. 
 
The application was for WCCDC to develop 6 000 serviced sites, and as a second 
phase to build houses on them. 5 250 of these would be in Weltevreden Valley, and the 
balance would be created through the upgrading of areas in Nyanga and Guguletu vacated 
by the Weltevreden Valley beneficiaries. Training, job creation programmes and labour-
intensive construction were envisaged, as well as access to the community facilities in the 
former Railway Police hostel that had been acquired by the CPA. It also stated that the 
project would be managed by the ‘Regional and Local Social Compacts’ consisting of 
leading members of the communities involved, the Local Authority and the PSC. 
Elsewhere the application stated that the project managers would report to the ‘Local and 
Regional Social Compact’, but nowhere did it state how such compact would be structured. 
It was stated that the project was being sponsored individually and mutually ‘by the 
affected local community leadership and their regional structures, namely SANCO, 
WCUSA and WCCA’. The document had apparently been written prior to the creation of 
WECCO.  
 
The Policy Committee meeting on 11 April was well attended , and included the 
leaders of WCUSA, SANCO and the hostels upgrade project as well as the Veteran 
representing WECCO. The town clerks of Ikapa and Crossroads had been invited. The 
Code of Conduct produced some discussion on wording, but as the broad principles were 
not disputed a sub-committee of the Democrat plus representatives of the CPA, ANC, 
SANCO, WCUSA and the hostels project were delegated to re-word the document. With 
regard to the WCCDC proposal the Strategist pointed out that the CPA had committed 
itself to the joint venture approach of the SLP and would therefore not make an 
independent bilateral decision regarding land availability. The proposal regarding 
community participation was also problematic because on the basis of the SLP Principles 
the Democrat’s team had facilitated the establishment of RDCs in communities and was 
running training programmes on the development process.  
 
Representatives of SANCO, WECCO, WCUSA and the hostel dwellers 
vociferously complained that the SLP processes were undermining their organisations and 
that RDCs were illegitimate ‘puppet’ structures. The chairman of SANCO claimed that the 
Policy Committee was only an interim structure and that “communities should be enabled 
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to prepare applications, raise finance and appoint their own consultants”, but the Veteran 
argued that the RDCs provided useful links to communities and should not be disbanded. It 
was decided to appoint a sub-committee comprising representatives of the community 
organisations and the SLP Coordinator to either design a strategy within the existing SLP 
policy principles or to revert to the Policy Committee with an alternative recommendation. 
There was no time left to discuss the WCCDC proposal further and it was held over until 
the next meeting on 9 May.103
 
 
On 27 April 1994 the whole of South Africa went to the polls for the first time ever. 
The world’s newest democracy had been born. But on 5 May the Democrat expressed great 
concern privately to the Strategist that the civic structures involved in the SLP were not 
representative of communities or in touch with the ‘grass roots’ – and that their leaders had 
become gate-keepers. His field workers had discovered that the communities that WCCDC 
claimed to have consulted had not been consulted at all. The Democrat argued that the 15 
RDCs that had been created and trained were far more representative of their communities 
than any of the structures in WCCDC and he suggested that consideration be given to 
creating a committee of representatives of the RDCs who could represent communities in 
the SLP. The civic structures could be consulted if necessary, perhaps to address disputes. 
Alternatively if the real motivation of those on the Policy Committee was to find 




Amongst the many changes brought about upon South Africa’s transition to 
democracy in April 1994 was the conversion of provincial administrations to provincial 
governments. Centrally appointed Administrators and their Executive Committees were 
replaced by elected politicians and from these Premiers and Ministers were appointed by 
the majority party. The first democratic government began as a ‘government of national 
unity’, a deliberate attempt to unify the country. The Housing Minister in the Western Cape 
was Gerald Morkel, who assumed the role of the Sponsor of the SLP. 
 
About subterfuges, deceptions and manipulations 
It was to be expected in South Africa under apartheid that any initiative that was potentially 
contrary to government policy would be infiltrated by persons from some secret service 
establishment. Because ‘development’ had been an instrument of oppression (‘separate 
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development’ was a pillar of apartheid policy) the development field was as likely to be 
populated with spies, informers and agents provocateur as any other. Such highly trained 
operators are virtually impossible to detect and perilous to investigate. But over time 
repetitively suspicious activities do not go unnoticed and the testimonies of people who 
encounter their strangeness coincide – and an uncomfortable consensus is reached that 
clandestine forces have been at work. They were perceived to be burrowing beneath the 
SLP from time to time, but nobody could tell precisely what they were doing or on whose 
behalf they acted. 
 
It is worth mentioning this here because for a social crisis to reach the stage where a 
cross-sector collaboration is the last resort it is probable that the opposing forces which 
have hitherto failed to work together have employed espionage and deception against each 
other. If one party to the collaboration has been a militaristic oppressor then this is not only 
likely but inevitable. The fact that a collaboration is being initiated is unlikely to signal an 
end to this activity. Even if one arm of the government is no longer involved others might 
continue, and a change in policy could release hoards of brilliant spies and manipulators, 
ready to be employed by whoever will pay them. One must not be naive. 
 
Risky exercises for right reasons 
The SLP workshops which were held for the constituencies of WECCO in December 1993 
and for SANCO in January 2004 drew representatives of virtually all the communities in 
the SLP. The meetings were given a list of 32 potential projects, each rated with regard to 
development readiness (with regard to planning and raising finance), and a list of 23 
eligible communities. Delegates were asked to prioritise the entries on each list “A”, “B” or 
“C” with regard to urgency. The exercise was risky, because the responses were 
unpredictable, but not only did each workshop result in almost complete agreement but 
there was considerable congruence between the two sets of results. The Policy Committee 
treated the outcomes as recommendations, which it promptly approved. This demonstrated 
the value of real community involvement and that consultation with a large number of 
competing communities was feasible. It was apparent that local community leaders were 
not only well informed about regional issues but sensitive to the different needs and 
possibilities that existed. 
 
Similarly it is noteworthy that the Strategist and his colleagues continued to meet 
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with WCUSA and later with WECCO when those organisations were at odds with the 
Policy Committee. It exemplified doing everything possible to maintain good relationships 
with parties that had excluded themselves from the mainstream and had the potential to act 
explosively. On the other hand well-meaning friendly organisations can also damage the 
process, particularly if they feel the urge to intervene in matters which they do not fully 
understand. The Peace Committee was well within its rights to want to take action 
regarding Weltevreden Valley, but it was not qualified to act in the best interests of the 
SLP. It was therefore essential that the Democrat ensure that the Policy Committee pre-
empt the Peace Committee.  
 
Appreciation of the SLP, whether from an international authority such as UN-
Habitat or from local community bodies representing grassroots interests, provided 
objective validation of the integrity of the process and also invited ongoing relationships. 
Not only were these endorsements valuable references, but officials of UN-Habitat 
expressed ongoing support by providing good advice and capacity-building materials - and 
community leaders became co-workers with the SLP facilitators in ensuring the success of 
the project committees on which delivery of the SLP was based.  
 
The last throw of the dice: May – June 1994 
The Policy Committee reconvened on 13 May and was informed that subsequent to the 
previous meeting SANCO, WCUSA and WCCA had decided to form yet another entity: 
the Peninsular People’s Compact (PPC), “which will facilitate the functioning of regional 
compacts and ensure adequate consultation”. (The new terminology reflected the 
requirement in the newly-announced National Housing Policy that any housing project 
must have a ‘social compact’ to qualify for state subsidies.) They reported that their sub-
committee appointed at the previous Policy Committee meeting had not finalised its 
proposals regarding the SLP, but that in the light of national political changes a complete 
restructuring of the SLP would now be necessary. Reference was made to a meeting that 
they had held with the CPA, from which they awaited a response.  
 
The Strategist responded that no restructuring of the SLP could be undertaken by 
bilateral negotiations and proposed a more inclusive discussion. The leaders of the civic 
structures, who began referring to themselves as the Task Team, caucused for 20 minutes 
and then announced that they required more time to develop a proposal for restructuring the 
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SLP. Their immediate attention would be given to building the capacity of the PPC, and in 
the meantime they required all SLP project activity to cease. They planned a community 
workshop on 5 June, which they requested the CPA to pay for. The iSLP now resembled 
Fig 15 below: 
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‘Task Team’ members were particularly upset with the fact that the development process 
still involved the RDCs, and objected very strongly to the SLP coordination team’s 
continued involvement with communities. It was decided to form a sub-committee of the 
Policy Committee of four representatives of the Task Team and four from the CPA, RSC 
and City of Cape Town, chaired by the Defender, to discuss any proposals on re-structuring 
the SLP and redefining roles. The Democrat would attend meetings of the sub-committee 
as an advisor only when requested. It was also decided to arrange a meeting between the 
Task Team and the Project Management Committee (to whom the Democrat as Project 
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Coordinator reported) to discuss which activities should be put on hold. The Democrat 
agreed to cancel all community meetings that had been arranged until a way ahead had 
been agreed. 
 
The next surprise was that the representative of SANCO stated that it would be 
inappropriate to discuss the WCCDC Weltevreden Valley application because it was now 
outdated and “should be declared null and void”. It was agreed that only the applicant 
could withdraw it, but there was no interest in taking it further at that stage. Furthermore, 
the Strategist reminded the meeting that the CPA had, at the Policy Committee’s request, 
withdrawn its letter of support to WCCDC regarding a land availability agreement – and 
without access to the land the proposal could not go ahead. There had also been no further 
progress towards reaching agreement on the Code of Conduct.  
 
Residents’ committees react 
Before that meeting ended the Defender reported that she had received a letter from the 
leadership of the Samora Machel informal settlement, which was located on the 
Weltevreden Valley site. They had an RDC and expressed appreciation for the community-
based approach. They were also members of SANCO and had heard that there was a 
proposal to develop Weltevreden Valley, yet they had never been consulted. They therefore 
requested representation on the Policy Committee. The SANCO representatives agreed to 
follow the matter up.105
 
 
On 17 May the Project Management Committee met with the Task Team, who this 
time asked to be referred to as ‘representatives of the PPC’. The Defender attended. The 
Democrat reported in detail on the status of each of seventeen projects and was given the 
go-ahead to proceed with all of them except Crossroads (because Nongwe complained that 
the Democrat was divisive) and Philippi East (where the creation of a project committee 
had been bedevilled by differences between SANCO and WCUSA factions).106
 
  
On 23 May the Democrat reported to the Strategist that in cancelling the scheduled 
community meetings it had been necessary to inform the RDCs of the reason. Their angry 
response demonstrated that grassroots community leaders knew nothing of the proposal to 
form a new organisation between existing community organisations. Leaders of the KTC 
settlement had briefed the Legal Resources Centre on the matter and leaders of three 
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informal settlements in Nyanga had asked the Development Action Group for help. News 
of all this dissatisfaction had reached the Regional Peace Committee, which expressed 
great concern that developments could once again fall into the hands of Mr Nongwe and 
the Headman. The Regional Peace Executive decided to request the national and provincial 
ministers of housing (Messrs Slovo and Morkel) to defer any decision on transferring 
control of the SLP until an investigation had been held into the entire affair and the 
communities had been consulted. 
 
On 26 May 1994 representatives of the Residents Development Committees of 
KTC, Mkonto Square, Mpinga Square, Mpetha Square, Black City and Millers Camp (all 
Nyanga), New Rest, Pholla Park and Fezeka (all Guguletu) as well as Samora Machel 
passed a resolution to mandate the Province to apply to the Provincial Housing Board for 
the funds to develop Weltevreden Valley. Later they were joined by the residents of 
Mahobe Drive, Kalanyoni, Barcelona and Kanana, and thereby the Weltevreden Valley 





On 2 June the sub-committee that had been commissioned by the Policy Committee to 
review the structure of the SLP met and proposed that the ‘community-based organisations’ 
should in future be represented on the Project Management Committee, or on a new project 
management structure in the event of a re-structuring. However, it was noted that the PPC 
had not yet provided any details on its own structure and proposed role, its proposals for 
the implementation and management structures of the SLP, how it intended community-
based organisations to be involved with RDCs, or its proposals on affirmative action in the 
implementation and management of the SLP. The Strategist also reported that the CPA was 
unable to finance the PPC’s workshop planned for 5 June.108
 
 
The Democrat had also learned that efforts were being made by the PSC to 
incorporate additional construction companies. He ventured to suggest that three of the four 
big greenfields sites in the SLP might be made available for development by the private 
sector, but only on certain conditions. These were that they complied with structure plans, 
created project committees that included the RDCs and fully involved them in the project, 
ensured that the site allocation criteria was pre-determined by the project committee, that 
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labour-based methods were used, employment offered to community members, and that the 
developers submit their projects to monitoring by the SLP to ensure compliance.109 On 7 
June the SLP Project Management Committee recommended to the Policy Committee that 
developers be given the opportunity to submit development proposals to project 
committees for the development of the SLP greenfields projects (Southern Delft, 
Weltevreden Valley and Philippi East) or phases thereof, but only after a social compact 
had been formed and the preliminary town planning and engineering report had been 
completed, for which they would have engaged the necessary consultants. Furthermore, 




When the Policy Committee met on 13 June it was addressed by the SLP’s new 
patron, Provincial Minister of Housing, Gerald Morkel, who expressed concern at the 
recently-announced findings of the Goldstone Commission into the 1993 violence in 
Crossroads and at allegations of potential private interests in the SLP. He reminded the 
committee that the objective was to produce affordable housing through an inclusive and 
transparent process. The leaders of SANCO, WCUSA and the Hostel Dwellers arrived late 
and missed the Minister’s address. They could provide no details about the existence or 
role of the Task Team, perhaps because the PPC’s workshop had not taken place on 5 June. 
The Strategist was blamed for not having financed it, but he responded that he had not 
received the motivation that he had requested. Again the suspension of activity in projects 
was mooted, but without any decision. PPC members refused to provide support for an 
application to the Regional Housing Board for bridging finance for the SLP until they had 
‘engaged in further discussions’. They complained that the Democrat was divisive, but 
when asked to put the grievances in writing the Veteran cannily responded that community 




On 20-23 June faxes were sent by SANCO, WCCA and WECCO to the other 
members of the Policy Committee asking for the removal of the Democrat as Project 
Coordinator and for his replacement by their own representatives.112 It also transpired that 
the PPC and PSC had surreptitiously submitted an application to the Regional Housing 
Board for the right to develop 10 000 sites within the SLP.113 The Policy Committee 
meeting scheduled for 23 June114 attracted an attendance of 33 people with 7 apologies, but 
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still yielded no proposals for the re-structuring of the SLP – just the faxes calling for the 
Democrat’s replacement, which were tabled by the Defender in the Chair. The Democrat 
excused himself from the meeting. The Town Manager of Crossroads asked “whether it 
would be permissible for the Policy Committee to ‘test’ the constituencies to ascertain 
whether the current proposals had been arrived at through a consultative process”, and was 
met by a storm of protest from ‘community structures’. Before a way ahead could be 
agreed the community organisations held a caucus meeting, as a result of which the Policy 
Committee decided once again to establish a sub-committee, with the task of putting 
forward concrete proposals regarding the restructuring of both the Policy and Project 
Management Committees and concerning the role in the SLP of the Democrat’s firm.115
 
  
Into a new dispensation 
These two months since the creation of the ‘new South Africa’ had been full of furious 
attempts by some parties to wrest control of the SLP from the main government actor. 
Their desperation was because the provincial government was now legitimate – it was 
product of democracy, part of a new national government and it therefore suddenly had real 
power and authority. 
 
The repeated creation of sub-committees and unending tolerance by the authorities 
of patently bogus “community representatives” must be viewed in the light of what was 
being played out on the national stage. The first quarter of 1994 was the last lap of a very 
fraught national negotiating process, with threats from the traditionally Zulu Inkatha 
Freedom Party to withdraw altogether and a constant threat of violence from right wing 
white organisations. During the process of transition the government was unable to be 
decisive about a local project like the SLP. Private sector bounty hunters had everything to 
play for – within a limited window of opportunity until government settled down. 
Ambitious civic leaders had their future careers to fight for, and in this interregnum they 
could posture and pronounce as much as they liked, in the hope of attracting the attention 
of the new raft of national leaders. Civil servants and consultants had to build and maintain 
relationships with everyone because nobody knew what would be required to avoid a 
foreshortened career. 
 
For these reasons the self-styled ‘community representatives’ were asserting 
themselves in the Policy Committee, frequently rearranging and renaming themselves to 
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appear impressive, yet when invited or challenged they were unable to demonstrate any 
strategy or organisational substance. But when they insisted that all SLP community 
meetings must cease there was an angry reaction from the grassroots, coupled with a 
warning about possible violence from the Regional Peace Committee. For on the ground 
the SLP had been steadily growing in substance with the creation of an increasing number 
of RDCs whose members were gaining confidence and asking questions about who was 
representing them in the Policy Committee. 13 RDCs, each representing a 
community/settlement, had become members of the SLP’s first green fields project 
committee. The catalyst for this transformation was the Democrat’s team of isiXhosa-
speaking facilitators, communication specialists and programme managers that he had 
established to enable participative development at the local project level. All of these new 
participants, those within communities and those employed by the SLP Coordinator, 
constituted the new generation of Enablers in the SLP. The life of the Policy Committee 
had been extended because of delays on the national stage but now there was not real 
government and in the SLP a growing degree of real community involvement and a swing 
in impetus from ‘top-down’ to ‘bottom-up’.  
 
The SLP was on a knife-edge. Many of the collaborators were now sitting on the 
fence with a foot in each camp and ready to jump to wherever the money and job prospects 
would appear. However they had focussed so much on their personal agendas that they 
failed to notice that the people whom they have been purporting to represent were 
beginning to speak for themselves. There was also a new government in power, at last, 




The narrative in this chapter covered the turbulent twelve months until June 1994, in which 
the competition for control of the iSLP became increasingly convoluted and furious, but at 
the same time local leaders were becoming aware that they were being misrepresented. The 
contestation brought the collaboration to a virtual standstill. The argument of this chapter is 
that there is a limit to what Enablers of a cross-sector collaboration can achieve on their 
own – in spite of all their endeavours the collaborative process had been brought to a halt. 
Its contribution to the thesis as a whole is to introduce the necessity of mandates to 
empower the Enablers. Chapter 8 describes how the iSLP process came to the attention of 
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the new national government which provided a mandate beyond anything that either the 










Empowering Enablers: Putting principles to work 
in trustworthy hands 
 
 
In this chapter we find the integrity of the SLP’s process being validated by the new 
national and provincial government, and the project’s opponents castigated in the press by 
local community leaders. Not only was the project endorsed and its promoters affirmed, but 
they were invited to scale up the project to provide a great deal more than serviced land. 
Implementation was to be managed at the level of individual projects in conjunction with 
community representatives, and the whole process was to be coordinated in accordance 
with the originally-agreed principles. The Policy Committee was abolished, to be replaced 
by more appropriate high level representative institutions. 
  
The interregnum is over 
 
On 30 June the Strategist and some of his colleagues briefed Billy Cobbett, the Director-
General of the Department of Housing, and followed it up with some background 
documents.116
 
 Cobbett also received a delegation of some Policy Committee members led 
by the veteran housing champion Alderman Eulalie Stott. On 3 July the Community 
Planner and the Democrat sent him their own analysis of the situation in the SLP. In this 
report they pointed out the mutual hostility between WCUSA, SANCO and WCCA that 
had existed in the policy phase of the SLP, but which had evaporated in the implementation 
phase when they joined forces with the private sector consortium and proposed to take over 
the SLP. There was also evidence that the leaders of these “community organisations” had 
neither sought nor received mandates for these actions from their purported constituents – 
yet they had entered into an agreement creating the PPC, signed on 13 June in the offices of 
the PSC’s lawyers.  
In their report the Community Planner and the Democrat stated that whereas the 
PPC claimed to be a “social compact” the evidence from Peace Committee community 
workers as well as from the RDCs indicated that it comprised only a small group of 
individuals. Cobbett was also told that the PSC, in association with WCUSA, had 
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previously received funding from the Independent Development Trust to develop 4 000 
sites in Khayelitsha, which project had eventually dissolved into violence after all 
allocations were controlled by the Headman. The Community Planner and the Democrat 
suspected that the consortium was now planning to use the PPC as a front to achieve a huge 
amount of publicly-funded work for a single group of consultants in a consortium with a 
small group of contractors. The PPC had already proposed themselves as community 
facilitators in projects outside of the SLP for a 3% fee. They reminded Cobbett that the 
term “rent a community” was becoming increasingly familiar in the development field in 
South Africa, and he recommended that it become national policy that project proposals be 
only invited from the private sector after the establishment of a community compact, an 




The Ministers of the Western Cape Provincial Government were briefed about the 
SLP on 11 and 19 July. All the weekend newspapers on 16/17 July carried stories of how 
the PPC and compact aimed to take over the SLP and remove the Democrat, and the 
rejection of these attempts by local community leadership.118 On 14 July the Defender 
wrote personally to Policy Committee members inviting them to a meeting on 26 July at 
11h00, with a reminder that each party was limited to two delegates.119 She followed it 
with a letter on 22 July, explaining that the implementation of the SLP had been the subject 
of discussion by the Executive Committee of the Regional Government, and that this and 
the possible re-structuring of the SLP would be the focus of the Policy Committee meeting, 
which would be addressed by Minister Morkel.120 At 14h37 on the day before the 
scheduled meeting the Democrat received a fax from the PPC requesting that the Policy 
Committee meeting be cancelled and that instead a meeting of the restructuring sub-
committee be convened as a matter of urgency.121 At 08h18 on 26 July the Defender faxed 
the PPC urging their attendance at the morning’s Policy Committee meeting to hear the 
views of the government.122 When the meeting commenced there was only one item on the 
agenda: “Re-structuring of the Serviced Land Project – The Hon. Minister of Housing.”123
 
 
Minister Morkel read from a prepared statement and reported that both the 
Provincial Executive and the national Minister of Housing regarded the SLP as one of the 
highest national priorities and that finance would be sought for it from the national 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Implementation of the SLP had been 
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frustrated by the actions of representatives of community organisations. It had therefore 
been decided that the provincial government would execute the project in terms of the 
agreed SLP Principles and with participation and empowerment of communities on an 
individual project basis – expressed through their active representation on project 
committees and thus involvement in the whole planning and delivery process, and by the 
design and implementation of programmes that would inform beneficiaries and promote the 
establishment of a strong social fabric within the suburbs and neighbourhoods that would 
be created. The Policy Committee was abolished with immediate effect, and replaced by a 
committee chaired by Minister Morkel to resolve issues, to which community organisations 
would be invited. The national Department of Housing would be invited to have a 
representative on the Project Management Committee, which would continue to be 
responsible for implementation, with assistance from the Democrat’s firm in coordination 
and facilitation. The project would be linked to the national RDP programme through the 
national Department of Housing. Proposals from developers would be considered by the 
relevant Residents’ Development Committees and the Provincial Administration, but only 
after the preliminary stages of the project process (per previous recommendations) had 
been completed. Finally he paid tribute to all the excellent work that had been done, and 
particularly thanked the Defender for her outstanding contribution in the chair.124
 
 The SLP 
Policy Committee never met again. 
A “Special Integrated Presidential Project” of the RDP 
 
The first documentation about the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
arrived in the iSLP Coordinator’s office on 5 August 1994, with a request to attend a 
meeting of the National Urban Development Task Team in Pretoria on the 9th. The papers 
included a proposal in the form of a memorandum from the RDP Minister Without 
Portfolio, Jay Naidoo, that the RDP Fund should be used to leverage a shift in priorities 
within the budgets of national line departments as well as provincial and local authorities 
and to kick-start special projects and programmes to initiate development. Applications for 
integrated projects were to be submitted by such departments and authorities, and must 
include an allocation in their budgets for capacity building for both “government RDP 
structures” and community development organisations.125
 
 
At the meeting on 9 August it was announced that “The Serviced Land Project in 
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the Cape Flats” was one of 6 key urban renewal focus areas that had emerged.126 On 24 
August it was learned that the SLP had in principle been selected to be one of these six 
“Presidential Projects” of the RDP.127
 
  
The SLP coordinators compiled a comprehensive business plan on the basis of a 
fully integrated project, which would provide not only housing (within the terms of the 
national housing subsidy policy) but all the community facilities necessary in new suburbs, 
plus provision for capacity building programmes. This was all to be undertaken within the 
5-year objective of the RDP, with a budget of almost R1,2 billion, half of which was 
requested from RDP funds. It was dated 23 November 1994, considered by the national 
RDP Committee on 15 December and thereafter approved by Minister Naidoo with an 
allocation of finance of R592 075 000.128 129
 
 The name “Serviced Land Project” now 
seemed very incongruous because the project would provide a great deal more than 
serviced land – but it transpired that nobody who had been involved in the project wanted 
to change the name. So it was renamed the “Integrated Serviced Land Project”, abbreviated 
“iSLP” – “i” being the appropriate isiXhosa prefix. 
Sadly, Housing Minister Joe Slovo died of cancer in January 1995. He had 
championed the introduction of a national housing policy based on an incremental 
approach, starting with a very small dwelling which could be extended. It was on this basis 
that the iSLP began implementation – a modest grant was to be used first to provide a 
serviced site and the remaining funds would finance a dwelling. His successors were 
otherwise inclined, and in later years introduced larger subsidies and minimum sizes for 
houses and attempted, seldom successfully, to reserve the whole subsidy for the house on 
the basis of the local authority paying for the creation of serviced sites.130
 
 It so happened 
that from 1994 state-subsidised houses became associated in the public mind with the RDP, 
and since then all houses that have been financed only with state subsidies have been 
colloquially termed “RDP houses”. 
The iSLP Business Plan was for the development of new suburbs on large tracts of 
‘greenfields’ land owned by the Province (particularly Delft South, Philippi East and 
Weltevreden Valley) and for the upgrading of informal settlements that existed on land that 
was, or would become, owned by local authorities. The beneficiaries would be drawn from 
informal settlements and backyard shacks in existing townships – and part of the plan was 
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that the greenfields sites would be used for the relocation of informal settlement residents 
so that the cleared informal settlements could be developed and formalised by the local 
authority. What happened, however, was that large scale delivery forged ahead on the 
greenfields sites while the local authorities went through years of re-structuring 
accompanied by diminishing political will, inadequate policies and insufficient resources to 
either protect or upgrade their informal settlements. As a result the greenfields projects 
accommodated a continuous stream informal settlements’ residents, whose places were 
taken by others. At the end of the project there were actually more households living in 
informal settlements within the project area than there had been at the start. 
 
The iSLP Business Plan 
After receiving indications from the national Department of Housing that the project was to 
be recommended for inclusion in the Reconstruction and Development Programme the 
facilitation team had to urgently compile a comprehensive business plan. The iSLP 
Principles, including technical standards, were already documented, but no budgets had yet 
been prepared because nobody had yet known whether or not the project would be limited 
to the creation of serviced sites. The RDP brief was that ‘integrated urban development’ 
was required, meaning suburbs containing streets, houses, schools, libraries, community 
halls, sports fields, playgrounds, health facilities, early childhood centres and sites for 
businesses and religious purposes – and that the programme must incorporate capacity-
building opportunities for the new residents. 
 
The starting point was to list every parcel of land that had been identified by the 
iSLP’s Technical Committee, dividing the large areas into phases of around 22 hectares. 
There were more than sixty of these, each to be treated as an individual project. Then the 
number of residential sites that could be achieved within each project was calculated, using 
a target ratio of 45 sites per hectare of gross vacant land, in compliance with the iSLP’s 
planning guidelines. Each serviced site and house would have to be financed from the state 
housing subsidy for low income earners, which had recently been announced, so the 
housing budget for each project was the product of the number of sites multiplied by the 
subsidy, plus the cost of the bulk and link infrastructure as estimated by the engineers in the 
Technical Committee. 
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A map of iSLP projects indicating the estimated number of households that were to 
live in each was then discussed separately with officials of the provincial departments of 
Education, Health and Libraries and of the local government agencies that would be 
responsible for facilities and amenities. This was to establish what kinds of facilities should 
be provided within each project and the estimated cost of each. The expectation was that if 
the SLP was approved the national Treasury would cover 50% of the capital cost of such 
facilities, with the balance and the operating costs being for the account of the relevant 
government department. The budget for schools was calculated on the basis of a primary 
school for every 1 000 households and a secondary school for every 2 000 households, but 
the capacity of existing schools in the proximity had to be also taken into account, and it 
was decided to extend some of these as part of the SLP. The schools budget was therefore 
based on the number of primary or secondary classrooms to be built, with an added factor 
to provide the other necessary facilities such as offices, ablutions and assembly halls. All 
the other facilities were planned carefully on the same basis and then priced and 
programmed by the responsible department.  
 
The national RDP was intended to be a 5 year programme, so this substantial list of 
projects with their budgets (including cost escalations over time) had to be phased over that 
period. The resulting budget for the entire iSLP was 1.2 billion Rands, of which half was 
sought from the national Treasury, on the basis of commitments made by the Western Cape 
Provincial Government, the Regional Services Council and the City of Cape Town to 
provide the balance. In fact the provincial contribution, which included all the housing 
subsidies (which amounted to more than half of the total iSLP budget) was all derived from 
the central government’s -allocations to its departments and thence to the provinces. 
 
The purpose of the iSLP Business Plan was to define the objectives, principles and 
components of the project and to secure the necessary overall funding. Over time some of 
the detail changed, particularly with regard to timing and phasing, but access to the 
Treasury money was secured and each of the many iterations of the iSLP budget was 
formally approved by the provincial government. Furthermore, as soon as each capital 
project or capacity-building programme was formulated it was submitted to the provincial 
government for approval and later formally signed off when it had been completed. By the 
completion of the iSLP it had comprised about 150 capital projects and 75 capacity-
building programmes. 
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In the long implementation process the approved iSLP Business Plan remained the 
only authorised framework for the project, and the iSLP Principles took on an untouchable, 
inviolable role, and could be raised as a banner at any time in defence of the founding 
values and decisions of the project. During a period of unprecedented change and 
administrative turmoil in government it was invaluable to have a set of principles that had 
been approved by all parties and at the highest level and which were effectively 
unchangeable. 
 
The iSLP Principles 
The eventual recommendation for state funding was framed in terms of the iSLP Principles, 
which had been approved early in the process by all of the parties except WCUSA, and in 
particular had been endorsed by grassroots leaders at local workshops. These lay at the core 
of the iSLP’s mandate. Over the succeeding years the first line of defence against any 
challenge to the project was whether the iSLP Principles would be compromised. Their 
wording was kept short and simple and began with the following Aim and Objectives: 
 
Aim of the iSLP 
The Integrated Serviced Land Project is primarily for the benefit of low-income 
families living in Crossroads and the surrounding informal settlements and in 
backyards and overcrowded hostels in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu who do not 
have secure rights to serviced land. The project will also be accessible to persons 
who are on the housing waiting lists held by local authorities in the metropolitan 
area. The iSLP’s aim is to enable low income families to participate fully in the 
planning and implementation of a process that will create access to serviced 
residential plots with secure tenure; and housing, education, health, employment 
and other resources so that a process of incremental and sustainable holistic 
development can take place in these communities. 
 
Objectives for the implementation of the iSLP 
The objectives are to: 
Structure the project appropriately under the authority of the Provincial 
  Administration of the Western Cape. 
Assist communities within the project area to establish inclusive, development- 
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 orientated committees. 
Identify potential projects. 
Facilitate the establishment of a Project Committee in respect of each project to 
  oversee planning and management, such committee to comprise representatives of 
  community committees, the public authority, a  private developer (if involved) and 
  the iSLP Project Coordinator, with consultants in attendance. 
Programme the completion of the iSLP within five years so that all potential 
  beneficiaries can have a realistic expectation of a material improvement in their 
  circumstances within that time frame. 
Facilitate the provision of educational, health and other resources required for the 
  development of communities. 
Facilitate and promote the consolidation of communities. 
Equip communities through training and capacity-building programmes so that they 
  can participate fully in the planning and implementation of projects and 
  programmes. 
Optimise skills generation and job creation, including the use of labour intensive 
  techniques, in all projects and programmes. 
Optimise the communities’ access to all appropriate resources, including technical 
  advice, project facilitation and conflict resolution. 
Raise the necessary finance. 
Ensure the maintenance of infrastructure and service delivery within the iSLP 
  Project Area, and that the communities pay for services received. 
 
These were followed by a list of the responsibilities of each of the parties involved in the 
iSLP’s implementation, principles for allocating access to land for each community and 
then principles for identifying beneficiaries within each community.  
 
The iSLP Principles also included a range of ‘approved development techniques’ and 
guidelines on densities, planning principles and levels of service. These latter documents 
had been researched and developed by the Technical Committee, comprising mainly 
professional planners and engineers, which took the opportunity provided by the dawn of a 
new political era to create a new suite of planning and design principles to replace 
protocols that were either too demeaning for communities or unnecessarily expensive and 
wasteful of resources. Specifications for roads, pavements, vehicle access, site sizes and 
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reticulation of water, sanitation, electricity and public transport were all reviewed – and 
new guidelines for upgrading informal settlements were incorporated. These were all 
negotiated with the authorities and officially approved. The considerable amount of finance 
that was reserved for the iSLP became an added incentive for applying these new ideas. 
 
The transformation in status 
In the space of a few weeks the fortunes of the iSLP had changed from being under total 
siege to being selected to be the new government’s biggest demonstration project of good 
practice. The credibility of the opposition was ultimately challenged by grassroots 
community representatives who found their voice in the Residents Development 
Committees. The last straw had been the revelation that the founding memorandum of the 
Peninsular Peoples Compact had been signed in the offices of the Private Sector 
Consortium’s legal advisors. 
 
A crucial factor in the evolving tale of this project was the state of health of 
democracy in South Africa during this preliminary period. ‘Community Participation’ in 
development is a democratic ideal, but South Africa was far from a democracy. The 
prospect of a democratic future had been inspired by the release and unbanning of political 
opponents of the apartheid government, but the whole society had lived within an 
autocracy for decades, and the black community had been its prime victim for generations. 
The involvement of black people in government programmes had been characterised by 
manipulation, force or patronage. People had developed skills for administering that but 
there was very little experience in real participative development. Even people like the 
Democrat and the Strategist were leading a democratic process more from principle than 
from experience – although they both were well acquainted with the weaknesses of 
alternative processes. Nor were the community leaders operating out of a rich history of 
successful democratic activism – successful activists had been imprisoned and since their 
release had been engaged at the national rather than local level.  
 
Another factor in the iSLP drama was the pecuniary motivation of the actors. Civil 
servants were remunerated regularly and although their future was uncertain under a 
changed dispensation their financial interests were being represented (and ultimately 
safeguarded) in the national negotiations. The consultants involved in the process were also 
remunerated for the services that they rendered. Although nobody was specifically looking 
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after their interests in the negotiations they knew that there was a lack of skills in the 
country and that they could position themselves to be engaged in any development 
opportunity that would probably follow independence. However, with very few exceptions 
the services provided by representatives of Civics and other community organisations were 
not remunerated in any way, and there was a real danger that they never would be. Their 
personal hopes and dreams of life in a new and different South Africa were becoming 
increasingly close to either realisation or evaporation. There were good grounds for anxiety 
and desperation.  
 
One might also reflect upon the wisdom of commencing a development process by 
discussing high-level principles and objectives and therefore needing to engage 
‘communities’ through agents who could operate effectively at that level. The consequence 
would be rather a ‘top-down’ process based on the belief or assumption that these were 
actually agents of the community and could therefore provide a ‘bottom-up’ balance. At 
some stage any false assumptions or deceptions would be exposed. Should more 
representative role-players have been chosen? At the start of the iSLP there were no others, 
and had they existed they would have demanded participation. Alternatively, could the 
nature of the role-players have been better understood from the start – after all, it was well 
known that the WCUSA-PSC association had failed to deliver in the IDT project in 
Khayelitsha? An inclusive approach to membership of the Policy Committee was adopted 
on the principle that to leave out a party would be to invite resentment and therefore 
conflict. Therefore the exclusion of a party, particularly an apparently significant role-
player such as WCUSA, whatever its track record, could not be contemplated. The 
possibility of a counter-proposal out of WCUSA’s association with the PSC might have 
been anticipated – but actually it arrived before the Policy Committee had even convened. 
 
The fact that the whole country was under a tumultuous political transition and that 
the attention of respected politicians was on national complications was a real disadvantage 
for the iSLP. There was nobody who could call the Policy Committee members to order 
except the Defender, who was a very faithful and even-handed chairperson but had no 
actual authority. And there was no way of propelling the project out of consultative mode 
into delivery because the necessary multi-year budgets were not yet available. The policy 
phase was a tedious and unsatisfactory consultative process in which unqualified persons 
acted as proxy for community representation, yet it was indispensable. Encounters with 
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representatives of grassroots communities, both in the two big iSLP workshops and in the 
creation of RDCs and project committees, were the highlights of the process and a vital 
encouragement to those who were leading it. 
 
Collaborating through conflict and constant change 
The iSLP was created as an experimental collaboration in a situation fraught with conflict 
and distrust, neither of which can be eliminated easily. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the first few years of the iSLP’s approach to Crossroads were characterised by no reduction 
in  contestation although for most of the time its form was not as violent as it had been.  
 
At this moment of project approval it can be interesting to reflect upon some of the 
main actions and counter-actions that had taken place around Crossroads over the previous 
two decades. Table 5 (see Annexure B. p. B3-5) presents a very condensed timetable of 
these events. 
 
Participation in the Policy Committee 
The SLP Policy Committee meetings were intense and frequent: 36 meetings within 39 
months attended by 12 broad groups, many of which were suspicious of, and in some cases 
hostile to, each other. At various times 83 people attended these meetings, but it is 
illuminating to analyse attendance in the same way as was done for its Local Authority 
counterpart (in Tables 3 and 4), as shown in Table 6 (See Annexure B. p. B5). 
 
The effectiveness of this committee rested on the 6 people who attended more than 
75% of the meetings. Two of them, the Strategist and the Democrat – the initiator and the 
facilitator – were also numbered among the 5 on whom the Local Authority meetings 
depended. In addition each had a chairperson, so that apart from those who were obliged to 
be there sustained attendance was provided only by 3 people in the Policy Committee (the 
Veteran and Zoli Malindi of the Civics and the Urban Planner of the RSC) and 2 in the 
Local Authority meeting – a Crossroads official and the SLP’s planning consultant. 
 
Just as striking is the fact that of all those who ever presented themselves at Policy 
Committee meetings only 15% attended more than 50% of the meetings, and almost 70% 
attended no more than 25% of the meetings. The Local Authority meeting was much better 
attended: 35% of the members attended more than half of the meetings, but then it was 
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populated mainly by officials and their managers and political heads.  
 
This clearly indicates that real commitment to the process was limited to the 
initiator, the facilitator, the chairpersons and the Civic movement – with strong support 
from the Regional Services Council in which metropolitan policy was vested. The political 
parties had bigger fish to fry in the national debates and WCUSA had an alternative 
agenda. The inescapable conclusion must be that during the policy-making process this 
project was driven by very few people. How was that possible? 
 
Table 7 (See Annexure B. p. B6) is a record of attendance at the extra-parliamentary Policy 
Committee. It shows how many of the 36 meetings each group attended or failed to attend; 
and the range and average of the number of their representatives at meetings. It show that 
the CPA, in whose offices the meetings were held, was always present, with very regular 
support from the Chairperson (the Defender, who actually only missed one meeting after 
her appointment as chair), the RSC, the Civics and the Facilitator/Coordinator (the 
Democrat). A factor which contributed to the Civics’ good attendance was that transport 
was provided to enable the ‘community organisations’ to attend meetings, organised by the 
facilitator and at CPA’s expense. At the other end of the spectrum neither political party 
(ANC or PAC) could be relied upon to attend, and the interest of the Philippi Industrialists 
was topical – as was also the required attendance of BLA officials and technical 
consultants. WCUSA attended less than half the meetings. But the lower right hand cells of 
the table show that meetings were well attended by 12-41 people, with an average of 19. 
On the two occasions when only 12 people attended they nevertheless represented 6 and 9 
diverse groups. Of the 12 groups (in which all the Civics, hostel dwellers and SANCO 
together comprise only 1) an average of 8 and a minimum of 6 attended throughout. This 
illustrates the need for committed Enablers – in particular a host, chairperson, facilitator 
and communicator as well as some strong well-placed supporters across the spectrum of 
stakeholders. 
 
The above analysis of attendance has only been possible because a detailed 
attendance register was completed at every meeting of the iSLP Policy Committees. This 
required attendees to write their name clearly, state whom they represented and provide a 
signature. This was all faithfully transcribed in the minutes of each meeting. One of the 
extra advantages that this provided in the iSLP was to indicate changes in allegiances over 
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time, especially with the different civic organisations moving into and out of SANCO, 
WCCDC, WECCO and the PPC.  
 
The Enablers thus far 
 
This is an opportune moment to consider the roles of the principal Enablers during the 
policy-making phase of the iSLP. 
 
The Sponsor in his position as Administrator of the Cape played decisive roles in launching 
the process, proposing that the Defender chair the Policy Committee and later determining 
the end of the policy phase and start of implementation. His role in sponsoring the initiative 
and supporting it thereafter was indispensable. Otherwise he stayed away from Policy 
Committee meetings, and so wisely avoided involvement in any debates which might have 
compromised his role as patron. As a ‘higher authority’ who only visited the Policy 
Committee when necessary he proved to be a very valuable Enabler. His successor played a 
critical role in negotiating the approval of the iSLP by the national and provincial 
governments and in ultimately calling the bluff of the ‘community organisations’ and 
terminating the life of the Policy  Committee. Thereafter, as will be demonstrated, his 
continued involvement was required. 
 
The Defender as chairperson of the Policy Committee was independent, fair and gracious, 
although anxious that this delicate and risky process might fail. She felt out of her depth, 
knowing little about housing development, but was supported by the officials and respected 
by all but the brashest members. She was not involved in the ultimate discussions with the 
national government and so when the Policy Committee was dissolved she feared that it 
had all come to nothing. In fact the opposite was true, but by that time her considerable 
dedication and expertise had drawn her into new fields – first as the Provincial Electoral 
Officer for the country’s first democratic election and then as a Commissioner in South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. To have a chairperson of such stature to 
help enable the iSLP was a huge advantage. 
 
The Strategist was a long term professional civil servant and town planner, a quiet and 
thoughtful man, who in his pivotal position as the senior official addressing the crisis had 
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demonstrated a very enlightened and pragmatic approach in initiating and guiding the iSLP. 
In maintaining the process despite all the frustrations and provocations he was supported 
and encouraged not only by his direct political superiors but by members of the state’s 
Intelligence Directorate which had been advocating adaptation for years.  
 
The Democrat was driven by a personal mission to improve Crossroads and not only 
conceptualised the process but offered to facilitate its application. That function had 
strategic, communication and administrative components and had to be performed with 
rigor, integrity and consistency in order to hold such an incompatible group of stakeholders 
together. His was also a position of weakness and vulnerability, because although he had 
considerable responsibility there was no authority attached. He was the most visible 
defender of the process and therefore came under personal attack from those who wanted to 
change it – and at times he felt completely isolated. On the other hand it is evident from 
interviews recorded later that participants were so aware of the challenges within their own 
parties and those presented by their opponents that the facilitator became almost invisible, 
particularly as his function at policy Committee meetings was to be ‘in attendance’, not to 
chair them. His role during the first four years of the iSLP was very demanding but 
completely indispensable. 
 
The Community Planner, held the connection with the ANC, which was slack most of the 
time but was activated when politically necessary, like when the self-styled community 
organisations aggressively sided with the Private Sector Consortium, and supremely when 
the new government was in power and he was able to draw the iSLP to the attention of the 
national Ministry of Housing. 
 
The Wrestler, as the CPA’s Regional Director and the Administrator of all the Black Local 
Authorities in the Western Cape, played a pivotal role in guiding those local authority 
officials and councillors who were involved in the SLP and in helping the CPA to come to 
terms with the new challenges of managing African urban issues. 
 
The Veteran, who represented the Western Cape Civics Association, was a veteran civic 
leader and although he was carried through the roller coaster of community responses and 
reactions to the SLP in the Policy Committee he attended meetings consistently and 
constructively – and uniquely as a community leader stayed involved until the very end of 
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the project. 
 
The Urban Planner was Chief Planner of the Western Cape Regional Services Council and 
consistently attended the meetings of the SLP Policy Committee and Technical Committee. 
He ensured that the planning processes were integrated and that the RSC’s management 
was constantly briefed on the iSLP and prepared to eventually play its part in financing the 
extensive bulk infrastructure that the iSLP would require.  
 
The Provincial Planner was the CPA’s planner responsible for the iSLP area, 
commissioned the planning of all the new suburbs which eventually comprised the bulk of 
the iSLP’s product. This required the application of all the iSLP’s novel standards and he 
eventually became the promoter of a creative new paradigm of double-storey housing in the 
project. 
 
The Scribe, who drafted all of the pivotal policy documents, reports, business plans, 
programme frameworks, presentations and critical correspondence and took responsibility 
for record-keeping for the life of the project. 
 
Other Enablers were consultants who were contracted to serve the iSLP policy-making 
process for a relatively short period of time, but provided specialised input on 
communications, town planning and civil engineering standards which promoted a 
significant change in attitude and practice. 
 
Reflecting on the various sides to the story 
The story of the iSLP so far appears to be dominated by two opposing forces. One force 
pursued a democratic, inclusive process for addressing the housing problem in and around 
Crossroads whereas the other pursued a technically driven, exclusive process. From one 
perspective the storyline could be perceived as a transparent, ‘straight line’ logical 
development process that was attacked by a parasitic process that inhabited it and then 
wound around it with the intention of usurping its authority, claiming legitimacy and 
appropriating its financial benefits by delivering the required product without complying 
with the desired process. However the champions of the second process regarded their own 
approach as conventional, logical and practical and the opposition’s as idealistic, 
unrealisable and focussed on process without being able to deliver product. The drivers of 
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each force viewed themselves as virtuous and the others as perverse. Evidently various 
parties can work towards the same goal but be in pursuit of different prizes. In this case a 
huge housing project was viewed by some as a potential financial bonanza and by others as 
an instrument of social redemption. Yet such a binary appraisal is too simplistic, for the 
stakeholders were diverse and their tensions and inclinations multi-directional and fluid. 
 
Within this overall drama there were a host of minor contests for territory and 
patronage, some of them violent and some merely stubborn and obstructive, which are not 
recorded here in any detail. They were specific to communities or areas of land and 
sometimes just involved one very local group in opposition to another. Each case involved 
opposing perspectives, perceptions and perhaps even world views. As a result the story of 
the iSLP and its components would be told quite differently by many of the myriad 
roleplayers. Such is life. The version in this thesis is from the perspective of a person at the 
hub of the project through almost its whole existence, who happened to be part of the 




Chapter 8 has shown how the approval and financing of a considerably expanded 
collaborative project brought the policy-making phase of the project to an end and thereby 
terminated the influence of opponents who had bedevilled the process. Also revealed was 
the broad extent of participation that the project had enjoyed, yet the small number of 
people who actually made a difference either by the consistency and integrity of their 
participation or by the leverage that they employed on behalf of the SLP at strategic 
moments. Thus the argument of this chapter is to highlight the crucial contribution made by 
Enablers and mandates. The contribution that this chapter makes to the thesis as a whole is 
to argue that cross-sector collaboration is not simply an iterative process but is an 
incessantly complex, demanding vehicle to drive on a long, difficult journey, which must 
be fuelled by powerful mandates and steered by a few strategically located Enablers.  
 
Chapter 9 describes how the project was restructured in order for the mandates to be 
implemented, but also how the political and institutional environment continued to change, 
producing unexpected waves of opposition and of weakness that had to be overcome for 
the objectives to be achieved.  




Enabling at scale: Applying mandates to multiply collaborations 
 
 
In this Chapter we find that although the iSLP Business Plan explained what would be 
provided, where, by whom and when, it failed to anticipate the territorial warfare which 
would be instituted by its new sponsor: those managing the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme nationally and provincially. It also failed to account for how long 
it would be before local government could actively support the iSLP. And nobody could 
predict what political changes would take place at every level of government in the first 
years of the ‘new South Africa’. In its favour, however, the iSLP had principles, 
programmes and finance approved by the highest authority in the land. It is argued that 
these mandates, and the actions of the Enablers, would power the project to its completion. 
 
When the project moved into the Implementation Phase the need arose for new 
structures that would provide community representation at all levels of the iSLP, 
management for individual projects, further policy-making if required and coordination for 
the iSLP as a whole. This chapter explains the convoluted process of gradually structuring 
implementation and policy-making in the simplest and most pragmatic manner. This 
involved limiting dependence upon politicians, compensating for a weakening bureaucracy 
by employing consultants, and engaging beneficiary communities in the development 
process to as great a degree as possible. And through all of this was the necessity to 
constantly increase the scale of the operation until all communities and all resources had 
been accounted for. The term ‘at scale’ when used in this thesis always refers to or implies 




In his statement at the final Policy Committee meeting on 26 July 1994 Provincial Housing 
Minister Gerald Morkel had stated that communities would henceforth be involved through 
their Residents Development Committees (RDCs) at project level and that any other issues 
would be resolved by a new committee chaired by himself, to which community 
organisations would be invited. He had explained that the project would be linked to the 
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It soon became apparent, however, that the national RDP office had done more than 
create a portfolio of initiatives – it had created RDP establishments within provincial 
Economic Affairs Departments, which regarded RDP projects with a proprietary interest. 
Furthermore, they initiated the creation of ‘RDP Forums’ within communities whose task it 
was to ensure that RDP projects were as community-based as possible. At a meeting of 
provincial Housing and RDP personnel held on 5 September 1994 the latter announced that 
20 RDP Forums had already been established in the Cape Peninsular, that one of their 
functions was to create a 5 year programme “and the iSLP represents a major part of their 
task”. Within communities these RDP Forums were challenging the legitimacy of the 
iSLP’s RDCs, and the RDP managers complained that “there were lots of problems on 
grassroots level that could jeopardise the project”. The iSLP team responded on 22 
September with the suggestion that as their Residents Development Committees (RDCs) 
had been well established and trained before RDP Forums had even been mooted they 
should drive the iSLP projects and the RDP Forums be used to drive other RDP projects.132 
These were the first salvos in a new battle for the iSLP. It was decided to convene a 




A meeting was convened for 16 November at Uluntu Centre in Guguletu. 
Invitations were sent by Minister Morkel to ten community forums or organisations, to the 
20 iSLP RDCs and to members of the provincial government and the SLP management 
structures. Morkel had a prepared speech and proposed terms of reference for an iSLP 
Consultative Committee – which “would enable the Minister to obtain the views of 
participating communities on matters of community concern relating to the implementation 
of the iSLP. The Minister will determine appropriate actions after consultation”.134 At the 
meeting he additionally proposed that an ombudsman be appointed to specifically deal with 
any complaints about the iSLP. The meeting was conducted by a panel sitting it a table 
facing all the delegates, who sat in rows – very different from any iSLP Policy Committee 
meeting. The atmosphere was rather tense, no decisions were made, no minutes were typed 
up and distributed, and matters were left with an intention that a follow-up meeting be held 
early in 1995, after communities had decided how they would be represented.135  
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The circumstances were further complicated by the introduction of a drawn out 
process of restructuring for local authorities which began with ‘pre-interim’ structures from 
early 1994 until the first local authority elections in May 1996 (for Cape Town). These 
located the iSLP across 5 local authorities, some with councillors who had never heard of 
the project. In the ‘interim phase’ which followed until the second election in December 
2000 the iSLP straddled 2 reconfigured local authorities with elected councillors, of which 
those in one local authority included many who were familiar with the iSLP whereas the 
project was virtually unknown in the other. Only in January 2001 did the whole 
metropolitan area fall under the jurisdiction of a reconfigured City of Cape Town. 
(McDonald, 2008. p. 99-134).  
 
When in December 1994 the iSLP Business Plan was approved and its status as a 
Presidential RDP Project confirmed by the national cabinet the conflict at community level 
between RDCs and RDP Forums intensified, with the latter becoming very powerful local 
influences. It became impossible to get all the parties together. By the end of July 1995 
only two effective RDCs remained and the RDP Forums had become very antagonistic 
towards the iSLP. The Democrat wrote to the Province that with the virtual collapse of the 
RDCs, the hostility of the RDP forums and the failure of many new councillors in the five 
interim local authorities to support the project, the whole basis on which the project was to 
be managed had become unachievable. He recommended that a comprehensive audit of 
community representation in the project be undertaken and requested high level political 
intervention to resolve the confusion. 
 
As a result a workshop was held on 29 August in Guguletu attended by 81 people 
and addressed by Provincial Ministers Morkel (Housing) and Nissen (Economic Affairs 
and RDP) as well as representatives of the national and provincial RDP offices. It was 
evident that the SLP had become an object of political territoriality – and Nissen proposed 
that in addition to local RDP Forums there be an RDP Forum at local government (metro) 
level and a “Super RDP Forum” specifically to bring the RDP Forums within the iSLP 
project area together. RDP functionaries were clearly disappointed that the RDP funds for 
the SLP were being channelled through the national and provincial Housing departments 
rather than their own – and asked that at least the non-housing elements be managed by the 
provincial RDP office. Minister Morkel replied that the national cabinet had decided that 
the Special Integrated Presidential Projects would be located in their dominant line 
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functions – Housing in the case of the iSLP. 
 
No representatives of the Crossroads and Philippi communities had attended the 
workshop, and they refused to participate in the “Coordinating RDP Forum” that was 
thereafter established to represent all communities in the iSLP. The politicians eventually 
decided to have another attempt at launching an ‘iSLP Consultative Committee’, 
comprising all the members of the provincial cabinet, 4 councillors from each of the 
relevant local authorities, 4 representatives of the Coordinating RDP Forum, and 2 
representatives each from Crossroads, Philippi and Delft. The purpose was to enable 
communities to advise the ministers responsible for Housing and the RDP, to consider the 
annual iSLP Business Plan, to monitor progress and performance and to promote 
communication. However the launch on 12 December was so poorly attended that it was 
postponed.136
A Project Committee for each housing project, in which beneficiary communities 
would be represented 
 Eventually a workshop was held on 20 January 1996 at which it was 
proposed that the iSLP have the following structures:  
A Consultative Forum of community representatives 
A Steering Committee that would comprise politicians plus four representatives of the 
Consultative Forum; and 
A Coordinating Committee containing officials of all the relevant line functions in 
provincial and local government.137
 
  
The new strategy was agreed at a well-attended meeting on 3rd February, followed by a 
celebratory braaivleis (barbecue).138 Over the following months these committees were 
established, mainly successfully, as described hereafter. However, in June 1996, just as 
community representatives in the iSLP established a collective identity, the national 
government replaced its RDP policy with the GEAR policy (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution), which resulted in the disbanding of the RDP ministry and offices. (Sparks, 
2003. p. 191-193). There had been growing criticism of the RDP’s needs-based approach 
and of its poor delivery, in a campaign led by Trevor Manuel who was then Minister of 
Trade and Industry and who emphasised the need for a high-growth economic policy.139 
Fortunately, the iSLP had performed relatively well, and an audit commissioned by 
Minister Naidoo in February of that year had reported that the Western Cape (i.e. the iSLP) 
was at least one year ahead in delivery compared to other provinces. The national 
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Over the life of the iSLP, through either its policy-generation or implementation phases, a 
total of thirteen different standing committees were required. They were for policy-making, 
community involvement, coordination or project management. The range is illustrated in 
Table 8 (see Annexure B. p. B6), which demonstrates that structures must be functional 
and not outlive their usefulness. Those that functioned during the implementation phase are 
explained below. 
 
Residents Development Committees 
Residents Development Committees (RDCs) were the real drivers of community 
involvement in the iSLP. They provided a forum within each community or settlement, of 
which there were around 30 in the iSLP, where residents who had a real interest in 
development could discuss needs and priorities, share experiences and opportunities, and 
also receive training in development procedures. RDCs were established in almost every 
community with the help of the iSLP Project Coordinator’s team of facilitators. At the start 
of the iSLP’s  Implementation Phase in 1993 the Project Coordinator provided training in 
development procedures for RDC members, but after the creation of Project Committees, 
to which RDCs sent representatives, the training became very practical and was achieved in 
discussions and workshops about real projects. 
 
The creation of RDCs also provided opportunities for leaders who were more 
interested in development than power and politics to get involved in the iSLP. One of the 
characteristics of the society that the iSLP was addressing is that those traditionally and 
formally regarded and respected as ‘elders’ are men, whereas women are typically better 
than men at understanding the needs and practicalities of community life. The creation of 
RDCs could therefore be used by the iSLP facilitators to encourage the involvement of 
men, women and youth, and the representation and affirmation of as many different 
existing groups within the community as possible. The imposition of RDP Forums on the 
iSLP made no real difference – once the politicians had lost interest in the grassroots 
activities it was the same RDC members who were involved, just under a new name, be it 
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as an RDP Forum or as a ‘SANCO’ (e.g. Browns Farm SANCO). 
 
The Project Committees 
The crucial institutional structures for the implementation of the iSLP were project 
committees – one for each project. The creation and maintenance of each project committee 
was the responsibility of the particular project manager and it comprised representatives of 
those communities that had been allocated a quota of houses in the project, plus officials 
and the technical consultants. Community involvement was taken seriously because it was 
understood that without community support any project could be halted by protest action of 
some kind. The facilitation of community involvement was provided by a team that was 
managed by the iSLP project coordinator. These facilitators were each allocated a portfolio 
of projects, and it was their responsibility to optimise the attendance of community 
representatives, to facilitate their involvement in the process and to facilitate the resolution 
of any misunderstandings or disputes. It was crucial that these facilitators understood the 
development process and all its imperatives – they were not only communicators, 
translators and mediators, for they were responsible for helping all the parties, particularly 
communities, to achieve their development objectives.  
 
Every project committee was founded on the basis of a simple ‘terms of reference’ 
document which stated the project’s objectives, the qualifications for membership of that 
committee, the frequency of meetings and venue and the election of office-bearers. The 
ideal was to have a community member in the chair, helped where necessary by the 
designated project facilitator who was on the staff of the iSLP Coordinator. Where in some 
cases the community representatives asked the facilitator to chair the meetings this was 
accepted – the process of capacity building cannot be prescribed.   Discussions in the 
vernacular were encouraged in order to optimise community ownership, and if necessary 
the facilitator would translate for the benefit of the project manager, officials and 
consultants who were not fluent in the community’s home language (isiXhosa). 
 
 It was the project manager’s responsibility to record decisions that were critical to 
the planning and implementation of the project, but the secretary would typically record the 
transactions in a minute book and the facilitator would produce brief minutes which would 
be confirmed at the next meeting. A notable number of community representatives in iSLP 
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project committees obtained a good grounding in the development process and went on to 
become councillors or officials for the local authority. The iSLP was a great place of 
learning for everyone involved, whatever their function or status. 
 
Project committees usually met frequently during the planning process, interspersed 
with workshops when required. When implementation was underway they met regularly to 
receive progress reports and then as required to deal with any crises or disputes and to 
manage the beneficiary identification process. A key person in the implementation of each 
project was the Community Liaison Officer (CLO), a person nominated by the community 
representatives on the project committee and then appointed (and remunerated) by the 
contractor to organise and administer the labour to be drawn from the local community. 
Sometimes two CLOs were appointed. Although they were accountable to both the 
contractor and the community leadership the system generally worked well. 
 
The process of beneficiary identification was based on the iSLP Principles and 
required the leadership of each community to create a list of potential beneficiaries, in 
priority order and slightly in excess of the available places. This would then be advertised 
publicly on a local notice board with an invitation for residents to tender corrections and 
objections. Any received would be dealt with under the oversight of the iSLP project 
facilitator in an effort to ensure fair dealing. The list would usually comprise residents in 
the order in which they settled in their existing location, taken from the register that had 
been kept by the leadership. Identity numbers would then be added and the list sent to the 
project manager, who would have the ID numbers checked against the national database to 
ensure that the resident was not disqualified from obtaining a housing subsidy. The project 
manager would then send the resident either an invitation to complete the application 
process or a letter stating that the applicant was ineligible. The project facilitator was 
responsible for ensuring the delivery of all correspondence between the project manager 
and applicants because there were no postal addresses in informal settlements. 
 
The most productive factor in the iSLP was the high level of community 
involvement at an intensely practical level within the project committees. Furthermore it 
was noticeably the same Project Committee members who represented RDCs before the 
crisis and RDP Forums after the crisis. The crisis had not been over ‘participation’ but over 
bureaucratic territory, and it was evident throughout the life of the iSLP that people who 
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attended and were influential in project committee meetings were generally much more 
engaged than those who enjoyed positions of power, even though elected politicians were 
always entitled to attend. 
 
Contestation within Project Committees 
Most of the contestation that took place at project committee level was between 
communities or leadership factions and was about access to housing in that project. The 
Consultative Forum (see below), comprising only community representatives, had 
compiled the quota allocations on the basis of equity rather than on any kind of 
prioritisation – and certainly not on patronage. The most highly contested areas in the early 
stages of the iSLP’s implementation were Crossroads, Browns Farm and Philippi East. The 
first two contained multiple factions competing for territory and influence – very much as a 
carry-over from the days of ‘warlord’ control. Although Philippi East was regarded by 
Jeffrey Nongwe of Crossroads as an extension of his domain, the leaders of the residents of 
the first phase of Philippi East set themselves up as gatekeepers and physically prevented 
any further development until they could get their way by having their own lodgers housed. 
The old adage, “possession is nine-tenths of the law”, held true, particularly where land 
was in short supply – and eventually compromises had to be made.  
 
A similar circumstance occurred when people from Browns Farm invaded private 
land (the old cement factory) resisting attempts by the sheriff and police to move them, and 
in Delft when a major invasion of uncompleted houses in Delft took place. In both cases 
compromises eventually had to be made – it was impossible to completely reverse large-
scale illegal activity. This on its own is a powerful reason for seeking optimum community 
participation – and with it peer accountability – because legal processes may be impotent. 
The history of the iSLP project area had been blighted by violence, the wounds from which 
were still raw, so everything possible was done to prevent it from re-igniting in any form. 
In these cases it ultimately became pointless to resolutely stand on principles that could not 
be enforced. If the land was not developed it would be invaded – so rather develop it under 
the best terms that can be negotiated and save it from a chaotic fate. 
 
There was always a faction that resisted development in Boystown, which was 
originally a phase of the Crossroads project. If a community is in occupation and demands 
the impossible nothing can be done, excluding the use of extreme force. The leadership of 
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Boystown wanted more than the housing subsidy could offer and by holding out for that 
they denied themselves any benefits of development. At one stage it was thought that 
agreement had been reached on a development strategy but as soon as the contractor 
established a yard on site it came under rifle fire and was set alight. Violence was never far 
below the surface in the iSLP. At one stage in the development of Crossroads it was 
reported that a gunfight broke out across the site between competing factions at 11 o’clock 
each morning. From time to time people who were involved in the project were robbed, 
shot at or even murdered in places such as Crossroads and Browns Farm. Violence between 
local taxi (minibus) operators was commonplace. The transition to democracy and the rule 
of law in one of the most dangerous areas of the country was a messy business. The iSLP 
manifested a brave attempt to build trust constructively in a highly charged environment, 
and there was constantly the need to simply achieve the best possible result, taking all 
factors into account. 
 
The iSLP Business Plan listed 31 communities or groups that would benefit from 
the project. This was reduced by 5 over time: 3 became clients of a separate Hostel 
Upgrade Project, Boystown failed to benefit because its leaders refused to be part of the 
project and Driftsands (Sikumbule) was developed separately by the provincial 
government. The iSLP Consultative Forum had considered the quotas of housing 
opportunities to be allocated to each community. After a few amalgamations the list was 
finalised as that shown in Table 9 (See Annexure B. p. B7]. In this table every community, 
living either in informal settlements or in shacks in backyards in townships, is listed in the 
left hand column, and the projects to which they were given access are shown across the 
top. The total number of sites allocated by this means was 29 785. The iSLP also catered 
for households who had already received serviced sites by organising the construction of 
their dwelling. Thus the total number of households accommodated by the project 
eventually reached almost 32 500. 
 
The Consultative Forum 
At the first meetings of the Consultative Forum on 17 February and 2 March 1996 it was 
agreed to hold a weekend workshop in order to foster a full understanding of national 
housing policy and the iSLP. In response to a report that all existing project committees 
had ceased to function because of the re-structuring it was resolved that officials and 
consultants must manage the projects until the project committees were re-established.  The 
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national Director-General of Housing, Billy Cobbett, had agreed to address the workshop, 
which was to be held in a suburban hotel from Friday to Sunday 8-10 March.140 41 
community members attended, participated thoroughly in the discussions and formally 
accepted the Consultative Forum’s terms of reference.141 The Consultative Forum dealt 
with policy issues at the community level and could make recommendations to the Steering 
Committee, to which it sent four representatives. The Forum successfully and amicably 
allocated quotas of sites within projects to the various communities and agreed on the 
procedures to be followed for identifying beneficiaries to fill those quotas.142
 
 The project 
committees were revived, with no changes in membership. 
Meanwhile in May 1996 Cape Town experienced its first ever democratic local 
government elections. Some of the most experienced community leaders within the iSLP 
Consultative Forum were elected as municipal councillors, particularly within the Central 
sub-district, which had been won by the ANC. For some months these councillors 
continued to attend Consultative Forum meetings, but then began to question its legitimacy 
now that there were legally elected representatives of the communities within government, 
whereas the members of RDP Forums were not. They demanded that the Consultative 
Forum be disbanded, and after February 1997 it only met once again. There had been 14 
regular meetings of the Consultative Forum from its launch in February 1996 to its final 
meeting in March 1998, including a bus tour of iSLP projects, although at only 12 of these 
meetings was the attendance properly recorded. The iSLP had lost a very vibrant and 
valuable committee, which within its short life it had made a considerable and lasting 
contribution. Its champion was the Veteran, one of the iSLP’s original Enablers, who 
before his election as a city councillor was chosen to chair the iSLP Consultative Forum, 
which he did so until its last meeting. Table 10 (See Annexure B. p. B8) provides an 
analysis of the frequency with which individuals attended forum meetings. 
 
The impression given by Table 10 is that attendance was poor, primarily because 
only 1% of all attendees attend more than 75% of meetings and another 10% attended more 
than half of the meetings. However, this forum was created for communities to make policy 
recommendations about aspects of the iSLP that mattered to them through group 
representation – not necessarily by the same individuals at every meeting. Table 11 (See 
Annexure B. p. B9) shows the involvement of groups – particularly as communities. 
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Table 11 demonstrates the degree of commitment of each group to these meetings. 
The most striking features are that on average 73% (8.8 / 12) of groups attended every 
meeting, with an average total attendance per meeting of 32. If allowance is made for the 
councillors’ absence after they had settled into office, and for the very late involvement of 
the Marcus Garvey community, the attendance rate improves even more. Officials of 
national government were only involved in the very early stages, to resolve the confusion 
created by the RDP Forums. This was a very successful structure – the members enjoyed 
participating and applied their minds to the issues. 
 
Meetings of the iSLP Consultative Forum differed from those of the earlier iSLP 
Policy Committee in a number of significant ways. This was a meeting of only the 
community stakeholders in the iSLP, not of all stakeholders – consequently members were 
able to be much more frank with each other than they would have been with all the 
government agencies and politicians present. Furthermore, meetings were conducted in the 
vernacular, with a chairman and deputy chairman appointed from their number, and an 
expert black facilitator from the iSLP Coordinator’s team. Only crucial information was 
translated into English for the benefit of support personnel. Whereas the Policy Committee 
had met in the grand provincial government building in central Cape Town, meetings of the 
Consultative Forum were held in local community halls that were easily accessible to the 
members, and at suitable times such as evenings and weekends. And as a contribution to 
the local economy refreshments and transport were supplied by local small contractors and 
paid for out of the iSLP Project Coordination budget. 
 
The Steering Committee 
Meanwhile, the first meeting of the iSLP’s new council of politicians, the iSLP Steering 
Committee, had been called for 26 February 1996. It was very poorly attended – apart from 
Minister Morkel there were only two councillors present and the Consultative Forum had 
not yet decided who should represent it at the Steering Committee.143 At the next meeting 
of the Steering Committee on 25 March, subsequent to the Consultative Forum weekend 
workshop, Morkel was joined by two Ikapa councillors and three Consultative Forum 
representatives and the meeting confirmed the land and site allocation policies that had 
been recommended by the Consultative Forum.144 At the end of March Gerald Morkel was 
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replaced as provincial housing minister by Cecil Herandien, who had no prior knowledge 
of the iSLP.  
 
At Minister Herandien’s first Steering Committee meeting on 22 April all the local 
authorities except one were represented, and discussion was confined to the reports of 
progress in the Consultative Forum.145
 
 The following month brought the first democratic 
local authority elections, with reconfigured municipalities that placed the iSLP across the 
Central Sub-Structure and the Tygerberg Sub-structure. The latter was responsible for Delft 
and the former was responsible for all other iSLP areas. The Cape Metropolitan Council 
(CMC) was responsible only for the financing of bulk infrastructure for the project. Whilst 
these Councils were taking their time to appoint their representatives to the Steering 
Committee a crisis developed in Delft. The iSLP site allocation rules for Delft required that 
half of the houses in each phase be allocated to residents of the iSLP project area and half 
to a waiting list of predominantly coloured people, managed by the Tygerberg sub-
structure. Now the first group of houses were almost ready for occupation but the local 
authority had not yet allocated its share. Houses standing empty, particularly in Delft, 
would be very vulnerable to illegal occupation and very difficult to protect.  
The next meeting on 26 August was attended by Councillors nominated by the 
Central and Tygerberg substructures. The election had put the ANC in power in the Central 
sub-structure and the New National Party (NNP) in Tygerberg.146 At the following meeting 
the Tygerberg councillor announced that as far as he was concerned any decisions 
regarding Delft would have to be ratified by the City of Tygerberg. He questioned the 
authority of the Steering Committee to take decisions on areas that were within a local 
authority’s jurisdiction and also challenged the validity of the iSLP Principles and 
structures, including the decision that housing in Delft be allocated 50/50 between the 
(black) iSLP communities who were located in the other local authority and predominantly 
coloured people allocated by Tygerberg from an inherited waiting list.147
 
  
When the Steering Committee met on 18 November 1996 the councillor voiced 
further concerns about the iSLP site allocation policy and said that Tygerberg was drafting 
proposals for an integrated waiting list based not upon race but on length of stay in the 
metropole and area of preference.148 The crisis dragged on. The Steering Committee met 
only infrequently and no progress was being made to resolve the impasse politically behind 
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the scenes. At the next meeting on 24 February 1997 it was reported that Tygerberg was 
creating its own waiting list and wanted all remaining sites in Delft to be placed under its 
control. The Minister left the meeting in despair and it was subsequently proposed that the 
issue be referred to the Centre for Conflict Resolution for mediation.149
 
 Month by month 
thereafter the scheduled meetings of the Steering Committee were postponed because no 
agreement had been reached.  
On 17 November 1997, a year later, Minister Herandien called a meeting of the 
iSLP Steering Committee and announced that because of the deadlock he had drafted a 
proposal to the Provincial Cabinet that responsibility for the iSLP be split between the local 
authorities of Cape Town and Tygerberg.150
 
 The Provincial Cabinet had reaffirmed the 
iSLP Principles and Tygerberg had to abide by the allocation agreements. However, the 
portion of Delft that had not yet been developed was transferred from the Province to 
Tygerberg, which was required to develop it for housing in terms of the iSLP Principles. 
The Steering Committee did not meet again. 
It had been handicapped from the start by a change in chairman, from Minister 
Gerald Morkel to his successor, Cecil Herandien, who had far less experience of politics 
and circumstances in Cape Town. Furthermore the Steering Committee became crippled by 
changes in the structure and politics of local government which immediately created 
stresses between the two sub-structures involved in the iSLP and between each of them and 
the provincial government. They were competing for power over the iSLP: the Tygerberg 
sub-structure wanted complete control over everything in Southern Delft, which was the 
only developable area of the iSLP within its jurisdiction, and then the Cape Town sub-
structure, sensing that the Province was losing the political will to manage the iSLP, began 
to seek control over the entire remainder of the project. In fact the provincial Housing 
Department did not have the right, nor did the local authorities have the capacity, to make a 
transfer of the whole project effective. The Housing Department was the custodian and 
implementer of this integrated project on behalf of the national government, and could not 
just abdicate its responsibilities in favour of local authorities that lacked the necessary 
authority or resources. As a result the iSLP Steering Committee met infrequently and was 
of very little value to the project, which is reflected in the poor attendance and general 
disinterest indicated in Table 12 (See Annexure. p. B9). 
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The main participants in the Steering Committee were the chairperson, the iSLP 
Manager within the provincial Housing Department and the iSLP Coordinator, who each 
attended all 8 meetings. The Veteran, who was chairperson of the Consultative Forum and 
who had also participated actively in the Policy Committee, attended 5 meetings. 
Representation by the ‘pre-interim’ local authorities in the 3 meetings held before the 1996 
election was very limited. However, of the 5 meetings which were held after the 1996 local 
authority elections the councillors representing the Tygerberg and Central substructures 
each attended 4. 
 
The terms of reference of the Steering Committee required that all the provincial 
ministers be members. The ministries of education, health, social welfare, public works and 
even safety and security had a stake and a vested interest in the success of the project and 
their participation would strengthen the political weight within the iSLP across party, race 
and gender lines. However, only the Housing Minister ever attended the Steering 
Committee, as convenor and chairman, without any support from his colleagues. The best 
that any of them did was on rare occasions to send an official to represent them – which 
was a waste of everybody’s time because officials had other iSLP structures to cater for 
their management and coordination needs. 
 
After the demise of the Steering Committee policy issues were simply referred to 
the most effective policy-making body or person within the responsible government 
structure. Within the provincial government the official responsible for the iSLP had some 
delegated authority, otherwise the matter was referred to the Minister of Housing and 
sometimes to the provincial cabinet. Within local government structures there was also an 
official with responsibilities for parts of the iSLP, then an Executive Councillor and a 
Housing Committee of politicians to whom matters could be referred. 
 
In fact, however, most of the high level policy decisions required for the iSLP had 
already been taken (or were deemed to have been taken) by the Policy Committee, 
incorporated in the iSLP Business Plan and approved by the national cabinet. Thereafter 
lower levels of politicians or officials slowed up the process at their peril because the 
project, programme and budget had been approved at the highest level in the land. It was of 
huge benefit to have obtained approval of so much detailed documentation at the start of 
the project’s implementation. 
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Inescapable overall responsibilities 
In terms of South Africa’s new Constitution, promulgated in 1996, provincial governments 
were obliged to assign to local governments any matter that could be most effectively 
administered locally. Likewise local governments were obliged to participate in national 
and provincial development programmes. The Western Cape provincial government 
regarded housing delivery as a local government function and began to devolve its 
responsibilities in this regard.  By the end of 1997 the Provincial Government began 
dismantling its dedicated iSLP management team and contracting an increasing amount of 
the work to project management consultants. In the national Department of Housing Billy 
Cobbett was no longer the Director General and had accepted an appointment in Cape 
Town’s Central Sub-Structure, which he then proposed should take over responsibility for 
every aspect of the iSLP that was within its geographical jurisdiction. Over the next few 
months Cobbett discovered that he had overestimated the capacity of his local authority and 
underestimated the size and complexity of the iSLP. It was not a practical proposition to 
split and share responsibility for the iSLP – instead responsibility for overall management 
was increasingly shifted to the iSLP Project Coordinator.  
 
There had also been a long series of decisions that ensured consistency in oversight 
and organisation of the iSLP, through the appointment, extension and, when necessary, 
expansion of the brief of the project coordinators. This ensured continuity from the original 
proposal by the Democrat in 1990 to the final report submitted in 2005. The Democrat 
began as an individual consultant and gradually built a team and then a company to 
coordinate the project. When the Democrat retired in 1998 the coordination team stayed 
intact and accepted greater day-to-day responsibility for managing the project as a whole as 
the provincial housing capacity was reduced. Such a consistent facilitating and 
coordination function was probably an indispensible factor in the project’s completion, let 
alone success. 
 
The Management and Coordination of the iSLP 
 
The overall management and coordination of the iSLP was the responsibility of the 
provincial Housing Department. As has been related, when in 1990 it began to explore the 
possibility of a collaborative approach to the problem it was very short of personnel who 
had experience in that approach, and particularly of partnering with black communities. 
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The Department established an “SLP Project Management Committee” and engaged 
consultants to facilitate the collaboration and coordinate the sensitive process. However as 
soon as implementation began intensive management and administration would be 
required, as the Department would have to commission the surveyors, planners and 
engineers, then put the actual construction out to tender and eventually organise the transfer 
and occupation of homes. Fortuitously the dismantling of the tri-cameral parliament in 
1993-94 enabled housing officials of the erstwhile House of Representatives to transfer into 
the Western Cape Provincial Housing Department. They brought a wealth of experience in 
housing management and marketing, and this enabled the creation within the Department 
of an entire directorate devoted to the management of the iSLP.  
 
Led by an experience project manager, the provincial team comprised a very 
capable group of planners, engineers, an architect, accountants and ‘marketing’ specialists 
(who dealt with beneficiary identification through to property transfer and occupation). 
They were responsible for getting the massive ‘greenfields’ tracts of land through all the 
legal, planning and design processes and into construction. Most of them were particularly 
comfortable to be developing in the southern portion of Delft, because they had been 
involved in creating all of its previous phases. This team worked in parallel with that of the 
iSLP Project Coordinator, the Democrat, who was responsible for the overall coordination 
of the iSLP, including budgeting, monitoring and reporting; facilitating the collaboration of 
all the communities, institutions and departments; ensuring that all the committees were 
established and maintained; and managing all communication on the project. This 
consultancy dedicated itself to these functions until the completion of the iSLP in 2005, and 
accepted no other work during this period. 
 
 The housing development environment for the iSLP was characterised by a low cost 
housing sector controlled by government, which provided the finance, the policies and 
land; and a housing delivery process strongly influenced by politics in many forms and 
across a broad spectrum, from communities controlled by tyrants to more democratic 
models, and through municipal politics to provincial and even national political influences. 
Responsibility for ensuring the actual on-the-ground delivery of housing rested not with 
government, but primarily with the private sector and, to a small extent, with community-
based NGO-linked initiatives. The intended beneficiaries of housing in the iSLP were 
predominantly poor - 93% of beneficiaries in the iSLP had declared household incomes of 
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less than 1 500 Rands (about US$200) per month. 
 
The development of vacant sites within existing townships and the upgrading of 
informal settlements, all of which were on the iSLP’s agenda, was a local authority 
responsibility – and these institutions were embroiled in such a complex transformation 
that the creation of a team (or even a committee) of municipal officials to address iSLP 
projects was impractical. Therefore in 1994 when the iSLP directorate was established by 
the provincial Housing Department its iSLP Project Management Committee was replaced 
by an iSLP Departmental Coordinating Committee, which included municipal officials and 
the iSLP Project Coordinator in its membership. This committee met weekly. 
 
The township development process was a necessary precursor to all the other 
construction that would be required, comprising not only houses, but schools, clinics, 
libraries, sports fields, community halls and early childhood resource centres. Once each 
township had been developed with roads, water, sewerage, electricity and demarcated plots 
the sites for community facilities could be handed over to the relevant provincial 
department or local authority. They would then commence planning, have their proposed 
iSLP project approved by the Housing Department on the recommendation of the iSLP 
Project Coordinator, and then proceed with procurement and construction. To coordinate 
the activities of the wide range of government departments which had contributed 
components of the Business Plan, an iSLP Coordinating Committee was created in 1994, 
which met monthly. This committee continued to meet until 2005, although for the last few 
years it met quarterly – under the chairmanship of the Wrestler.  
 
By 1996 the greenfields projects had progressed to the stage where serviced sites 
were being produced in Delft South and Weltevreden Valley, and development in Philippi 
East, Crossroads, Heinz Park and Browns Farm was getting underway. The responsibility 
for day-to-day management was stretching the capacity of the iSLP Directorate. 
Furthermore, although it was not yet apparent to everyone, new senior management within 
Province was reviewing its deep involvement in housing implementation and preferring to 
see the Province as resource-provider, with local authorities as implementers. The 
legislation was also changing, requiring much higher standards of financial management by 
officials, with daunting penalties for transgressions. Mixed up in all of this was a national 
public sector transformation process containing clear racial, gender and political themes, in 
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which provincial posts were re-advertised and early retirement packages were offered to 
and accepted by many experienced white officials. Under the circumstances the 
Department decided to invite tenders from substantial and experienced civil engineering 
firms to provide project management services to the Department for the iSLP. They would 
be required to take responsibility for the entire housing process in one or more greenfields 
projects right through to the occupation of dwellings and securing of ownership for 
beneficiaries (per the rules of the national housing subsidy policy). Four firms were 
appointed. The iSLP Departmental Coordinating Committee was re-named the iSLP Team 
Leaders Meeting, which now included the four new project managers. 
 
As might be expected, the iSLP directorate within the provincial Department of 
Housing began to disintegrate as its members found more favourable employment in other 
departments and in local government. Furthermore, as noted above, the Province attempted 
to devolve responsibility for the iSLP to local government institutions, but which proved to 
be only possible to a limited extent. Municipal officials responsible for the areas that were 
heavily occupied as informal settlements were unable to manage their upgrading without 
help, so they also appointed consultant project managers. The issue of governmental 
jurisdiction within the iSLP project area ballooned in complexity. For the final few pre-
democracy years all African urban residential areas had been under the authority of the 
provincial government, but from 1994 responsibility was dissipated across half a dozen 
rather ineffective pre-interim structures. From 1996 it was divided between two much more 
powerful sub-structures which were politically at odds with each other and resented the 
peculiar authority that the Province had over the iSLP. When the Province began reducing 
the human resources that it had applied to the project the viability and sustainability of the 
iSLP came to depend increasingly on relationships and less on authority. At national level 
interest in the project almost vanished after the demise of the RDP, and the only ‘live’ 
contact between the project and the national Department of Housing was to organise the 
flow of funds. Comprehensive project reports were sent faithfully to Pretoria every month 
until 2005, but evinced very little response. 
 
Another factor that affected the iSLP was that few senior politicians stayed in one 
job for long. Political support is crucial for creating and sustaining an innovative and 
participative social project. But during the iSLP’s lifespan the political actors in national, 
provincial and local government kept changing, and at the same time that the structures of 
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government were being constantly transformed. Within Cape Town and the Western Cape 
province the political parties holding power also kept changing – and not only after 
elections because politicians would ‘cross the floor’ mid-term and change the balance of 
power. Furthermore the effectiveness of political representation for most of the iSLP’s 
beneficiaries fluctuated because although political parties moved in and out of power they 
continued to be racially aligned. As time went on in the iSLP every fresh new wave of 
politicians showed less interest in the project - they each wanted to create and champion 
their own causes, not have to make speeches in support of a project associated with an 
opponent or predecessor. How was it possible for the iSLP to be sustained by such 
unreliable political support? 
 
The answer lay in the nature of what had been agreed by the national Cabinet and 
Treasury when they approved the iSLP Business Plan in 1994: they endorsed all of the 
iSLP Principles, provided 50% of the budget with the balance committed by the provincial 
government, and they named it a ‘Presidential Project’ – the President being Mandela. 
Those resolutions and associations were so powerful that they just had to be implemented 
with consistency and vigorously propagated and defended when necessary. Under 
conditions of tumultuous change, particularly in the public sector, it required an 
independent Project Coordinator to keep in touch with every facet of the project from 
beginning to end, and to not be afraid to gently but seriously call anyone to account for 
their performance along the way. By the end of 1998 the consulting role of the iSLP Project 
Coordinator had been extended to include a great deal of the administrative oversight that 
had until then been provided by the provincial team, including taking the chair in the 
weekly Team Leaders Meeting and being the spokesman for the iSLP generally. 
 
The role of a few Enablers is the common unbroken thread through the entire iSLP 
saga, coupled with the mandates which were eventually granted to empower them. All of 
the committees which were created were essential as a matter of principle, but whenever 
they failed the Enablers found other ways of obtaining the necessary binding decisions. 
Progress was assured as long as the Business Plan was enforced, the necessary money 
secured and people of good will were available to implement the project in a collaborative 
manner. The various elements that were delivered are explained in Chapter 10. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explained the institutional arrangements that were made for the 
implementation phase of the iSLP and how some were more successful than others – 
because of competing interests or changes in government structures, politics and personnel. 
The argument presented in this chapter is that the power invested in the project’s mandates, 
if wielded judiciously by the iSLP’s Enablers, was able to trump any new attempt or threat 
to oppose, undermine or divert the project. The contribution that this chapter makes to the 
thesis is to demonstrate that the four focal points of the thesis - incessant complexity, 
incapacity of the participants, need for Enablers and necessity of mandates - apply just as 
much in the implementation process as in policy-making.  
 










Enabling development: driving implementation 
wherever resources are available 
 
 
The creation of residential areas provided the framework for all physical development 
within the iSLP, and their occupation prompted the introduction of capacity-building 
programmes to equip and empower the new settlers. By outlining the process, products and 
programme this chapter substantiates the extent, complexity and success of the iSLP as a 
cross-sector collaboration and re-emphasises the vital role of Enablers and mandates. It also 
reveals the extent to which all these lessons were applied thereafter. 
 
The Housing Programme 
 
Most of the iSLP was concerned with the development of new residential areas. Once the 
roads and utilities had been installed houses, schools, clinics, community halls, sports 
fields, libraries and early childhood resource centres could be constructed. When the 
residents had taken occupation capacity-building programmes could be planned and 
implemented. The availability of finance was seldom a problem, and projects were tailored 
to the quantum of available funds. 
 
The ability to initiate housing projects was determined principally by the 
willingness and readiness of local communities to participate in project committees. Where 
there were conflicts between communities or leaders, or territorial claims that were 
groundless or counter to the iSLP Principles, nothing could happen until the disputes had 
been resolved. Sometimes conflicts broke out in the middle of the development process, 
halting work on occasions. As has been mentioned there was also the inability of local 
government structures to engage with the informal settlement upgrading components of the 
iSLP, and the re-structuring of local government placed serious limitations on the number 
of housing projects that could be managed on municipal land. 
 
As a result the implementation timetable was determined by what was practicable at 
any time. The process in each case began with negotiations to create a project committee 
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containing adequate community representation. This was followed by the participatory 
planning process. Then, after the necessary planning and project approvals, the 
infrastructure was installed (often requiring preliminary earthworks to shape the land) and 
the houses were constructed. Simultaneously the beneficiaries were identified, their 
eligibility for housing subsidies was verified and the applications processed. Before taking 
occupation of a dwelling a beneficiary would attend a presentation on home ownership and 
what that entailed. South Africa’s housing subsidy policy since independence has provided 
households which have very limited incomes with ownership of a dwelling on a serviced 
site without having to make any contribution to the capital cost. The provision of the 
subsidy was rooted in the need to counter the deeply discriminatory policies recounted in 
Chapter 2 – it was a political imperative, and the iSLP was one of the first projects to apply 
it at scale. The housing subsidy was the primary means by which the residential projects in 
the iSLP were financed. The policy has been controversial in some ways and has been 
mismanaged in some areas of the country but in the iSLP quality of construction was not 
sacrificed to increase house size or profit – every effort was made to make the best use of 
the available money.  
 
Table 13 (See Annexure B. p. B10] shows how each housing project was phased over time 
– starting with negotiations for land and community involvement, then moving into a 
planning phase before proceeding to the construction of infrastructure and then dwellings. 
The table indicates the years covered by each phase in each project and is annotated with 
explanations of the process that occurred within them. 
 
The planning and delivery of Community Facilities 
 
It was the housing project committees which laid the platform for the development of all 
the other facilities that an integrated project requires. The scale and rate of delivery of the 
housing and facilities in the iSLP overall is shown in Table 14 (See Annexure B. p. B11]. 
The operation of a project committee for every housing project was described in the 
previous chapter. Although the intention was that there be a project committee for the 
planning and implementation of all the other components of the iSLP the reality was that 
the human resources required to manage such an intense participative process for 150 
capital projects were not available, either from government or communities. Furthermore, 
as has been explained, work only started on community facilities after the housing project 
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committees had already been meeting for many months and had witnessed the development 
of the serviced sites on which the facilities would stand. The communities’ priority was 
housing, and they wanted to be involved in its development. The building of other facilities 
was not as ‘close to home’ and there were specialist architects who knew all about how to 
best design clinics, schools and libraries. In their construction the community hoped to be 
allocated some jobs and given some training, so this was made a condition of all contracts, 
and a Community Liaison Officer was appointed for each project to efficiently manage that 
process. 
  
Provision of Capacity Building Resources 
 
Every aspect of the collaborative process was designed not only to benefit those who would 
be physically accommodated but to inspire and liberate everyone involved. For all the 
different role-players had been tainted and moulded by an oppressive and discriminatory 
system of government but involvement in the iSLP enabled them to explore how to work 
and build together. Every committee was a crucible in which changes took place in 
understanding, attitudes and values – leading to improvements in policy and practice. 
 
The iSLP was structured as a capacity-building process. The housing elements 
constituted a huge capacity-building machine, incorporating the development of a 
multitude of skills that produced everything from construction labourers to novice city 
councillors. Furthermore, because the iSLP was by far the biggest project in the region for 
many years, the participatory practices that it required infected the development industry in 
the entire region and set the benchmark for ‘good practice’ in a country that was rapidly 
democratising. 
 
In addition to this general process, however, a budget of 10 million Rands was 
allocated to finance particular capacity-building programmes that would enable the 
residents of iSLP projects to make the most of the opportunities before them. In order to 
ensure that such programmes would be appropriate and effective an invitation was made by 
the iSLP Project Coordinator to all government departments that were engaging with iSLP 
residents to add a capacity-building component to their projects and nominate capacity-
building initiatives for the award of grants. Each was also invited to supply a representative 
to join a committee that would adjudicate all the nominations and make recommendations 
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to the province to release the funds. 
 
The resulting 55 capacity building projects offered a great variety of skills training 
to the people of the iSLP.  They included initiatives to improve income-generating capacity 
through the acquisition of skills in building, business and financial management, proposal 
writing, fundraising, handcrafts, and information technology. Opportunities to improve 
social capital were created through conflict resolution training, the building of 
organisational skills to assist with the improved running of school and pre-school 
governing bodies, the provision of peace training for adolescents, leadership training for 
sports structures; and a range of life skills for volunteers, from dealing with children to 
those assisting in health related issues. Most of the programmes were provided by NGOs. 
 
The diversity of the iSLP’s major capacity building programmes is noteworthy, and a 





‘Community participation’ must always be qualified by its extent. In simple terms there are 
two phases in the housing development process:  planning and implementation, between 
which is usually a moment of project approval when financial resources are allocated. 
There is merit in making the planning phase as participatory and comprehensive as 
possible, because after project approval any delays and changes will cost money, which on 
a fixed budget (or subsidy) will reduce the value of the eventual product. Community 
interest in the iSLP’s implementation phase was primarily in obtaining a house, 
employment opportunities and in monitoring progress. Any crises, such as delays in getting 
implementation started or labour disputes that jeopardised progress and delivery, tended to 
threaten the position of project committee members in the eyes of their constituencies. In 
one or two cases it provoked communities to replace their representatives causing the 
whole sense of partnership and trust in the project committee to be weakened and set back.  
 
Therefore in the iSLP, although the Province chose the project managers, it was the 
community representatives on the project committees who selected the planning and 
engineering consultants for their projects after receiving presentations from and 
interviewing a panel nominated by the Province. Although the Province made the 
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appointments in every case it was in response to recommendations made by the community 
representatives. This simple exercise in participation contributed substantially to achieving 
community ownership of the process.  
 
The next step was also vitally important: the newly appointed town planning 
consultants did not commence by bringing proposals to the project committee but discussed 
with the committee what the planning parameters should be: site shapes and sizes, vehicle 
access, house orientation, public facilities and their location, etc. The committee would go 
and look at the site, and some took a bus tour to see how a variety of existing projects had 
been planned. After a number of meetings and workshops the consultants were given a 
mandate by the Project Committee to draft plans and designs, which were submitted for 
discussion. Care was taken to achieve a high level of understanding by community 
representatives, and after having made a thorough, respectful and thoughtful start the 
consultants were in every case asked by the community representatives to finalise their 
plans and get implementation started as soon as possible. Project committees typically met 
for workshops at weekends and for meetings in late afternoons so that working members 
could attend. Meetings were only held during business hours in cases where it was verified 
that community representatives were able to attend. Often the iSLP project facilitators 
provided transport for the community members. 
 
Project committee members were required by their own structures to report back to 
and consult with their constituencies on a regular basis, usually at weekends. The culture 
within the communities required representatives to be mandated by their constituents 
before attending meetings, and access to housing was such an important item on the 
residents’ agenda that report backs were unavoidable. The main issues were those of 
principle, process and product – and the main concerns were “How can I get a house?”, 
“What kind of house can I get?” and “What jobs are on offer?” The beneficiary 
identification process within each community required the approval of the community as a 
whole and its implementation had to be transparent, fair and responsive to challenges. It 
was very important for community representatives to have something to show, and 
therefore they shared with the technical team and public authorities a desire for urgent 
action, and it became a process of real mutual supportive process. 
 
Community participation at the level of individuals had to be limited because of the 
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scale of the project. Individual community members, once they had been identified as 
potential beneficiaries by a community-driven process, were invited by the project manager 
to visit the project office to complete subsidy application forms and deeds of sale and to 
participate in an educational process about home ownership and maintenance. If a variety 
of house types were available a choice could be made but unfortunately the pace of 
construction and logistical constraints made it impracticable to also offer beneficiaries a 
choice of site. They were given a few days notice of when their house would be ready and 
when they were required to take occupation. Houses could not be left unoccupied because 
of the real danger of illegal occupation or vandalism. The housing delivery process and the 
numbers involved made it impossible to have all these meetings at weekends, so employed 
beneficiaries were obliged to take time off work in order to visit the project office. They 
also had to make their own arrangements for relocating their possessions to their house.  
 
Attempts were made to create some housing options using contractors from the 
community. However, the very limited size of the subsidy remaining after paying for the 
development of serviced sites, the fast rate of delivery of houses that was required and the 
inexperience of small contractors in costing and management reduced such possibilities to 
a minimum. The most successful of such exercises was the Delft Leyden turnkey project in 
which the developer employed and supervised local subcontractors to deliver a prescribed 




The decision to manage the iSLP at the level of individual projects was crucial. On that 
basis the main actors in the drama were those who would have to live with the 
consequences. In politically stable communities developmentally-orientated community 
members were appointed to project committees and they worked together through the 
planning process to achieve good results. In conflict-ridden communities the politicians or 
strong men held on to all the power and development was hamstrung.  
 
It is worth re-emphasising the immense value of unequivocal decisions on major 
policies: the iSLP Principles in the Business Plan, and later the allocation principles and 
quotas recommended by the Consultative Forum and approved by the Steering Committee. 
These created a clear and unambiguous framework within which the whole project could be 
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managed as pragmatically as might be necessary. 
 
The national Cabinet’s approval of the project as a whole and its allocation of half 
of all the financial requirements on clear conditions provided authority, resources and 
leverage. To this was later added the authority for the provincial Treasury to hold and 
disburse the funds. In a long term project committed and sustained responsibility and 
ownership is vital for success. 
 
How did the project survive such irregular patterns of attendance at important 
meetings? It is evident from the analyses of all the iSLP structures that the project was 
empowered by the substantial grassroots involvement and support in the Project 
Committees combined with the dedicated facilitation, guidance and leverage provided by a 
small number of Enablers. The iSLP was also driven by some undisputed values, a huge 
need for housing and a unique and substantial source of funds. Once project 
implementation began nobody would dare call for any suspension or termination, and so 
while debates might rage at policy level the delivery process churned on, supported by 




It was at first assumed by the iSLP Coordinator that implementation should be 
accompanied by a publicity campaign through the mainstream media – newspaper, radio 
and television. It quickly became apparent that major newspapers did not regard 
development projects, even on such a large scale, newsworthy unless there was some kind 
of sensational scandal to report. It was therefore decided to focus the whole communication 
effort upon the intended beneficiaries of the iSLP, almost all of whom lived in the clearly 
defined iSLP project area, and to provide useful information about the project and 
illustrated stories about community achievements. So the iSLP published its own quarterly 
newspaper and distributed 30 000 copies to schools, libraries and shops throughout the 
project area, where they could be collected by residents. At first it was issued in 3 
languages (isiXhosa, Afrikaans and English) which were published in separate editions, but 
at the request of schools in the area which were utilising the newspaper to teach English it 
was eventually published in English with just a few articles in isiXhosa.  
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A very popular publication was the annual iSLP wall calendar, full of scenes and 
people from the project in full colour, which was delivered to every household each 
December. Web sites only became conventional late in the life of the iSLP, by which time 
there was so much information that could have been uploaded that it was rather impractical. 
The iSLP web site was, however, of some use to researchers and although it was not 
updated after August 2004 it might still be accessible at http://www.islp.org.za/ . 
 
The spoken word was a vital means of communicating to and within the beneficiary 
communities. Furthermore, the common language was isiXhosa – one of the three ‘official 
languages’ used in the Western Cape. The six facilitators employed by the iSLP 
Coordinator played an invaluable and indispensable role in this regard, for not only did 
they ensured the accuracy and effectiveness of all communications between beneficiary 
communities and project managers but they built strong and interdependent relationships 
between all these actors. This was before the proliferation of mobile phones, so one of the 
most effective ways of getting the word out to a large audience was through radio. The 
leader of the facilitators established a good relationship with a government isiXhosa radio 
stations and arranged to be interviewed and to engage in chat shows with listener 
participation when there was a need. This was a good way to correct misunderstandings, 
diffuse erroneous rumours, and build relationships by associating a warm voice and 




By the time the iSLP came to an end in March 2005 most of the personalities whose names 
have populated this case study had moved on with their lives and careers and had lost touch 
with the day-to-day operation of this interesting collaboration. Some had entered politics or 
government or become consultants, others had retired and some, including the Democrat, 
had taken leave of this world. Organisations that had dominated the business of the Policy 
Committee disappeared – community structures established during the ‘struggle’ for 
democracy had been replaced by legalised political parties and were no longer able to raise 
funds. All the organs of government experienced rolling re-structuring, especially in local 
authorities, and of course all of the politicians changed place, at least every five years as 
elections took place. The beneficiaries of the iSLP, who must have numbered well over 
150 000 people, considering not only the housing but public facilities that served much 
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broader communities, were getting on with their lives – finding work, going to school, 
incrementally improving their dwellings. At the end the iSLP Coordinator simply ensured 
that each of the more than 200 projects had been signed off and accounted for and then 
invited the remaining stalwarts to a celebratory meal and an opportunity to share their 
appreciation of each other and of their experiences in the iSLP. 
 
So there were no public closing events, press conferences or speeches by politicians 
– and that was the way that the iSLP had always been conducted: quietly, and with as little 
fuss as possible. The objective was to design and build houses and schools and 
communities, not build reputations and public images. As a consequence very few people 
outside of the project area knew that the biggest and longest-running housing project in the 
country was in Cape Town. That was perhaps unfortunate, but otherwise the iSLP might 
have become much more of a ‘political football’ than it was. 
 
When the iSLP ended there were only two housing projects in the approved 
Business Plan that had not been started: the development within the township of Langa of 
the buffer strip and some infill sites, and the development of Boystown. Both of these were 
sites of chronic political contestation. Langa, the oldest black township in Cape Town, had 
been a stronghold of the Pan African Congress Party, but whose members had for decades 
been at odds with the growing number of hostel dwellers in the area. Then when the buffer 
strip between Langa and the bordering highways was invaded in December 1994 to create 
the informal settlement of Joe Slovo the three-way stand-off between ‘residents’, hostel 
dwellers and ‘latecomers’ rendered collaborative discussion about future development 
impossible. In Boystown there was a long-standing feud between its leadership and that of 
Crossroads, followed by a feud between the long-standing city councillor and his followers 
and a succession of rival groups. The Boystown contests were often expressed through the 
barrel of a gun. When it ultimately became possible for an iSLP housing project to be run 
there the contractor’s site office came under fire on the first day and he withdrew his team 
immediately. 
 
Fortuitously a new major housing project to upgrade informal settlements along the 
N2 highway had been launched in late 2004, which planned to include Joe Slovo and 
Boystown, as well as New Rest where an experimental in situ upgrading project had been 
begun but was moving slowly, so responsibility for their development was transferred from 
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the iSLP to the ‘N2 Gateway’ project. In some ways the N2 Gateway was the natural 
successor to the iSLP – it was a high profile national ‘flagship” project championed very 
personally by a new national minister of housing. But there the resemblance ended, because 
this was a government that believed that it knew what communities wanted and therefore 
saw no need for participative, let alone collaborative, development. Secondly, no time was 
to be lost in getting underway with construction, so there was no consultative policy-
making phase and the procurement of consultants and contractors was short-circuited and 
fast-tracked as much as possible. The fifteen years of iSLP experience was offered, but 
declined. The project promoters sought publicity and got it, and it was not long before the 
process began to go badly wrong.  
 
The N2 Gateway will no doubt provide a huge and fascinating case study, although 
it will probably require a lot of unravelling to discover exactly what has happened. The 
only reason why it is worthy of mention here is that the people who drove it chose 
deliberately to ignore the many lessons that had been learned by so many people who were 
involved in the operation of the iSLP. The explanations are probably numerous, but at the 
root of them is a single cause: the iSLP was a cross-sector collaboration and that is never 
the preference of any party (least of all a government, and even more so a new minister). 
Cross-sector collaboration really is the last resort. As will be demonstrated in Part 2 cross-
sector collaborations are appropriate for turbulent situations where every other kind of 
development arrangement has proved impossible, and they are only undertaken with great 
difficulty. So any politician or leader who believes that the environment is not particularly 
turbulent and that all that is needed is more determined autocracy in project development is 
unlikely to be remotely interested in what was learned from an old project that was birthed 
in the dying days of a bygone era. In the event the turbulence returned and every kind of 




Chapter 10 has quantified the deliverables of the iSLP and described some key processes.. 
The argument presented in this brief chapter is that although this cross-sector collaboration 
involved a very complex and lengthy process it was able to successfully deliver a huge 
spectrum and volume of products, in a coordinated manner. The contribution of this chapter 
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to the overall thesis is to validate the case study as a genuine but successful cross-sector 
collaboration.  
 
The previous seven chapters have described how a large, multi-dimensional project 
was created on and around a site of chronic chaos, anarchy and anger – and how, after 
coping with endless attempts to take over control, the sustained, principled, collaborative 
process of formulating a development project was rewarded with approval and resources. 
Chapter 11 begins to contrast the literature with the experience of the iSLP and argues that 
the difference – the keys to success – are framed by the recognition that a cross-sector 
collaboration is likely to be plagued by incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity. 
 
 




Framing the gap: Unremitting contextual turbulence 
and stakeholder incapacity 
 
 
The argument of this thesis has two parts. The first is that a cross-sector collaboration 
should expect to suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, 
and that the stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the 
collaboration themselves. This is the subject of this chapter and frames the gap within the 
existing literature. Furthermore these factors are likely to count in good measure for the 
poor expectation of success in cross-sector collaboration. The second part of the argument 
relates to what fills the gap: that success depends upon the existence and activities of 
Enablers – diversely located and motivated activists, with a shared dedication to the 
collaboration’s objectives – and the mandates which empower them. That will be presented 
subsequently, in Chapter 12. 
 
This Chapter presents the first part of the argument in two sections: turbulence and 
incapacity. Critically, these are both presented as ‘initial conditions’ in the literature 
(Bryson et al, 2006 - their first two ‘Propositions’: p. 46), but their persistence has not been 
declared. 
 
Complexity and turbulence : Multi-dimensional and omnipresent 
 
Bryson and his colleagues concluded that collaboration only becomes an option in a very 
turbulent environment and is only chosen as a last resort. They emphasise the complexity 
and extreme difficulty of cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al, 2006), and Ansell and 
Gash commented on their own research, “as we proceeded, we were overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the collaborative process” (Ansell and Gash, 2008. p 7). The literature on 
community participation and collaborative governance provides hardly a hint of 
complexities at that scale, and where references are made it is typically about the pre-
existence of fraught relationships between the intended collaborators. It is implied that the 
very establishment of a cross-sector collaboration is likely to significantly diminish the 
level of complexity, turbulence and violence. - although Bryson et al do mention 
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continuing constraints.  
 
Such collaboration in the field of large-scale housing provision for the poor, for 
example, implies not only persuading government, communities/civil society and the 
private sector to work together on a shared objective but achieving coherence and synergy 
within each of those sectors. That, in a volatile, constantly changing environment, is a 
major task which will require sustained attention from conception to project completion. 
But these institutional issues contain only part of the complexity, for a major project itself 
generates a host of expectations, possibilities and fears which, within a socio-political 
cauldron, are able to foment a completely new set of tensions, subterfuges, splits, alliances 
and battles for control of resources in every dimension of the project. The iSLP case study 
demonstrates that this incessant complexity can be manifested in the following ways: 
 
Long memories and wounded hearts 
First there was a centuries-old and deeply hurtful history of abuse, discrimination and 
exclusion suffered by people of colour, particularly Black people, in the Cape that reached 
its climax in the 1970’s and 80’s under apartheid. On top of that, within the case study area, 
were layers of aggression, resistance, promise, betrayal, deception, violence and dislocation 
that affected wave after wave of people who tried to make their home on a triangle of land 
called Crossroads. Warlords emerged and engaged in deadly inter-territorial battles and 
burning of homes, watched by a heartless state. Some thirty satellite settlements of refugees 
resulted, creating multiple polarities and opposing allegiances that rendered inappropriate 
any broad concept of “community”. A combination of old, deep scars and un-healed open 
wounds ensured a lingering lack of trust between the victims and the oppressors and 
between democratic and autocratic leadership groups within communities. Very little is 
possible in a collaboration without trust. 
 
A paralysing interregnum 
On the national stage the apartheid state surrendered in February 1990 in the hope that it 
would not be too late for South Africans of all colours to begin constructing democracy. 
The transition took more than four years, during which time government was in a 
maintenance mode, without the policies and resources necessary to begin development in a 
different way. At the same time recently unbanned community organisations and political 
parties were finding their feet and organising their constituencies. Then it took another six 
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years for local government to undergo a massive reconstruction, which severely limited its 
contribution. While in this limbo there was no shortage of spurious developers tempting 




Change takes place in increments and waves and was unremitting in the iSLP. The 
main changes that impacted on the iSLP year by year from 1991 to 2005 are indicated in 
Table 15 (See Annexure B. p B12). They included incessant changes in the nature of 
government structures, particularly at local government level, but also in the second tier of 
government; and frequent changes in political parties, politicians and officials in local and 
provincial government – and in policies and procedures. There was also a steady decline in 
the capacity of the public service, caused by a reduction both in experienced personnel and 
in delegated authority. Although the national government generously provided nearly R600 
million of RDP funds for the iSLP, government at any tier was not naturally organised to 
deliver large fully integrated human settlements. There was no constant political champion 
available for the entirety of the iSLP, leaving the field clear for politicians to make 
unrealistic promises with regard to the iSLP’s products and programmes with impunity. 
 
Territoriality 
‘Turf wars’ bedevilled the iSLP. Within government here were administrative territorial 
battles between long-term incumbents and functionaries who have been recruited to fulfil 
new mandates – e.g. the disinterest that the Wrestler discovered within his own 
organisation; the stresses between the old guard in the provincial government and the 
inflow of officials from the dismantling of the House of Representatives who had 
completely different experience and philosophy; much later came the attempts by the RDP 
ministry to wrest control of the project from the Housing ministry; and after that were the 
attempts by local authority structures to take control of part or all of the iSLP from the 
provincial government. 
 
Cultural territoriality within and between government administrations was manifest 
– e.g. the cool reception which the Provincial Planner received when he began work for 
the provincial government because he was not an Afrikaner; and the long-standing enmity 
between that institution and the liberal City of cape Town. There were also technical 
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boundaries with regard to priorities and process, typically between systems-oriented 
engineers and process-oriented participatory planners and facilitators – e.g. the technical 
resistance to the Democrat’s proposals. Political territorialism was rife – the narrative is 
riddled with political confrontations: e.g. state support of the authoritarian Witdoeke against 
the pro-democracy ‘Comrades’ in the Crossroads war; the conservative provincial 
bureaucracy against the liberalism of the Democrat, the Defender and the Community 
Planner; old guard autocrats in the private and public sectors supporting WCUSA in a bid 
to run the iSLP in discredited ways; the division of Crossroads into two violently-opposed 
ANC branches; and years of contestation between ‘civic’ and ‘warlord’ leaders of informal 
settlements. 
 
Running at a deep level were rights and claims to land: the root of the whole 
problem was the historically deliberate inadequate allocation of urban land to Blacks, let 
alone inadequate development. The original approval of Crossroads as a settlement area 
made it a unique focus of demand – and a unique opportunity for patronage, which was 
exploited without regard to life and property. Even after the iSLP began leaders would 
claim exclusive rights to huge areas of land, prevent other communities from gaining 
access, and charge their own people to be placed on their unauthorised ‘waiting lists’. 
 
Territoriality begins at the individual level with personal space and functional turf – 
and a person may have more than one function within a collaboration – e.g. a professional 
engineer, an official and a member of a particular committee or team. Then there is 
institutional territory and sector/group territory – and within them department or group 
territory - all of which are associated with real or perceived or potential rights and benefits. 
In an unstable, transforming landscape ‘territory’ is not only of huge interest to most actors, 
but is a minefield over which battles are constantly fought.  
 
Incessant Contestation 
The iSLP became not only an instrument with which to right the wrongs of the past, but 
through which a few sought to access power and profits. The collaboration had not even 
been launched when it became a battleground for control of the development process and 
of the financial rewards that could be reaped. The careful building of ‘shared objectives’ 
with many stakeholders and the assembly of priorities, policies and institutional 
arrangements were shadowed by dogged and convoluted struggles for control of the 
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process and ultimately of the resources. Within the collaboration alliances were assembled, 
dissolved, reconstructed and camouflaged. Principles were propounded, argued, 
communicated and submitted for approval only to be stalled by opportunists hoping to 
achieve something more lucrative. Some participants disappeared, sometimes for months, 
and suddenly reappeared and had a lot to say. Much purported representation of 
‘communities’ was left unchallenged and unproven in order not to rock the boat. The 
development environment was hazardous, ever-changing and unpredictable – and it stayed 
that way for the next fourteen years until the project was completed.   
 
Development cartels  
Exclusive arrangements had been fostered under National Party government to enhance and 
protect the status of the Afrikaner business community and when they became threatened in 
the transition to democracy attempts were made to build new cabals with Black groups that 
would be presumably supported by an incoming government. The iSLP carried the biggest 
bounty of any housing project in the country, for in the delivery of all its 32 000 houses and 
everything else suppliers of goods and services would receive a total of 1.2 billion Rands 
(US$333 million in 1994) – well worth fighting for and vitally important to protect, 
because the use of small and local contractors was part of its development agenda. This 




Civil servants in provincial and local government were afraid of losing jobs, position and 
influence during what became a long and uncertain transition; and on the other hand civic 
leaders who had been denied opportunities (and in most cases, education) were afraid that 
their hopes for jobs in the new dispensation would not materialise, fuelled in part by the 
superior attitudes and expectations adopted by ‘freedom fighters’ who returned from exile. 
There was plenty of fear within communities as well, for even until the late 1990s there 
were areas of the iSLP that were, in the last resort, ruled with firearms – Crossroads, 
Boystown, Browns Farm and Delft were particularly dangerous areas. 
 
Violence 
The war in Crossroads lasted for ten years, from 1983-1993 and displaced an estimated 
60 000 people. Faction fighting continued between groups in Crossroads and neighbouring 
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Boystown. Taxi wars erupted sporadically. Local political assassinations were frequent and 
armed robberies and vehicle hijackings commonplace. Firearms were plentiful. Desperate 
times produce desperate actions, and they are extremely difficult to curtail. 
 
Invasion 
The iSLP was fundamentally about access to land and ultimately to housing, and there was 
nothing that violated a careful consultative development process more than an anarchic 
invasion of developable land or newly-completed houses. It is a sobering fact that both 
attempts to invade land during the iSLP’s tenure were successful: the invasion of the 
cement factory land in Philippi and the invasion of many new houses in Delft – the danger 
of violent repercussions were considered by the Police to be too great for them to enforce 
evictions. Furthermore, because of the limited ability of local authorities to control and 
upgrade informal settlements, there is little doubt that at least half of the 23 000 households 
from informal settlements that were housed in iSLP green fields projects were promptly 
succeeded by at least that many families who obtained ‘informal access’ to the places that 
they had vacated. 
 
In conclusion, contemporary literature on power analysis in the participative sphere 
is a little too tame to be helpful for contending with the vehemence and unscrupulousness 
within large-scale cross-sector collaboration. The extent of the conflict and contestation - 
multiple parties, hidden agendas, surprise tactics from all sides, gate-keeping, arson and 
murder - are likely to render rather inadequate many of the academic debates about the 
location, visibility of interactions and the point at which interests intersect. Cross-sector 
collaboration should not be regarded as a stable negotiating space but as a mobile, volatile 
battleground which is driven through ever-changing terrain towards a desired objective 
whilst the participants battle each other (and potential hijackers) over whatever they believe 
is worth fighting for. 
 
Incapacity: incapable or distracted stakeholders 
 
The literature apparently, by omission, assumes that when stakeholders have exhausted 
their individual means of addressing a burning issue and realise that they should work 
together they will be naturally able to collaborate effectively to achieve the objective (viz: 
Bryson et al’s Proposition No. 6), if necessary with some temporary external facilitation. 
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However, the narrative in Chapters 4 - 10 demonstrated that the size, complexity and 
uniqueness of a challenge such as that presented by the iSLP requires an abnormal 
application of some unusually versatile and resilient personnel as well as more than 
sufficient capital to cover project requirements. It is a matter of capacity – and in this thesis 
he terms ‘capacity’ and ‘incapacity’ are used relatively to denote the ability of a party to 
absorb and undertake additional responsibilities required by the collaboration. In the 
absence of very capable external support each sector would have to dedicate some of its 
ablest employees to an obviously risky venture within unknown terrain. The important 
point being made is that it is unlikely that any stakeholder organisation or employee would 
make such a commitment – they have businesses to run and careers and ambitions to 
pursue. The demands of the collaboration would considerably exceed the extent to which 
they can invest time and expertise in the process, and it would have to be augmented with 
exceptional mandates and the provision of considerable finance precisely when required.  
 
The incapacity, or perhaps skewed capacity, of the collaborators would not be the 
only hindrance. The environment within which each stakeholder organisation is 
endeavouring to run its day-to-day business is likely to be in turmoil. ‘Business as usual’ 
would probably be only a fond memory for many, replaced by a hiatus in government, an 
absence of leaders as they are called into higher level negotiations and consultations around 
much bigger agendas, a reduction in the maintenance of law and order, and a contradictory 
environment of insecurity and opportunism. Nobody, in 1990 South Africa, knew what the 
future might hold and how long it would be before stability was established – except that 
what used to be termed ‘stability’ was unlikely to be restored. As a result it was difficult for 
many people to be single-minded – those who possessed jobs and responsibilities had to 
keep an eye open for alternatives, and most of those who volunteered hoped that it might 
lead to something remunerative but kept an eye out for alternatives just in case. 
 
The provincial government, which was the principal public sector actor, was torn 
between its old political commitment to develop Crossroads and its realisation that it could 
no longer develop exclusively – yet neither was within its capacity, for Crossroads was a 
war zone and the state had no experience of inclusive participative development. The 
leaders of communities, whether organised into civics or associations of informal 
settlement strongmen, wanted development and would have liked to control it, but had no 
skills or experience in that field whatsoever. Neither did they have money with which to 
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buy skills. But consultants and contractors had money and promises with which to buy the 
support of community leaders, and in this way synergies were fashioned and re-fashioned 
which existed partly inside and partly outside of the iSLP collaboration and were thus 
incongruous with the objectives, principles and values of the iSLP and could not be 
entertained. 
 
The following examples demonstrate more explicitly the inability of the iSLP 
stakeholders to establish and sustain the collaborative process on their own. 
 
Provincial and National Government 
The provincial Community Services Branch and its Housing Department initiated, hosted 
and exercised overall responsibility for the iSLP. However it was not until the project had 
been approved in 1994 that it was able to devote personnel to the project, but almost all of 
them came from the disbanded House of Representatives, where they had served only 
Coloured people, who had a very different culture, history and language from most iSLP 
residents and where a different housing policy had been applied. Within four years this 
team had been disbanded as the Province attempted to shed its direct housing activities, and 
almost the entire team relocated to other departments or to local authorities. Their functions 
were replaced by consultants. The iSLP continued for seven years beyond that, until 2005. 
 
Furthermore, during the life of the iSLP there was a succession of seven provincial 
housing ministers. They represented various political parties, and had they not all been held 
responsible for the iSLP on account of the 1994 national cabinet approval and treasury 
allocation of effectively the full budget there would have been a steadily diminishing 
number of reasons for them to maintain their support. 
 
At the national level, the Minister of Housing who had taken the decisive act of 
supporting the iSLP process against the pressure of the private sector consortium in 1994, 
and recommended the approval of the iSLP business plan to cabinet, died soon afterwards. 
The national Reconstruction and Development Programme, with its own Minister Without 
Portfolio, was launched with much fanfare in 1994, threw its weight around in the iSLP 
area for two years, and was then summarily disbanded in a cabinet coup. Throughout the 15 
year life of the iSLP not only did political parties come and go but politicians ‘crossed the 
floor’ from time to time to change the balance of power - yet politicians accrued to 
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themselves ever-increasing power over government administrators. Eventually the capacity 
of government fell to such a level that delivery of development was almost completely 
dependent upon consultants. By the time the iSLP had completed its work in 2005 there 
was a national Housing Minister in power who was not remotely interested in collaborating 
with communities – by that stage the ruling party claimed to know exactly what people 
wanted and would endeavour by all means to deliver it without any consultation. 
 
Local government 
When the iSLP Policy Committee was inaugurated in 1991 the local authorities responsible 
for the project area were apartheid era structures with unrepresentative councillors who 
were widely regarded as ‘sell-outs’ by the residents. Consequently they were excluded 
from the main iSLP negotiating forums and confined to meeting in a parallel committee 
which was short-lived. Although the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Regional 
Services Council were included in the Policy Committee they were there to provide 
executive support, not delivery. From 1994 to 2000 the number of local government 
structures in South Africa was drastically reduced and even where continued employment 
was secured the number of senior positions was greatly diminished. Morale plummeted. 
The transformation continued as the preponderance of White males in senior positions was 
reduced and as politicians took increasing control over government affairs at all levels. As 
recorded a number of times in the case study, local government was so incapacitated 
through the 1990s that it was unable to upgrade or replace informal settlements in the iSLP 




In 1990 Black communities looked to the unbanned political parties for leadership, whilst 
at the same time those parties were doing everything in their power to gather all leadership 
and influence to themselves. However, whilst communities were looking forward to 
development and jobs the parties were working towards winning an eventual election and 
gaining real power. So although the two parties who would represent the bulk of iSLP 
residents were invited to join the process the Pan African Congress declined because it did 
not have the capacity and the ANC sent a nominee – a non-politician, the Community 
Planner, who attended meetings of the Policy Committee in a voluntary capacity. 
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The remaining ‘community organisations’ comprised civics associations, the hostel 
dwellers’ association and squatter leaders, some of whom were represented by WCUSA  – 
three groups that were diametrically opposed to each other in terms of community politics. 
A year after the iSLP Policy Committee was created the ANC established the South 
African National Civics Association (SANCO), which it hoped would supersede all of 
these groups and win their membership to the party. Between them they had no capability 
in housing or community development – except WCUSA’s nefarious link to the private 
sector consortium, which eventually became shared with the other organisations in turn and 
ultimately altogether. The strategy failed and within a few years none of these 
organisations formally existed. 
 
Conclusion 
 The argument presented by this chapter is that incessant turbulence and 
stakeholder incapacity are substantially un-theorised realities in cross-sector collaboration, 
giving rise to an indistinct and hopeless prognosis for such collaborations. The literature 
gives the impression that turbulence will be dealt with substantially by the creation of a 
cross-sector collaboration and that a collaboration can be managed effectively by the 
stakeholders. But it has been demonstrated that the turbulent circumstances which warrant 
cross-sector collaboration are unlikely to abate and the possibilities of assembling a 
dedicated and devoted team of collaboration managers from the parties themselves is likely 
to be remote. It is consequently argued that incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity 
actually frame a gap in the literature. 
 
This gap between the required and available management and facilitation resources 
must be filled by Enablers, and the mandates necessary to empower them, as will be 








Filling the gap: The few Enablers and their powerful mandates 
 
‘Cross-sector collaboration is increasingly assumed to be both necessary and desirable 
as a strategy for addressing many of society’s most difficult public challenges... 
but the research evidence indicates that it is hardly easy’. 
 Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006. p 44. 
 
This thesis provides some responses to Gaventa’s 5th challenge that “far more needs to be 
learned about how new spaces for participatory governance work, for whom and with what 
social justice outcomes” (Gaventa, 2004. p 31). In Chapters 5 – 10 I have engaged with his 
6th challenge, by applying power analysis (including relationship maps) to understand the 
extent to which the spaces created in the iSLP were used by different parties for 
transformative engagement or for the purpose of control. In Chapter 11 I ventured that it 
has been falsely assumed that the creation of a collaborative space reduces turbulence and 
that such space is substantially manageable by the stakeholders themselves. Instead I have 
argued that such incessant turbulence and the incapacity of stakeholders should be 
expected: and that they frame the missing key to a greater possibility of achieving success 
in cross-sector collaborations. This key comprises the Enablers – diversely located and 
motivated activists who share a dedication to enabling the achievement of the 
collaboration’s goals – and the mandates with which they are empowered. This is the 
argument presented by this Chapter. 
 
The Work within a Cross-Sector Collaboration 
 
In the last part (‘F’) of the literature review in Chapter 2 I explored the roles that the 
literature had identified as being useful in the processes of collaboration. Not surprisingly a 
general need for leadership is expressed, and a range of functions were identified, such as 
sponsors, champions, boundary spanners, facilitators, brokers and convenors. Some of 
these would be part of stakeholder organisations and some would be professionals who are 
contracted in to broker deals or break deadlocks. All these functions express capability – 
yet, quoting Bryson and his colleagues again, “the normal expectation ought to be that 
success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations” (Bryson et al, 2006. 
p. 52). 
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In another step towards understanding the kind of work that is required in a cross-
sector collaboration I have combined the 22 Propositions emanating from Bryson et al’s 
research into cross-sector collaboration with the 10 articles of Ansell and Gash’s 
Contingency Theory for collaborative governance that were described in Chapter 2. To 
achieve this I have translated the information that they contain into the ‘circumstances’ that 
they describe and the ‘work required’ to address them. The result is a formidable list of 34 
kinds of work, categorised into the different phases, beginning with the Presenting 
Problems, leading to the Initiation, creation of Institutional Arrangements, then the 
Participative Process, and finally Outcomes and Accountability. These can be grouped in 
order to consider the circumstances implied in their analysis and therefore to identify the 
kind of work that would be required to address them. The product of this synthesis is an 
extensive tabulation, Table 16 (See Annexure B. p. B13 - 15).   
 
Table 16 lists 34 kinds of work that are likely to be required to survey the 
circumstances, initiate collaboration, create an appropriate structure, manage its creative 
processes and ensure delivery of the required outcomes. The range of tasks is so demanding 
in its breadth and complexity as to render a summary here impractical – but the table 
demonstrates that a collaboration is an unusual construction, probably an unnatural one, the 
operation of which presents considerable challenges. The nature and volume of the work, 
and the context in which it must be performed, does not fit into simple, conventional 
functional categories and is likely to require more than part-time, intermittently employed 
personnel. It is also extremely unlikely that these responsibilities as a whole could be 
effectively fulfilled by any qualified employees of stakeholder groups who have their own 
jobs, careers and institutional agendas to pursue at the same time. Some of them could 
certainly provide occasional help, support and encouragement – but not full time 
engagement. This chapter probes how this complex and demanding work can be done 
successfully.  
 
The Gap in the theory 
 
There is acknowledgement within the literature that ‘facilitative leadership’ is a critically 
important ingredient in the collaboration process, particularly with regard to “bringing the 
parties to the table” and then “steering them through the rough patches of the collaborative 
process” (Ansell and Gash, 2007. p 12). However, their recommended interventions of 
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facilitation, mediation and nonbinding arbitration are rather inadequate for the kind of 
jungle conflict found in cross-sector collaboration. Bryson et al (2006) are more realistic 
about the complexity and difficulty of cross-sector collaboration but their brief 
endorsement of “sponsors, champions, boundary-spanners and facilitators” (p 52) resonates 
more with a kind of courtly diplomacy than with countering the kind of frequently 
transmogrifying opposition in sustained guerrilla warfare that was demonstrated in the 
iSLP.  
 
Bryson and his colleagues have concluded that cross-sector collaboration is the last 
resort within the spectrum of cooperative initiatives and is unlikely to be successful. 
However the evidence from the iSLP case study and the deductions of Table 16 made by 
extending their arguments and those of Ansell and Gash one step further, suggest that the 
unusual work that is required cannot be described or structured in a usual way. The iSLP 
cannot be regarded as a unique event - contemporary demands for a change of order in 
society, for justice and an end to discrimination, are likely to be accompanied by demands 
for democracy and involvement. Dignity is bestowed by a collaborative process of delivery 
more than by delivery alone. Large scale cross-sector collaboration is intrinsically difficult 
because it is only chosen in extreme circumstances and it is unnatural - in the sense of 
being a hybrid: a forced, manipulated and experimental creation, conceived in an 
uncomfortable amalgam of social responsibility, institutional incapacity, undefined 
opportunity and considerable risk. It is not, however, impossible, as the iSLP has 
demonstrated.  
 
People are required to establish and then hold fast a centre or hub in which the common 
objective resides, identify potential collaborators by sector and organisation and then 
secure and sustain collaborators’ commitment and effective representation within effective 
collaboration structures. Thereafter they must monitor and respond constructively to inter- 
and intra-sector strengths and weaknesses; to the creation, fragmentation and dissolution of 
alliances that may affect the collaboration; and to changes in participating personnel over 
time and minimise any negative effect on the collaboration. It is then essential to monitor 
and promote the efficiency and effectiveness of every step of the policy-making, planning, 
approval, procurement, delivery and completion processes; optimise the integrity of 
representation in the collaboration; and ensure the transparency of the process and supply 
of necessary information to every constituency. These are radical roles, requiring people of 
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peculiar ability and commitment within the participating sectors, at the hub, across all 
potential fault lines and guarding and maintaining every bridge.  
 
 The investigation of what made the difference in the iSLP and enabled it to be 
successful led not to ‘functions’ or ‘work’ but to people – people with particular 
backgrounds, personalities and motivations. The introduction to each of Enablers that I 
have provided in Chapter 4 describes and explains them far more accurately than my 
attempt to categorise them functionally (into sponsors, champions, levers, etc.) in Chapter 
8. The personalities themselves were far greater than any position that they held or service 
that they rendered. In the iSLP the Enablers were a ‘type’ more than they were even a 
‘cadre’ because they were not an organised band. Nor did they have a name or a special 
title – the term ‘Enablers’ is my fabrication, a retrospective classification. We live in an 
organised world where unless someone is a functionary they are considered to lack 
function. That kind of categorisation cannot accommodate real, whole people – especially 
people who are passionate and generous. Like Enablers. Boxes – even matrices – cannot be 
used to describe people who must think and move ‘outside of the box’ and cross barriers, 
and not on some esoteric whim but to engage with the real world and make a real 
difference. 
 
Enablers: diverse activists whose motivations intersect 
 
The people who made the iSLP possible are referred to in this thesis as Enablers because 
they made possible what was hitherto impossible - and which was nevertheless very 
difficult. They had to be unconventional, creative, radical and totally convinced that the 
iSLP process was imperative and indispensable. They comprised a diverse assortment: a 
senior politician who broke the apartheid stereotype by inviting the president of a liberal 
women’s protest movement to chair the iSLP Policy Committee, who responded by 
volunteering out of duty but with trepidation; the senior provincial official responsible for 
development who horrified many of his colleagues by appointing an avowed opponent of 
the government as a consultant to facilitate and then coordinate the process; the head of the 
province’s regional office who was determined to break out of the institutional straight 
jacket and make a way to deal constructively with the Crossroads crisis; a community 
leader who had spent years as a trade union activist, civic leader and clandestine freedom 
fighter, who knew that change would need patience and commitment and was dedicated to 
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collaborative problem solving; four town planners, located in different institutions, who 
were convinced of the merits of cross-sector collaborative development and longed for an 
opportunity to practice it in South Africa; and later a diverse group of civil engineering 
project managers engaging deliberately with the community representatives in of their 
project committees.  
 
The Enablers in the iSLP came from an assortment of backgrounds and occupied a 
variety of institutional positions but their Enabling functions, either formal or informal, 
added another layer of diversity to their lives. Through the functions that they performed - 
whether as patron, chair, host, facilitator, coordinator, bridge-builder, innovator, planner, 
project manager or steadfast encourager - they pulled, pushed, corralled and guided the 
stakeholders and hundreds of other role-players into adopting and applying principles, 
formulating and approving projects and then collaboratively planning and delivering. They 
served for different durations and were never in the public spotlight. The iSLP was 
undertaken for the benefit of tens of thousands of households who had suffered intolerably 
and a prime objective of the participative process was that they would proudly regard the 
project as their own achievement. 
 
The mind of an Enabler: attitudes, values and principles 
The structural integrity and effectiveness of a cross-sector collaboration rests upon an 
appropriate and comprehensive policy framework.  However, policies cannot be just 
plucked out of the air or borrowed from other applications – they have to be constructed 
out of more deeply embedded elements otherwise they will be swept away by the issues of 
the day. 
 
Policies are built upon Principles. 
Principles are built upon Values. 
         Values - if we are honest and really intend abiding by them - are built upon  
         Attitudes. 
  
A fundamental and common characteristic of Enablers of any cross-sector collaboration is 
the set of attitudes and values that they hold. This is what enables them as individuals and 
makes cross-sector collaboration possible through them. 
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In embarking upon a complex and perhaps lengthy collaboration it is worth carefully 
considering what attitudes are likely to be required. From such a frame of reference values 
can be constructed. Values lie at the heart of a respectful, thoughtful society, and at this 
point suggested values must be correlated with the principal values of the society and any 
discrepancies ironed out. Then a verified set of values should be applied in two ways: to 
refer back to attitudes, which makes it possible to recognise deviant, destructive attitudes 
for what they are, and to modify them if possible; and also to move forward by using the 
values as a platform for creating the principles that will guide every aspect of the 
collaboration.  
 
Attitudes that are likely to undermine collaborative efforts are those which discriminate 
prejudicially between the various groups or people who might have a shared interest in a 
particular issue or project by, for example,  
• Believing or implying or acting as though we are more important, able, responsible, 
resourceful, ethical or accountable than they are; 
• by assuming that our perspective or opinion is more valid or correct than theirs; 
• by considering it unnecessary to try to empathise with other parties and to understand 
and respect their culture, world view and perspective. 
 
At the heart of the success of the iSLP was the fact that there were a group of Enablers 
from completely different backgrounds, some of whom were diametrically opposed to each 
other politically, but who all shared the same strong attitudes, values and principles. 
Because they were each in very different roles (community workers, politicians, NGO 
workers, officials in professional and managerial roles, and consultants) the practical 
manifestations of those attitudes, values and principles was quite different – but they were 
all pointed in the same direction and in the iSLP they found a common cause that they each 
strongly believed in. 
 
Attitudes, values and principles constantly influence and feed back to each other: 
principles that work well in practice generate convictions which can become concretised as 
values and reflected as attitudes. There is therefore great value in Enablers of cross-sector 
collaborations developing a good understanding of the attitudes, values and principles that 
will be required, and how they inter-relate. Table 17 (See Annexure B. p B16 - 18) 
suggests the kinds of attitudes, values and principles that are likely to apply to the 
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circumstances that give rise to the need for a large-scale cross-sector collaborative 
development. 
 
The qualities, skills and competencies that the Enablers brought to the iSLP could be 
summarised in the following way. They brought a contrasting mix of idealism (variously a 
product of youth, liberal philosophy and inexperience) and pragmatism (variously a 
product of long and sometimes traumatic experience, disappointment and frustration). They 
were thoughtful, strategic thinkers and respectful of different perspectives. They were 
quiet, modest people, avoiding the limelight. They were both creative and empathetic – an 
essential combination for finding acceptable ways forward in a diverse collaboration. And 
each of them located themselves seriously within their professional disciplines – 
deliberately broadening that discipline’s boundaries, not breaking them down in order to 
become a different kind of functionary. The use of the term ‘Enabler’ denotes more of a 
quality than a function. As has already been mentioned, they possessed a common 
conviction that the concept of the iSLP was the only possible way to address a very serious 
problem – and some devoted themselves to it out of duty, some because of their faith, and 
some because engaging in this mode of development was their passion. A number of the 
practical wisdoms that they introduced to the project are included in the ‘Lessons Learned’ 
reproduced in Annexure C.  
 
The work of an Enabler 
In order to understand what is required of the Enablers, particularly in a collaboration to 
address large scale social issues such as housing provision for poor and marginalised 
communities, the nature of what is to be enabled must be understood. Firstly the identity of 
all parties interested in solving this problem must be established - and whether they would 
consider defining the problem together and then working together to solve it. The extent of 
polarisation is likely to be such that this first step is already beyond the individual ability of 
any of those parties. Enablers will be required. 
 
Enablers are required to establish a coalition around a hub and then to develop a 
collaboration to drive a suite of initiatives that will achieve the required result. The 
collaboration must not only be constructed but held together, both inter-sector and intra-
sector, for every institution involved in socio-political issues within a changing context is 
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likely to be fragile and vulnerable, suggesting both danger and opportunity. The hub must 
be well-defined, then inhabited by Enablers with formal functions of patron, chairperson 
and facilitator who can hold the centre steadfast. The hub must be consolidated with 
mandates and defended by Enablers who are in key positions within the sectors - who each 
tie their sector to the hub and use their boundary-spanning relationships to lock all the 
sectors into a circumference.  
 
In due course the planning and delivery processes have to be driven, and these require 
Enablers who know what is needed but are committed to doing them collaboratively and 
therefore probably unconventionally. Over all this the entire collaborative enterprise must 
be comprehensively coordinated and supervised by a dedicated Enabler, probably with a 
team. All of this must be carefully constructed in multiple dimensions step by step.  
 
A two dimensional representation is shown in Fig 16 overleaf, which offers a way of 
thinking about the operation of a cross-sector collaboration and constitutes a template for 
an overall Relational Map. 
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KEY to the symbols used in Fig 16. [Each of these is explained in more detail overleaf. 

















The Hub and Chairperson  1. Sector  2. 
Parties  2. 
Mandates  5. 
Key Enabler within 
 Party and Sector  2. 
Boundary spanners  3. 
3rd Party boundary spanner   3. 
Key Process Driver  4. 
Collaboration  Coordinator  6. 
Enabler  2. 
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The commitment of an Enabler 
The Relational Map template in Fig 16 is an attempt to show how all the fixed and moving 
parts of a cross-sector collaboration are related and strengthened. There are no rules for 
how the sectors (denoted by arcs), parties (shown as circles) and their representatives might 
behave – they are likely to be unstable and unpredictable. The Enablers (denoted by stars in 
Fig 16), on the other hand, are dedicated to the achievement of the shared objective. Those 
within sectors are shown as Key Enablers (stars within arrows), some of whom may have a 
personal relationship with a Key Enabler in another sector and so are referred to as 
boundary-spanners (linked stars). Enablers who are not formal stakeholders but use their 
relationships with different sectors in support of the collaboration are termed 3rd party 
boundary spanners (a star on a link). These are all individuals who choose their own tactics, 
who may come and go because of the nature of their employment, who might only be 
available for part of the project period, and who might even exercise their Enabler role 
clandestinely. It may be that few, if any of them, will actually be called ‘Enablers’ – it is 
their personal commitment that is crucial.  
 
Enablers bring additional influence to bear simply through their relationships, 
particularly when they have developed some trust, however slim, between sectors. A cross-
sector collaboration provides many opportunities for even entrenched opponents who have 
even a little respect or reluctant admiration of each other to enjoy a unique opportunity to 
pool their resources and counteract their weaknesses by enabling a really worthwhile 
collaboration to succeed. One of the simplest methods of building cross-sector relationships 
is to arrange meetings and events in ways that encourage social interaction. Creating a 
central place for refreshments or meals during meetings or arranging informal gatherings, 
such as to celebrate small achievements, create natural opportunities for participants to 
meet each other across sector boundaries. 
 
The hub (at the centre of Fig 16) is occupied by Enablers fulfilling the functions of 
patron, chairperson and facilitator and is the repository of all of the collaboration’s 
principles and agreements. It stays at the centre of the collaboration. In Chapters 5 - 8 the 
Defender provided an excellent example of ‘holding the hub’ – despite the fact that she 
knew nothing about development and had never met most of the people there she attended 
and chaired all but one of her 33 Policy Committee meetings, as a woman in a 
predominantly and traditionally male field - and as a volunteer. The hub was 
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institutionalised in her during the policy-making phase. The hub is the anchor and must not 
move. 
 
The coordinator of a collaboration (the unconnected, multidirectional symbol in Fig 
16) is the Enabler who keeps the hub and all the collaboration linkages working together 
and constantly monitors every aspect of planning and implementation, and particularly the 
status of inter-relationships and involvement. The coordinator must have real affection for 
the collaborative exercise, and have respect and intentionally empathise with all of the 
participants – otherwise the task will prove impossible. The coordinator should be in place 
for the duration of the collaborative project. ‘Coordination’ in this context includes and is 
greater than ‘facilitation’ – coordination is more permanent, multifaceted, responsible and 
accountable. The hub and the coordinator must always be accessible, available and utterly 
dependable.  
 
By this means such a cross-sector collaboration is able to become something much 
greater and more effective than the aggregate of whatever could be created by the 
individual participants – which is entirely necessary. Once the shared objective has been 
validated and the principles have been formulated participating organisations and/or their 
representatives are likely to come and go for all sorts of reasons that may or may not have a 
direct connection to the collaboration, but the collaborative project must be pursued 
relentlessly. Participants in the iSLP demonstrated a propensity for intermittent and 
unexplained attendance and for constructing other alliances in opposition to the iSLP whilst 
simultaneously urging the iSLP process to continue. In a large and long-term collaborative 
project judgements frequently have to be made about the significance of participants’ 
attitudes and actions – for which the perspectives of the Enablers and the authoritative 
guidance provided by the mandates are of great value. 
 
There was a widespread sense of ‘calling’ amongst the Enablers in the iSLP, 
something that is often in evidence within trying, challenging, possibly dangerous but 
socially imperative projects. It adds a higher purpose to work, a greater tolerance of 
difficulty and failure, and requires a relatively un-material dimension of reward. 
 
 The only still unexplained symbols in Fig 16 are the mandates (indicated by 
squares). There are three of them, indicating that the mandates comprise instructions, 
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approvals and resources. It is the mandates which, when added to the personal commitment 
of the Enablers, empower them to propel a collaboration to success. They accompany the 
Enablers in filling the gap in the theory, and are discussed below. 
 
Empowering mandates: inaugurating, confirming and authorising 
 
Responsibility without authority is ineffective. Enablers require powerful mandates which 
prevent them from being pushed off course by the vicissitudes of the collaborative struggle, 
and which act as levers to further strengthen the collaboration. By assuming that leadership 
is only provided either by participants operating in terms of their organisational mandates 
or by facilitators commissioned to address a specified issue the literature fails to emphasise 
the mandates that are vital requirements of the cross-sector collaboration as a whole. It is 
very unlikely that a cross-sector collaboration will itself be endowed with any authority – 
because it is not an institution. Authority has to be provided externally, by one or more of 
the participating organisations or by an altogether separate institution. It is therefore 
necessary to anticipate the various authorisations that are likely to be required, from where 
they must be sought and at what point in the process – and to build these into the 
collaboration programme. 
 
The iSLP contained five major mandates which empowered and advanced the whole 
process by providing the means and authority for all the necessary steps – as well as 
powerful levers for the Enablers. These mandates comprised:  
• the initial commission from the political patron;  
• the formal approval of the iSLP Principles;  
• the termination by decree of a Policy Committee that had outlived its usefulness;  
• the approval of the iSLP Business Plan by the national cabinet; and  
• the securing of the entire budget, with half paid in advance into a dedicated account.  
 




The key instructions given in the iSLP were from the Sponsor to the Strategist and thereby 
to the Democrat to first of all canvass support from all stakeholders for a cross-sector 
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collaboration based on a specified proposed set of principles, which were radically different 
from anything that the government had applied previously. This mandate was more than an 
invitation – it was a firm expression of intent to operate inclusively and on equal terms to 
address a major social crisis. The credibility of the invitation rested upon the authority of 
the signatory (the head of government in the province) and the integrity of the messenger, 
the Democrat, who had offered himself to facilitate such an uncertain process. The next 
instruction was to inaugurate the process on the basis of those terms – to deliver carefully 
worded invitations to a meeting convened by the Sponsor, who knew that he would be an 
unacceptable chairperson for carrying the process forward. Once the Policy Committee had 
been convened they issued instructions to their Technical Committee, comprising a 
research agenda. 
 
 Another vital field of ‘instructions’ were the conditions that were contained in the 
national Housing Policy which was finalised in 1993 and implemented in 1994. This was 
the first non-racial housing policy in South Africa’s history, and its great significance was 
that it not only provided for the delivery of better housing products for the poor but it 
required the implementation of a participative process. No project could be approved 
without verifying the existence of a ‘social compact’ between the developer (usually a 
government department or agency) and the community from which the beneficiaries were 
to be drawn. These parameters, incorporating the subsidy limit for various income groups, 
became the framework within which members of the iSLP’s project committees could 
identify affordable housing options and make appropriate choices. The major reason why 
the policy phase of the iSLP had been so drawn out was that there was no money available 
for development until the promulgation of the Housing Policy which had to await the 
inauguration of the new political dispensation.  
 
 A ‘higher’ field of instructions was incorporated in the inclusion of the iSLP as a 
‘Special Integrated Presidential programme of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme’ in December 1994. This meant that the iSLP would not just be treated as a 
collection of housing projects, each of which could apply for housing subsidies, but that it 
would be regarded as a development of new suburbs and communities, with each suburb 
provided with a full range of community facilities, including schools, libraries and halls, 
and each newly settled community supported with a range of ‘capacity building’ 
programmes. 
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 The other instructions that had to be issued were briefs to consultants, which had to 
be worded very carefully to accurately represent the unconventional nature of the 
collaborative process. Misleading briefs could derail the process, and Enablers within and 
external to government facilitated the drafting of these. In a highly contested environment 
in which great flexibility would be constantly required it was essential that contracts were 
designed to fulfil their objectives and to be completely practicable by service providers and 
manageable by their clients.  
 
 There were three characteristics of the way consultants were selected and briefed 
that were unconventional. The first was that the town planning and engineering consultants 
for the major housing projects were selected by the particular project committee from a 
panel of three consultants from each discipline. Each panel been nominated by an inclusive 
list of consultants – not standard practice under the previous regime – and each consulting 
firm was required to make a presentation to a project committee. The community 
representatives within the project committees were then given freedom to interrogate the 
consultants and to recommend the appointment of one – which was then fulfilled by the 
relevant government agency. 
 
 The second unconventional feature was that those consultants were required to 
embark on a participatory planning process with the members of their project committee – 
and particularly with the community representatives. The terms of this process were set out 
in a substantial manual entitled, “Integrated Serviced Land Project Guidelines on The 
Participative Development Process”, and it was one of the functions of the iSLP Project 
Coordinator’s facilitators to ensure that the consultants followed the guidelines in every 
housing project. 
 
 The third unconventional aspect of consultants’ briefs was that when the housing 
departments within provincial and local government no longer had the human resources 
necessary to manage projects they appointed four civil engineering companies to each 
manage a group of projects and required them, in addition to conducting the process with 
the involvement of the community in a project committee, to ensure that beneficiaries were 
fairly identified, properly informed about their rights and obligations as new homeowners, 
and given legal title to their home when they took occupation. This was revolutionary 
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within the local engineering profession, and some firms established new departments that 
specialised in these aspects of holistic housing delivery.  
 
Approvals 
An unconventional approach like a cross-sector collaboration is like a journey up an 
untested rock face – every time a further position is achieved it must be hammered into 
place, to prevent the process from slipping back and to provide a firm platform for moving 
ahead. To fulfil that it was necessary that approvals be in writing, accurate and 
unambiguous and confirmed by the necessary authority. The basic steps of approval in the 
iSLP were resolutions of committees as recorded in minutes which were circulated well in 
advance of the next meeting and confirmed or corrected there. To optimise the accuracy 
and effectiveness of minutes in the iSLP every effort was made to draft and distribute them 
within 24 hours of each meeting. 
 
In order to achieve approvals that would specify precisely what the Enablers 
believed was necessary for the success of the collaboration it was necessary for Enablers to 
draft the proposals for consideration by the appropriate committee or authority. This would 
comprise a draft resolution and a detailed motivation – which would be for the benefit of 
all committee members but for the proposer and chairperson. With a great assortment of 
stakeholders it would have been very easy for inappropriate or unhelpful decisions to be 
taken, and this had to be obviated by all means. The ultimate action in this regard was the 
compilation of the very substantial and comprehensive iSLP Business Plan which was 
approved ultimately by the national Cabinet. It documented every objective, principle, 
programme and budget that would apply to and authorise what eventually became 250 
projects or programmes. Accuracy was essential, because mistakes were irredeemable. 
 
Resources 
The iSLP needed access to land, the commitment of many government departments and 
agencies and a great deal of money. To obtain public land agreement was needed for the 
transfer of land from one ministry to another and funds were required to purchase private 
land. Until the approval of the project in 1994 the process within government had been 
driven exclusively by Housing functionaries. The national government then called for the 
iSLP Business Plan to be drafted in conjunction with the departments of education, health, 
social services, police and the local authorities, incorporating their existing plans wherever 
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possible, with the inducement that half of the capital costs would be provided from a 
special iSLP budget. The huge project budget was approved with half funded by the 
national treasury, matched by commitments from the provincial government and local 
authorities. The leverage was immensely effective, and overnight the iSLP became the 
biggest multi-department, multi-stakeholder project in the land – and awarded the cachet of 
President Nelson Mandela. 
 
Effective, comprehensive mandates are fundamental; the need for them must be 
anticipated, specified and programmed in advance; and then they must be protected, 
affirmed, defended whenever necessary and applied to the greatest advantage for the 
collaboration. It was these mandates that were reported against at the completion of the 





Whereas Chapter 11 argued that there is a gap in the collaboration theory that is framed by 
inadequate appreciation of ongoing environmental turbulence and stakeholder incapacity, 
Chapter 12 has argued that the gap cab be filled by Enablers – people of diverse 
backgrounds, positions and motivations who share a common personal commitment to 
achieving the objectives of the collaboration - and the mandates which empower them. By 
this means the prospects for success, so negatively portrayed in the literature, can be 
improved significantly. Chapter 13 first summarises the argument of this thesis and then 
demonstrates how it can be applied by the construction of an Enablement Plan and by 









The Argument and its application: Raising confidence 
in the last resort 
 
 
This final chapter presents the argument of this thesis: that there is a gap in the literature 
which is framed and filled by a combination of four factors. The frame is constructed from 
both an inadequate appreciation of how incessantly turbulent is the environment in which 
such collaborations are pursued and by the extent to which participating stakeholders are 
unable to apply the requisite human resources to drive such a collaboration themselves. The 
gap is filled by an appreciation of the involvement of Enablers and of the mandates 
required by them to achieve the collaboration’s objective. It is therefore argued that 
Enablers, adequately mandated can make the difference between failure and success in a 
cross-sector collaboration. 
 
 After formally stating the argument of this thesis three ways will be offered 
whereby it can be applied: through the use of an Enablement Plan; by the modification of 
Bryson et al’s cross-sector collaboration framework; and by the modification of Ansell and 




This thesis was fashioned to take up Gaventa’s call for new relationships to be constructed 
between ordinary people and the institutions which affect their lives, and I then used four 
of his six Challenges to frame the literature review. This requires new relationships; a focus 
on the intersection of civil society and state-based approaches; analyses of spaces, how 
they function and whom they benefit; and to undertake power analyses that will reveal the 
true purpose and effect of such spaces. (Gaventa, 2004. p 25-38). The project that I 
examined was certainly an experiment in constructing new relationships between different 
and opposing parties, and the narrative tracked the ebb and flow of influences wrestling for 
control of the project. However, it is not practicable to undertake power analysis, such as 
grounded theory, long after the event. So whilst I have ‘unpacked’ a large, complex project 
and demonstrated who took sides from time to time I was unable to respond adequately to 
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the detail that Gaventa requires. This needs to be researched intensely from conception in a 
contemporary project. 
 
The literature then moved into the debate as to whether developments such as 
housing project should be community-based or government-driven, with Ward (1976), 
Turner (1988), Gibson (1994), and Hamdi (2004) all promoting community ownership of 
development processes. Invariably, however, it is government who takes the initiative, 
provides land and money and then demands that it be managed by institutions that will be 
accountable. I quoted UN-HABITAT (2003) as defending that position, and the reality – 
certainly as illustrated by the iSLP – is that a pragmatic response to the debate is to 
compromise by allowing the state to control but insisting that it manage the process as a 
collaboration, and at as many levels as possible. 
 
It may often be easy to play lip service to such an objective, but not in an 
environment such as South Africa’s four-year transition in which government was not all-
powerful and had frozen funds for development whereas the influence of opposition groups 
had never been greater. Therefore from the start of the iSLP it was clear that a mode 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between community control and state control (see 
Table 1) would have to be found. As a result communities could not just be regarded as 
‘beneficiaries’ a concern expressed by Cornwall (2004), but had to be involved in 
everything from policy-making, town planning, employment in construction, the 
identification of beneficiaries and personally choosing housing options. 
 
The comments by Cleaver (2004) about the importance of recognizing the limits of 
the makeability of social life resonated strongly as a pragmatic approach to collaborative 
development. Bénit-Gbaffou (2008), Bebbington (2004) and Robbins (2008) all described 
how messy community involvement in development actually is because no development 
processes is completely satisfactory and actors have multiple allegiances to fulfil. 
Development is messy, and muddling on in the right direction is for everyone an art. 
Within the iSLP the application of community participation principles was a requirement of 
town planning, engineering and project management professionals, and described for them 
in a manual. As they implemented the prescribed participation processes they learned to 
listen to and respect their counterparts, to the extent that they were able to share 
responsibility for the process and discuss and resolve challenges together.  
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Moving on in the literature search it was then interesting to study models in the 
collaborative governance literature and to see how they evolved from the rigidly-structured 
Agenda 21 type (ICLEI, 1996) to something far more flexible and responsive as proposed 
by Ansell and Gash (2008). They recognised that collaborations of different parties, even if 
led and controlled by institutions, are fraught with challenges and complications and that 
instead of being designed like an institutionalised organisation chart it is a churning process 
that is required - that is complex, cyclical and iterative.  
 
The body of theory on the participatory sphere is particularly helpful in this regard, 
because this locates the focus of the interactive space neither in the state nor in, for 
example, communities, but in a distinct arena of interface, in with occur both contestation 
and collaboration. (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Whilst such spaces may be located in 
intermediate institutions, perhaps tailor-made, they need not be – as was the case with the 
iSLP. Here the space was a project and process, defined by objectives, principles, 
temporary structures and a succession of meetings, to which all parties with a direct interest 
were invited. And without becoming an institution it survived and delivered on its goals – 
in fact over time its locus of power moved away from government and was distributed to 
over two hundred subsidiary projects and a coordinating hub. The sensitivity and flexibility 
that was then required and practised is reflected by Cornwall (2004) and Flyvbjerg (2004), 
who paint a picture of this sphere of different kinds of engagement for different purposes at 
different times. A representation of the participation options as a spectrum has been 
gathered from various sources into Table 1, which is a useful gauge because of its 
simplicity, but the modes that are available mid-way between the poles of state and 
community control are more spherical and plastic than modular and prescriptive. And of 
the options and combinations that can be created in this participative sphere cross-sector 
collaboration is the last resort. (Bryson et al. 2006). This was the location of the iSLP, 
whose diverse and opposing stakeholders had reached the point of realising that no party, 
or sector of parties, had any chance of being able to successfully address the challenge 
alone. 
 
This thesis has therefore explored the field of cross-sector collaboration, and in particular 
the reasons why the chances of success are reported by the literature to be so remote. The 
research for this thesis was motivated by my having participated in a successful cross-
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sector collaboration that was undertaken in very challenging circumstances. My 
investigation took me into an extensive library of project records, then deep into an analysis 
of actual participation in a very inclusive process. It was there that I found the key to 
success: a few very diverse people who made a great deal of difference. I documented the 
project narrative, taking note of their individual involvements, and then, curious to discover 
what had motivated each of them to operate so unconventionally, I interviewed them. 
 
 It was the interviews that brought this exercise to life and brought the term 
‘Enablers’ to mind. They were very different people and they still are, but the arresting 
factor in each of their stories was that they had gone against the grain or changed direction 
as a deliberate and principled act of will. And these new trajectories intersected in the iSLP, 
for long enough in each case to make a profound difference – collectively the difference 
between failure and success. Significantly, they did not form a team. There were enough 
teams battling it out in the iSLP already, and teams have turf. They worked as individuals 
in an interrelated way. Their contribution received no recognition or acclaim, partly 
because that was a territory of its own and partly because not many people knew who was 
actually driving the iSLP – keeping it on the rails. 
 
 The mandates that were granted to the iSLP – unprecedented in scope and finance 
in that era and ever since in South Africa – were awarded in the terms of the Business Plan, 
but with the confidence that there was actually a viable, inclusive collaboration that was in 
sound hands. Names would have been mentioned, eyes would have connected and heads 
would have nodded. It was the Enablers who were being entrusted with the resources, 
because it was they whose commitment and trustworthiness in the tumultuous policy-
making phase was evident in the attendance records. 
  
 This spreads the domain of large-scale cross-sector collaborative housing 
development across many fields: politics, sociology, history, urban geography, project 
management, construction, town planning, civil engineering, collaboration management, 
development anthropology, law and perhaps into applied psychology and religion. The 
point is that the essence of success lies not in professions, functions or fields of study but in 
individual people. You have to dig to find them because they are not waving a flag. 
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The Argument 
 
The argument of this thesis is that a cross-sector collaboration should expect to 
suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, and that the 
stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration 
themselves. Success therefore depends on the existence and activities of Enablers – people 
who are not only the designated patrons or champions or just ad hoc facilitators, conflict-
resolvers or blockade-breakers.  They are likely to have a wide assortment of backgrounds, 
positions and motivations but they share a dedication to the achievement of the 
collaboration’s goals and ensure that the mandates and to make that possible are specified, 
acquired and applied. Such mandates comprise instructions, approvals and resources.  
 
The task of an Enabler transcends that of a ‘job’ or even a role to fulfil – they are 
unselfishly providing support to a critical social cause, knowing that if the collaboration 
fails there will not be another chance. Furthermore, they do this during a period of social 
and political upheaval when most people are either opportunity hunting or staying out of 
harm’s way. Their contribution is also without any public recognition. My argument is that 
they are the special ingredient without whom a large-scale cross-sector collaboration is 
doomed to failure.  
 
Ways of applying the argument 
 
The analysis developed through this thesis suggests three ways in which theory of 
collaborative development, particularly that which must be exercised across sectors, can be 
enhanced. The first applies ‘Enabler thinking’ to the planning , facilitation and coordination 
of cross-sector collaborations by means of what I have termed an Enablement Plan. The 
second is a modification of the Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaborations 
that was developed by Bryson and his colleagues. And the third moves a step back in 
complexity to provide some feedback to the Participative Sphere into which flow both 
community participation and collaborative governance theory and to the Model of 
Collaborative Governance formulated by Ansell and Gash. Thereafter some suggestions for 
further research have been offered. 
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An Enablement Plan 
 
In the narrative of the iSLP Relational Maps were used to illustrate the nature of 
relationships between the different parties that were engaged in or with the collaboration. A 
Relational Map can include whatever information is relevant, represented in whatever way 
is meaningful for the users. The establishment of a cross-sector collaboration can also be 
formulated and planned by building up a whole map piece by piece. As the responsibility 
for this will always fall to Enablers, a useful term for this product is an Enablement Plan. 
Its components may also be viewed as a box of tools that can be used along the way by 
Enablers to fine tune, detect weaknesses and effect repairs. 
 
An Enablement Plan can be constructed using the six building blocks which are 
numbered in the Key of the Relational Map shown in Fig. 16 in Chapter 12. These 
comprise the following fundamental tasks: 
 
1. Define the hub. What does it contain? Values, principles, objectives, resolutions, 
commitments to contribute, mandates, resources, personnel etc. These must all be 
embedded in the hub through confirmed written minutes, correspondence and 
contracts.. 
2. Define the participating parties and sectors. Some sectors may be more clearly defined 
than others. Are some sectors excluded? Identify key persons and their strengths and 
weaknesses. It may be unclear as to which sectors some parties belong. Identify the 
persons most committed to the hub as potential Enablers. 
3. Identify the cross-sector boundary-spanning relationships – and not just at senior level 
because all relationships can be levers. 
4. Identify what processes will drive the project and who are or should become the key 
drivers. 
5. Identify the vital decisions that will be required to mandate and empower the process. 
6. Appoint a coordinator and/or facilitator for the whole enterprise. 
Out of the experience of the iSLP the contents of these six elements can be revealed, and in 
so doing they demonstrate the extent and texture of the Enabling functions that are required 
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to assemble the cross-sector collaboration and maintain it successfully. They amount to a 
great many functions, and perhaps only a few will be achievable right at the start of the 
process. What is important is that the Enablers, and particularly those in the ‘coordinator’ 
or ‘facilitator’ role, have a real plan which they are assembling all the time – and the earlier 
that they can think and act about these issues the better. The detailed elements of an 
Enablement Plan are listed below. 
 
1. Define the hub   
The hub is the heart of the cross-sector collaboration in which the following are gradually 
accumulated, documented, lodged, safeguarded and managed by dedicated Enablers: 
The problem statement 
The mandate to investigate the possibility of a collaboration 
The shared objective 
The mandate to establish a collaboration 
The list of parties to the collaboration and their sectors 
Evidence of the commitment of each party to the collaboration and the appointment of its 
  representatives 
The agreed programme 
Resources acquired for the work of the collaboration – e.g. land, finance, dedicated 
  personnel 
The authorised budget 
Agreed principles (addressed in the next section of this chapter) 
Briefs for work required by the collaboration 
Information gathered and shared 
Resolutions adopted by the collaboration 
The approved Business Plan 
Mandates / approvals acquired by the collaboration 
Mandates given by the collaboration for the creation of committees, task groups, etc. 
Mandates given by the collaboration to participating parties to act on the collaboration’s 
  behalf 
Mandates given by the collaboration to individuals to serve the collaboration 
Minutes of meetings 
Reports, including progress reports 
Communications on behalf of the collaboration to specific or general audiences 
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Matters under discussion within the collaboration but not yet resolved 
 
2. Define the participating parties and sectors 
This is a process which warrants the application of a great deal of consideration, discussion 
and research, to carefully build up the following: 
List of parties which have a direct responsibility for or interest in addressing the problem 
  statement, with details of such responsibility of interest 
A profile of each party, identifying its constituency, function, history, influence and 
  vulnerability 
Knowledge of factions or fragmentation within each party, particularly those which might 
  threaten its commitment to the collaboration 
Information on the contribution that each party can make to the work of the collaboration 
Categorisation of such parties into sectors 
Identification of the leading party in each sector 
List of parties invited to join the collaboration 
List of parties that have agreed to join the collaboration 
Key persons in each party, their strengths, weaknesses and commitment to the 
  collaboration 
Key persons in each sector, their strengths, weaknesses and commitment to the 
  collaboration 
Enthusiastic collaborators within each party 
Enablers within each sector 
 
3. Identify the cross-sector boundary-spanning relationships 
A successful cross-sector collaboration requires that every participating sector, organisation 
and person is not only connected to the hub in some real way, but is tied in some formal or 
informal way to one or more people within other sectors. These are ‘boundary-spanning’ 
relationships and they create some cross-accountability which can provide vital stability to 
the process over its bumpy journey. The process calls for the following steps: 
Identify participants in the collaboration who have a good relationship with others in the 
  collaboration who are located in a different sector. 
Encourage such relationships to work in support of the collaboration as Enablers, at least to 
  build the cross-sector integrity of the collaboration but also to leverage, strengthen and 
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  promote specific initiatives. 
Identify participants in the collaboration who have a particularly strong relationship with 
  others in the collaboration who are located in a different party within their own sector, and 
  encourage such relationships to work in support of the collaboration as Enablers, at least 
  to build the intra-sector integrity of the collaboration but also to leverage, strengthen and 
  promote specific initiatives. 
Identify participants in the collaboration who do not get on well with each other, and take 
  steps to prevent their personal animosity from derailing the collaboration process in any 
  way - as well as steps to find ways of getting them to work together for the sake of the 
  collaboration. 
Identify parties outside of the collaboration who have good relationships with opposing 
  parties or participants within the collaboration, who could be persuaded to exert influence 
  on them for the benefit of the collaboration. 
 
4. Identify the driving processes and key drivers 
The purpose of a collaborative development is to move the participants together towards an 
objective and to deliver things along the way. It is a vehicle that must be driven. It is 
therefore necessary to: 
Identify what unconventional, abnormal or innovative processes will be required to drive 
  the initiatives within the collaboration - recognising that a cross-sector collaboration is not 
  an expression of ‘business as usual’. 
Identify what decisions will be required to enable those processes and where such decisions 
  will have to be formulated and authorised. 
Identify the key persons who will have to drive such processes and any support that they 
  will require for that purpose. 
 
5. Identify the required mandates  
Collaboration vehicles and their drivers must be mandated and empowered, so identify 
what radical decisions, taken by whom, will be required to authorise and resource the 
process, such as: 
An instruction to investigate the need and feasibility of a cross-sector collaboration 
An invitation to parties to collaborate 
Terms of reference of all the structures (e.g. committees) within a collaboration 
Approval of the collaboration’s principles 
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Initiation and termination of processes 
Censure of an inappropriate action 
Approval of collaboration or project business plans 
Allocation and dedication of resources to the collaboration e.g. land, finance, personnel 
Certification that a mandate has been fulfilled 
 
Care must also be taken to arrange for knowledgeable people to draft the documents that 
must be approved – they must be comprehensive, unambiguous and precisely serve the 
purpose for which they are required. 
 
6. Appoint a Coordinator of the collaboration 
However collaborative every element of the process may be there must be ‘single point 
responsibility’ for coordinating and/or facilitating the whole enterprise. Furthermore the 
coordinator must be appointed for the entire duration of the project to ensure that at least 
one person has the comprehensive knowledge and institutional memory necessary to keep 
the process intact, to develop integrity and respect within and for the process, and to be 
able to discern fact from fiction and truth from lies. These duties, very simply stated, are to: 
Keep the collaboration together 
Keep the collaboration moving towards its objective 
Anticipate and avoid hazards, or at least ameliorate their effect 
Strengthen weaknesses and gaps 
Consolidate strengths 
Defend the collaboration against attack 
 
Evidently no cross-sector collaboration is identical to another, so the Enablement Plan 
described above should, as mentioned earlier, be regarded as a box of tools (or even a 
check list) more than a blueprint. Any of the many elements within each of the six 
‘building blocks’ can be contemplated, investigated, applied to a set of circumstances and 
evaluated. As part of an Enabler’s function is to train one’s mind to think creatively and 
constructively about how to deal with complexity, simply interrogating each of these items 
is likely to be a good investment. To this end I have used the material gathered in this thesis 
to create two resources for reference by practitioners who may be confronted by 
circumstances for which a cross-sector collaboration is indeed the last resort. The first is a 
brief catalogue of lessons learned by Enablers in the iSLP, annotated to indicate whether 
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they are of broad or restricted application, and it constitutes Annexure C to this thesis. The 
second is a very practical Enabler’s Manual, which includes guidelines and templates for 
practitioners, and is presented as Annexure D.   
 
Feeding back into Cross-Sector Collaboration theory 
 
The insights drawn from Chapters 5 - 10 can be used to supplement the Framework for 
Understanding Cross-Sector Collaboration postulated by Bryson and his colleagues and 
referred to in Chapter 2. Their extensive analysis can be enhanced by overlaying each of 
the four factors that were described in Chapters 11 and 12 to demonstrate that throughout 
the process each of them is likely to be relevant. Firstly, turbulence and change should be 
expected within the general environment and be reflected in multiple agendas, instability 
and manoeuvring within the project throughout its lifespan. Secondly, there should be an 
explicit recognition that the collaborating parties are very unlikely to be able to hold it 
together, equip it and drive it on their own without putting their own organisations and the 
careers of their most capable personnel at risk. Thirdly, and in consequence of the first two 
factors, the indispensability of Enablers must be recognised, the first component of which 
are strategically located activists who are dedicated to the cause, some of whom are located 
within the participating organisations and some in and around the hub of the collaboration. 
They must understand the environment and the times and be very capable, influential and 
able to sustain their influence. Finally, the process must be authorised and empowered by a 
carefully planned and articulated progression of mandates, comprising significant 
authorisations and the dedication of the required resources. 
 
On this basis Bryson et al’s ‘Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector 
Collaboration’ could be modified as shown in Fig 17 overleaf. 
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Fig 17. A Modified Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaborations 
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Conditions’ section would provide warnings of the possibility that some of what already 
appear as ‘Initial Conditions’ may persist and even deteriorate, particularly if these 
conditions are environmental and not under control of the collaboration. Any notion that a 
chronically turbulent environment will be changed by the initiation of a cross-sector 
collaboration may be very optimistic, so a realistic assessment and forecast of prevailing 
conditions (at least a ‘SWOT analysis’) within and around the collaboration and the also 
within each sector and participating organisation is well advised. Its purpose would be to 
soberly appraise the difficulties that may be encountered and gauge the ability of the 
participating organisations to run the collaboration. 
 
Feeding back into the participative sphere 
 
The second contribution that can be made to the literature is in relation to the ‘participative 
sphere’, to which both community participation and collaborative governance discourses 
are connected, as I explained in Chapter 2. In the light of the iSLP both of the latter two 
bodies of theory appear rather simplistic because of the apparently small scale and binary 
nature of the circumstances that they address. One of the consequences of such paradigms 
is a tendency to be so wary of the motives and actions of a single opposing party that one 
fails to detect the enemy within, and to be so defensive of one’s rights that one’s wrongs 
and weaknesses go ignored. The iSLP provides examples of duplicity within both 
community organisations and government. It encourages a careful analysis of the possible 
agendas of each sector, participating organisation and participant – not in order to police 
them, for that would be impossible, or even to censure them, for that might embarrass or 
anger them into leaving – but to be able to anticipate and compensate for their actions.  
 
Elucidation of the complexity within the iSLP may encourage theorists in the 
participative sphere to take their skills into cross-sector collaboration territory, or simply to 
examine their existing paradigms for signs of multiple agendas, internal fractures and 
unexpected alliances that might challenge their binary constructs. Therefore it would be 
helpful if Gaventa’s 6th challenge - to undertake a power analysis of spaces, places, 
visibility and intersections - were extended to cover the abuse by any party or person of the 
privilege of accessing the participatory space for their own ends. Perhaps a 7th challenge 
would be appropriate: to thoroughly interrogate the possible hazards and demands of a 
collaborative process and therefore identify precise requirements for its enablement by 
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individuals and mandates.  
 
Such a contribution to the participative sphere discourse could feed back to its 
community participation and collaborative governance tributaries. The need for Enablers is 
often treated with disdain in the community participation school and given a part-time role 
in collaborative governance. One constructive contribution would be a general cautionary 
note on how easily opportunities for ‘community participation’ can be misappropriated, 
abused, distorted and neglected by those who are ostensibly or purportedly community 
leaders – especially during times of change and disorganisation. Another would be to 
modify Ansell and Gash’s Model of Collaborative Governance which was discussed in 
Chapter 2 to call attention to the relevance of the four factors (turbulence, incapacity, 
Enablers and their mandates), again within dashed lines, as shown in Fig. 18 overleaf. 
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Fig 18. A Modified Model of Collaborative Governance 
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located both at the hub and in the participating organisations. Furthermore a box has been 
added that indicates ‘Enabling Mandates’ as an external resource. This requires the 
proponents of the collaboration to consider what are the most critical authorisations and 
resource allocations required for the collaboration and to describe, schedule and prepare to 
negotiate for them. 
Suggestions for further research  
The subject matter of this thesis can provoke many questions about a great variety of topics 
– within the literature, within the project that I have researched and within the environment 
in which project was pursued. I would not be surprised if the reader has already compiled a 
list of questions to consider researching. Furthermore, I am well aware that I have 
undertaken this research from an internal and quite narrow position which for those reasons 
would be regarded as subjective and biased. Yet I found myself in a unique position to tell 
the story, and as a development practitioner I regarded that as worth doing. I did not expect 
to find that there was not a body of theory to explain its success – and that revelation led to 
the thesis. I am confident that there are many other related research topics that will yield as 
much surprise and satisfaction and so I offer below some suggestions for further research. I 
also hope that this thesis will generate some diversity of interest, because the more diverse 
perspectives that are expressed on the many processes involved in a cross-sector 
collaboration the better. I also hope that my work will prompt theoreticians to engage more 
with development practitioners, not only to share the fruits of their scholarship but to listen 
to and learn from practitioners so that they may collaboratively create more effective 
approaches to challenges. 
 
Some topics for exploration in and around the iSLP: 
The ways in which a  particular community was involved in the project. 
The inside story of the groups who wanted to gain control of the iSLP. 
The influences within and by the Urban Foundation. 
Changes in the ability of government to manage and coordinate development. 
The impact of the ‘transitional period’ in South Africa on development. 
The impact of the ‘transitional period’ in South Africa on local community representation. 
The nature and dynamics of community representation in development projects. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
The strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in managing and coordinating development. 
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Ways and means of measuring success in multi-facetted development projects. 
The effects of development projects on ‘beneficiary communities’. 
The basis upon which new housing is made available in housing projects. 
The most important features of effective community involvement in development projects. 
What has happened to the houses and their occupants within a section of the iSLP over 20 
years? 
What has been the extent and effect of property ownership provided under the iSLP? 
How have the buildings constructed by the iSLP performed? 
What is the extent of local entrepreneurship in iSLP areas? 
 
Some wider and more general questions 
Why was the funding and institutional arrangement for large-scale integrated development 
only available in this country under the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(1994-96) – and what has been the effect on urban development since? 
 
How can cross-sector collaboration become less of a last resort or a mode that parties ‘fail 
into’ – and instead become a mode to promote and aspire to? 
 
What trade-offs should parties engaged in a collaboration anticipate having to make? 
 
The primacy of ‘product’ or ‘process’ is a long-standing debate in development – but does 
the concept and implication of a ‘project’, with accompanying principles, values and 
deliverables, occupy higher ground? 
 
It was impossible to undertake an effective power analysis of the iSLP retrospectively. Find 
a project that is in the process of conception, offer a neutral service like facilitation, 
translation or minute taking which will permit presence at all meetings, and rigorously plot 
what happens. The process may take longer than expected. 
 
Take a multi-participant project and research the different attitudes and values that are 
manifested within the various individuals or groups. 
 
I have suggested that development under complex conditions is an art. Track and analyse 
the flexibility that is exercised and the compromises that are made in a development 
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project, the reasons for them and the affect on both the parties and the product. 
 
In conclusion ... 
 
Where society is in crisis and transformation has become irresistible but conventional 
institutionally-driven development practices are no longer possible the need for large-scale 
cross-sector collaborative development is likely to arise. There is little within the literature 
on participation and collaborative governance to alert or prepare the policy-maker or 
practitioner to the acute challenges that may lie ahead and to the remedies that can be 
applied. The literature on cross-sector collaboration is much more cautionary, but on the 
other hand it provides insufficient guidelines for how success might be achieved. This 
thesis addresses the needs of practitioners, policy-makers and academics to understand how 
the prospects for such an essential instrument can be improved. My argument is that there 
are four factors that are underplayed or ignored in the literature, two of which frame a gap - 
which is filled by the two others. 
 
In the first place this thesis has warned that the turbulence and even violence that 
drive the stakeholders to collaborate as a last resort are unlikely to abate. There is an 
assumption in the literature that the establishment and implementation of a collaboration 
will address the turbulence. However, those involved in creating synergy and development 
within a fraught and transitioning society have to cope not only with the crisis that is the 
focus of their endeavours, which may take an age to subdue, but with ongoing exogenous 
and turbulence which is completely beyond their control. They are also likely to face, as the 
iSLP case has demonstrated, fierce contestation between the stakeholders and the making 
and breaking of alliances that are designed to capture control of the initiative for spurious 
ends. In this respect, engaging in such activity may be likened to fighting a battle within a 
war. The importance of this point is that participants, and Enablers in particular, must go 
into a cross-sector collaboration ready and equipped for a drawn out, messy, complicated, 
convoluted struggle – on a platform that is likely to be rocked in different ways at different 
times by different people, interminably. To underestimate this factor is to be seriously 
under-prepared. 
 
In the second place this thesis asserts that under the sort of conditions that 
necessitate the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration, particularly at a large scale for 
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development purposes, it should not be assumed that the stakeholders themselves will be 
able to adequately dedicate to the task personnel with the necessary skills. In such 
circumstances organisations are likely to have difficulty pursuing their own agendas, let 
alone being able to release talented staff to engage in a completely hybrid and experimental 
venture – however important it may be. Furthermore, in times of considerable change 
everyone becomes super-alert to fluctuations, opportunities, vulnerabilities and dangers – 
and the most unlikely choice by an ambitious, able employee would be to accept 
deployment out on a limb in some experimental expedition with a bunch of strangers, 
including opponents. The literature is silent on this issue, except to mention that an 
independent facilitator may be required from time to time – thereby assuming that most, if 
not all of the time, the collaboration is managed by stakeholders. That is a manifestly 
unrealistic proposition. What will be required is a very unusual but quite intentional mix of 
human resources, characterised by some vital similarities as well as some very strong 
differences – which leads to the third factor. 
 
Thirdly, to have any chance of success a cross-sector collaboration requires an 
assortment of Enablers, fulfilling a variety of roles in different ways and for different 
periods, but sharing a commitment to a common goal and a determination to see it 
achieved. On the one hand there must be people within the collaborating organisations who 
passionately believe in the cause and in the process to be adopted. They are unable or 
unwilling to sacrifice their careers to work in the collaboration full-time, but they recognise 
that within their positions they can help the collaboration – and their values are such that 
they will do that even if they get transferred out of direct engagement with the process. 
Amongst these people will be some whose values and consequent actions have endeared 
them somewhat to one or more individuals within other stakeholder organisations, enabling 
them to be bridge-builders to some extent – even if it is just the facility to reach out, make a 
contact, and know that it will be reciprocated. Then, because the stakeholder institutions 
themselves have been part of the problem, there will be concerned, committed, external 
parties or people who see the germ of a cross-sector collaboration as a seed that is 
eminently worth watering – and they contribute resources, probably pro bono. In addition, 
particularly if the task is a large-scale one, full-time expert personnel will be required to 
fulfil particular functions – perhaps facilitation or coordination – on a contracted, sustained 
basis. They would have to appointed by one party for practical reasons, but it would have 
to be on the recommendation of all stakeholders and with accountability to them all as well. 
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These functions are unconventional from an institutional perspective, but illustrate the 
kinds of applications that are necessary to achieve organic adaptations in a society under 
stress. 
 
In the fourth place this thesis has demonstrated that at some strategic stages in the 
process Enablers will require more than their passion, goodwill, talents and relationships. 
They will require powerful interventions, mandates, vested authority and effective 
leverage. Persons of undisputed authority must inaugurate, terminate, approve and 
empower at a few very significant moments in a collaboration’s life. These are not routine 
actions, which should be regarded as management or committee functions, but rare very 
high-level decisions that are virtually irreversible because of their stature. Through such 
mandates the Enablers, on account of their commitment and integrity, are entrusted with 
the instruments necessary to drive the process unceasingly until all the objectives have been 
achieved. Because of the complexity of the exercise small compromises on standards, 
programmes, process and budget will inevitably have to be made occasionally – but the 
mandates, and the way that they are implemented by those who grant them, also provide 
the delegated authority for making such approvals along the way. 
 
To sum up, the evidence within literature is that cross-sector collaboration is only 
chosen to address social crises as a last resort, by which time the environment is likely to 
be turbulent, requiring a process which is so complex that it offers very little chance of 
success. This thesis demonstrates that the possibility of achieving success can be improved 
by recognising that the turbulence is likely to be long lasting and must be continuously 
managed and counterbalanced; that the stakeholders will be unable to organise and manage 
the collaborative process out of their own human resources; and that the actions and 
interactions of a few diversely positioned but dedicated Enablers will be crucial, in 
combination with the award of some powerful mandates. 
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Table 1  Degrees of participation and their characteristics. [Ref: Page 38] 
 
# Type Comment Participants 
1 Manipulation Any ‘participation’ is only used to indoctrinate. Government.  Client 
community. 
2 Information Stakeholders are informed about their options, rights and 
responsibilities – but it is one-way communication with no 
channels for feedback or negotiation. 
Government.. 
Client community. 
3 Consultation Two-way communication, with opportunity given to offer 
suggestions or express concerns, but with no assurance 








Stakeholders interact in order to understand each other 
and arrive at negotiated positions which the entire group 
can tolerate. However, vulnerable individuals or groups 
tend to remain silent or passively agree. 
Government. 
Partner community. 
5 Decision-making Consensus is acted upon through collective decisions, 




Maybe other  involved parties. 
6 Risk-sharing This requires mutual accountability, so the mix of 
beneficial, harmful and natural consequences are shared 
– and not typically borne by the community. 
Government. 
Partner community.  
Maybe other involved parties. 
7 Partnership This adds to Degrees 4-6 the element of mutual respect 
and a committed relationship. 
Government. 
Partner community. 
Maybe other  involved parties. 
8 Self-management This gives the community majority representation in 
decision-making processes and the community becomes 
the locus of power and responsibility. 
Community as principal 
partner. 
Government. 
Maybe other involved parties. 
9 Community 
control 
The community takes sole responsibility for planning, 
policy-making and managing a programme, with help 
from others when requested. 
Community as principal. 
Other parties 
on request of the community 
  
 
Table 2. Demand and supply of residential sites: estimate by CPA in May 1991 








Existing residential areas    
Informal settlements 23 655 10 453 13 202 
Hostels 16 509 923 15 586 
Township backyard 
dwellers 
15 861 0 15 861 
Unoccupied areas    
Surrounding townships 0 2 854 -2 854 
Browns Farm (Philippi 
West) 0 2 300 -2 300 
Philippi East 0 7 800 -7 800 
TOTAL 56 025 24 330 31 695 
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Table 3. Meetings of the Local Authority Grouping May 1991 – November 1992: 
Consistency of attendance at the 13 meetings by individuals within each group 
[Ref: p. 107] 
 
 Frequency of attendance by individuals Total Group >75% 51-75% 26-50% <26% 
Cape Provincial Admin. 2 4 0 5 11 
Regional Services Council 0 1 2 1 4 
City of Cape Town 0 0 1 3 4 
Crossroads Town Council 1 2 1 4 8 
Ikapa Town Council 0 1 2 1 4 
Khayelitsha Council 0 1 1 3 5 
Philippi Industrialists Ass.    2 2 
Consultants / Facilitators 2 2 0 4 8 
Number of attendees 5 11 7 23 46 
% of attendees 11% 24% 15% 50% 100% 
 
 
Table 4. Meetings of the Local Authority Grouping May 1991 – November 1992: 
Attendance at the 13 meetings by each group, and the number of their representatives 
[Ref: p.107] 
 

























































































































1 6 2  4 3   1 5 16 
2 4 1 1 5 2   1 6 14 
3 5 2  4 3 2  5 6 21 
4 6 1 1 5 1 2  3 7 19 
5 4 2 2 4 1   4 6 17 
6 5 2 1 4 2 2  4 7 20 
7 6  1 4 2 2  4 6 19 
8 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 4 8 19 
9 6    1 2  3 4 12 
10 3 1   1   4 4 9 
11 3  2 3 1 2  3 6 13 
12 5 2  4 2 2  3 6 20 
13 2   2  2  4 4 10 
Meetings 
missed 0 4 6 2 1 4 12 0  Av:16 
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Table 5. Actions and counter-actions around Crossroads and the SLP: 1974-94 
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ation by the Sponsor 
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exclusive rights 
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Private sector / 
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participate in 
collaboration 
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Administrator Ambivalent response  
WCUSA Pursuing opposing 
agenda 
1993 






Re-settlement area and 
programme not yet 
ready Chaos in Cross-roads 











obtain control of 
the SLP 
‘Community 
orgs and private 
sector 
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mandated ‘Community 
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End of Policy 
Committee and 
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Table 6. Meetings of the Policy Committee (Extra-parliamentary Grouping) May 1991 – 
July 1994: consistency of attendance at the 36 meetings by individuals within each 
group [Ref: p 144] 
 
 Frequency of attendance by individuals Total Group >75% 51-75% 26-50% <26% 
Chairperson 1    1 
Provincial Government 1 1 3 10 15 
Regional Svcs Council 1 2  1 4 
City of Cape Town   4 6 10 
ANC   1  1 
PAC    3 3 
WCUSA   2 7 9 
Civics etc. 2 2 2 14 20 
Black Local Authorities   1 4 5 
Philippi Industrialists    4 4 
Facilitator / Coordinator 1   3 4 
Consultants   2  5 7 
Number of attendees 6 7 13 57 83 
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Table 7. Meetings of the Policy Committee (Extra-parliamentary Grouping) May 1991 – 
July 1994: attendance at the 36 meetings by each group, and the number of their 
representatives [Ref: p 145] 
 
 Attendance at 36 
meetings Representatives present per mtg. 
Group (12) Present Absent Range Average 
Chairperson 32 4 0-1 0.9 
Provincial Government 36 0 2-6 3,7 
Regional Svcs Council 35 1 0-4 2.0 
City of Cape Town 30 6 0-6 1.7 
ANC 14 22 0-1 0.4 
PAC 6 30 0-2 0.2 
WCUSA 21 15 0-8 1.5 
Civics etc. 34 2 0-14 4.7 
Black Local Authorities 4 32 0-3 0.5 
Philippi Industrialists 10 26 0-2 0.4 
Facilitator / Coordinator 34 2 0-3 1.1 
Consultants  22 14 0-4 1.4 
Range 
Meetings / Group 6-36    
Average 
Meetings / Group 23    
Range 
Groups / meeting 6-11 
Reps/ 
Mtg: 12-41 19 
Average 
Groups / meeting 8    
 
Table 8. Institutional arrangements during the iSLP  [Ref: p. 154] 
 
PHASE POLICY - MAKING IMPLEMENTATION 
 May91–Aug93 Aug93–Mar05 
POLICY STRUCTURES   
Extra–Parliamentary 
 Policy Committee May 91 – Jul 94  
Local Authorities 
 Policy Group May 91 – Nov 92  
Steering Committee  Feb 96 - Nov 97 
City of Cape Town 
 Steering Committee  Sept 99 - Sept 00 
COMMUNITY STRUCTURES   




 Feb 94 - Jul 95 
RDP Forums  Aug 95 - Mar 05 
COORDINATION 
STRUCTURES   
Technical Committee May 91 - Nov 92  
Coordinating 
 Committee  Sept 94 -  N ov 04 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES   
CPA Project Mgmt Committee  Aug 93 - Sep 94 
Provincial Departmental 
Coordinating Committee  Sept 94 – Jul 96 
Housing Team Leaders Meeting  Feb 95 - Mar 05 
Project Committees  May 94 - Mar 05 
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Table 9. Numbers of residents of informal settlements and townships who were 




WV DS DL XR PE HP BF KTC MC TOT 
BARCELONA / EUROPE  500        500 
BLACK CITY 200 300 76       576 
BROWNS FARM 200    1048  3060   4308 
CROSSROADS    2109 454     2563 
GXA-GXA 100         100 
HEINZ PARK      634    634 
KANANA 200         200 
KTC 600 214 661  75   692  2242 
JOE SLOVO  200 1307  454     1961 
LOWER C’ROADS CAMP     809     809 
LOWER C’ROADS LODGERS     893     893 
MAHOBE DRIVE 200 10        210 
MARCUS GARVEY     100     100 
MILLERS CAMP 100 300 336      104 840 
MKHONTO SQUARE 100 160 210       470 
MPETHA SQUARE 100 400        500 
MPINGA SQUARE  280        280 
NEW REST 200         1350 
PHOLLA PARK 100 486 327       913 
SAMORA MACHEL 1847         1847 
TAMBO SQUARE   66       66 
KALANYONI  60        60 
VIETNAM     1283     1283 
Total 3947 2910 2983 2109 5116 634 3060 692 104 21555 
           
TOWNSHIPS           
GUBULETY BACKYARDS   218  150     368 
LANGA BACKYARDS 120  109       229 
NEW C’ROADS BACKYARDS 25    102     127 
NYANGA BACKYARDS 80  214  133     427 
Total 225  541  385     1151 
           
Municipal Waiting List - Delft  3277 3802       7079 
           
TOTAL 4172 6187 7326 2109 5501 634 3060 692 104 29785 
   
KEY TO PROJECTS 
WV Weltevreden Valley  DS Delft South 
DL Delft Leyden   XR Crossroads 
PE Philippi East   HP Heinz Park 
BF Browns Farm   MC Millers Camp 
KTC KTC     
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Table 10. Meetings of the Consultative Forum Feb 1996 – March 1998: attendance by 
individuals at 12 regular meetings. [Ref: p 159]. 
 
 Frequency of attendance by individuals Total Group >75% 51-75% 26-50% <26% 
Councillors   4 5 9 
Community      
Crossroads  2  6 8 
Samora Machel   2 5 7 
Nyanga  1 1 5 7 
KTC   2 2 4 
Lusaka   2 8 10 
Lower Crossroads 1 2 1 4 8 
Guguletu  3 1 4 8 
New Crossroads  3 1 2 6 
Langa  3 1 2 6 
Delft  1 1 5 7 
Philippi  2 2 3 7 
Marcus Garvey    2 2 
Sub-Total 1 17 18 53 89 
% of attend. 1% 19% 20% 60% 100% 
Nat. Officials    3 3 
Provincial officials   1 6 7 
Municipal officials   1 7 8 
iSLP Coordinator  2 3 5 10 
Sub-Total  2 5 21 28 
% of attend.  7% 18% 75% 100% 
Grand Total 1 19 23 74 117 
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Table 11. Meetings of the iSLP Consultative Forum Feb 1996 – March 1998: 
attendance at the 12 meetings by each group, and the number of their representatives  
[Ref: p 159] 
 Attendance at 12 
meetings 
Representatives present per 
meeting 
Group (17) Present Absent Range Average 
Councillors 7 5 0-6 2.2 
Crossroads 10 2 0-6 2.6 
Samora Machel 7 5 0-4 1.6 
Nyanga 8 4 0-4 1.5 
KTC 10 2 0-3 1.3 
Lusaka 9 3 0-4 1.7 
Lower Crossroads 11 1 0-6 3.3 
Guguletu 12 0 2-4 3.0 
New Crossroads 11 1 0-4 2.5 
Langa 9 3 0-4 1.9 
Delft 10 2 0-4 2.1 
Philippi 12 0 1-4 2.5 
Marcus Garvey 1 11 0-2 0.2 
Nat. officials 2 10 0-2 0.3 
Provincial officials 11 1 0-3 1.3 
Municipal officials 10 2 0-4 1.4 
iSLP Coordinator 10 2 0-5 2.9 
Range 
Meetings/Group 1-12    
Average 
Meetings/Group 8.8    




Meeting: 13-54 32 
Average 
Groups/meeting 12    
 
 
Table 12. Meetings of the iSLP Steering  Committee February 1996 – November 1997: 
attendance by individuals at the 8 meetings. [Ref: p 162] 
 
 Frequency of attendance by individuals Total Group >75% 51-75% 26-50% <26% 
Chair (CPA)  1  1 2 
Other Ministers     0 
Councillors representing:      
 Cape Metro   1 4 5 
 Ikapa Town     2 2 
 Crossroads     0 
 Melton Rose    1 1 
 Tygerberg   1 2 3 
 Central (Cape Town)   1 1 2 
Consultative Forum  1 3 3 7 
Officials 1   7 8 
iSLP Coordinator 1   1 2 
Total 2 2 6 22 32 
% of attendees 6% 6% 19% 69% 100% 
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Table 13. iSLP housing project activity timetable : periods in which negotiation, 
planning, provision of infrastructure and building of housing took place. [Ref: p 171] 
 
 Project Units Negotiate Plan Infrastructure Housing 
1 Weltevreden Valley 1 & 2 2205 1994 1994 1995 1996-98 
2 Weltevreden Valley 3 & 4 1347  1996-97 1998 1999-01 
3 Weltevreden Valley high dens. 620  1999 2000 2001-02 
4 Delft South 1 & 2 2000  1994 1995 1996-97 
5 Delft South 3-6 3747 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999-00 
6 Delft South high density 440  2000-01 2002 2003 
7 Delft Central ‘Leyden’ 6317 1999 2000 2001 2002-03 
8 Philippi East 2-4 3696 1994-95 1996 1997-98 1999-02 
9 Philippi East ‘K’ 850 1994-95 1996 1997-99 2000-02 
10 Philippi East high density 958  1998-99  2000 
11 Crossroads 4 604 1994 1995 1996-97 1998-99 
12 Crossroads 3 1505 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-02 
13 Crossroads 5 (Boystown) 0 1994-96 
1998-04 1997   
14 KTC 2b1 383 1994-95 1996 1997-98 2002-04 
15 KTC 2b2 304 1997-98 1999 2000 2002-04 
16 Heinz Park 2 & 3 634 1994-96 1997 1998-99 2000-02 
17 Browns Farm 3-5 3060 1994-95 1996-98 1999-00 2001-02 
18 Millers Camp (Lusaka) 104 1994 1995 1996-97  
19 New Rest 1150 1994-99 2000-01 2002-04  
20 Victoria Mxenge 148 1994 1994 1995-96 1997-02 
 Total 30072     
 
Notes to Table 13 
 Project Notes 
1 Weltevreden Valley 1 and 2 
Fast start, but rapid housing construction blocked by City 
2 Weltevreden Valley 3 and 4 





Creative design, progressed well 
4 Delft South 1 & 2 Community participation impractical; house choices reduced 
5 Delft South 3 – 6 Huge delays because of protests and house invasions 
6 Delft South high density 
Small precincts, progressed well 
7 Delft  “Leyden” Highly efficient turnkey contract with local subcontractors 
8 Philippi East 2 – 4 Delayed start because of local politics and gate-keeping by Lower Crossroads; and then frustrated by City’s housing policy 
9 Philippi East “K” Complicated by negotiations with Rastafarians and City housing policy 
10 Phil East high density 
Design was constricted by being confined to original transit camp site 
11 Crossroads 4 Process obstructed by conflict 
12 Crossroads 3 Process obstructed by conflict 
13 Crossroads 5: Boystown 
Conflict and changing demands resulted in project being aborted 
14 KTC 2b1 Delays in reforming local government and in renegotiating house funding 
15 KTC 2b2 Delays in reforming local government and in renegotiating house funding 
16 Heinz Park 2 & 3 Difficulties in establishing effective community participation  
17 Browns Farm 3 - 5 Very contested territory and land densely squatted upon 
18 Millers Camp / Lusaka 4 
Disagreements within community delayed a tiny project 
19 New Rest Political interference delayed this project so was not completed by iSLP 
20 Victoria Mxenge (CBO) 
This project was completely built by a community-based organisation, with 
access to the iSLP budget 
Tot 
30 072 was the target number of sites. It includes sites in New Rest that were not completed by 
the iSLP and excludes houses that were built by the iSLP on previously serviced sites. Actually 
built totals were 29 217 serviced sites and 32 484 houses. 
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Table 14. Cumulative number of Physical Resources provided in the iSLP  [As at March 
of each year.] [Ref: p 171] 
 
Completed by 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 
Serviced sites 9 200 16 300 20 457 29 200 29 217 
Houses 4 300 15 900 23 000 32 000 32 484 
Classrooms 443 506 630 725 788 
Clinics 2 9 13 16 16 
Halls 1 8 11 11 11 
Sports fields  4 5 6 8 
Swimming pool   1 1 1 
Libraries  3 3 4 4 
ECD centres    5 6 
Spent Rmillion R365 R658 R864 R1 105 R1 158 
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Table 15  iSLP time chart  [Ref: p 183] 
 
National and Local events YEAR Events in the iSLP 
Nelson Mandela released from 
prison. 
Political parties unbanned 
1990 
Provincial government explores whether 
there is broad interest in an inclusive 
approach to housing. 
Tricameral system of government. 
CODESA committed to parliamentary 
democracy in a unitary state. 
 
1991 
iSLP Policy Committee established of 
equal parties. 
Served by iSLP Technical Committee 
National negotiations collapse. Much 
violence. Administrators appointed to 
manage local authorities in black 
areas 
1992 
Demand and supply researched. Project 
objectives and parameters negotiated. 
National negotiations succeed. In 
informal settlements civic 
organisations challenge warlords. 
 
1993 
iSLP objectives, Principles and 
parameters defined. 
Implementation of housing process 
begins. 
First national election. Government of 
National Unity. Tricameral system 
disbanded. 
1994 
Attempted hijack of the project foiled. 
iSLP re-defined as an integrated project, 
selected as a Presidential RDP project. 
Transitional Local Councils 
established with appointed members. 1995 
RDP funding starts to flow to the iSLP. 
Planning for all projects and 
programmes underway. 
First local authority elections. Many 
long-standing civil servants take early 
retirement. 
1996 
First serviced sites are completed. 
House building begins. 
Responsibility for housing delivery 
devolved from provincial to local 
government, but disputed as an 
unfunded mandate. 
1997 
Delivery of school facilities begins. 
Housing delivery accelerates. 
Western Cape Provincial 
Government dismantles its dedicated 
iSLP directorate. City fails to take 
over iSLP. 
1998 
Capacity building programmes begin. 
Construction of other facilities begins. 
National election increases ANC 
majority but creates NP/DP coalition 
in the Western Cape. 
1999 
Accelerating delivery across a broad 
front. Research into early childhood 
needs begins. 
Unicity elections won by DA (NP/DP). 
Endless re-structuring of Cape Town 
organisation continues. 
2000 
First medium density double-storey 
housing delivered. Early childhood 
development strategy agreed upon. 
NP leaves DA to partner ANC in 
national and provincial government. 
Increase in hi-jacking and violence 
within iSLP project area. 
2001 
ECD consortium appointed. 
Intensive delivery, including 50 capacity 
building programmes. 
Major changes in national housing 
policy paralyse housing delivery. 
NP/ANC hold city. 
2002 
First “turnkey” housing project begins. 
First in-situ informal settlement upgrade 
begins. 
Cape Town has executive mayor. 
Decision-making centralised and 
slowed. 
2003 
Delft Leyden turnkey project 
successfully completed at high speed. 
Provincial election won by ANC. NP 
disbands. N2 Gateway project 
includes undeveloped portions of 
iSLP. 
2004 
Most projects and programmes 
completed. 
Outstanding housing projects 
transferred to “N2 Gateway” 
 2005 iSLP ends on 31 March. 
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Table 16. The circumstances within cross-sector collaborations and the work they 
require  [Ref: p 192]  Note: within the references (“REF”) column, ‘B...’ refers to one of 
Bryson et al’s numbered propositions and ‘A...’ refers to one of the ten Articles of Ansell and 
Gash’s Contingency Theory. 
# REF CIRCUMSTANCES WORK REQUIRED 
  PRESENTING PROBLEMS 
1 B1 Turbulence – crises, volatility, 
violence. 
Minimise violence and loss 
2 B2 Sector failure – incapacity, 
incompetence, communication failure, 
inadequate resources, lack of political 
will. 
Acknowledgement of failure and of inability 
by each stakeholder to correct it. 
  INITIATION STAGE 
3 B No common agreement on ‘the 
problem’ or a ‘solution’. 
Canvass stakeholders to establish a simple 
shared objective. 
4 A1 Power imbalances. Design and implement strategy to empower 
and ensure the representation of weaker or 
disadvantaged stakeholders 
5 A1 Resource imbalances. Identify ways to share control over resources 
to be used in the collaboration. 
6 A4 
A7 
Distrust. Positive steps are taken to increase levels of 
trust and social capital between stakeholders. 
7 B1 Anti-collaboration constraining forces. Identify and understand these contrary forces 
and their origins/motivation so that they can 
be addressed effectively. 
8 B1 Pro-collaboration driving forces. 
 
Identify these and how they can be 
augmented and improved. 
9 A4 Prehistory of conflict between parties 
and/or individuals. 
Promote a high degree of interdependence. 
 
10 B3 Prehistory of synergy or empathy 
between parties and/or individuals. 
Identify existing linkages, powerful potential 
sponsors, areas of agreement – and utilise 
them constructively, formally or informally, 
visibly or not. 
11 A2 Availability of alternatives to 
collaboration. 
Stakeholders must acknowledge their 
interdependence, making collaboration the 




There is need of a Convenor (at least 
initially) and a Leader and/or 
Facilitator (on a sustained basis). 
These indispensible roles require at least a 
sponsor/patron, a leader/chair who might be 
a leading participant or an honest broker, and 
possibly a facilitator. A large project will 
require tiers of leaders/chairs and facilitators. 
  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
13 A 
A8 
Membership : without inclusive 
participation the endeavour will be 
vulnerable to attack by those 
excluded. 
All stakeholders must be invited to join the 
collaboration, without exception – and 
encouraged to stay in to maximise 
ownership. 
14 A3 Unless an exclusive forum is created 
and protected disaffected parties will 
use alternatives. 
Attempts to create or join alternative 
initiatives must be discouraged and thwarted. 
Sponsors must persuade possible alternative 
forums to prefer and respect the 
collaboration. 
15 A The need for clear ground rules. Design and agree a simple, unambiguous, 
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# REF CIRCUMSTANCES WORK REQUIRED 
16 A A lack of transparency, candour or 
disclosure between parties. 
Ensure that everything about the 
collaboration is visible and well-documented; 
and actively promote transparency by the 
parties of their own agendas, structures, 
strengths and weaknesses. 
17 B14 Lack of formal or informal structures 
for engagement. 
Formal structures must follow an entire logic 
and cater for protocols; but there must be 
informal (possibly illegible) mechanisms that 
monitor, anticipate, protect and correct. 
18 B11 Confusion about how to configure a 
hybrid organisational structure. 
Structure must be tailor-made to suit 
participating and environmental systems and 
the strategic purpose. 
19 B Confusion about how such a structure 
should interface with or accommodate 
governance requirements. 
Systems to comply with governance 
requirements must be incorporated in the 
linkages and protocols between the 
collaboration and participating organisations. 
20 B12 Structural inflexibility restricts the 
accommodation of changes in 
membership and environment over 
time. 
There must be a facility to adapt the structure 
and process from time to time to 
accommodate changing circumstances 
without abrogating the project principles and 
objectives. 
21 B13 Collaborations organised from the top 
down do not guarantee delivery to the 
grassroots. 
The structure must be designed to work from 
the bottom up. 
  THE PARTICIPATIVE PROCESS 
22 B4 Without comprehensive initial 
agreements a collaboration has no 
foundation. 
Agreements must be compiled from first 
principles with full consultation and then 
iteratively discussed and approved by all 
parties. 
 
23 B5 The need for formal and informal 
leadership and facilitation. 
Recognise, activate and nurture the functions 
and strategies of sponsors, champions and 
other enablers, formally and informally, in key 
positions, forums, processes and sectors. 
24 B6 The need to widely legitimise 
collaboration as a form of organising, 
as a separate entity, and as a source 
of trusted interaction among parties. 
Promote and extol by all means the virtues 
and fruits of collaboration – as a concept and 





Competing institutional logics 
combined with lack of trust may 
render the collaborative process 
impossible. 
Allocate sustained time, money and expertise 
to nurture cross-sector, cross-institutional 




Power inequalities, conflicts and 
shocks should be regarded as a 
constant threat. 
Use resources and tactics to equalise power 
and manage conflicts. 
27 B9 Deliberate planning (follows a 
development logic) and emergent  
planning (exploring needs and 
opportunities incrementally) are 
opposing philosophies that could be 
insisted upon by different parties. 
Participative planning requires training, 
organisation and management, for deliberate 
and emergent modes used in combination. 
28 B15 
A10 
System-level planning activities 
require time-consuming negotiation 
which can frustrate a collaboration. 
Collaborations for service delivery and 
administrative improvements may provide 
quicker results. Early wins must be prioritised 
and programmed in the midst of participative 
processes that will require lengthy 
negotiations and approvals. 
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# REF CIRCUMSTANCES WORK REQUIRED 
29 B10 Professionals tend to regard planning 
as their domain and exclude other 
stakeholders from the process.  
Participative planning must be fully 
collaborative, not simply consultative, and 
respond to stakeholders’ needs, priorities and 
desire to participate, share and learn. 
  OUTCOMES and ACCOUNTABILITY 
30 B18 The danger of weak parties failing to 
achieve delivery to their 
constituencies.  
Optimise the creation of public value by 
building on each participant’s interests and 
strengths and by minimising or compensating 
for their weaknesses. 
31 B19 The propensity for a collaboration to 
become an expensive ‘white 
elephant’.  
Optimise the public value of a collaboration 
by fulfilling its mandate, inspiring the creation 
of parallel initiatives, and spawning 
replications at scale elsewhere – by 
deliberately and creatively interpreting and 
communicating the value and lessons learnt 
to carefully identified audiences through 
selected actors and media. 
32 B20 The danger of losing focus and 
relevance over time.  
The processes and outcomes must be 
accurately monitored, evaluated, reported 
upon and reviewed on a regular basis in 
order for the collaboration to stay necessary 
and relevant. 
33 B21 The danger of any sense or practice 
of accountability diminishing over time 
because of changes in politics, 
policies or personnel.  
Facilitate the achievement of success with an 
accountability system that tracks inputs, 
processes and outcomes; uses a variety of 
processes for gathering, processing and 
using data; and uses a results management 
system that is built on strong relationships 
with key political and professional 
constituencies. 
34 B22 “The normal expectation ought to be 
that success will be very difficult to 
achieve in cross-sector 
collaborations.” 
Welcome the difficulties, learn from the 
failures and celebrate the successes. Be 
willing and able to accommodate and 
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Table 17.  Appropriate attitudes, values and principles for a cross-sector collaborative 
project  [Ref: p 196] 
 
Issue : PROJECT DEADLOCK 
Appropriate 
attitude 
If we can’t do it our way maybe other interested parties have different 
approaches and possibilities. 
Values There is more than one way to do anything. It is worth exploring various 
possible development strategies. 
Principles Every effort must be made to identify and establish a workable strategy that 
will fulfil the objectives. 
  
Issue : RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERY. 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Perhaps other parties can share responsibility for ensuring a good outcome. 
Values Responsibility can be shared between diverse stakeholders. 
Principles Share involvement and responsibility with parties which share the objective. 
  
Issue  : THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY. 
Appropriate 
attitude 
We could involve others in exercising that authority without abdicating our 
responsibility. 
Values The responsible exercise of authority includes consultation with stakeholders 
with mandates or relevant expertise. 
Principles Stakeholders hold various kinds of authority and must consult with each other 
before making decisions which affect each other. 
  
Issue : ACCOUNTABILITY 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Different parties will account to different constituencies for outcomes of the 
same project process. 
Values Each party’s accountability should be recognised, respected and encouraged. 
Principles All parties must consult with and account to their constituencies. 
  
Issue  : LIMITED RESOURCES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Resource limitations within an unsuccessful development paradigm may 
disappear if a more promising paradigm is created. 
Values The involvement of other parties may provide or leverage access to resources 
that are not hitherto available.  
Principles A holistic, inclusive approach to development adds security to resource 
providers. 
  
Issue  : CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Different kinds of contributions can be made by different kinds of stakeholders. 
Values Every interested party should be able to demonstrate how it can add value to 
the process. 
Principles Each party to a collaboration must declare the nature of its interest and of its 
proposed contribution to the process. 
  
Issue  : OPPOSITION 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Opponents are often created by exclusion and discrimination. Inclusion and 
respect can create valuable associations. 
Values It is wiser to engage an opponent within a consultative process than further 
alienate the party by exclusion. 
Principles Participation of stakeholders within a collaborative process must be always 
inclusive, even if parties exclude themselves. 
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Issue  : ALIENATION 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Alienated parties can always be reached through intermediaries 
Values A collaboration should include all stakeholders. 
Principles Every effort must be taken to make every stakeholder welcome and 
appreciated. 
  
Issue  : DISTRUST 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Distrust may be the product of a paradigm more than a characteristic of the 
people or parties. If the paradigm is changed trust can be built. 
Values Distrust should be recognised as a natural product of exclusionary 
development practices. 
Principles The gradual reduction of distrust between parties will be a bi-product and 
indicator of success in collaboration. 
  
Issue  : CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Different cultures should be respected, not ranked, and cultures working 
together can enhance both. 
Values Respect for the different cultures represented in a collaboration, and 
determination to optimise the combination of benefits that they offer. 
Principles Differences in culture among participants is appreciated and must  enhance 
the project. 
  
Issue  : LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Project development processes can use multiple languages in parallel. 
Values It is useful to have a standard language for project documents but by using 
interpreters any language can be used in discussions. 
Principles Participants may use their home language in discussion. Project documents 
will be in ..... language. 
  
Issue  : DIFFERENCES IN VALUES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Project beneficiaries will only appreciate that which they value, which values 
must therefore be understood by other parties. 
Values We desire all participants to add value and all project beneficiaries to receive 
what they perceive as value. 
Principles Care must be taken to ensure that all beneficiaries of the project perceive real 
value in what they receive. 
 
 
Issue : PRIORITIES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Understanding and combining each other’s priorities consolidates a 
relationship. 
Values Priorities are subjective and project priorities must represent the consensus of 
all stakeholders. 
Principles Project priorities must be a synthesis of those proposed by all stakeholders. 
  
Issue  : COLLABORATION 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Collaboration is a multi-party, multi-process initiative - not unilateral alliance 
building or mediation or conflict resolution. 
Values Collaboration involves all participants in the building and application of 
directed working relationships. 
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Issue  : COLLABORATION SKILLS and EFFORT 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Any existing inter-party relationships can be built upon; and augmented by 
using independent facilitators. 
Values Building trust, integrity and resilient personal inter-relationships make for an 
effective collaboration. 
Principles Attention must be given to building trust, integrity and personal relationships 
between parties in a collaboration. 
  
Issue  : THE NATURE OF ACTORS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS 
Appropriate 
attitude 
Public, private and social sectors have different strengths and ways of 
operating. By agreeing and focusing on one shared objective the most useful 
of these can be combined. 
Values Different sectors should use collaborations as an opportunity to learn helpful 
perspectives, skills and techniques from each other. 
Principles The involvement of different sectors enriches a collaborative process and its 
individual participants. 
  
Issue  : THE INTEGRITY OF EACH PARTY 
Appropriate 
attitude 
A collaboration is not an amalgamation of parties, but a project-specific 
association of independent parties. 
Values No party in a collaboration is expected to sacrifice its identity or integrity by 
participating. 
Principles Participating parties preserve their own identity and integrity whilst 
collaborating. 
  
Issue  : PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
Appropriate 
attitude 
A problem or project has many facets, and many interested and affected 
parties each with their own perspective and hopes. Our own objectives are 
unlikely to be as generally beneficial as they could be. 
Values We respect and value the interests of all stakeholders in formulating project 
objectives. 
Principles The objectives of the project shall reflect the best interests of all stakeholders, 
and particularly the project’s clients. 
  
Issue  : PROJECT’S CLIENTS 
Appropriate 
attitude 
These are the people and parties who will use, manage, maintain and pay for 
the project deliverables over their life span. 
Values The project’s clients are all those who will have a direct involvement in the use 
of the deliverables. 
Principles All parties who will have a  direct involvment in the use of the project’s 
deliverables shall be regarded as the project’s clients. 
Issue : PROJECT DESIGN 
Appropriate 
attitude 
The design process is not just a technical or professional function but can 
creatively involve persons from all client groups. 
Values Project design is the responsibility of all the parties involved in a project and is 
not the exclusive domain of technical experts. 
Principles The project design shall involve and respond to the needs and best interests 
of the project clients. 
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ANNEXURE C 
 
SOME LESSONS LEARNED BY ENABLERS OF THE iSLP 
 
 
The experience of managing and enabling the iSLP provided many lessons for the benefit of 
future policy-makers and practitioners. Amongst these lessons are a number that are 
particularly for Enablers. Fifteen of these are listed below, each with a note as to whether 
they are likely to be helpful for general application in enabling a collaboration or more 
particularly for enabling a cross-sector collaboration. 
 
Lesson 1  Some first steps towards understanding a chronic social crisis [General 
application] 
First identify the presenting problems – but don’t try to solve them, because they are 
superficial. Then consider what the underlying problems might be – but don’t try to solve 
them either because they probably are only symptoms. Thereafter dig deeper to find the real 
foundational problems – such as attitudes and policies. 
Begin thinking of some principles that might create a better foundation.  
 
Example:  
In the iSLP the Democrat had a very different perspective on the problem from the officials 
who simply wanted to put infrastructure into Crossroads. And his perspective was quite 
superficial compared to that of the many communities who had become victims of the endless 
violence. The Wrestler, the Defender and the Community Planner also had deeply-etched 
perspectives drawn from their considerable experience in the field. 
 
Lesson 2 Be prepared to redefine the Project crisis [General application] 
A common mistake is to presume that the project has already been correctly defined, and that 
all that is required is to accomplish it in a slightly different way, or with a somewhat different 
group of participants. Stakeholders may have different views about what is required, and 
those who claim to have most experience may be lacking perspective. Be sure to review the 
definition of the project.  
 
Example:  
The ambit of the project in the case study began as ‘Crossroads’, then was expanded under 
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the influence of the Provincial Planner  to ‘Crossroads and Environs’, then depoliticised on 
the advice of the Communications Consultant to “Serviced Land Project”, then it shed its 
hostel upgrading component which became a separate project, and finally it was greatly 
enlarged into the “Integrated Serviced Land Project”.  
 
Lesson 3 Creative participation crisis [General application] 
‘Inclusive and equal participation’ usually requires the involvement of all stakeholders or 
role-players on an equal basis around the same table. That is a challenge for any party that 
has been acting in a superior manner because of its power and/or resources. It can be no less 
challenging for any party that has historically been dominated, oppressed or patronised by 
others. Creative thinking may be required to ensure that everyone can be fully and effectively 
involved. So if some of the parties cannot tolerate each other, let them work in separate 
groups together with those parties that are accepted by all – until relationships or 
circumstances have undergone the necessary changes.  
 
Example:  
The Sponsor and the Strategist demonstrated considerable courage and faith in the process 
when they accepted that the Provincial Government would have as much say as any other 
party in the Policy Committee – especially as some of the participating parties had very 
questionable mandates and motives. But it made the collaboration possible, and shared the 
responsibility equally for everything that happened. The Provincial Planner and his 
engineering counterparts also made a bold step in allowing community leaders to interview a 
panel of consultants and recommend appointments – which the government then confirmed. 
In a stroke a strong relationship was established between all the parties involved in the 
planning of a project. 
 
Lesson 4 Anticipate and accommodate constant and unpredictable change [Particularly 
applicable in a cross-sector collaboration] 
Experience has shown that cross-sector collaboration is only chosen in times of turbulence 
and only as a last resort (see Chapter 3). Turbulence implies complex changes in direction 
and thrust of powerful forces and therefore it should be anticipated that the project will have 
to be steered and driven through a constantly changing environment. For the objectives to be 
reached the project leadership must be focused, determined and extremely adaptable.  
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Example:  
When WCUSA walked out of the Policy Committee the collaborative process did not falter, 
while the Strategist and his management team did their best to negotiate their return. When 
WCUSA did return it was with a renewed takeover bid, but again the Policy Committee 
steadily continued, simply dealing with each issue as it arose. 
 
Lesson 5 In a turbulent social environment do not take claims of stakeholders’ ‘mandates’ 
too seriously [Particularly applicable in a cross-sector collaboration] 
It can be tempting to recognise stakeholders’ claims to hold mandates on behalf of others, 
especially if they relate to large or diverse groups. Mandates are often contrived and are very 
difficult to satisfactorily verify. Rather avoid giving exclusive recognition to monopolies and 
cartels by working with as many stakeholder organisations as possible, which will compete 
with and correct each other.  
 
Example:  
The Enablers in the iSLP were well aware that organisations in the Policy Committee were 
not actually mandated – there was no evidence that many of the participants represented 
anybody but themselves. But the Enablers did not demand accountability, because it would 
have broken the collaboration and there were no replacement organisations at that stage. 
When grassroots organisations built up strength they were able to challenge the charlatans on 
their own. There was also the factor that until 1994 none of the government institutions in 
South Africa could claim to have a proper mandate either as black people were 
disenfranchised.  
 
Lesson 6 Tolerate shows of force, demonstrations, protests and outbursts [Particularly 
applicable in a cross-sector collaboration] 
Protests and exhibitions, whether they are friendly or aggressive, are an indispensable part of 
encounters, and are therefore to be expected in collaborations, at least in the early stages 
when parties need to establish an identity and find their voice. So they should be quietly 
appreciated and the minimum of offence should be taken unless they are physically violent or 
personally abusive. Parties must learn to listen to each other, and whereas some participants 
will be able to eloquently articulate their points with the spoken word others may need to 
sing, dance, shout, arrive in numbers or have time to caucus. Everyone is engaging in an 
innovative mutual learning process. Enablers must help others to interpret what is happening, 
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to ‘read between the lines’, and to respond empathetically, respectfully and constructively.  
 
Example: 
 Noisy and occasionally violent public protests were very common in South Africa, 
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. Many protests were enlivened by singing, dancing and 
intimidating gestures. In a divided society, there were some people who not only were never 
part of a protest, but never even saw one except on television or in newspaper photographs. 
The Enablers, however, each in their own way, had become familiar with public 
demonstrations and had grown to recognise and respect them as a form of communication 
and outlet for frustrations and anger. Enablers in public service were accustomed to being the 
target of demonstrations, some of the Enablers participated themselves in protests, and the 
Democrat and his facilitators deliberately based themselves in areas of contestation – not in 
some quiet secluded office. 
 
Lesson 7 Attempt to appreciate the problems and perspectives of each participant, without 
necessarily claiming to understand them crisis [General application] 
In a critical, turbulent social crisis every participating entity is likely to have its own unique 
problems to deal with and unique perspectives on what any new initiative is about, what its 
role should be and the degree to which its own objectives might be satisfied. Furthermore, 
every participating person has their own personality, perspectives and preoccupations. A 
primary objective is to build trust – an appreciation of each other and of what each could 
contribute. Conversations should not be limited to formal meetings – informal chats uncover 
common interests and create opportunities for building relationships, however slight, which 
can be built upon to everyone’s advantage. Do not be too quick to claim an understanding, 
however, because people’s cultures, histories and ways of seeing, thinking and speaking may 
differ greatly. Be content to keep listening, learning and respecting.     
 
Example:  
Tracking the Veteran’s affiliations during the course of the iSLP is illuminating. His 
involvement in the project was one of the most consistent and long-lived. But he began as a 
civic leader within the UDF until it was disbanded; when SANCO was established he was 
obliged to associate himself with it but became increasingly uncomfortable and re-established 
his Western Cape Civic Association identity; later he joined forces with WCUSA and others 
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in the creation of WECCO and was appointed its chairman, only to realise that he had been 
duped; he then became caught up in the Peninsular People’s Compact which was then 
publicly discredited by the grassroots community leaders. He re-emerged in the iSLP and was 
elected by those grassroots leaders as Chairman of their iSLP Consultative Forum, until he 
was elected as a City Councillor. Therefore, although he participated from a number of 
different positions, some apparently contradictory, the Veteran as a person was an Enabler of 
the iSLP process and project. It was unnecessary to question his moves and the motives 
behind them within the context of a country and society in turmoil – all that was important 
was to keep his relationship with other Enablers strong. 
  
Lesson 8 Sign-off achievements crisis [General application] 
In a complex and convoluted process there can be great advantage in formally recognising 
completed events, ‘milestones’, which will prohibit any participant from re-instituting old 
debates and allow the whole process to move forward. All participants must be invited to 
witness the signing-off event – but consideration should also be given to inviting 
representatives of a broader public and the media as witnesses. The signing off must be 
recorded within formal minutes so that there is an authoritative record for future reference.  
 
Example: 
The Sponsor, in Chapter 7, made a very rare appearance in the Policy Committee simply to 
affirm that the SLP Principles had been adopted and to announce that the end of the policy 
phase and the commencement of the implementation phase. In a way it was a public 
ceremony, witnessed and recorded in the minutes. It was significant for two reasons: Not 
every party in the Policy Committee had approved the iSLP Principles – WCUSA had not – 
but this was a way of taking a decision without actually telling WCUSA that their delaying 
tactics would no longer be tolerated. This announcement did not terminate the Policy 
Committee (that came later), because the Policy Committee was still the only manifestation 
of the collaboration, but by starting the implementation phase (even though there was not yet 
any project funding available) it authorised the Democrat to appoint facilitators who would 
work with grassroots leaders to establish the residents Development Committees which 
eventually became the prime means of collaboration for the entire implementation process. 
 
Lesson 9 Create local development committees as early in the process as possible [General 
application] 
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The greatest hindrance to participative development is self-appointed, unrepresentative 
community spokespersons. Self-proclaimed ‘representatives’ who have strong personalities, 
are erudite, have some knowledge of development processes and claim associations with 
influential persons or organisations should be treated with suspicion until their bona fides 
have been verified by others - the community, in particular - and demonstrated by their 
actions. The greatest assets in participative development are small localised development 
committees that comprise publicly elected representatives of communities from which project 
beneficiaries are to be drawn. The sooner these development committees can be established, 
and linked into the fabric of the project process through facilitation and training, the better.  
 
Example:  
At the time when the Policy Committee was being assembled, the communities who were 
meant to be involved were still organised in clandestine ways because the apartheid 
government had been very quick to label any local gathering as political and seditious, to 
arrest attendees and hold them in prison without trial. The unbanning of political parties 
eliminated that danger but did not immediately provide replacement structures – and in any 
event, should local representative structures have party affiliations? So it was impossible to 
have grassroots participation at the start of the iSLP. However after 1994, it became easy to 
populate project committees for housing development, and they were so successful that such 
structures were hardly required for the next phases of development: community facilities and 
capacity building processes. As the Democrat’s facilitators discovered, local, legitimate 
community leaders were just waiting to be included in local development committees. 
 
Lesson 10 How to prevent the process from breaking down before it is concluded crisis 
[General application] 
A controversial process to address a major social crisis can be sustained for a lengthy period 
if there is a committed host, a dedicated and impartial chairperson, an able facilitator and 
communicator, a few more committed Enablers often working behind the scenes – and a 
sustained attitude of inclusion of all stakeholders. On this basis the scheduled meetings will 




In the iSLP the process of convening Policy Committee meetings was driven inexorably and 
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persistently by the host (the Strategist), the chairperson (the Defender) and the facilitator (the 
Democrat) – such that 36 meetings were convened within 38 months. Each meeting presented 
challenges, with regards to who might attend and what might they say or do, and very little 
could be done to ‘oil the waters’ in advance because there was so much contestation, and its 
form kept changing. It was their dogged commitment to the principles and process that had 
been agreed at the start which held it all together all the time. Such unwavering commitment 
is indispensible. It is also likely to be exhausting. Remember, also, that the Defender was an 
unremunerated volunteer, fulfilling a very costly role. 
 
Lesson 11 Document everything and have the record formally approved  crisis [General 
application] 
The facilitator or coordinator of a collaborative project has a huge administrative 
responsibility to feed every aspect of the process with documentation of a high quality that 
accurately expresses the intention of meetings both in advance (notices and agendas) and 
retrospectively (minutes) and which also informs the process of policy making, 
programming, budgeting, monitoring and reporting. The decisions made at meetings are not 
just the product of the decision-makers – they are primarily formulated by ‘backroom’ people 
who think about an objective, how to construct a strategy that will achieve it, and then 
translate that into a readable, unambiguous, polished document that is ready for approval. 
There is often only one chance for a document to be tabled, so do not present rough drafts 
because they might be approved by mistake and become a headache for those who have to 
implement them. Ensure that all minutes, policy documents and reports are formally 
approved or endorsed so that they can be referred to later – they are the foundations and 
cornerstones of a strong, adaptable development.  
 
Example:  
In the iSLP, the Scribe, as an assistant to the Democrat, took responsibility for assuming that 
all of the information needed for effective process facilitation, and later project coordination, 
was properly and accurately recorded and stored systematically so that it could be easily 
recovered. The Scribe also drafted all the proposals that were put to the policy Committee to 
ensure that they were unambiguous, and drafted many of the critically important letters or 
invitations that had to be sent from time to time to promote the project – to the extent 
sometimes of drafting a letter for one party and later, in response to a request from another 
party, drafting an appropriate reply. 
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Lesson 12 Understand and respect historical conflicts but focus on building a better future  
crisis [General application] 
The objective of a cross-sector collaboration is not to resolve differences and conflicts that 
are rooted in history but to respect them and create a new ethical paradigm on which a just 
future can be built.  
 
Example:  
The Policy Committee of the iSLP was not established to adjudicate past actions or to resolve 
long-standing disputes. The past was implicitly recognised but it was never all owed to 
dominate proceedings. The new government, faith groups and civil society could deal with 
justice, reconciliation and restitution issues if they wished, but the sole purpose of the iSLP 
was to design and drive a vehicle that would take all the affected communities into a new and 
improved housing dispensation. All the Enablers were committed to achieving that. 
 
Lesson 13 Empower communities by involving men, women and youth in committees crisis 
[General application] 
Ensure that men are not allowed to dominate committees which have been established to 
represent the whole community and to enable development. Women have an especially good 
record as powerful initiators and motivators of development and this capacity must be 
appreciated, harnessed and expressed in any development project.  
 
Example: 
 It is traditional among some cultures to allow or expect the men to lead, to make decisions 
on behalf of everyone else, and to speak on their behalf as well. There were very, very few 
women on the Policy Committee of the iSLP. The rare exceptions included the chairperson 
(the Defender) and the Communications Consultant (whose appointment was relatively 
short). The Democrat’s facilitators included women, and they were in the vanguard of 
making sure that grassroots women were consulted in the planning processes and that every 
Residents’ Development Committee and Project Committee had a good representation of 
women and youth. As time went on such provisions were written into the draft terms of 
reference that were used to establish such structures. 
 
 
ANNEXURE C    C9  
Lesson 14 Not ‘the developer’s meeting’ but ‘the community’s meeting’, not your project, 
but theirs crisis [General application] 
If the community owns the project they will contribute generously and energetically to its 
success, and long after the officials, consultants and contractors have left the site they will 
still be enthusiastically improving and maintaining whatever assets the project delivered. It 
all starts with enabling communities to take ownership of the forums which mean most to 
them: the committees which discuss and decide on the details of their part of the project. 
Therefore those meetings must be structured primarily for their benefit, in ways that will 
maximise their involvement. Location, language, timing, procedure, control, record-keeping 
should all be as they would like it. If they need encouraging to take the initiative then be sure 
to encourage them to speak up, engage the officials and professionals, elect a chairperson 
from their own number, set the agenda, decide on the refreshments, etc. Participants will 
never forget meetings that were theirs, and what they achieved. The facilitators must work 
out a way for the supporting officials and others to be adequately informed, and for suitable 
minutes to be kept of the decisions taken.  
Example:  
Because there are three official languages in the Western Cape, participants in the Policy 
Committee could speak in the language of their choice and have it translated by a formal or 
informal interpreter. In general, however, those discussions were conducted in English, 
although that was the ‘first language’ of relatively few participants. At grassroots level many 
people were not confident in English and so the vernacular isiXhosa was used by the leaders 
and facilitators. These people constituted the majority at Project Committees as well, so most 
of the business there was conducted in isiXhoa, and only the critically important elements 
were translated for the benefit of the officials and consultants who were in attendance. 
 
Lesson 15 Affirm local community leaders as Enablers of the project  crisis [General 
application] 
A large development project provides the opportunity to create forums in which community 
leaders who are not politicians but who are respected for their wisdom, experience and 
service can be recognised, affirmed and consulted on significant matters. These people 
become the real Enablers at local level. Politicians do not generally provide consistently good 
and sustained leadership for development projects. If the grassroots leaders are allowed to 
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consider policy issues their recommendations are likely to be appreciated by the politicians, 
who will endorse them with confidence.  
Example:  
Remember that nobody was actually called “an Enabler” in the iSLP. It is a function that is 
being recognised in this thesis and highlighted by a few examples – but the reality is that in 
such a large project there were many Enablers at many levels, characterised by their 
committed exertion to ‘make it happen’. In every Project Committee there were characters 
who could be relied upon to attend, to ask questions that would yield more clarification for 
everyone, who would roundly endorse what they regarded as good practice, and 
pragmatically tell the consultants and officials when to speed up and when to slow down. 
Men and women, some of them real ‘elders’ and some of them inspired youngsters – together 
pulled the project through to its successful conclusion without receiving any special benefit 
or praise at all. 
 
The above fifteen lessons fall far short of all the lessons learnt by Enablers during the course 
of the iSLP, but they highlight some particularly important generic issues. Rather than 
attempt to list all the experience acquired from one project a ‘Manual for Enablers’ has been 
compiled as Annexure D to this thesis, to which the Reader is referred. 
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INTRODUCTION - THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SECTOR 
COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
This Manual is designed to enable persons to approach the possibility of creating a cross-
sector collaborative development in a careful, logical manner. The emphasis here is on the 
conceptualisation, design, structure and overall planning of the collaboration, rather than on 
the planning and implementation of its project components. 
 
These are tools to assist the practitioner to design and manage an effective collaborative 
process. If that is done properly it will establish a strong and durable foundation for the 
planning and implementation of projects and programmes. 
 
The 14 Stages in a Collaborative Development Process. 
 
STAGE 1 – PROBLEM STATEMENT   Consider the circumstances and problems that 
lead you to believe that a collaborative project might be necessary. 
 
STAGE 2 – CONCEPTUALISATION   Develop an idea yourself of how a collaborative 
development might be created. 
 
STAGE 3 – EXECUTIVE SUPPORT   Obtain support for your concept from political and 
administrative superiors, and a mandate to canvass support more widely. 
 
STAGE 4 – CANVASSING SUPPORT   Canvass the perspective of each party and the 
basis on which they would consider participating in a collaborative development. 
 
STAGE 5 – INVITATION   Negotiate with all parties a few basic principles as a mutually 
acceptable basis for an invitation to collaborate – and deliver such invitations on behalf of the 
patron. 
 
STAGE 6 – INAUGURATION   Organise the event, chaired by the patron, who seeks 
formal agreement on the objective of the collaboration, the basic principles of procedure and 
willingness to proceed to Stage 7. 
 
STAGE 7 – ESTABLISHMENT   Obtain agreement on the principles which will be used to 
anchor and guide the process towards achieving the agreed objective; on terms of reference 
for one or more committees; and on the initial research to be commissioned. 
 
STAGE 8 – RESEARCH   Collaboratively research, analyse and report on key unknowns 
and their implications; achieve agreement on project content.   
 
STAGE 9 – BUSINESS PLANNING   Prepare a comprehensive Business Plan as an 
instrument to obtain the support and resources required to conduct detailed planning and 
implementation. 
 
STAGE 10 – OBTAINING RESOURCES   Obtain approval of the Business Plan by 
political, financial and other authorities, and an assurance that all the necessary resources will 
be made available. 
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STAGE 11 – PLANNING  OF PROJECTS Collaboratively plan individual projects in 
detail for use in obtaining an allocation of resources and as a basis for procurement and 
contracts. 
 
STAGE 12 – PROJECT APPROVALS   Obtain approval of each project and access to 
resources as they are required. 
 
STAGE 13 – IMPLEMENTATION   Collaborative implementation of individual projects 
according to approved plans; and coordinated implementation of the project as a whole. 
 
STAGE 14 – COMPLETION    Achieve certified completion of every aspect of the project 
in terms of original approved plans and authorised amendments. 
 
These stages are explained in detail in the pages that follow. 
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THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
 
THE STEPS WITHIN EACH STAGE OF THE PROCESS 
 
The Notes referred to below can be found after the details of Stage 14. 
 
 STAGE 1 – PROBLEM STATEMENT    
Consider the circumstances and problems that lead you to believe that a collaborative project 
might be necessary. Begin this process without delay. 
Step  
1 Do some very careful research on the background to the problem. (Note 1) 
2 Jot down a few ideas for what should be the objective of this particular development. 
3 List what you consider to be the main problems associated with this challenge. 
  4 List any other complicating circumstances that would have to be taken into account. 
  5 List what you think are the resource constraints, in terms of available will, expertise, 
personnel, finance, materials, land, official policies, etc. 
  6 State why you believe that such a development cannot be successfully undertaken by 
your own organisation. 
  7 Consider the possibility of it being achieved by specific other organisations, stating 
their strengths and weaknesses, and coming to a conclusion. 
  8 State why you think that a collaborative development provides the only or best chance 
of success. 
  9 Compile all of the above into a ‘Problem Statement’, containing first of all your 
responses to Steps 1-7, each with its own heading and paragraph. Then leave a few 
lines and add as a last paragraph, entitled ‘Conclusion’, your response to Step 8. 
 10 Share your Problem Statement with your colleagues and superior and request their 
comments, corrections and additions and invite discussion on the subject. 
 11 In the light of their responses first revise the document excluding the Conclusion. Do 
this carefully, including further discussion if necessary, so that the final result will be 
a fair expression of your organisation’s assessment of the problem. 
 12 Then, on the basis of that write a new Conclusion. You should then consider the 
comments that you received about your original Conclusion and see whether any 
criticisms are still justified on the basis of your revised document. If they are, you 
should amend your new Conclusion accordingly. If the criticisms are invalid, they 
may indicate that there is opposition to your strategy. If so discuss this possibility 
with your superior, who may be able to reduce the risk of the exercise being 
undermined from within. 
 13 Identify, from these first discussions within your organisation, whom your allies are 
likely to be and the various roles that they could fulfil as internal Enablers of the 
project, such as: patron, champion, host, chairperson, secretary, administrator, bridge-
builders, technical facilitators, community facilitators, interpreters. (Note 2) 
 14 The revised Problem Statement now represents a perspective that enjoys broad 
support within your organisation. However, before any action is taken Stage 2 must 
be carefully worked through, so obtain assurance from your superior that no other 
action will be taken prematurely.  
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 STAGE 2 – CONCEPTUALISATION    
Develop an idea yourself of how a collaborative development might be created. This will 
give you a head start in thinking about these issues. 
Step 
  1 List the probable stakeholders: organisations, groups and individuals who are likely to 
have a direct interest in a possible development, particularly if it is a collaboration – 
and state what their interest would be. 
  2 List possible supporters: any other parties whose involvement or support would help 
to achieve success. 
  3 List possible opponents: any organisations, groups and individuals who might be 
opposed to such a development. 
  4 Develop an idea of how a collaboration of all these parties could be created. 
  5 Consider what would be needed to attract all of these parties to an exploratory 
meeting. 
  6 Consider who would be the most suitable available person to canvass such support. 
  7 Consider what values will have to be applied to underpin a collaborative process. 
  8 Consider what attitudes will be required in to promote success. 
  9 Identify what existing attitudes will therefore have to be changed. 
 10  Draft some initial principles that could be adopted to guide the process. 
 11  Consider whom should adopt these principles, by what means and when. 
 12  Draft a clearly stated initial objective for the project.  
 13 List the items that should be addressed in a simple but effective inaugural meeting. 
 14  Consider in what language the inaugural meeting should be conducted, and whether 
translators will be required. 
 15  Identify suitable meeting venues which would be accessible, of an adequate size, have 
the required furniture and facilities, be dignified and regularly available. 
 16  Carefully consider how much time each of Stages 3 to 10 may take and draft a 
programme, suggesting some key milestones. 
 17  Combine Steps 1-14 into a ‘Proposal for the Collaborative Development of .......” 
 18  On the basis of the Proposal draft a Canvassing Brief (Note 3) with a Draft Agenda 
for an Exploratory Meeting (Note 4) attached, which can be given to whoever is 
mandated to canvass support from the parties. 
 
 STAGE 3 – EXECUTIVE SUPPORT   
Obtain support for your concept from political and administrative superiors and a mandate to 
canvass support more widely. 
Step  
  1 Discuss your Proposal critically with your key internal allies (the initial internal 
Enablers identified in Stage 1 Step 13) and amend it as necessary. 
  2 Present the Proposal and Canvassing Brief to your superior and request a discussion 
about it, to be attended by as many of the internal Enablers as possible. 
  3 If your superior is in support of the process request that a senior executive within the 
organisation be approached to be the project Champion and to lead the quest for the 
necessary political support from the highest level. Thereafter the Champion must be 
kept fully informed about all aspects of the process. 
  4 The Champion obtains the appointment of a patron from among high level superiors. 
  5 Ensure that the presentations given to obtain executive support are of a high standard 
and that as a result a mandate is secured for canvassing interest in a collaborative 
development process from as many potential participants as possible. 
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  6 Ensure that the executive approval is put in writing and that the wording of the 
Canvassing Brief (Note 3) is also approved. 
  7 Appoint the person chosen to canvass support (the Canvasser) and provide him/her 
with the Canvassing Brief and a signed document that provides evidence of their 
appointment. 
 
 STAGE 4 – CANVASSING SUPPORT    
The Canvasser will obtain the perspective of every party and the basis on which they would 
consider participating in a collaborative development. The following tasks are primarily for 
the Canvasser. 
Step  
  1 Draw a Relationship Map (Note 5) using all the names that you listed in Stage 2 
Steps 1 and 2 together with the name of your own organisation. This map will show 
the strength of relationship between the different parties and the extent to which one 
party may be able to influence another. 
  2 To the Relationship Map add the names that you listed in Stage 2 Step 3 and indicate 
their relationships to the other parties. 
  3 To each organisation in the Relationship Map add the names of their key decision-
makers and also the names of individuals in each organisation who have good 
relationships with individuals in other organisations in the Map. Any particularly bad 
relationships should also be indicated. 
4 Use the Relationship Map to choose a starting point and a route for canvassing 
support for the collaboration proposal, and also for deciding at which points other 
people should be asked to assist in the canvassing, e.g. by providing introductions, 
attending presentations, hosting or arranging meetings. Use all of this to create a 
Canvassing Programme (Note 6). 
  5 Create a Canvassing Report Form (Note 7) which you will complete after each party 
has been approached. 
  6 Proceed to canvass support for the proposal, following the order of the Canvassing 
Programme, which can always be amended as you collect more information about 
parties and inter-relationships along the way. Complete a Canvassing Report form 
immediately after each meeting, to ensure that no information is lost. 
  7 After all parties have been canvassed meet with your superior and/or project 
Champion and some internal Enablers, give them copies of your Canvassing Reports, 
and discuss the response. Discuss whether any further negotiation is required – 
internally and/or with any of the canvassed parties and/or with any other parties – 
before concluding whether there is broad interest in holding a first exploratory 
meeting of all parties. 
 
 STAGE 5 – INVITATION      
Negotiate with all parties a few basic principles as a mutually acceptable basis for an 
invitation to collaborate – and deliver such invitations on behalf of the patron. These tasks are 
primarily for the Canvasser. 
Step 
  1 If it is required, conduct a final round of canvassing with some or all parties, seeking 
an agreed basis on which the process can be started. If there is enough support among 
the parties to make a collaboration possible it is worth considering inviting all those 
parties to a meeting – trusting that if it they decide to continue meeting it is likely that 
any other parties will not want to be excluded and will join in. 
  2 Ask the Champion to obtain the agreement of the Patron that invitations can be issued 
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in his/her name for a meeting at a suitable date and time at the proposed venue. 
Reserve the venue immediately and reserve the time in the Patron’s diary 
  3 Draft a brief and simple Invitation (Note 8) to be issued by the Patron, separately 
addressed to each party that has been canvassed, requesting the pleasure of their 
attendance at a meeting to explore the possibility of creating a collaborative 
development of ...., which will be held at a specified place and time. The agreed 
Agenda for the Inaugural Meeting must be attached to each invitation. There should 
be some limit to the size of the delegation from each party, but there is usually an 
advantage in providing an opportunity to engage on the subject to more than just a 
couple of people in each party. Invitees should be requested to ‘RSVP’ and to indicate 
the size of their delegation in order to facilitate arrangements for the meeting. 
  4 Invitations must be delivered, preferably by hand and by the Canvasser, and their 
receipt should be signed for so that there can be no doubt about whether they were 
delivered and received. If any invitations cannot be delivered by hand they must be 
sent by secure means and followed up with a phone call to confirm their arrival. 
  5 Before the inaugural meeting the Canvasser should give a follow up call to the contact 
person in each party, confirming that they will be attending the meeting and ensuring 
that they know where the meeting is taking place and that they have the necessary 
transport. Transport, or a refund of the cost of transport, should be offered if it poses a 
problem. 
  6 Establish a simple and effective procedure for providing transport or transport 
refunds. The use of locally available transport should be encouraged if it is efficient. 
 
 STAGE 6 – INAUGURATION     
Organise the event, chaired by the Patron, who seeks formal agreement on the objective of 
the collaboration, the basic principles of procedure and a willingness to proceed to Stage 7. 
Step  
  1 The venue was reserved in Stage 5 Step 2. Confirm the reservation and ensure that 
there will be adequate and appropriate seating and that all facilities are functioning. 
The seating format should be as close as possible to a ‘round table’, and unlike a 
classroom or court room. 
  2 Organise appropriate refreshments for the meeting, preferably arranged so that people 
can mix informally. 
  3 Brief the Champion thoroughly about the objectives of the Inaugural Meeting and the 
attendees, and about all the arrangements you have made. The Champion must then 
brief the Patron, who will chair the inaugural meeting. Together they will be 
responsible for ensuring the success of the meeting. It should be emphasised that the 
meeting is for the purpose of discussing only the items on the agenda that has been 
agreed by all parties. Any other issues should be left for future meetings, and used as 
an attraction for meeting again, and for everyone to prepare to discuss them then. 
  4 If you are going to use a translator/interpreter in the meeting be sure to brief him/her 
at the same time as the Champion is briefed, as it is essential that they both have the 
same objective and communicate the same message. 
  5 Ensure that the proceedings of the meeting will be accurately recorded in the agreed 
language.  Appoint a proficient secretary who understands the context of the meeting 
and who is experienced in managing any recording or transcribing equipment to be 
used and then drafting accurate minutes. 
  6 Prepare a table sign for each party indicating its name on both sides, and allocate an 
equal amount of space at the table for each party to have at least two delegates sitting 
at the table, with their other delegates sitting behind them. 
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  7 Prepare an Attendance List (Note 9) of parties and representatives, with space for 
additions to be made. Also prepare a standard blank Attendance Register (Note 10) 
for circulation during the meeting and at any future meetings, which will capture 
additional information that will be essential for the accurate administration of the 
process. 
  8 Prepare a reception table at the entrance to the venue, at which copies of the agenda 
are made available and where at least two copies of the Attendance List are placed to 
be ticked as people arrive. The reception table should be attended by at least two 
administrators who will ensure that everyone is welcomed, their presence recorded 
and given an agenda – without any lengthy queues forming. 
  7 Have another two or three administrators available to show delegates to their seats. If 
delegates are likely to have multiple home languages ensure that there are 
administrators present who speak their language and make them feel at home. 
  8 In Item 1 of the Draft Agenda the chairman will welcome everybody and explain the 
purpose of the meeting: to explore whether there is a common will to collaborate in 
order to address the challenge.  Everyone present has agreed to come, so a common 
interest is assured. If the canvassing has been comprehensive with all preliminary 
issues having been clarified or negotiated this meeting should be a formality, and the 
chairperson should treat it with that expectation. The purpose of the meeting is simply 
to convene the process and get it moving forwards, not to resolve issues that will 
require research and deliberation later. Contentious issues must be noted and recorded 
in the minutes, and agreement sought that they will be addressed in later meetings – 
perhaps in specified stages of the process. 
  9 Item 2 of the Draft Agenda provides the opportunity for the leading representative of 
each organisation to briefly introduce their organisation and their delegates, explain 
the organisation’s function and constituency, state why they are interested in helping 
to address this challenge and declare what they would hope to contribute to a 
collaborative development process. 
 10   Item 3 of the Draft Agenda is to seek agreement on the general objective to be 
achieved. This should be kept simple and narrow at this stage, taking care not to raise 
any unrealistic expectations. There will be plenty of opportunity to refine it later. It 
can also be useful to agree on a title for the project, so that it can be easily and 
unambiguously referred to in future. 
 11 Item 4 of the Draft Agenda is a preliminary explanation of the development process 
that is likely to be required – viz: Stages 7-14 and the simple reason for each stage. It 
would also be helpful to provide some idea of how long each stage may take. Then 
focus on the content of Stages 7 and 8, and a proposal for how these should be 
addressed procedurally – and recommend that the meeting constitutes itself into a 
committee – perhaps a ‘Policy Committee’ in the first instance. 
 12  Item 5 of the Draft Agenda puts flesh onto the idea of creating a committee by 
agreeing to some important practical aspects – and lays the ground for Item 6. 
 13  Item 6 of the Draft Agenda then gets into more serious ‘housekeeping’ issues about 
how the meetings are to be chaired, administered, facilitated and recorded. The host 
organisation should try to avoid providing a chairperson itself in order to deliberately 
and visibly equalise power and influence; but on the other hand it must ensure that all 
the functions will be competently performed. 
 14  Finally (Item 6) the chairperson should summarise the resolutions taken and agreed 
actions; and the (Item 7) a date must be set for the next meeting. 
 15  Set a high administrative standard from the beginning by preparing minutes without 
delay that accurately record the attendance, resolutions and required actions and 
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distribute them to all participants while the meeting is still fresh in their minds – 
ideally within 48 hours. Also establish a procedure whereby a Notice of Meeting and 
its Agenda and all the required supporting papers (including proposals, information 
and reports) are received by all participants no less than 7 days before each meeting. 
Participants should never be expected to discuss an issue without having received a 
proposal or the relevant information in advance so that it can be carefully considered 
and discussed within each party beforehand. 
 16 Finalise the appointment of all the roleplayers as quickly as possible, so that they are 
each briefed and equipped well before the next meeting. 
 
 STAGE 7 – ESTABLISHMENT   
Obtain agreement on the values and principles which will be used to anchor and guide the 
process towards achieving the agreed objective; on terms of reference for one or more 
committees; and on the initial research to be commissioned. 
Step  
  1 Prepare a proposal for the adoption of a few fundamental Values and Principles (See 
Chapter 11) on the basis of the broad objective agreed at the Inaugural meeting. Also 
prepare a Preliminary Project Programme (12-24 months) (Note 11) for consideration 
and adoption. Then identify the fundamental Research Questions (Note 12) that apply 
to this project and prepare a proposal for how and by whom such research should be 
commissioned and whether a Research Sub-Committee (Note 13) should be formed to 
supervise such process. The research must include all the information that will be 
required for the drafting of a comprehensive Business Plan. The research reports are 
likely to form the basis of discussion at a number of meetings. They must be sent to 
participants in advance, with the notice and agenda of the next meeting. 
  2 In order to build and maintain momentum in collaborative projects it is essential to 
have regular meetings, a regular flow of documentation to participants and regular 
progress reports, so that participants can report back confidently to their 
constituencies. Meetings must also be relevant, and therefore committees must be 
created for specific purposes when necessary. A Framework of Committees for a 
Collaboration is given below as Note 14. It would be constructive to propose draft 
Terms of Reference (Note 15) for each Committee before it is formed. These must be 
approved by all the participants and will guide the functioning of the Committee. It 
would also be wise to give the Committee a name, such as the ‘.................. Policy 
Committee’, in order to distinguish it from other committees.  
  3 It is essential to enable every participating organisation to really participate – to speak 
on subjects that interest them and to engage in meaningful activities. It is just as 
important to allow participants to complain, object and propose alternatives – and for 
those to be as respected and seriously considered as any other. Involve participants in 
sub-committees and in the drafting of proposals as much as possible. This maximises 
transparency and mutual ownership of the whole process. 
 
 STAGE 8 – RESEARCH    
Collaboratively research, analyse and report on key unknowns and their implications; achieve 
agreement on project content. 
Step  
  1 Convene the Research Committee, peruse the list of Research Questions and decide 
the order in which they must be addressed. Then decide how each item should be 
researched: by individuals or teams; and by committee members and their colleagues 
or by consultants – and if consultants are used who would contract, brief and 
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remunerate them? 
   2 When each item of research has been completed a draft report must be presented to 
the Research Committee for detailed consideration and review – until it is in a form 
that can be confidently recommended to the Policy Committee for approval. 
  3 Obtain the approval of each item of Research from the Policy Committee, which will 
then apply the information to its design of the overall project. 
 
 STAGE 9 – BUSINESS PLANNING    
Prepare a comprehensive Business Plan as an instrument to obtain the support and resources 
required to conduct detailed planning and implementation. 
Step  
  1 Compile into a document information about the challenge that is being faced, the 
stakeholders and their interests, the participants in the collaboration, the terms of 
reference of their highest level committee, and the overall objective, values and 
principles that have been agreed upon. 
  2 Add details about the process that has taken place and is proposed and of the progress 
that has been made. 
  3 Present the proposed overall programme, with milestones showing what is to be 
achieved by when, and state which party or person has overall responsibility for each 
function. 
  4 Identify all the projects or activities that can be separately managed and accounted 
for, which will make up the whole project.  
  5 Create an outline programme and budget for each of these projects or activities, 
together with a consolidated programme and budget, and a consolidated forecast of 
the requirements pertaining to each type of resource. 
  6 State from where each resource will be sought. 
  7 Conclude with a request for access to the required resources – e.g. by a formal project 
approval or allocation of resources (e.g. finance, land). 
 
 STAGE 10 – OBTAINING RESOURCES    
Obtain approval of the Business Plan by political, financial and other authorities, and an 
assurance that all the necessary resources will be made available. 
Step  
  1 Obtain detailed application requirements from potential resource providers and in 
drafting an application ensure that every one of those requirements is satisfied. 
  2 Find out what internal approval process is used by each resource provider, so that it 
will be possible to track progress and to also learn of and respond to any problems 
experienced. 
  3 Identify the key roleplayers within each organisation to which applications will be 
made, and make every effort to have each one briefed by a senior member of the 
collaboration before the application is submitted, so that they are expecting (and 
looking forward to) it. 
  4  Submit the application (including the Business Plan), delivering it by hand if possible, 
and inform the relevant role-players that it has been submitted and request reports on 
the application’s progress through the approval system. 
4 Respond immediately to any queries, negative feedback or mis-understandings. 
5 If the application is declined establish the reason without delay and try to rectify the 
situation while the issue is still alive and current. 
  7 If the application is accepted express appreciation to all the roleplayers and then 
attend to whatever contracts the resource provider may require, and to accounting and 
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reporting procedures. 
  8 Remember that contracting with a resource provider brings a new party into the 
collaboration, and with it an assortment of new role-players and connections, some of 
whom are likely to have their own agendas and ambitions which could complicate the 
work of the collaboration. Prudence and caution are recommended. 
 
 STAGE 11 – PROJECTS PLANNING      
Collaboratively plan individual projects in detail to obtain an allocation of resources and as a 
basis for procurement and contracts. The steps will be similar to those required for the overall 
project in Stages 7, 8 and 9 above, but will require much greater detail in stakeholder 
involvement, planning, technical design and implementation. 
 
 STAGE 12 – PROJECTS APPROVAL    
Obtain approval of each project and access to resources as they are required, applying the 
steps used in Stage 10 of the overall project. 
 
 STAGE 13 – IMPLEMENTATION   
Collaborative implementation of individual projects according to approved plans; and 
coordinated implementation of the project as a whole. Remember that collaboration at the 
scale of local projects that directly affect beneficiaries is the most important of all if they are 
to perceive themselves as owners of the products. 
 
 STAGE 14 – COMPLETION   
Achieve certified completion of every aspect of the project in terms of original approved 
plans and authorised amendments. 
Step  
  1 Learn from each resource provider or authority what its requirements are for 
certifying project completion, and agree upon an acceptable reporting format that will 
incorporate signatures by all responsible parties, including a representative of the 
resource provider or authority. This must include the requirements for certifying the 
completion of the entire project. 
  2 Brief project managers and project accountants on what is required and provide 
deadlines for providing the required information and certificates. 
  3 Compile and submit completion reports for each project in duplicate, and ensure that 
one copy of each is returned to you for the record, signed off by the resource provider 
or authority. 
  4 Compile and submit a completion report for the project as a whole, with an annexure 
listing all complete projects, what they delivered and when and by whom each 
completion report was signed off. 
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NOTES 
 
Note 1  BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
The histories of the stakeholders in the contemporary crisis, as well as the emotions and 
attitudes that have been fostered over time, must be at least taken seriously and respected. 
The wise aspiring Enabler will expect the roots of the crisis to be very complex, too complex 
to really understand, and will engage in much more listening than concluding. Furthermore, if 
the Enabler is a member of one of the stakeholder groups it is especially important (and 
difficult) to not assume that your perspective on history and on the current crisis is the 
‘correct’ one. Instead, an Enabler might do much good by laying aside (but not denying) a 
personal historical perspective in order to help others to create a shared future. 
 
To understand the roots of the crisis it is not necessary to become a history scholar – just do a 
bit of digging. Visit the library or archives and find the relevant histories and scan the 
newspapers for pictures and articles relating to particular events. Find some ordinary people 
who were spectators or victims at the time to tell their stories confidentially. Diverse 
stakeholders are likely to appreciate any trouble taken to understand ‘where they are coming 
from’, where they are at the moment, and the hopes and hindrances that they face for the 
future. The object at this stage is not to ‘solve the problem’ – but simply to become sensitive 
to the complexities, layers and dimensions of the crisis. 
 
 
Note 2  ENABLERS 
Enablers are individuals who, because of their position and relationships, formal and 
informal, are able to influence attitudes and affairs in favour of a collaborative process. 
 
The term ‘Enabler’ is a function, not a title. Some of these functions, such as patron, host, 
facilitator, chairperson and coordinator are formal and may be referred to in conversation or 
minutes. But others, such as initiators, bridge-builders, levers, friends, allies, associates and 
supporters may fulfil such functions very quietly and privately but be very influential and 
helpful in bringing an assortment of people together and then encouraging them to work 
together and move in the same direction. 
 
Some Enablers will be participants in the collaboration, but others may not be participants yet 
may be able to influence, support and encourage particular participants because of their 
relationship to them or authority over them. 
 
Enablers can be of any age or status, bearing in mind that the work of the collaboration will 
involve all sorts of people. So although the support of a powerful political leader would 
enable the work of the collaboration such support might be expressed only occasionally, 
whereas a good day-to-day working relationship between two field workers who are 
employed by opposing camps can be of huge benefit in the planning and implementation of 
the collaboration’s work. 
 
Therefore those who are primarily responsible for constructing and driving a collaboration 
must identify potential Enablers, consult them and keep them well-informed to fuel their 
commitment to the collaboration, and not hesitate to ask them for help. The more that 
Enablers can be involved and included in the process, especially informally, the more they 
will be able to contribute as Enablers. 
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At the opposing end of the spectrum there may be ‘Disablers’: people who would like to 
disable and destroy the collaboration in whole or in part. The Enablers can help to identify 
such threats and to devise creative strategies to counteract them. If the collaboration has been 
created to address a critical social issue it is likely to have broad public and political support, 
within which there may be many potential Enablers who can help to diffuse opposition. 
 
Read more about Enablers and enabling in Chapter 11. 
Read the Lessons for Enablers within the Notes and References at the back of this book. 
 
 
Note 3  CANVASSING BRIEF 
This is a document that specifies the terms which the proposing organisation offers to other 
parties as a basis for exploring the possibilities for collaborating to achieve a shared 
objective. It should also include a mandate for a specified person to represent the organisation 
in canvassing interest in the proposal. 
 
The essence of a collaborative project is that all the parties are given equal status in the 
decision-making processes, although the functions that they perform are likely to differ 
considerably. The approach by the proposing organisation must therefore be made in the 
following spirit:  
 
“There is widespread recognition that this particular [specified] set of problems must 
be addressed, but the members of my organisation have realised that they cannot 
achieve the required objective on their own. However there are other parties who 
could make valuable contributions to this process, and if we could all work together it 
might be possible to achieve success. Therefore we invite you to meet with us as 
equals to discuss the challenges that these problems present, define an objective that 
we can all share, and establish some acceptable principles that could guide a 
collaborative process. We are willing to host, administer and help to facilitate such a 
process and to contribute to the costs involved – but have no desire to dominate or 
control the initiative.  
 
Our proposal is that we invite all parties who have a stake in this issue to attend a 
meeting at a convenient place and time, at which we can each register the nature of 
our interest and what we might be able to contribute, and together agree on the broad 
project purpose. We should also consider what initial steps have to be taken to plan a 
project and organise an effective basis for moving ahead. We can also discuss 
possibilities of inviting any other parties to join us. There will be some procedural 
issues about how future meetings should be chaired, conducted, administered and 
recorded. We therefore suggest that the following items would comprise a sufficient 
agenda for the exploratory meeting, which I am willing to convene and chair”.  
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Note 4   DRAFT AGENDA FOR AN EXPLORATORY MEETING 
N.B. Only publish the bold print below – the remainder are explanations. 
 
Meeting to Explore the Creation of a Collaborative Development Process to Address the 




1. Welcome and introduction to the purpose of the meeting – the Chairperson 
2. Recognition of each party present – a representative of each party introduces the 
party and its delegates, explains their interest in the challenge being faced and 
indicates what kind of contribution they might be able to make. 
3. Agreement on the general objective to be achieved – recognising that the objective 
will be refined and detailed as time goes on. 
4. Consideration of the development process and the steps that should be 
anticipated – an understandable presentation of what is likely to be required for 
effective policy-making, planning, resourcing and implementation; and for the 
participation of all interested and affected parties in the process  - and a suggestion as 
to the nature of the first few steps. This must be discussed as a starting framework, not 
in detail, but with the objective of getting agreement to constitute a committee of 
representatives of all the organisations present and to agree on a proposed agenda for 
the next meeting. 
5. Meeting arrangements – the venue, frequency, times and dates, language and 
translation issues, any transport issues, catering requirements, arrangements for 
delivering notices, agendas and minutes. 
6. The facilitation of meetings – appointment of chairperson, secretary and 
administrator/facilitator, and the determination of how many delegates of each party 
may attend meetings. It may be wise to offer the possibility of an independent or 
rotating chairperson. It is recommended that a specific secretary and 
administrator/facilitator be agreed upon as soon as possible in order to anchor the 
essential administrative functions. 
7. Conclusion - summary of resolutions that have been taken, and of actions that are to 
be taken before the next meeting – the chairperson and secretary. 
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Note 5  RELATIONAL MAP 
Relational mapping attempts to illustrate who the main actors are at any time and to indicate 
which are associated with, related to or opposed to each other by the use of symbols. In 
situations where parties are polarised a Relational Map may be a useful tool for those who 
have to consider strategy. It may be helpful to use such diagrams to illustrate from time to 
time which parties are binding together or pulling apart, recognising also that alliances can 
also destroy a wider collaboration if they adopt a different agenda... Some symbols that can 
be used are shown below: 






As an illustration: In 1990 tensions were very high in and around the informal settlement of 
Crossroads, Cape Town. The above symbols were used to construct a Relationship Map in 
Chapter 4 which is reproduced below: 
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Here is what the above Relationship Map aims to illustrate: 
 
“The right hand side of the diagram shows the State’s establishment: responsibility had been 
delegated to the provincial government, which also administered the Black Local Authorities 
– and shown here is the Crossroads Town Council and its neighbouring Ikapa Town Council 
(for the ‘townships’ of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) and the Council for the massive new 
‘city’ of Khayelitsha. Those in power within the Crossroads remnant had been co-opted into 
the Crossroads Town Council. Their leader was installed as mayor - he was also an office-
bearer in WCUSA – the association of squatter leaders. 
 
Crossroads was not the only squatter settlement with autocratic leaders – a number of the 
groups who had entered Crossroads and later fled as refugees into previously uninhabited 
areas were led by autocrats, and these also joined WCUSA. However, those refugees who 
settled in open spaces within existing formal townships and within hostel complexes relied on 
support from the leaders of the neighbourhood, most of whom were associated with civic 
movements and therefore with the United Democratic Front (UDF). They as a body were 
implacably opposed to the State and all its repressive manifestations and to any allies of the 
State, whom they regarded as ‘sell-outs’. Between all of these refugee settlements was a 
cautious, competitive relationship. They each wanted to receive priority in any possible 
housing project and were willing to fight for it.”  
 
Note 6. CANVASSING PROGRAMME 
This can provide an overall guide to the order in which parties are to be canvassed, and then 
be used to create a record of when meetings were held and when the Canvassing Report for 
each has been completed. Creating this table in ‘landscape’ format would permit more data 
about representatives – e.g. titles and contact details. 
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Note 7  CANVASSING REPORT FORM 
 
Name of Organisation  
Nature and function of Organisation  
Senior representative’s name 
 phone numbers and e-mail addresses 
 
Date of meeting  
Present at meeting  
Initial reception received by us  
Their response to proposal  
Issues raised by them  
Their relationships to other parties  
Agreed actions by them  
Agreed actions by us  
Arrangements for next contact  
 
The above form is just a framework. Use a separate form for each organisation, and utilise as 
much space and as many lines as you require to capture as much information as possible. 
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Note 8  INVITATION 
Invitations to the Inaugural Meeting should ideally be delivered by hand and by the 
Canvasser, thereby ensuring that the invitation reaches the right person with an explanation 
that it results from the earlier discussions. The invitation must be signed by the Patron, and 
printed on the Patron’s stationery. The message should be brief, along lines such as those 
shown below: 
 







I have pleasure in inviting you and your colleagues to join me in a discussion to begin 
exploring the possibility of addressing the challenge of ................................. in a 
collaborative manner. 
 
The meeting will be held on ......................... (date) at ........................ (time) at  
........................ (venue).  
 
A simple agenda accompanies this letter. 
 
In order to ensure that there is room for everyone I request that each party limits their 
delegation to ...... (four?) people.  
 
RSVP to .............................. at tel:................................ or  
e-mail: ............................. by 16h00 on ......................  (date), kindly providing the names of 
your delegates. 
 
I look forward to our meeting. 
Yours sincerely, 
.............................. (signature)   
                             
[Remember to include  the agenda!] 
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Note 9  ATTENDANCE LIST 
This is a list of all the parties expected to attend the meeting and the names of each party’s 
delegates, compiled from the responses received to the invitation. The parties must be listed 
in alphabetical order, with no suggestion of any hierarchy. The list will be used for the 
registration of all attendees as they come to the reception table inside the entrance to the 
venue (as described in Stage 6 Step 8). Copies of this list must also be given to the Patron, 
Champion, Secretary and Interpreter, if any, before the meeting – and to the administrators to 
enable them to seat people without difficulty. 
 
EXPLORATORY MEETING ........................ (date) 
ATTENDANCE LIST – IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF ORGANISATION 
 
Each attendee is requested to initial this list next to his/her name. Replace or correct 



















Note 10  ATTENDANCE REGISTER 
This table is to be circulated during the meeting, for completion by every attendee, including 
administrators. This will be the formal record of attendance, attached to the minutes of the 
meeting, so make every effort to ensure that it is properly completed. The details of at least 
Organisation and Names will be recorded in the minutes of the meeting. It should be printed 









ORGANISATION Tel/Cell e-mail 
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Note 11 PRELIMINARY PROJECT PROGRAMME 
Some of the biggest challenges to be overcome in a cross-sector collaborative project are 
unrealistic expectations by participants about how quickly the process will take and what will 
be delivered. Once they have made incorrect or inappropriate statements or promises to their 
constituents about how and when they will benefit it is very difficult for them to withdraw 
them – and huge tensions are likely to result. To avoid such problems it is essential that 
participants be provided at the earliest opportunity with an idea of what has to be done and 
how long it might take. 
 
Stages 7-14 of the project process provide a framework for this, and for the purposes of 
drawing up a Programme they can be re-named as Phases 1-8. What is required is a 
comprehensive but simple list of the required activities, how long each might take, and on 
that basis when they could be expected to start and end. Technical personnel can use 
sophisticated methods to draw programmes, e.g. using Gantt Charts and software such as MS 
Project, and should be encouraged to do so to ensure that all factors are taken into account. 
But it is important that all participants, many of whom may neither understand or need the 
technical details, receive regular up-dates of the project programme in a format that they can 
all understand and be able to communicate accurately to their constituencies. 
 
The table overleaf provides an example of a basic Programme Outline that can be modified to 
suit circumstances but kept simple enough to be easily understood by all. Of course its 
contents must be changed to reflect the particular project and must be regularly updated and 
made available to all parties. It could be sophisticated by showing the start and end dates for 
each sub-phase, incorporating overleaps where they are expected; and it could be simplified 
for more general use be eliminating the sub-phase column and periods altogether. 
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Sample Format for Preliminary Project Programme 
 
PHASE SUB-PHASE PERIOD START-END 
1 Establish-
ment   








































Prelim Town Planning 
Prelim Engineering 
Detailed Planning and Engineering 
designs and approvals 




































 ENTIRE PROCESS 3 years & 2 months 
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Note 12 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
When any project process commences there are all sorts of unknown details – questions that 
have to be answered in order to make planning possible. Some parties in a collaboration may 
not realise the extent of the unknown factors, and it is really helpful for them and necessary 
for the process as a whole to take the trouble to list all the main questions that have to be 
asked. This will produce the Research Agenda that will have to be tackled by a team or 
committee created for that purpose. 
 
For example, here are some quite general research questions that collaborators are likely to 
want answered: 
 
Identify the target market: Who is to benefit from this project - generally and precisely? 
The ‘general market’ might be people who live in a particular area, but the ‘precise market’ 
will require a detailed boundary of the area, details of any categories of people that will not 
be eligible and the required qualifications of people who are eligible. Details of the eligible 
residents will then be required: how many of them, their names, identity numbers, addresses 
and relevant details of their age, education level, sex, employment, skills, etc. 
 
Group consultations: How will we involve the intended beneficiaries in the research? 
This is usually a fundamentally important aspect of collaboration – to involve the 
beneficiaries themselves as much as possible in the research, and thereafter in also the 
planning and implementation. That can be achieved by a number of means, such as training 
teams of community researchers; interviewing residents in small groups; creating a 
questionnaire for every resident or person to respond to; and creating a number of discussion 
forums. The objective is two-fold: to obtain accurate information and to start getting 
beneficiaries involved, to the extent that it really becomes their project. 
 
Establish demand/need: What do the various Stakeholders require from the project? 
This will require accurate and inclusive research of all stakeholder groups, using a standard 
questionnaire, so that the responses can be aggregated and reported upon. In order to 
maximise stakeholder ownership they should be given as much freedom to express their own 
opinions and choices as possible. 
 
Prioritise issues: In what order of importance or urgency should the requirements be met?  
In order to get useful answers to this question the questionnaires must ask respondents to 
record their needs in order of importance. It is very possible that some of the needs might not 
be those for which the project was originally conceptualised. If these are a high priority 
serious attention must be given to accommodating them within the project. If this is not 
possible then every effort should be made to have those needs met in a different project, 
perhaps managed by completely different agencies in conjunction with the community 
representatives. 
 
Seek resources e.g. land: How much of each resource is required, from where can it be 
acquired and upon what terms? 
There is no point in starting to plan a project if some key resources are completely 
unavailable for any reason. List the major resources required, plus any special resources that 
may be in short supply, all with their detailed specifications– and then investigate how 
available they will be at the time when they are likely to be required for the project. 
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Rough estimates:  What are the estimated total costs for various aspects of the project? 
This information is required as early as possible in the process so that those who have 
responsibility for financing the project can obtain an idea of the likely costs involved and can 
begin to canvass possibilities for such funding. 
 
Note 13 RESEARCH SUB-COMMITTEE 
This is a team of people who have the necessary skills to obtain the answers to the Research 
Questions by personal investigation, designing questionnaires and surveys, training 
researchers, managing the research process and controlling its quality and then analysing and 
reporting on the results. Such items should be recorded in the committee’s terms of reference. 
 
Care should be taken in choosing the committee members to allow each stakeholders to 
nominate a suitable person who can represent them. In a committee of mixed experiences and 
talents everyone will learn new facts, techniques and perspectives which will enrich the 
whole process. Parties that represent communities should be allowed to nominate specialists 
from their support NGOs if they wish – but that should preferably be as a supporter to a 
community person for whom committee membership will be a very enriching experience. 
 
The Research Committee can, of course, be called by another name if it is desired. Its 
duration is likely to end as soon as it has submitted its final report on the Research Questions, 
but it will have played a very important role. 
 
The nature of functions to be fulfilled by individuals will depend upon the work to be done, 
the skills required and the extent to which they can be fulfilled by employees of participants 
in the collaboration. Every function must have clear responsibilities, the required authority 
and real accountability. 
 
The terms of reference for any such committee are outlined below in Note 15. 
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Note 14  A FRAMEWORK OF COMMITTEES FOR A COLLABORATION 
For each function in the process of collaborative development the table below suggests a type 
of committee, the phases during which it should operate, to what the committee and its 





Structure name Steering Committee 
Applicable phases All 
Accountable to Participating organisations 
Responsible for Achieving overall objective 
   
Community 
Consultation 
Committee name Consultative Forum 
Applicable phases All 
Accountable to Stakeholder communities 
Responsible for Communication and consultation 





Committee name Technical  Committee 
Applicable phases Preparatory phase 
Accountable to Steering Committee 






Committee name Technical  Committee 
Applicable phases Planning; Implementation 
Accountable to Steering Committee 
Responsible for Commissioning and coordinating 






Committee name Project Committees 
Applicable phases Planning 
Accountable to Project stakeholders and Technical 
Committee 







Committee name Project Committees 
Applicable phases Implementation 
Accountable to Project stakeholders and Technical 
Committee 
Responsible for Implementing one project 
collaboratively 




Committee name Coordination Committee 
Applicable phases Planning; Implementation 
Accountable to Steering Committee 
Responsible for Coordinating the activities of the 
collaboration as a whole to achieve the 
overall objectives 
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Note 15  TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A COMMITTEE 
Every committee should have a ‘Terms of Reference’, which is a document which sets out 
the reason for the committee’s creation, its purpose, how its members are to be selected, and 
how it will function. A simple framework for a Terms of Reference is shown below: 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE .................... .................. COMMITTEE 
 
The parties who have signed this document have agreed to embark on the development of 
............ and have therefore created the ............. ................ Committee for the purpose of 
............................. for the development of ................... 
 
The membership of the Committee shall comprise two representatives from each of the 
following parties:  ......................................   ..........................................  
.....................................  ...................... 
 
Decisions of the Committee shall be made by consensus. 
 
A Chairperson for the Committee shall be appointed from time to time by the members. 
 
The Committee shall appoint a Secretary, who shall make arrangements for meetings and 
provide the members with notices, agendas and minutes of meetings. 
 
The Committee shall meet monthly, or as required by agreement of the members, or as 
decided by the Chairperson in response to a request by at least two members. 
 
Signed at ...........................................................(place)   on ............................... (date)  [all 
members sign] 
 




CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES IN THE iSLP 
 
This annexure contains a brief summary of some of the 55 capacity-building programmes that 
were embarked upon in the iSLP, selected to provide an indication of the diversity of skills 
training that was offered. As explained in Chapter 10, these programmes were designed, 
requested and then managed by service departments within local and provincial government, 
usually with the aid of service providers such as NGOs. 
.  
Peace Training in Schools  An initiative to combat the impact of violence in schools 
resulted in the establishment of Peace Clubs at sixteen iSLP schools. In these clubs strategies 
and plans were worked out to combat violence in schools and to devise ways of creating 
tolerance for diverse cultures. It was managed by the Department of Social Services. 
 
Babies Need Books   A literacy intervention programme in Guguletu, Crossroads and 
Browns Farm was aimed at breaking the cycle of deprivation in which illiterate parents 
compromise their children’s ability to gain basic skills by not exposing them to books at an 
early stage. It encouraged parents to bring their nine-month-old babies to clinics where they 
were given a first reader starter pack. Included in the pack was a voucher to collect one book 
from participating libraries in the project. 
 
Network of Nutritional Services in Southern Delft  A network designed to improve the 
health status of people, especially pregnant mothers and children, and to equip beneficiary 
organisations with skills to be able to apply for nutritional development finance from the 
Department of Health. 
 
Home-Based Carer Training – Provision of  care and support to the sick and terminally ill 
through the training of home-based carers in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, 
Driftsands, Philippi East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park. 
 
Community Health Worker Project  This raised awareness about issues of gender; 
developed leadership skills and inter-cultural understanding for the management of conflict 
by focusing on women in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi 
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East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park. 
 
Integrated Management of ChildhoodIillnesses  An integrated strategy was designed and 
implemented to promote health in homes and in communities using media programmes and 
training in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi East, Guguletu, 
Tambo Square and Polla Park. 
 
Emergency Services Volunteers   Training was given in order to establish a capable 
volunteer paramedical corps in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, 
Philippi East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park. 
 
Training for the National Diploma in Emergency Medical Care Project  This was 
provided for 2 iSLP community members in each of Philippi East, Crossroads, Southern 
Delft, Guguletu and Langa. 
 
Information Technology (IT) Technician Training for Matriculated Youths - IT skills 
were offered through an international course, and placement in jobs for youth from Philippi 
East, Crossroads, Southern Delft, Guguletu and Langa. 
 
Formation of Sports Structures  This programme established a stakeholders group and 
trained 3 groups from the target areas in sports leadership and general business skills, leading 
to better run sports clubs and employment opportunities in Guguletu, Langa Nyanga, Philippi 
East and Crossroads. 
 
Leadership Training of Volunteers for ‘Come and Play’ Programme  This provided skills 
to unemployed people to expand or revitalise existing programmes taking place in the 
community and build a strong, sustainable community-based volunteer group which can work 
with the ‘Come and Play’ programme to extend the City of Cape Town Administration’s 
Sport and Recreation development network in Guguletu, Philippi East, Browns Farm, Langa, 
Nyanga, Guguletu, Weltevreden Valley, KTC, Crossroads and Southern Delft. 
 
Certificate of Youth Trainers – A training course was provided for a selected group of the 
‘Come and Play’ volunteers to further their skills in working with young people. 
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Training Volunteers Linked to TB/HIV Pilot Project  This programme offered improved 
HIV/AIDS/STD and TB care and referral in Langa. The project ensured continuity of care 
and increased access to voluntary counselling and testing. It also provided prophylactic 
therapy to HIV positive patients. 
 
Training Tenants in Business Management Skills at the SBDC Hive  This provided 
training for the transformation of the old small business ‘hive’ in Philippi East to become a 
catalyst for development of small business job creation. 
 
Residents’ Education in Council Services – ‘Masiphakameni’ – This programme enabled 
residents to understand the services provided by the City and to measure the impact of service 
delivery in Weltevreden Valley, Philippi East, KTC, Browns Farm and Millers Camp. The 
number and type of complaints were measured and the programme helped to increase 
payment levels  
 
Involvement of Local Communities in Management and Optimal Use of Public Facilities  
This improved facility management by educating local community in the better utilisation of 
resources provided by the City in Weltevreden Valley, Philippi East, KTC, Browns Farm and 
Millers Camp. 
 
Arts and Cultural Baseline Survey  This survey identified programmes of interest to the 
community with a view to building capacity and developing the youth in Millers Camp, KTC, 
Philippi East, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa and Crossroads. 
 
Housing Resale Pamphlet This pamphlet informed residents about proper sale procedures 
and to point out the disadvantages of selling their properties. This was issued throughout the 
iSLP. 
 
‘Masimanyane’ Peoples Housing Process  Technical support was provided in the form of 
the services of a Xhosa-speaking quantity surveyor to assist in the self-building project in 
Browns Farm, and the provision of training in bricklaying. 
 
Khanya Arts and Culture  This programme provided training in administration and 
management to ensure sustainability of community performing arts organisations in Philippi 
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East, Guguletu, Langa and Weltevreden Valley. 
 
Needs Assessment Workshop This empowered community-based organisations to undertake 
a community profile and needs assessment in Weltevreden Valley and Brown’s Farm. 
 
Community Based Organisation Training   Training was given in fund raising techniques 
and proposal writing. A mentorship period followed the training. 
 
‘Qinga’ Peoples Housing Process  This training helped people to build their own homes and 
to assist others in Heinz Park, Browns Farm, Lower Crossroads and Nyanga. 
 
Skills and Business Training  This programme provided economic empowerment through 
skills and business training. 
 
Basic Financial Record Keeping for Principals and Treasurers of Pre-schools This 
programme promoted improved financial management of pre-schools in Southern Delft, 
Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi K. 
 
Basic Financial Record Keeping and Foundational Capacities for School Governing 
Bodies  Each of these courses comprised two phases, and improved the financial 
management of schools in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, 
Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi K. 
 
Capacity Building for Adult Based Education and Training (ABET)  Management, 
business and administration programmes were provided at Community Learning Centres in 
Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and 
Philippi East. 
 
ECD Needs Analysis  This programme analysed the needs of community pre-school teachers 
in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and 
Philippi. 
 
ECD Training of Pre-school Teachers   This training improved the standard of teaching in 
community pre-schools. 
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Representative Council of Learners  This programme provided learners with skills 
necessary to usefully contribute to the governance of their schools through their 
Representative Council of Learners. 
 
Training of school caretakers  this programme improved the skills of school caretakers in 
order to better maintain the schools and thus be more cost effective. 
 
Buildsmart  A not-for-gain company was established  to assist and support community 
builders. 
 
Building Environment Empowerment Project  This programme rained selected labourers 
in building skills and in labour and project supervision using Department of Works projects 
in the iSLP as the training ground. 
 
Procurement Management Programme This provided emerging contractors with training 
for effective tendering for construction projects in Southern Delft. 
 
Establishment of Community Structures  This programme established  representative 
community structures in Southern Delft, and included a team building retreat. 
 
Home Ownership Campaign  This educated residents about rights and obligations of home 
ownership in Southern Delft and Delft Leiden. 
 
Dispute Resolution Service This enabled the Southern Delft community to establish an 
integrated dispute resolution service to serve the community and assist the local authority in 
this area. 
 
Leather craft and Sewing Skills   This was a training programme for a group in Southern 
Delft in order to develop useful and marketable skills - which included basic business skills 
to enable the participants to sell their wares more effectively. 




A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOUSING FOR BLACK PEOPLE 
IN CAPE TOWN UNTIL 1970 
 
Discriminatory housing practices in Cape Town    F1 
The first black townships       F2 
Apartheid Cape Town        F4 
The new enforcers        F7 
 
This annexure offers a brief summary of the historical background to the iSLP case study as a 
prelude to the history of Crossroads recorded in Chapter 4. The reader would be wise to 
ponder and try to imagine a little of what the narrative represents in order to appreciate the 
strength of attitudes and emotions that were accumulating. 
 
South Africa’s social history is dominated by issues of ‘race’, the classification of 
which was, particularly under apartheid legislation, based upon four primary descriptors: 
Indian, white, coloured and black, with enormous implications for every person within a very 
segregated and discriminatory society.i
 
 In the historical sections of this thesis (Chapters 4 
to11) the use of some of this terminology is unavoidable, with ‘black’ denoting indigenous 
Bantu-speaking peoples; and ‘coloured’ referring to people of ‘mixed race’, predominantly 
consequent upon the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by Europeans from 1652. 
Coloured people comprised the largest segment of Cape Town’s population until the end of 
the 20th century, when the black population overtook them. 
Discriminatory housing practices in Cape Town 
 
When the Dutch began creating a permanent settlement near the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 
the residents of the region were the Khoikhoi, nomadic herdsman who showed no interest in 
working for the settlers. Furthermore, the Dutch East India Company prohibited the slavery 
of local inhabitants and therefore imported slaves from countries that fringed the Indian 
Ocean, particularly Madagascar, East Africa, India and the East Indies. Slavery was the 
source of almost all ‘labour’ until the 1830s. Although the British, who governed the Cape 
from 1805, banned the slave trade in 1807, the practice was not abolished in its Cape Colony 
until 1834 after which freed slaves were required to work as ‘apprentices’ for another four 
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years. Consequently very few indigenous black people lived in Cape Town during the city’s 
first 180 years. 
 
Historical records suggest that it was only in the 1830s that the first black residents of 
the Eastern Cape began to move to Cape Town, some fleeing from the Frontier Wars in 1834-
35. The first record of a settlement is of a small community of some 20 – 40 people who 
“lived in 6 or 8 huts … near the foot of Table Mountain” in 1839 ii. In the1865 census, out of 
Cape Town’s total population of 28 400 iii there were about 700 black persons living in Cape 
Town, apart from those imprisoned on Robben Island iv. By 1900 of the city’s total 
population of 160 000 there were about 1 500 black dock-workers living in the harbour 
barracks, plus 8 000 living in very overcrowded and unhygienic conditions in District Six 
who worked primarily as labourers but also as office messengers and cleaners. v
 
 
The first black townships 
 
By 1900 racial segregation was practiced in government hospitals and schools and by 
private employers. Fears of a “black invasion” circulated. The Prime Minister of the Cape, 
WP Schreiner, asserted that black people did not really belong in Cape Town, even though 
the city needed their labour. The idea of establishing ‘compounds’ of single quarters to 
control black workers, as had been done on the diamond and gold mines, was increasingly 
suggested vi, and in 1900 a government commission recommended that such a facility be 
established on Uitvlugt, a state farm near Maitland, about 8kms from the city centre. vii
 
 
An opportunity to implement this plan arose that year when bubonic plague broke out 
in Cape Town. It was carried by the rats that inhabited the hay that had been imported from 
Argentina to feed horses used by the British troops in the Boer War. Because black dock 
workers were the first to contract the deadly disease they were blamed for its transmission 
and health legislation was used to forcibly relocate black residents of District 6 to a barbed 
wire enclosed ‘native location’ at Uitvlugt, soon re-named Ndabeni. Accommodation there 
comprised five big corrugated iron huts, each sleeping 500 men, plus 615 unlined lean-to 
corrugated iron huts approximately 6m by 4m in floor area, each accommodating 8 people, 
together with a small number of tents. There was no privacy, cooking and ablution facilities 
were inadequate and there were initially no floors, resulting in flooding in winter. Rent of 10 
shillings a month was charged.viii 
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In 1902 the Native Reserve Locations Act was passed by the Cape government, which 
empowered the state to force black urban dwellers to live in locations, excluding only 
domestic servants, registered voters (who were very few, because of the high income earning 
and property ownership qualifications) and those with special permission. In 1910 the Union 
of South Africa was established, followed rapidly by a string of legislation that controlled the 
accommodation and movement of black people. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 
required that all black residents of urban areas throughout the country be segregated in 
locations and that controls be exercised over the movements of black people to towns and 
cities - “influx control” had arrived.ix Black urban work-seekers required a permit, which 
expired after a short period, after which the person could be ordered to leave town. An 
employer of a black person had to register the employment contract and pay a fee. Only black 
people who owned land, were on the voters role, or who were chiefs, clergymen, or (in some 
cases) teachers were exempt the registration provisions.x The Natives (Urban Areas) 
Amendment Act of 1937 specified that no black person could acquire land outside the rural 
reserves, except from another black person.xi
 
 
Labourers were much in demand in Cape Town during the First World War and 
Ndabeni grew rapidly. By 1920 it was indescribably filthy and derelict. It was transferred by 
the government to the Cape Town municipality, which soon came under pressure for the land 
to be used for industrial purposes as it adjoined the new ‘garden city’ of Pinelands. So in 
1926 Ndabeni was closed down and its residents forcibly removed to a new township, Langa 
(meaning ‘sun’ - and also an abbreviation for Langalibalele, a Hlubi chief who had led an 
uprising against the British in Natal in 1875). Langa was designed for control by the 
authorities and migrant worker hostels were separated from each other by very high fences 
with only one point of access. Trading, gatherings, dances, etc. were all subject to the 
permission of the superintendent.xii By 1938 the housing in Langa was full, and the lack of 
housing for black urban dwellers in the Western Cape had become a social and political 
crisis. The government commissioned eight three-storey hostels in Langa, which were 
completed by 1945. xiii
 
 
Cape Town expanded through the creation of new local authorities which serviced 
suburbs but were not well-equipped to impose influx control measures. Consequently 
shantytowns of black (and coloured) people proliferated, particularly after the Second World 
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War was declared when the increased demand for labour in Cape Town resulted in a 
relaxation of the pass laws. After the war, however, influx control was re-imposed with a 
vengeance, including railway authorities in the Eastern Cape being authorised to prevent 
black persons from travelling to Cape Town and a requirement that Cape Town employers 
pay for their black employees to return to their rural homes at the end of their contracts. xiv
 
  
In 1948 the ‘Old Location’ of Nyanga (‘moon’) was opened and the first 210 four -
roomed houses became available for a weekly rental of seven shillings and sixpence - fifteen 
times the going charge of sixpence for a shack in a shantytown xv. In that year about 80% of 
Cape Town’s black population lived outside of the townships, mainly in shantytowns.xvi
 
  
Apartheid Cape Town 
 
In 1950 apartheid legislation began to be introduced by the recently-elected National 
Party government. This included the Population Registration Act, which officially divided 
South Africans into four racial groups and became the vehicle for implementing broad scale 
segregation, and the Group Areas Act, which was used to create racially-based residential 
areas, invariably requiring forced removals. The Group Areas Board designated group areas, 
and ‘disqualified’ people were given notice that they would be removed to alternative 
accommodation, whenever it should become available. In Cape Town it predominantly 
affected coloured people, but hundreds of black persons were also forcibly relocated. Barren 
‘buffer areas’ were created to separate ‘non-white’ residential areas from white suburbs as 
well as highways.  
 
In 1952 more racist legislation followed. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
required local authorities to set up emergency camps in which to control squatters, and 
authorised the demolition of shacks without offering alternative accommodation. The 
government refused to allow the Cape Town City Council to erect family housing in Langa 
and instead ordered it to build 70 more single sex barracks to cater for 17 000 male black 
migrant workers.xvii Further legislation permitted black men and women to stay only 3 days 
in an urban area seeking work. Only black males who could prove that they had been born in 
the urban area or had lived there continuously for at least 15 years, or had worked for one 
employer for 10 years, were given the right of permanent residence (‘Section 10 status’) - 
which they could share with their wives and children. Furthermore the Natives (Abolition of 
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Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act required every black man over the age of 16 to 
carry a reference book with a photograph - the hated ‘dompas’. Pass raids against ‘illegals’ 
became the order of the day, and those caught (who amounted to more than 18 000 men and 6 
000 women just between 1954 and 1962) were ‘endorsed out’ of Cape Townxviii 
 
and returned 
to what the government termed their ‘native reserves’ or ‘homelands’ in the Eastern Cape, 
hundreds of kilometres away. 
In 1954 Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, then Minister for Native Affairs, declared the Western 
Cape to be a ‘Coloured Labour Preference Area’. No one could employ a black person if a 
coloured person was available to do the job. Influx control came to be applied more harshly 
in Cape Town than anywhere else in the country. xixThe Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr 
Werner Eiselen, drew a line near the Fish River in the Eastern Cape and declared that only 
black people who possessed Section 10 rights would be allowed to live to the west of it.xx In 
1958 the Native Affairs Department (NAD), which had become almost a ‘state within a 
state’, was re-named the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) as part of a centralising exercise to 
implement influx control more effectively than was being achieved by local authorities, some 
of which, like Cape Town and Johannesburg, were controlled by the opposition United Party 
and had not cooperated with the NAD. The BAD proceeded to engage in a long and 
protracted struggle to wrest control of ‘native affairs’ from local authorities.xxi
 
 
The second phase of Nyanga location had been completed in 1953, comprising 700 
semi-detached family units for black households whose shacks had been demolished. Then in 
1958 a new township was established at Nyanga West, which became known as Guguletu 
(‘our pride’). All houses there were designed so that they could be converted into single 
quarters. For many families their ‘home’ comprised no more than one bed.
xxiii
xxii In 1959 Dr 
Verwoerd, now Prime Minister, announced that apartheid had been succeeded by the 
supposedly ‘non-racist’ policy of ‘separate development’ in terms of which black people 
would live in Bantustans and urbanisation would be stemmed.  In 1960 the government 
infamously demonstrated its determination by shooting protesters at Sharpeville in the 
Witwatersrand, establishing a state of emergency, banning political parties whose members 
were predominantly non-white and jailing their leaders for long terms. Locally, the 
government divided the Cape Peninsula into two ‘proclaimed areas’ for the administration of 
black people. One included Nyanga and was administered by the Divisional Council and 
northern municipalities (all National Party controlled); and the other included Langa and 
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Guguletu and was administered by Cape Town Municipality (controlled by the opposition 
United Party). Black persons were supposed to work only within the proclaimed area in 
which their township was located, and had to obtain permission to visit family or friends in 
the other area.xxiv
 
 The persecution of black urban dwellers, even those with permits, was 
inexorable. 
From 1965, as a strategy by government to interrupt employment service and avoid 
additional awards of permanent residence, Black persons in the Western Cape were required 
to return to their homeland at the end of each contract period and from there re-apply for their 
work. By the late 1960s those who were endorsed out of Cape Town were sent to 
‘resettlement camps’ in the Eastern Cape, sometimes located near artificially-created, 
unsustainable industrial areas. Furthermore, the Bantu Affairs Department was given the right 
to remove anyone’s Section 10 rights if they were deemed to be ‘idle’ or ‘undesirable’. In 
spite of this, official figures show that the black population of Cape Town rose from 
approximately 70 000 in 1960 to 250 000 in 1974.xxv
Map 1 below shows in diagrammatic form the location of townships that had been 
constructed by 1960. 
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